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This thesis takes an ethnographic focus on the beliefs, rituals, and lived realties of 
practicing Iraqi Shi’is in London in order to theorise an alternative conception of intra-
communal sectarianism. Eschewing primordialist or essentialist understanding of 
sectarianism as a natural product of underlying ethno-religious “sects”, the thesis 
simultaneously seeks to distance itself from any kind of normative characterisation of 
sectarianism as a necessarily “bad” thing. Rather, the term “sectarianism” as defined and 
applied throughout this thesis should be understood as a fundamentally descriptive 
category; one that highlights processes of identity formation and mobilisation in which 
certain kinds of in- and out-group identity boundaries are prioritised over others.   
 
Drawing on insights garnered from psychoanalysis, particularly the work of scholars 
such as Jacques Lacan, this thesis puts forward an understanding of sectarianism that 
sees it as the unconscious by-product of positive identity formation. Crucially, the 
theoretical framework employed here distinguishes analytically and conceptually 
between the individual and the subject, whereby the latter denotes the subject of 
discourse. Such a framework allows the thesis to enquire into the construction, function, 
and (re)iteration of the discursively-formed sectarianised diasporic “Shi’a subject” as a 
product of individual and collective practices of identification. It is this Shi’a subject that 
forms the core of the enquiry conducted here. 
 
Ultimately, the thesis makes the case that the sectarianised diasporic Shi’a subject 
functions as an ideological construction that is simultaneously the product of 
contemporary discursive and political alignments and that channels the desires and 
attachments of individuals by promoting (re)iterative practices of identification. In this 
sense, the notion of a coherent and stable “Shi’a identity” functions as an ideological 
fantasy that channels the desire of individuals to identify with this subject at the same 
time as it unconsciously produces sectarianism as the by-product of such identity 
practices through its inscription in the contemporary (ideological) power structures of 
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A Note on Transliteration 
  
The transliteration of Arabic and Persian words in this thesis is based on a simplified 
version of the system recommended by the International Journal of Middle East Studies 
(IJMES). I employ IJMES’s transliteration of consonants and vowels but omit all diacritics, 
except the mark for ayn which is denoted by (‘). Exceptions to these rules are names of 
individuals and places where an English version is widely accepted, including the name 
“Hussain” and all derivations (hussainiyya, hussaniyyat, etc.). Words transliterated from 
Arabic or Persian are italicised, except titles of individuals and the months of the Islamic 
calendar. In cases where a word has entered common parlance in English, the 
recommended IJMES spelling is used unless covered by one of the exceptions mentioned 
above.  
 
Regarding the use of “Shi’a” and “Shi’i”: although grammatically in Arabic the former 
denotes the collective noun and the latter the adjective, throughout this thesis I have 
employed the common usage of these terms in English, whereby “Shi’a” denotes both the 
collective and singular noun (“Shi’a diaspora”, “Shi’a establishment”) and “Shi’i” serves 
an adjectival function (“Iraqi Shi’i person”). This serves the purpose of both simplifying 
my use of these terms, and distinguishing between individual practicing Shi’is and the 
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I woke up when I was just a young boy, 
And saw that life’s not what it seems. 
I realised long ago, 
It’s a dream within a dream. 
I remember when father once held my hand, 
Told me a story about a faraway land, 
Land of hope, land of mystery, 
The land I never got to see. 
 
Son,  he said, “Don’t ever stop fighting  
For what you truly believe, 
Let her set your heart and soul free, 
Breath the air she has to give, 
She’s the one that will help you dream, 
With her sun and gracious beam.” 
Land of my forefathers’ history, 
The land I never got to see. 
 
Father, why then did you leave her, 
The land of your birth? 
Why did they all mistreat her? 
With poison distort her earth? 
I often wish you were present to see,  
How they betray her whilst her sons flee, 
Land of sorrow, land of misery, 
The land I never got to see. 
 
She cries, “son can you help me? 
Your father, he abandoned me.” 
I weep, I’m just lost here, 
I don’t know where I’m meant to be. 
They say: “Boy, don’t loose your identity, 
Remember who and what you’re supposed to be, 
Part of a distorted community 
Of the land I never got to see. 
 
She was once the endless beauty of time  
Now… she’s a dying rose 
Lost her elegance, vibrancy, and charm, 
Broken by life’s endless blows. 
Times of Babylon and the golden gate, 
Wiped away by ravage and by hate. 
Savaged throughout history, 
The land I never got to see. 
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It is in the realm of experience inaugurated by psychoanalysis that we may grasp 
along what imaginary lines the human organism, in the most intimate recesses of 
its being, manifests its capture in a symbolic dimension. 
 
JACQUES LACAN 
Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’ (1955), Écrits, Vol. 1 
 
 
On 10 May, 2013, a protest march against the Syrian government held on London’s 
Edgware Road turned violent when (Sunni) demonstrators began attacking (Shi’a) 
passers-by on the street. 1  In a YouTube video of the incident posted later that day 
entitled “Muslims fight Muslims in brutal clash on London streets”, angry protesters can 
be seen carrying  placards reading “Jihad today, Khilafa tomorrow”, as well as images of 
Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad, former Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and 
spiritual leader of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah superimposed with the words “The Shi’a 
Enemies of Allah and Muhammad”.2 Five men were later convicted of assault for their 
involvement in the violence.3 
 
This incident is indicative of a perceived rise in intra-communal antagonism amongst 
Sunni and Shi’a Muslims in the UK over the past few years. Indeed, several recent media 
articles have drawn attention to this trend, with sensationalist references to “sectarian 
hatred” being “at the heart of the British Muslim community”4 and widespread “fears” 
                                                             
1 The demonstration was organised by Salafist group Jund al-Sham and led by controversial Sunni 
Islamist preacher Anjem Choudry, the former leader of proscribed group Islam4UK. 
2 Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MtDB6hVNkEk, accessed 24 July 2017. 
3  Source: http://5pillarsuk.com/2014/05/13/five-men-guilty-of-assault-at-edgware-rd-anti-
shia-protest/, accessed 24 July 2017. 
4  Source: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/sectarian-hatred-at-the-heart-of-british-muslim-
community-9qgpcxcqz2w, accessed 24 July 2017. 
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over a “deepening Sunni-Shi’a divide in the UK”.5 But how much truth is there in such 
grim assessments of Sunni-Shi’a relations in Britain, and to what extent do such 
antagonisms indicate a rise in intra-communal sectarianism?  
 
This thesis takes such examples as a starting point from which to theorise an alternative 
understanding of sectarianism within the UK context; using the case study of the Iraqi 
Shi’a diaspora in London as a lens through which to understand the complex social, 
political, historical, psychological, and affective dynamics productive of such intra-
communal antagonisms. In particular, I am interested in addressing the questions of how 
and why Shi’a ethno-religious identity is becoming sectarianised and politicised within 
the British diasporic context. While eschewing primordialist or essentialist 
understanding of sectarianism as a natural product of underlying ethno-religious “sects”, 
I am equally concerned to distance myself from any kind of normative characterisation 
of sectarianism as a necessarily “bad” thing. Rather, the term “sectarianism” as defined 
and applied throughout this thesis should be understood as a fundamentally descriptive 
category; one that highlights processes of identity formation and mobilisation in which 
certain kinds of in- and out-group identity boundaries are prioritised over others. In this 
way, identity discourses that work to construct the category of “Shi’a” as conceptually 
and empirically distinct from the category of “Sunni” (and vice-versa) are necessarily 
sectarian, no matter what their normative or emotive content.  
 
In this sense, sectarianism is less about the cultivation of intra-communal antagonisms 
founded on a logic of mutual hatred as about the move towards the production of 
discrete and mutually exclusive identity categories that are undergirded by at least some 
sense of in-group ethno-religious commonality. Such a characterisation of sectarianism 
has theoretical and analytical implications for the argument of the thesis as a whole, and, 
                                                             
5 Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31691120, accessed 24 July 2017. 
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crucially, it is my contention that positive affirmations of in-group identities (e.g. “I am 
Shi’a”) can unconsciously work to foster antagonisms for those who fall outside the 
parameters of such boundaries (i.e. “Sunnis”, “non-Muslims”, etc.). In this sense, 
sectarianism should be understood as an unconscious and socially-produced discursive 
by-product of Shi’a-specific identity construction, and not as a conscious move towards 
violence or antagonism between Shi’is and Sunnis (though it may eventually lead to such 
conflict under certain circumstances). Ultimately, the thesis seeks to address the 
question of Shi’a sectarianism within the British diasporic context and, in particular, to 
enquire into the ways in which Shi’a ethno-religious identity as a category of belonging 
has become politicised and sectarianised across both time and space.  
 
Although a significant amount of literature exists on the production and manipulation of 
sectarianism within the Islamic world (Ali, 2010; Byman, 2014; Dodge, 2014; Farouk-
Alli, 2014; Gause, 2014; Haddad, 2014; Hashemi and Postel, 2017; Machlis, 2014; 
Makdisi, 1996; Matthiesen, 2013; Salloukh et al., 2015; Sluglett et al., 1993; Yousif, 2010; 
among others), very few scholars have focused on the way in which such concepts have 
come to be transferred and translated within the diasporic context. This is especially 
pertinent given the increasing demographic importance of Muslims in Britain and the 
West more broadly and the current perceived rise of Sunni-Shi’a antagonism within 
diasporic Islamic communities in the UK. Moreover, while there have been a number of 
important studies focusing on the internal identity-dynamics of Sunni communities in 
Western counties (Abbas, 2007; Cesari, 2004b; Haddad, 2002; Mandaville, 2003; Meer, 
2008, 2010; Meer and Modood, 2009; Metcalf, 1996; Modood, 2003; Modood and 
Werbner, 1997; Roy, 2004; among others), there has been a dearth of serious scholarship 
that focuses exclusively on Shi’a Muslims within such contexts.6 
                                                             
6 Notable exceptions include Flynn (2013); Scharbrodt (2015); Scharbrodt et al. (2017); Shanneik 
(2015); Spellman-Poots (2012); Tripp and vom Bruck (2017); and van den Bos (2012). However, 
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This thesis thus seeks to bridge the gap between current scholarship on intra-communal 
sectarianism in the Middle East and identity politics in Muslim communities in the West 
in order to present a study of Shi’a sectarianism in the UK in which “sectarianism” is 
understood as a socially-constructed unconscious by-product of discursive identity 
formation. In particular, I wish to make the case that the specificities of the diasporic 
experience – through the experience of exile and the cultivation of transnational links – 
and of the British domestic context – through the encounter with liberal “Western”7 
norms of secularism, humanitarianism, and multiculturalism – have contributed to the 
production of a particular kind of (sectarianised) Shi’a subject. This diasporic Shi’a 
subject at is simultaneously invested in the history, mythology, and theology of Shi’a 
Islam at the same time as it is oriented towards minority representation and ethno-
religious self-determination in a way that replicates the increasing differentiation of 
identity discourses within the British multicultural context (Abbas, 2007; Aly, 2015; 
Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009; Modood et al., 1997; Song, 2003). In this sense, the 
significance of the diasporic context has arguably produced qualitatively different forms 
of Shi’a sectarian identifications than those currently being articulated and mobilised in 
the Middle East and wider Islamic world. For this reason, it is equally important to 
explore the ways in which Western norms, ideals, and values have shaped particular 
articulations of what it means to be “Shi’a” in the British diasporic context as it is to 
understand the history and background of Shi’ism as both a religion and a transnational 
form of political mobilisation. 
 
                                                             
most such studies approach Shi’a Islam from the field of Islamic Studies or Anthropology, and 
often neglect to examine the political implications of Shi’a identity formation. 
7 For the purpose of this thesis, I am loosely using the term “Western” as both a discursive and 
geographical signifier to refer to Europe and North America, and in particular the enduring legacy 
of military and colonial dominance of this part of the world over areas denoted as “non-Western”. 
In this sense, my use of the term should be seen as predominantly marking a discursive rather 
than analytical boundary. 
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The central argument of this thesis rests on the contention that it is the result of this 
cross-pollination of ideas and ideals across contexts that has resulted in the emergence 
of a Shi’a-specific identity construction – what I call the “Shi’a subject”8 – that, crucially, 
harbours an attachment to sectarianism as its unconscious by-product. The 
sectarianised diasporic Shi’a subject that forms the core of this inquiry – a discursive 
construction that works to constrain the kinds of identifications available to individuals 
– can thus be understood as a fundamentally modern product of multiple forces of 
subject-formation as experienced in the contemporary moment. As Deeb highlights in 
her work on pious Shi’a Muslims in Lebanon, “[t]he contemporary moment is one during 
which public religiosities have emerged across the globe… Such publicly engaged 
religiosities have contributed to the collapse of the notion that religion and modernity 
are incompatible” (Deeb, 2011: 4). In this sense, the contemporary forms of sectarianism 
experienced and articulated within the diaspora should be understood not as a 
throwback to some ill-defined primordial “essence”, but rather as a logical outcome of 
global processes of liberalism, modernity, secularism, and diaspora (cf. Mahmood, 2015).  
 
Rather than conceptualising sectarianism as a static social construct resulting from the 
discursive hegemony of modernity, or as an inevitable product of longstanding historical 
and theological disputes between Sunni and Shi’a Islam, this thesis seeks to foreground 
the significance of lived experience by excavating the ways in which articulations of the 
(sectarianised) diasporic Shi’a subject have changed across time and contexts. As Gaiser 
highlights in a recent edited volume, sectarian identification should be understood 
primarily as “a dynamic and conscious process of adoption, maintenance, and 
manipulation of certain types of… identities in particular places and at particular times 
by particular persons or groups of persons” (Gaiser, 2017: 62). Indeed, “for many people, 
                                                             
8 My use of the term “subject” throughout this thesis draws on insights garnered from Lacanian 
psychoanalysis and is conceptually distinct from any sense of individual “identity” or 
“subjectivity”. See below for a more in-depth discussion. 
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even an explicitly labelled sectarian identity can be fluid and contextually specific” 
(Ewing, 1997: 23). By prioritising the experiential and “lived” quality of Shi’a-specific 
identity articulations, I seek to foreground the ways in which multiple discursive forces 
across multiple sites work to cultivate “multiple subjective modalities” productive of the 
sectarianised Shi’a subject (Ewing, 1997: 35). In this way, this thesis offers an alternative 
conceptualisation of sectarianism as the unconscious of Shi’a politico-religious identity 
formation that takes seriously the differential ways in which individuals imagine, enact, 
articulate, and perform being “Shi’a” within the diasporic context. Cumulatively, the 
result of such individual identity articulations is to collectively produce and police the 
contours of the Shi’a subject at any given moment in time; and it is these processes of 
social subject formation that I am primarily interested in documenting here. 
 
This theoretical and methodological preoccupation with the interior psychic lives of 
individuals, and its connection to the external material world, takes inspiration from the 
discipline of psychoanalysis, especially the work of Jacques Lacan. If psychoanalysis, as 
Lacan claims in the quote that serves as the epigraph to this thesis, can illuminate the 
ways in which human beings are rendered intelligible through inscription into a 
“symbolic dimension” represented by social reality, then the seemingly clear-cut division 
between internal (psychic) and external (material) worlds appears to dissolve. Indeed, 
one of the central preoccupations of this thesis is to take seriously the ambivalent 
relationship between psychic and material reality. As Navaro-Yashin argues: 
 
Why assume a separation between interiority and exteriority? Why conceive of 
human beings as distinct from the environments, spaces, and objects with which 
they coexist, correlate, or cohabit? Likewise, why presume that interiority 
(conceptualised as a separate entity) will always reign supreme, that it will, 
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through its projections on the “outer” world, determine everything? (Navaro-
Yashin, 2012: 23) 
 
Here, then, sectarianism can be understood as a psychic, as well as material, reality in a 
way that seeks to unsettle the boundaries between the two. In order to undertake this 
theoretical endeavour, the thesis draws on insights garnered from psychoanalysis and 
critical discourse analysis as a way to foreground the processes of subject-formation that 
both inform and constrain the identity choices available to individuals. In particular, the 
concept of the subject drawn from Lacanian psychoanalysis is used as a way to 
distinguish between the Shi’a subject as a product of material and discursive power and 
individual practicing Shi’is who may or may not seek to align themselves with this 
subject through active practices of identification. It is the sectarianised Shi’a subject – its 
cultivation, articulation, and transformation through individual acts of identification 
within the diasporic context – that forms the core of the enquiry conducted here. 
Adopting Lacanian-inflected approach allows the thesis to maintain a conceptual and 
analytical distinction between the individual and the subject without collapsing the 
former into the latter as a product of discursive power (as in much poststructuralist 
theory).9 
 
By focusing on the sectarianised Shi’a subject, rather than the individual, the theoretical 
framework employed here thus opens up scope for individual agency at the same time 
that it avoids the essentialist trap of reifying such sectarian identity constructions. 
Putting forward the case for a processual approach to Shi’a identity that understands it 
as the result of active identification with the Shi’a subject by the individual, the thesis 
adopts a multi-faceted approach that dovetails an empirical and methodological focus on 
                                                             
9 See discussion in literature review, later in this Introduction. 
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micro-level and embedded practices of identification10 with a wider examination of the 
various social and discursive phenomena that are productive of the Shi’a subject in the 




Although the primary focus of this thesis is on the formation and crystallisation of the 
sectarianised diasporic Shi’a subject as a product of material, discursive, symbolic, and 
affective practices that are in turn embedded in contemporary power structures, the 
empirical case study that provides the material necessary for exploring such processes 
of subject-formation is that of the Iraqi Shi’a diaspora in the UK, with a particular 
emphasis on religiously practicing Iraqi Shi’is. The focus on Shi’a Islam, and Iraqi Shi’is 
in particular, is significant for at least three reasons.  
 
Firstly, Shi’a Muslims have mostly been overlooked in studies investigating the status of 
Muslim minorities in Britain11 and the West more broadly, and their experiences have 
often been either glossed over or simply relegated to a caveat or footnote in more 
mainstream studies on Sunni Muslims (Bowen, 2014; Cesari, 2004b; Grewal, 2013; 
Hopkins and Gale, 2009; Meer, 2010; Modood, 2003, 2006; Modood and Ahmad, 2007; 
Roy, 2004).12 As van den Bos argues, “Shi’ism in Europe represents a particular realm of 
                                                             
10  For a more detailed discussion of the ways in which micro-level identity practices can be 
understood as contributing to wider processes of identity change at the social and collective level, 
see Degli Esposti (2017). 
11  It is estimated that Shi’a Muslims make up around 15 percent of the 2.7 million Muslims 
currently living in Britain (Spellman-Poots, 2012), and come from a variety of socio-economic, 
ethno-national, political, and educational backgrounds; and from countries and regions as diverse 
as Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Asia, and East Africa. 
12 It should be noted that there is an existing and burgeoning literature on Shi’a minorities in 
Europe within the disciplines of Islamic Studies and Anthropology (Al-Khalifa Sharif, 2003; 
Flaskerud, 2014; Gholami, 2016; Scharbrodt et al., 2017; Scharbrodt and Shanneik, 2018; 
Spellman-Poots, 2012; van den Bos, 2012), but most of these studies focus on either the theology 
and religious practices of Shi’is or on the local domestic contexts in which they have settled, and 
there is very little that approaches the contemporary experiences and practices of diasporic Shi’is 
within a political framework. 
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organisation and a particular religiosity” that has mostly been “neglected” in studies of 
European Islam (van den Bos, 2012: 1). This is especially pertinent given the increasingly 
sectarian politics of contemporary geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East and their 
potential impact on diasporic communities in Europe. Indeed, within such a context, 
“Shi’i Muslims in the UK have become more assertive in the British public sphere, 
highlighting their distinct identities in response to the rise of anti-Shi’i sectarianism in 
the Middle East and presenting themselves as victims and opponents of militant Sunni 
movement” (Scharbrodt et al., 2017). Thus, the time is ripe for a more detailed study that 
treats Shi’a Muslims in the West as an object of analysis in and of themselves and that 
takes seriously the transnational dynamics of such globalised sectarian geopolitics.  
 
Secondly, Iraqi Shi’is are both demographically and symbolically significant in the 
cultivation of a diasporic Shi’a subject in the UK context. Not only do Iraqi Shi’is represent 
some of the first waves of Shi’a migration and settlement in the UK, beginning from the 
late 1970s, Iraqis are also institutionally dominant in both the social and religious urban 
environment of London (where the majority of Shi’is in Britain live).13 In a self-claimed 
“exhaustive” directory of Shi’a religious establishments provided by the official website 
of the UK’s annual Arba’een procession (run by the Hussaini Islamic Trust), of the 19 
London-based institutions listed, nearly half (nine) are run by Iraqis, while a quarter 
(four) are Iranian-run14 (the rest are a mixture of South-Asian, Khoja, Lebanese, and 
minority branches of Shi’ism such as the Ismailis). 15  It is due to their institutional 
                                                             
13  Although there are no accurate data regarding the ethno-national demographics of Shi’a 
Muslims in Britain (the UK census does not record religious sect), and it is likely that South Asians 
make up the demographic majority (especially if we include Khojas – East African Shi’is of South 
Asian origin), the majority of Twelver Shi’a religious and community institutions in London tend 
to either be founded and run by Iraqis, or have links to the Iraqi shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala. 
14 It should be noted that as a result of the politics of the Iranian regime, and especially the fallout 
of the 1979 Islamic revolution, the majority of Iranians in Britain tend to be religiously secular 
and non-practicing, hence the dominance of Iraqis (Gholami, 2016; Spellman-Poots, 2012). 
15 www.arbaeenuk.com/directorylist, accessed 25 Sept 2016. According to my own fieldwork 
data, 11 of the 15 Shia religious institutions in northwest London were founded or run by Iraqis. 
This figure does not include secular or non-religious Iraqi-run establishments, such as the Iraqi 
 22 
dominance of the UK’s Shi’a Muslim population that Iraqi Shi’is are thus fundamental in 
shaping both the social and psychic contours of this minority religious group. 
 
Finally, the focus on practicing Shi’is of Iraqi national background is significant as a result 
of the specific historical and socio-political circumstances of the Iraqi diaspora and the 
highly politicised nature of Shi’ism in contemporary Iraq, where a violent form of 
sectarianism has become an increasingly salient fact of social and political life (Dodge, 
2014; Haddad, 2014; Sluglett et al., 1993; Yousif, 2010). In particular, the recent rise of 
fundamentalist Sunni militant organisation Islamic State (ISIS), has served both to 
highlight and to foment Sunni-Shi’a sectarianism both within Iraq and more globally. 
Indeed, Iraq itself has significant religious, political, and symbolic power over the 
development of a globalised Shi’a-specific identity primarily due to its status as the 
historic “homeland” of Shi’a religious belief and practice as the locus of the Battle of 
Karbala in 680AD (Dabashi, 2011). Moreover, the transnational influence of the Shi’a 
religious establishment in Najaf and Karbala makes Iraqi Shi’ism a significant locus of 
enquiry into the status and development of Shi’a identity more broadly.16 
 
Despite the institutional and symbolic dominance of Iraqi Shi’is within the context of 
diasporic London, however, this thesis will demonstrate that the question of ethnic or 
national belonging has become decreasingly salient for practicing Shi’is in the UK, 17 
while categories of religious belonging (often couched in pseudo-ethnic terms) have 
gained increasing traction – especially within the younger generation of British-born 
Shi’is. Such a shift is part of a global trend produced by the increasing fluidity of 
                                                             
Cultural Centre, Al-Muntada Institute, or the London headquarters of the Iraqi Communist Party 
(ICP). 
16 The dynamics of this will be explored further in Chapter 1. 
17 Just as it has for practicing Sunnis, who have increasingly been drawn to a cross-cultural and 
decontextualised notion of transnational Islam (Cesari, 2004a; Mandaville, 2001; Meer, 2010; 
Modood, 2003)., 
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movement and ideas whereby “political identities are becoming increasingly 
disembedded from the context of the territorial nation-state” (Mandaville, 2003: 50) and, 
when it comes to Islam in particular, focused instead on notions of a “‘global’ or 
translocal community of believers in which racial, ethnic or national differences are 
irrelevant” (ibid: 18). For this reason, the thesis’ empirical focus on Iraqi Shi’is in the UK 
should be seen as part of a wider preoccupation with the social, political, economic, and 
discursive forces that are contemporaneously shaping the contours of a cross-cultural 
and transnational diasporic Shi’a subject, and the ways in which articulations of this 
subject come to be implicated in the unconscious affective and material practices of 
sectarianism. 
 
Before launching into a more detailed discussion of the theoretical framework that 
provides the architecture for the conceptualisation of sectarianism outlined in the thesis, 
it is first necessary to present a brief overview of the case study under scrutiny in order 
to contextualise and excavate the ways in which the development and articulation of a 
Shi’a-specific identity amongst Iraqi Shi’is in the UK has resulted in the fostering of 
sectarian attachments and antipathies within the diasporic setting. 
 
Contextualising the Diaspora 
In presenting a study of the Iraqi Shi’a diaspora, it is first necessary to delineate the 
object of analysis under consideration. Despite the rise in critical approaches to diaspora 
(Axel, 2001, 2002, 2004; Brah, 1996; Brubaker, 2005; Ong, 2003; Raman, 2003; Venn, 
2009; among others), much of the literature continues to reify or essentialise any notion 
of “diaspora identity” along ethno-national (Safran, 1991; Cohen, 1996; Tölölyan, 1991) 
or cultural lines (Hall, 1990). Within such an essentialised framework, “diaspora 
identity” is most often studied and understood through the mobilisation practices of 
diaspora activists towards the homeland (see, for example, Adamson, 2012; Koinova, 
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2013). Conversely, while recent scholarship on the “Muslim diaspora” (Aitchison et al, 
2007; Cesari, 2004; Meer, 2010; Modood, 2003; Roy, 2004) has prioritised trans-ethnic 
and trans-national forms of identification along religious lines, the heterogeneity of 
sectarian, ethnic, national, and cultural traditions encompassed by the catch-all term of 
“Islam” are rarely explored in full. This thesis seeks to problematise both essentialist 
frameworks that couch diaspora in cultural, ethnic, or religious terms, and unitary 
conceptions of “Islam” by focusing on the rise of a transnational and trans-ethnic 
diasporic Shi’a identity. 
 
Drawing on the work of critical scholars of diaspora studies (Axel 2001, 2002, 2004; Brah 
1996; Brubaker 2005; Butler 2001; Hall 1990; Kinnivall 2009; Ong 2003; Raman 2003; 
Venn 2009; Werbner 2005, among others), this thesis seeks to problematise the notion 
of “diaspora” as an ontological thing-in-the-world capable of being bracketed off and 
studied, and of the implicit assumption that a “diaspora” is both a pre-formed social 
entity and an agglomeration of individuals who have been scattered across the world 
and yet nevertheless all nurture an indelible link to the imagined diasporic homeland or 
place of origin. Rather, I take classifications of diaspora as “a globally mobile category of 
identification” (Axel 2004: 27), or as “a series of projected imaginaries of identity” 
(Werbner 2005: 758) as a starting point from which to theorise the formation of a Shi’a 
diasporic subject as a historically specific and temporally contingent discursive 
alignment.  
 
This notion of diaspora as a process of belonging and identification thus offers 
conceptual clarity to the “dispersion of the meanings of the term” (Brubaker, 2005: 1) 
within the literature, and further acts as a corrective to the ontological primacy afforded 
to nation-states and territorial boundaries in classical diaspora studies by prioritising 
readings of “diaspora” that understand it as an “idiom, stance, and claim” regarding the 
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“way of formulating the identities and loyalties of a population” (ibid: 12). In this way, 
“being diasporic” should be understood as an orientation and identification with the 
diasporic subject, not as an ontological category in and of itself. Moreover, focusing on 
the construction of the diasporic subject rather than on the “place which is diaspora” 
(Werbner, 2002) thus productively engages psychoanalytic notions of subjectivity and 
identity within a wider conception of the political world that serves to foreground 
questions of affective, experiential, and phantasmatic attachments, and the various ways 
such attachments work to bind individuals to iterations and performances of the 
diasporic subject. 
 
In this sense, my use of the term “Iraqi Shi’a diaspora” refers not to individual Iraqi Shi’is 
themselves, but to a discursively constructed “diasporic imaginary” (Axel, 2002, 2004) – 
itself a term borrowed from Lacanian psychoanalysis – maintained through temporal 
and corporeal processes of identification that work to produce diasporic subjects: 
 
Imaginary here is not an adjective that describes or qualifies the diaspora, its 
“people” or “community” as illusory or as a mere figment of some misguided 
imagination, Rather, the diasporic imaginary – used as a noun – indicates a 
precise and powerful kind of identification that is very real. (Axel, 2002: 423) 
 
Indeed, I have encountered little evidence to suggest that the average Iraqi Shi’i living in 
London has any understanding of themselves as “diasporic” beyond their status as exiles 
or migrants, but rather seek to identify themselves with alternative iterations of the 
identity categories of “Iraqi” and “Shi’a” that circulate within the diasporic imaginary. 
For this reason, developing an understanding of the historical, political, social, and 
discursive processes that are productive of such terms becomes key to exploring the shift 
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away from Iraqi national identifications and towards the formation and crystallisation 
of a sectarianised Shi’a subject within the diasporic context.  
 
Baghdad-on-Thames 
There are currently no reliable figures pertaining to the size and demographic 
composition of the Iraqi population in the UK. According to the 2011 Census of Britain, 
there are an estimated 73,000 Iraqi-born individuals living in the UK, with the vast 
majority concentrated in London (Office for National Statistics, 2013). However, since 
this figure is neither up to date nor takes into account second or third-generation Iraqis 
born in Britain (not to mention those born in exile who later settled in the UK), it is safe 
to assume that the total number of diasporic Iraqis in the UK is much higher. For example, 
Zainab Saleh gives the total number of Iraqis in the UK as of 2005 as being between 
282,000 and 350,000 (Saleh, 2011), while Nadje al-Ali gives a lower estimate of 100,000 
(Al-Ali, 2007), and the Iraqi Embassy estimates between 350,000 and 400,000. In a 
comprehensive mapping exercise conducted in 2007, the IOM suggests there are a total 
of 240,000 Iraqis in the UK, including 125,000 in London alone (IOM, 2007). Due to the 
demographic composition of Iraq itself, as well as the political nature of much Iraqi 
migration to the UK (discussed further below), the vast majority of Iraqis in London tend 
to come from Shi’a backgrounds 18  – a fact that has arguably been significant in the 
shaping of a specifically Shi’a sectarianised diasporic subject, as illustrated throughout 
this thesis.    
 
As with any diaspora population, Iraqi Shi’is in London represent a diverse amalgam of 
individuals from a variety of socio-economic, class, regional, ideational, and generational 
backgrounds, and who may have come to the UK at different times and under very 
                                                             
18  Arguably, secular Iraqis from Shi’a backgrounds who have settled in the UK have adopted 
qualitatively different approaches and understandings of their ethno-religious “identity” than 
practicing Iraqi Shi’is, and as such are not included in this study. 
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different circumstances. The most significant waves of Iraqi immigration over the last 
few decades have coincided with a number of key political events in Iraq itself; and 
different political conditions in the homeland have led to differences in the economic, 
political, and sectarian demographics of Iraqis in the diaspora (al-Ali, 2007; al-Rasheed, 
1991; Saleh, 2011; Interviews 1, 2, 4, 11, 20, and 23).  
 
The largest wave of Iraqi migration to the UK took place under the regime of Saddam 
Hussain from 1979-2003, and for this reason was mostly (but not exclusively) 
characterised by middle- and lower-class Iraqi Shi’is (whether practicing or secular)19 
(Al-Ali, 2007; Al-Rasheed, 1991; Saleh, 2011; Spellman-Poots, 2012). The vast majority 
of these Iraqis eventually settled in London – as one of my interviewees noted: “London 
to Iraqis is considered a second home” (Interview 4). In this sense, the demographic 
dominance of Iraqis Shi’is both amongst British Shi’a Muslims (in terms of the number 
of religious and community institutions) and within the Iraqi diaspora itself makes this 
community an ideal case study for exploring the intra-communal dynamics within 
British Islam, and in particular of scrutinising the ways in which identity practices may 
either fuel or mitigate existing sectarian and political tensions between different Islamic 
sects in the UK. 
 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of political and social mobilisation within the Iraqi 
diaspora in the late twentieth century was characterised less by religion and more by 
pre-existing political divisions that had existed in Iraq itself, especially when it came to 
opposing the Saddam Hussain regime (Kadhum, 2016). Indeed, a number of my research 
participants commented on the growing sense of a distinct yet heterogeneous Iraqi 
community in London throughout the 1980s and 1990s, especially in terms of political 
opposition to the Ba’thist regime in Iraq, with a strong representation of professionals, 
                                                             
19 This includes Iraqi Faili Kurds, who follow Twelver Shi’ism. 
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intellectuals, and elites.20  As one former opposition activist put it: “London was the 
centre of Iraqi opposition [in the 1990s]” (Interview 32); while another expressed that 
during this period “everyone was anti-Ba’thist and anti-Saddam” (Interview 10). In this 
sense, such mobilisation can be seen as typical of first-generation diasporans: politically 
active, oriented towards the homeland, and preoccupied with building community and 
social ties in the country of settlement (Adamson, 2002, 2008; Brah, 1996; Butler, 2001; 
Clifford, 1994; Koinova, 2009, 2011; Tölölyan, 1996; Werbner, 2002, among others).  
 
Across ethnic and sectarian divides, therefore, the Iraqi diasporic subject during the 
latter part of the twentieth century was arguably characterised by a political and 
symbolic orientation towards Iraq as a homeland, often couched in nationalistic 
expressions of identity and belonging and organisational participation in official political 
and social bodies that operated transnationally between Iraq and the UK. It wasn’t until 
the US-led invasion of 2003, following which a significant number of influential Iraqi 
political activists returned to Iraq to participate in the rebuilding of the country, that the 
sense of a unified “Iraqi” national identity in the diaspora began to disintegrate.21 It was 
this fracturing of Iraqi diasporic identity that arguably paved the way for a rise in 
sectarian forms of identification, especially among the demographically and 
institutionally dominant Iraqi Shi’is. 
 
For Iraqi Shi’is in the UK, the establishment and maintenance of religious institutions 
such as hussainiyyat (known colloquially as “Shia mosques”, sing. hussainiyya) became 
especially important in exile as a result of the social and political status of Shi’is in Iraq – 
the practice and observance of certain Shi’a rituals, for example, was banned under the 
Saddam regime. As a result of such converging social and political factors, such Shi’a 
                                                             
20 For a detailed study of diasporic activism oriented towards the homeland, see Kadhum (2016). 
21 The reasons for this are explored in detail in Chapter 1, and as such are not discussed further 
here. 
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religious institutions in exile assumed a significant political dimension in the 
emancipatory articulation of a hitherto suppressed Shi’a religious identity (Flynn, 2013), 
and, moreover, allowed Iraqis in exile to connect with others who found themselves in 
similar positions. Thus, “from the outset, there [was] an emphasis on the political 
dimension of the [Iraqi Shi’a] community and its political expression as part of its 
particular identity” (Flynn, 2013: 3). In other words, the mediation of the exile 
experience through the religious institutions of the hussainiyyat plausibly contributed to 
a diasporic identity that came to be intimately linked with Shi’a religiosity and political 
emancipation. Indeed, the tendency for migrant religions to become politicised as 
transgressive and/or emancipatory practices in the host society context has been widely 
documented (Alfonso et al., 2004; Levitt, 2008; Mandaville, 2001; Marston et al., 2005; 
Metcalf, 1996; Modood and Werbner, 1997; Schiffauer, 1988; among others) – Iraqi 
Shi’is, it seems, are no exception. The social and political context of Britain during this 
period, in which policies of multiculturalism and ethnonormativity governed the ways in 
which immigrant communities could articulate and perform their attachment to certain 
ethno-cultural identity categories, arguably played a key role in shaping the emergence 
of a specifically Shi’a ethno-religious identity in the diaspora.22  
 
Having thus briefly outlined the empirical case study underpinning the thesis, I now turn 
to a more detailed exploration of the concepts of discourse, identity, and sectarianism in 
order to sketch out the theoretical framework on which the argument of the thesis is 
based and to place this argument within the context of the relevant scholarly literatures. 
The final part of this introduction will explore the research methodology underpinning 
the thesis’ claims, before outlining the structure and content of each of the five 
substantive chapters, each of which explores different facets of Shi’a subject-formation 
within the diasporic context.  
                                                             
22 This is explored further in Chapter 3. 
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Discourse, Identity, and the Sectarian Unconscious 
Departing from studies that conceive of sectarianism as an ideological formation 
(whether primordial or discursive) consisting of a belief system that is productive of 
sectarian subjects (Dodge, 2014; Hashemi and Postel, 2017; Kadhum, 2016; Reidar, 
2007; Salloukh et al., 2015; Sluglett et al., 1993; Weiss, 2010; Yousif, 2010), this thesis 
offers an alternative conceptualisation of Shi’a sectarianism that sees it as an unconscious 
product of identity formation within the discursively-constructed diasporic imaginary 
arising from the encounter between transnational Shi’a politico-religious theology and 
contemporary hegemonic power structures of liberal capitalism, humanitarianism, 
ethnonormativity, and minority representation within the British diasporic context. This 
reading of sectarianism prioritises a Lacanian understanding of identity formation that 
foregrounds the relationship between psychic and material reality through the concept 
of discourse, at the same time as it maintains a key analytical and conceptual distinction 
between the subject of identity and the individual and collective practices of identification 
that work to produce this subject.  
 
Before fleshing out the theoretical architecture underpinning the argument of the thesis, 
it is necessary to explore the various uses (and misuses) of the term “sectarianism” 
within the literature in order to establish how the particular conception employed here 
differs from the majority of existing studies. Significantly, this thesis should be read as a 
critical intervention within the literature on sectarianism that simultaneously seeks to 
problematise the implicit assumptions often underlying the use of the term itself while 
offering an alternative conceptualisation of “sectarianism” that understands it as a 




Problematising Sectarianism: From Primordialism to Poststructuralism 
Despite its prevalence in discussions of communal antagonisms across a variety of 
contexts, 23  the term “sectarianism” is notoriously “slippery” (Kingston, 2013: 21), 
especially when employed as an explanatory device for individual or collection action. 
Moreover, the vast majority of studies that employ the concept seem either to take the 
meaning of sectarianism for granted, or condense it to the sensational quality of religious 
violence (often with implicit normative assumptions that regard sectarianism as an 
uncritically “bad” thing). Indeed, “sectarianism”, under this reading, can be understood 
primarily as “a signifier ordinarily employed as a synonym for the anti-social or divisive 
acts, typically involving physical violence or intimidation of ‘religious’ paramilitary 
organisations” (Cairns, 2000: 438).  
 
The problem with simply equating sectarianism with religious violence, however, is that 
such usage presupposes the existence and salience of religious groups and identities in 
the first place, and risks essentialising or reducing the complex social, economic, 
political, and discursive forces that go into producing sectarian identities to formulaic 
depictions of primordial ethnic, religious, or tribal ties. In the context of Sunni-Shi’a 
sectarianism, such a paradigm thus constructs each religious sect as quintessentially 
antagonistic social and political actors, monoliths locked in an eternal battle for survival 
and dominance.24 A good example of such reductive essentialism can be found in the 
controversial myths of the “Shi’a crescent” and “Shi’a revival”,25 both of which construct 
                                                             
23  Although contemporary use of the term is most commonly found in the context of plural 
societies such as in the Middle East (Byman, 2014; Dodge, 2014; Erkli, 2010; Gause, 2014; Louër 
and King, 2012; Makdisi, 2000; Salloukh, 2013), South Asia (Ali, 2010; Haqqani, 2006; Nasr, 2000; 
Zaman, 1998), and Northern Ireland (Anderson and Shuttleworth, 1998; Burton, 1979; McVeigh 
and Rolston, 2007), “sectarianism” may also be used to refer to any form of in- and out-group 
antagonism (Clarkson, 2013; Wilson, 1992). 
24  For a critical discussion of this tendency to reduce sectarianism to eternal historical 
antagonisms, see Hashemi and Postel (2017). 
25  In 2006, for example, the Council on Foreign Relations held a symposium entitled “The 
Emerging Shi’a Crescent” that aimed to address US foreign policy interests in the region. Despite 
the deluge of works that make use of such essentialist concepts, especially since the US-led Iraq 
invasion of 2003 (Amos, 2010; Barzegar, 2008b; Helfont, 2009; Horr, 2012; Nasr, 2000, 2004, 
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Shi’ism as a unitary politico-religious system whose influence stretches across a 
geographical area encompassing countries as diverse as Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Iraq, 
Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and whose actors are engaged in an ongoing “proxy war” 
for ideological and geopolitical power (Barzegar, 2008a; Bröning, 2008; Cockburn, 2008; 
Helfont, 2009; Nasr, 2004, 2006, 2007; Proctor, 2008; Terhalle, 2007).  
 
In this sense, the term “sectarianism” as applied to Sunni-Shi’a antagonism “tends to 
imply a static given, a trans-historical force – an enduring and immutable characteristic 
of the Arab Islamic world from the seventh century until today” (Hashemi and Postel, 
2017: 5). Abdo neatly summarises the underlying assumptions of this position in her 
claim that “because religious difference is, by its nature, unresolvable, this would mean 
the violence now sweeping the Middle East is intractable” (Abdo, 2016: 5). Indeed, the 
prevalence of such approaches has arguably led to the distillation of any multifaceted 
concept of sectarianism into Sunni-Shi’a antagonism tout court, in which Shi’a Islam in 
particular, “often tends to stand in for the ‘sectarian condition’ par excellence” (Weiss, 
2010: 8).  
 
In contrast to such primordial essentialism, recent critical scholarship has tended to 
adopt a more “post-culturalist” approach that underscores both the ethno-cultural 
foundations of sectarian identities and “the very modern and productive power of 
sectarianism” as a discursive social construction (Salloukh et al., 2015: 3). Such 
interventions often rest on an implicit commitment to constructivism, in which ethnic, 
religious, and cultural identity “is not fixed, but is rather a political construct based on a 
dense web of social relationships that form in the context of modernity” (Hashemi and 
Postel, 2017: 7). Indeed, some scholars have even gone so far as to assert that 
                                                             
2006, 2007; Walker, 2006), the notion of a “Shi’a crescent” or “Shi’a revival” has also attracted 
considerable criticism in the literature (Barzegar, 2008a; Bröning, 2008; Chaulia, 2007; Proctor, 
2008; Terhalle, 2007). 
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“sectarianism and modernity can no longer be simplistically understood as inherently 
antagonistic” (Weiss, 2010: 6). Within this scholarly tradition, sectarianism is 
understood less as “a static thing-in-itself, but rather a ‘way of doing things’” (Weiss, 
2010: 13), a manner of organising and meaning-making within the social world that is 
productive of communal antagonisms. In this sense: 
 
[F]ar from being a relic of a traditional pristine past, sectarianism is a modern 
constitutive Foucauldian socioeconomic and political power that produces and 
reproduces sectarian subjects and modes of political subjectification and 
mobilisation through a dispersed ensemble of institutional, clientelist, and 
discursive practices… Much like other disciplinary institutions – such as the 
modern state, the prison, or the clinic – the sectarian system and its institutional, 
political, economic, and symbolic ensemble aim at manufacturing docile sectarian 
subjects who abide by the rules of the sectarian political economy and its 
ideological hegemony. (Salloukh et al., 2015: 3–4) 
 
While a number of productive studies have been spawned from such approaches, 
exploring the historical (Clarkson, 2013; Makdisi, 1996, 2000; Peteet, 2008; Weiss, 
2010), social (Dodge, 2014; Farouk-Alli, 2014; Sluglett et al., 1993), economic (Yousif, 
2010), political (Haddad, 2014; Kadhum, 2016; Matthiesen, 2014; Reidar, 2007; Salloukh 
et al., 2015), gendered (Deeb, 2011), geographical (Anderson and Shuttleworth, 1998; 
Visser, 2010), and institutional (Al-Marashi, 2008; Cairns, 2000; Hoffman, 2014; 
Kingston, 2013) dynamics of sectarianism as a system of meaning, it is my contention 
that such postmodern approaches fall into the opposite trap of the primordialists. 
Namely, by placing a greater emphasis on the structural factors and power relations that 
go into producing sectarian identities in the first place, this literature runs the risk of 
evacuating or flattening individual agency by reducing actors to “docile sectarian 
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subjects” (Salloukh et al., 2015: 4) trapped in a sectarian system of which they 
themselves are the products.  
 
Moreover, such conceptualisations often implicitly assume an ideological commitment 
to sectarianism either through the workings of “the sectarian system” (ibid) or through 
the conscious manipulation of “sectarian entrepreneurs” who stand to profit from the 
cultivation of sectarian sentiment within the general population (Machlis, 2014; 
Matthiesen, 2013; Salloukh et al., 2015; Yousif, 2010; Zubaida, 2014). As Hashemi and 
Postel argue: “the idea of manipulation thus figures centrally in this school of thought. 
By emphasising in-group similarities and out-group differences, as well as invoking the 
fear of assimilation, dominance, or annihilation, ethno-religious leaders can stimulate 
identity mobilisations” (Hashemi and Postel, 2017: 6). While there is much disagreement 
within the literature regarding the extent to which these identities can be manipulated 
(as well as how they are formed in the first place), there is a general consensus regarding 
the potential for identity mobilisation by leaders and elites that necessitates at least 
some kind of ideological commitment on the part of these political actors. In other words, 
sectarianism, under this reading, is the product both of contemporary power structures 
and of the conscious manipulation by sectarian actors; a conception that implicitly 
denies agency to ordinary individuals by seeing them either as passive “sectarian 
subjects” within a wider hegemonic system or as the victims of manipulation by 
sectarian elites. 
 
In this way, much of the literature on sectarianism can be seen to either fall into the trap 
of reifying sectarian identities as stemming from some kind of intractable primordial 
“essence”, or alternatively denying the salience or agential potential of such identity 
categories in the first place and writing them off as the effect of structural power 
relations or elite manipulation. The former of these approaches serves to conflate 
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individuals with the sectarian identities they espouse and attributes the category of 
identity with the capacity for producing political outcomes above and beyond individual 
agency (as if it were identities themselves that act, not people); while the latter results 
in marginalising or silencing the capacity for individual agency when it comes to the 
adoption and expression of such identities (Haddad, 2011). Both approaches are 
problematic in their tendency to either overstate or understate the coherence and 
relevance of ethno-sectarian identities, and relate to broader issues surrounding the 
study of identity as a whole.26 The crux of this conundrum, I would like to suggest, lies in 
the lack of conceptual clarity regarding the terms “identity”, “individual”, and “subject” 
that has partially arisen from the rising popularity of poststructuralist and post-
culturalist accounts that often reduce sectarian identities to the product of power in 
ways that flatten the distinction between the individual and the subject and ultimately 
undermine the capacity for individual agency at the same time as they construct 
“sectarianism” as an ideological product of power. 
 
In order to counter such conceptual confusion, this thesis puts forward an alternative 
conceptualisation of sectarianism that takes seriously the contingent and antagonistic 
nature of contemporary power relations at the same time as it seeks to explain 
individuals’ (unconscious) attachments to sectarianism in a way that does not vacate 
their capacity for agential choice or risk essentialising problematic ethno-religious 
identity categories by equating sectarian identity with the individuals who espouse it. 
The theoretical framework employed for such a project makes use of psychoanalytic 
formulations of the distinction between the individual and the subject in order to 
highlight how processes of identity formation, including those involving sectarian 
identities, are not necessarily consigned to fall into either the essentialist or the 
poststructuralist trap. In particular, I draw on the insights offered by Lacanian 
                                                             
26 See discussion in following section. 
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psychoanalysis and critical discourse analysis in order to offer a framework for the study 
of sectarian identity as an unconscious by-product of the active and reiterative practices 
of articulation and identification with the sectarian subject that is conceptually separate 
from any notion of a pre-existing individual or self. It is to this project that I now turn. 
 
Theorising Identity: From Individual to Subject 
The shifting sands of individual and collective “identity”, a term at once analytically 
problematic (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000) and yet one that evades critical 
deconstruction (Hall, 2000), represents the site of multiple and intersecting socio-
political processes. And yet, despite such scholarly confusion, the concept of “identity” 
has drawn increasingly attention in recent decades, especially when it comes to the study 
of ethnic and religious identity constructions. This thesis takes the preoccupation with 
identity in the literature on sectarianism and ethnic conflict as a starting point from 
which to problematise the blurring of the distinction between individuals/selves and 
political and social subjects in studies of intra-communal antagonism. In particular, it is 
my contention that the rise of constructivist and post-cultural accounts, despite their 
success in foregrounding the role of power in the production of sectarian identities, has 
further muddied the conceptual waters by not clearly distinguishing between the 
subject-as-individual and the subject of discourse in ways that ultimately obscure the 
object of inquiry.  
 
This thesis draws on the theoretical insights offered by poststructuralist accounts of 
identity formation as a product of discursive power (Butler, 1997; Foucault, 1977, 1982, 
2012; Howarth et al., 2000; Howarth and Torfing, 2005; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Lloyd, 
1996, 1999; Milliken, 1999; Müller, 2008) while insisting on the importance of 
maintaining an analytical distance between the concepts of the individual and the subject, 
understood as the subject of discourse. This distance is maintained by drawing on 
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elements of Lacanian psychoanalysis in order to build a theoretical framework that 
facilitates the study of the sectarian subject as conceptually distinct from the individuals 
who identify with it. Fundamental to this project is an understanding of discourse that 
extends beyond a purely linguistic category and sees it as the ensemble of social 
utterances, performances, and practices that constitute the social world: 
 
The discursive can be defined as a theoretical horizon within which the being of 
objects is constituted. In other words, all objects are objects of discourse, and their 
meaning depends on a socially constructed system of rules and significant 
differences. (Howarth et al., 2000: 3) 
 
Crucially, this is not to make any ontological claim about the existence or otherwise of an 
external “reality”, but rather to highlight the socially-constructed nature of the meaning 
invested in this reality. As Laclau and Mouffe argue: 
 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to 
do with whether there is a world external to thought… An earthquake or the falling 
of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, 
independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed 
in terms of “natural phenomena” or “expressions of the wrath of God”, depends 
upon the structuring of a discursive field. (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 108) 
 
Identities, under such a discursive reading, are social constructs (which may or may not 
be predicated on physical and material differences such as skin colour, religious practice, 
political affiliation, etc.) and are therefore not reducible to any kind of innate or pre-
existing “essence” but are revealed to be deeply implicated in collective understandings 
and meanings generated about the social world. Moreover, adopting such a holistic 
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understanding of discourse illuminates the way in which individuals “are always internal 
to a world of signifying practices and objects” (Howarth et al., 2000: 3) and are therefore 
unable to escape the discursive logic of such constructions. Discursive power, in other 
words, is productive both of the social world as a whole and the place of the individual 
within it.  
 
Turning attention away from the problematic notion of an ontologically prior “self” and 
towards the category of the “subject” as the subject of discursive power, such approaches 
thus allow for the study of identities as the product of power relations without the 
limitations of constructivism.27 And yet, despite such theoretical advancements, it is my 
contention that the uptake of poststructuralist and discursive approaches to the study of 
identity – especially those that draw on the work of Michel Foucault – has led to the 
dispersal and dilution of key concepts such that many theorists seem to use the notions 
of the individual/self and subject interchangeably (often in the rather cumbersome 
formulation of “individual subject”), rather than clearly delineating between the two. In 
particular, the prominence of Foucauldian accounts of discursive subjectivity, in which 
individuals are made subject by the all-encompassing nature of power relations, has 
exacerbated the confusion regarding the relative conceptual roles of the individual and 
the subject. Indeed, it is arguably the dual meaning of the word “subject” – i.e. to be 
subject to and the subject of particular articulations of discursive power and interest – 
that has played a significant role in the conceptual blurring between the subject-as-
                                                             
27 This is not to claim that all poststructuralist and discursive approaches are coterminous, but 
rather that such approaches share an orientation towards the social world that necessitates a 
preoccupation with the subject of discourse, however defined (Howarth and Torfing, 2005). It is 
the plurality of these definitions that I am specifically addressing here, not the relative merits of 
various methodological approaches within the discursive tradition. 
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individual and the subject-of-discourse while simultaneously seeming to theorise out the 
role of human agency by reducing it to an effect of discursive power.28 
 
While Foucault’s insights regarding the nature and role of power as a productive force 
that circulates amongst various actors in the social world (Foucault 1980, 1982, 1991, 
2003a, 2003b, 2003c) have been fundamental in challenging the realist preoccupation 
with coercive power (Dahl, 1957), the tendency for Foucauldian scholars to gloss over 
the distinction between the individual and the subject (or even to equate the two)29 has 
resulted in multiple and sometimes contradictory definitions of political subjectivity, 
especially as a result of Foucault’s own shift from the subject of discourse to the subject 
of power, and ultimately to “the individual [as] an effect of power” (Foucault, 1980: 98; 
Bevir, 1999).30 The result of these divergent approaches, I would like to suggest, is the 
spread of conceptual confusion in which studies of identity often fail to specify their 
object of inquiry, or, alternatively, switch between different meanings of various key 
concepts without due diligence. 
 
At this juncture, it is worth exploring the way in which the field of psychoanalysis – and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis in particular – has played an important role in redefining our 
                                                             
28 For critiques of the Foucauldian tendency to overlook individual agency, or simply reduce it to 
a product of power, see Doty (1997); Epstein (2010); Ewing (1997); Lloyd (2005); and Navaro-
Yashin (2012). 
29 It should be noted that although Foucault himself articulated a conceptual difference between 
the subject and the individual (most notably in The Subject and Power), his insistence on the 
capacity of power to “make individuals subjects” (Foucault, 1982: 331) effectively served to erase 
this difference in discussions of the social world, pre-saturated as it is by existing power relations 
and subjectivities. In this sense, while Foucault asserted the significance of maintaining a 
distinction between the individual and the subject, in practice his theoretical framework rarely 
allows for this difference to bear any conceptual weight. 
30 Compare the following quotes, for example: “power that at first appears as external, pressed 
upon the subject, pressing the subject into subordination, assumes a psychic form that constitutes 
the subject’s self-identity” (Butler, 1997: 3)– in which the subject is implicitly equated with the 
individual; and “a subject-position refers to a position in a discourse. It is a place-holder, a linguistic 
category” (Epstein, 2010: 17) – in which the subject is clearly delineated as the subject of 
language. 
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understanding of the concepts of both the individual and the subject by taking seriously 
the relationship between interior psychic life and exterior social reality in ways that 
maintain individual agency while acknowledging the socially-constructed nature of 
discursive reality (Frosh and Baraitser, 2008; Grossberg, 2010; Hollway, 2004, 2006; 
Hollway and Jefferson, 2000; Stavrakakis, 2002, 2007; Venn, 2002; Walkerdine, 2002). 
Rather than representing a departure from the world of politics, such unconscious 
internal processes are crucial to the construction, articulation, and performance of 
political identity (including ethno-religious sectarian identities) such that building an 
understanding of psychological processes “is not just the continuation of politics by other 
means; it is politics itself” (Papadopoulus, 2004: 5). In this sense, “questions of fantasy, 
fiction, and the unconscious are critical for understanding cultural and political 
processes” (Peterson, 2007: 59), especially the role such processes play in facilitating 
certain modes of social or political behaviour and sidelining others. It is to this 
psychoanalytic dimension of identity I now turn. 
 
i. Psychoanalysis and Politics: Between Interior and Exterior Worlds  
Psychoanalysis rests on the premise that conscious thought is not sufficient to explain 
human motivations and actions; rather, it is necessary to take into account the 
unconscious drives and desires lurking beneath the surface of consciousness. For this 
reason, psychoanalysis is often credited with bringing attention to the “silent dimension 
of social and political life” that works to structure the field of individual action and 
collective social practices (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2010: 225). Indeed, in the words of 
Ernesto Laclau, psychoanalysis might be seen “as the only fruitful approach to the 
understanding of human reality” (Laclau, 2004: 326). However, strict readings of 
psychoanalysis have the potential to focus too narrowly on the internal psychic 
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processes of subjectivity and self-reflexivity,31 thus prioritising the internally-bounded 
human self at the expense of a more holistic discursive understanding of the constructed 
nature of the social world (Hollway, 2004; Navaro-Yashin, 2012).  
 
In the Lacanian reading of psychoanalysis used throughout this thesis, the unconscious 
itself arises through the individual’s entry into the social world and is thus a 
fundamentally social product. It is this blurring of the distinction between social, 
material, and psychic realms that makes Lacanian psychoanalysis a useful tool in the 
study of political identities, since it helps foreground the discursive nature of identity 
formation at the same time as it avoids the trap of equating individuals with the identities 
they espouse (Lacan, 1968, 2002, 2004). In order to understand the analytical and 
methodological implications of such an approach, I will offer a brief outline of Lacanian 
theory and in particular the significance of the distinction between the (pre-social) 
individual and the (socially and discursively constructed) subject when it comes to the 
study of political identities.  
 
For Lacan, the world is structured according to three realms: the Real, the Imaginary, 
and the Symbolic (Lacan, 1958, 2004, 2006; Frosh, 2012; Laclau, 1990; Stavrakakis, 
1999; Žižek, 1999, 2006). On a psychic level, the self exists in a pre-social state as raw, 
unmediated desire, unbounded by the logic of social order – this is the realm of the Real, 
the excess that escapes the constraints of the other two orders and defies explanation or 
understanding. However, since the Real is always in a position of excess and can never 
be fully expressed (because expression itself requires language, which is socially 
constructed), it is in the Imaginary and Symbolic orders that the desire of the individual 
                                                             
31 For a critical discussion of the various schools of classical psychoanalysis and an account of 
relational approaches, see Hollway (2004), Walkerdine (2002) and Venn (2002, 2009). For a 
more methodological critique of the inside/outside distinction, see Navaro-Yashin (2012) and 
Stopford (2004). 
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comes to be articulated. In this way, Lacanian theory is predicated on a conceptual 
distinction between the pre-social, unmediated self (or individual) and the (socially-
constructed) subject as expressed through the projection of certain images of subjective 
identity within the Imaginary realm on the one hand, and through the discursive 
articulation of social and political identity within the Symbolic realm on the other. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, I am less interested in the specular realm of the Imaginary 
(which in Lacanian theory is central to the formation of subjective identity)32 than in the 
inscription of the individual into the socially-constructed Symbolic realm and the 
consequent production of social and political identity. In Lacanian theory, the Symbolic 
order is the ensemble of signs and practices that make up the social order, and is 
structured according to the logic of language – in other words, the Symbolic is akin to the 
concept of the discursive discussed above. In order to become recognised as a social 
being, the self must submit their pre-social desires and drives to the social logic of 
Symbolic order via the medium of language (Lacan, 2004). Only by aligning themselves 
with particular discursive subject positions can individuals gain meaning as social 
subjects.  In this way, language and discourse come to determine both what individuals 
can say and the potential ways they have of speaking about the social world and their 
place within it.  
 
This brief outline of Lacanian theory helps to illuminate the way in which the cohesive 
pre-social self posited by both realist and constructivist theories of identity is marked as 
problematic from the start. Indeed, “psychoanalysis is founded on the rejection of 
traditional individualist conceptualisations of the subject” (Stavrakakis, 2008: 1037–8). 
According to Lacan, there is simply no recognisable self that exists prior to or outside of 
                                                             
32 For a discussion of the significance of the Imaginary in the formation of subjective identity, see 
Fink (Fink, 2017), Frosh (2008), Lacan (1968), and Stavrakakis (Stavrakakis, 2002). 
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the Symbolic realm; rather, what exists is an ensemble of unmediated desires that are 
given form and substance through submission to the discursive logic of the Symbolic 
order through identification with the subject. In this sense, “the ego, the reflexive ‘I’ (the 
Cartesian subject) is a fantasy. It does not exist as a cohesive entity” (Ewing, 1997: 27).  
Rather, the self can only gain meaningful existence through identification with the 
subject by articulating itself as an “I” or a “me” within the discursive Symbolic order 
(Epstein, 2010; Laclau, 1994). This framework takes seriously the discursive 
construction of social reality while refusing to fall into the poststructuralist trap of 
reducing individuals to mere products of discourse – instead, there is an active and 
agential process of identification that is required in order for the individual to enter the 
Symbolic realm that is nonetheless constrained by the discursive contours operating 
within the particular context in which that identification is made. Within a Lacanian 
framework, therefore, we move from an essentialist to a processual understanding of 
identity (Guillaume, 2007; Lloyd, 2005) where “identity” does not refer to some property 
or facet of the self but rather to an active practice of identification with the subject of 
discourse.  
 
However, because this Symbolic order is socially constructed and never of the 
individual’s own making – and thus “other” – the individual is necessarily alienated in 
entering it since it can never fully encompass the entirety of their interior psychic life 
(Frosh, 2010; Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008; Hook and Neill, 2008; Lacan, 2004, 2006; 
Laclau, 1994). This is the key to the Lacanian notion of the “lacking subject”. Since every 
discursive realm is defined and constrained by what lies outside it – its constitutive other 
– and is thus never complete in and of itself, all discursive systems (including that of the 
Symbolic order) are necessarily incomplete and lacking (Fink, 1995; Lacan, 2004; Laclau, 
1990; Laclau and Mouffe, 2000; Žižek, 1999). What this means is that the discursive 
subject that forms the core of social identity is itself lacking. As Verhaeghe (1998: 175) 
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lucidly puts it in relation to the notion of personal identity: “the very kernel of our 
personality is an empty space: peeling off layer after layer of identification in search of 
one’s personality, one ends up with a void, with the original lack.” For this reason, any 
attempt by the individual to identify with an identity category (understood as the subject 
of discourse) is therefore equally incomplete and lacking; and thus precipitates a 
constant re-articulation and re-iteration in a vain attempt to seek the impossible fullness 
of identity: “What we have then… is not identities but identifications, a series of failed 
identifications” (Stavrakakis, 2002: 29). 
 
The individual is thus trapped in an incorrigible bind; on the one hand, “one has to 
identify with something” (Laclau, 1994: 3; emphasis added), while on the other hand the 
subject with which the individual seeks to identify is exposed as hollow and lacking 
(Campbell, 1998; Doty, 2000; Epstein, 2008; Hansen, 2006; Smith, 2000; Zehfuss, 2001). 
For this reason, the process of identification is never complete and constantly in flux; 
perpetually shifting and reiterating itself in a doomed attempt to paper over the silences 
and cracks inherent in every discursive construction. Such an active and (re)iterative 
understanding of identity also takes seriously the differential and contingent nature of 
various discursive power structures across various times and contexts. Within this 
framework, then, the notion of any kind of coherent or stable identity emerges as a 
fantasy; in the words of Stuart Hall: identity “is, then, a process of articulation, a suturing, 
an over-determination... There is always ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ – an over-determination 
or a lack, but never a proper fit, a totality” (Hall, 2000: 17). This is where the Lacanian 
concept of ideological fantasy comes into force. For Lacan, the function of ideological 
discourse is predominantly “to ‘cover-over’ or conceal the subject’s lack by providing a 
fantasy of wholeness or harmony” (Howarth, 2013: 247). In the following section, I offer 
a brief exegesis of the Lacanian notion of ideological fantasy, before turning to the 
implications of such a theoretical framework for the argument of the thesis as a whole. 
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ii. Identity and Ideology 
Lacanian theory builds on the materialist concept of ideology developed by scholars such 
as Marx (Marx, 2010; Marx and Engels, 1972), Mannheim (Mannheim, 2013), and 
Althusser (Althusser, 1976, 2006) in which the consciousness of individuals is 
determined by the workings of the social world. Under such readings, ideology functions 
primarily as a “mental fiction” (Mannheim, 2013) produced by the ensemble of material 
practices and that works to maintain “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their 
real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 1976: 152–159). For such scholars, it is all but 
impossible to conceive of social practice without ideology, since it is ideology that plays 
a central role in maintaining the contemporary alignment of social structures by masking 
the true nature of those structures. Lacan, and Lacanian-inspired theorists such as Laclau 
and Žižek, take this move one step further, exposing the way in which ideology functions 
not only to obscure the material workings of the social world but also to paper over the 
discursive instability inherent in any form of identity construction by binding individuals 
to specific iterations of the subject through the workings of fantasy. 
 
For Lacan, ideology cannot simply be reduced to a rationalist preoccupation with 
“conscious, well-articulated systems of belief” (Eagleton, 2014: 221); rather, ideological 
formations involve attempts to “fix” the instability of the Symbolic order by papering 
over the lack inherent in any discursive articulation. In other words, ideology can be 
understood to represent “the point where power impacts upon certain utterances and 
inscribes itself tacitly within them” (Eagleton, 2014: 223). The way in which ideology 
performs this function is through the inscription of particular words and phrases that 
work to structure the meaning of a particular discourse (what Lacan calls points de 
capiton and Laclau and Mouffe call “nodal points”). These nodal points often take the 
form of what Laclau and Mouffe call “empty signifiers”: terms such as “justice”, “equality”, 
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“order”, etc. whose function it is to paper over the lack of social closure within any given 
discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). In this sense, then, “the articulation of a political 
discourse can only take place around an empty signifier that functions as a nodal point” 
(Howarth et al., 2000: 9). Of course, the way in which such nodal points function are 
contextual and contingent – and are themselves dependent on the socially-constructed 
meanings of the discursive Symbolic order – and thus expose the way in which discursive 
power alignments shift and rearrange themselves over time and across contexts. As 
Glynos argues: 
 
The link between ideology and power is generally taken for granted. More and 
more, so too is the link between power and systems of meaning. It is no longer 
uncommon to find analyses of ideological power conducted in terms of the 
‘naturalisation’ of meanings and patterns of meaning. Such naturalisations 
effectively conceal the political moment in which decisions could have been 
otherwise made on account of the irreducible contingency that inhabits the 
dynamics of socio-political discourse. (Glynos, 2001: 192) 
 
Žižek, in his application of Lacanian theory, takes this deconstruction of ideology one 
step further. For Žižek, the empty signifiers that work to “fix” or “quilt” discourse are 
themselves complicit in the Symbolic order, and take the form of particular norms that 
help to maintain the socio-political status quo (Žižek, 1989). These “master signifiers” do 
more than simply “fix” the meaning of particular discourses; they also work to structure 
the desire of the pre-social self by managing its entry into the socio-symbolic order. For 
Žižek, it is ideological fantasy that works to smooth over the inherent gaps in the system 
of signification by shaping the articulation of desire: 
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Fantasy thus animates and manages desire; it teaches us how to desire. But just as 
fantasy can never live up to its promises (because no fullness exists), so desire is 
never satiated; it is condemned to repetition and failure in search of the missing 
object. (Kapoor, 2014: 1134) 
 
In this sense, while the pre-social self desires the fullness of identity promised through 
identification with the subject of discourse, this desire can never be entirely fulfilled 
since the subject itself is lacking (as discussed above). It is this fundamental failure that 
lies at the heart of the power of ideology; ideology works to bind the self to (various 
iterations of) the subject by promoting the fantasy that its desires can and will be fulfilled 
– but the very impossibility of this fulfilment is what leads to a sense of dissatisfaction 
and thus requires a perpetual process of (re)identification with the subject in the first 
place. The pre-social self is thus trapped in a never-ending cycle of desire and alienation, 
in which it is “sold” the lie of the fullness of identity – a fullness it desperately desires. 
Ideology thus works to paper over the fundamental lack at the heart of subjective 
identity by promoting the fantasy of “identity”.  
 
Key to this understanding of ideological fantasy is the Lacanian concept of jouissance – 
what Žižek calls the “hidden kernel of enjoyment” (Žižek, 1989) – which designates the 
sense of pleasure derived from dissatisfaction (such as in the perpetual failure to fully 
identify with the subject of discourse). For Žižek, jouissance is key to explaining the 
formation of political community and identity, and can elucidate the affective and 
emotive mechanisms behind things that “stick”, such as why people become so attached 
to concepts and value-systems such as nationalism or xenophobia (Žižek, 1989, 2000, 
2005). In this sense, jouissance is a crucial element to the successful functioning of 
fantasy – in order for the subject to desire attachment to the ideological order (provided 
by fantasy), it must first come to enjoy this attachment (through jouissance). For this 
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reason, fantasy is a crucial element in the way ideology works to obscure the 
inconsistencies inherent in the Symbolic order and render participation in it enjoyable 
(Žižek, 1989, 2012). 
 
Taking inspiration from this theoretical paradigm, this thesis understands attempts to 
construct a cohesive and coherence “Shi’a” ethno-religious identity in the diasporic 
context as an ideological fantasy predicated on the (always-already impossible) desire 
for the fullness of subjective identity. It is through the (unstable) cultivation of a 
discursive “Shi’a community”, predicated on a shared sense of “Shi’a identity” that this 
ideological fantasy works to structure the desire of individuals by determining their 
sense of “belonging” to this community. Moreover, the production of a Shi’a-specific 
identity category predicated on the subjective desire for belonging forms part of a wider 
ideological fantasy sustained by the contemporary hegemonic power structures of 
neoliberalism and consumer capitalism whereby in-group identities are becoming 
increasingly streamlined and bounded via the logic of market segmentation. For this 
reason, not only should sectarianism be understood as an unconscious by-product of 
Shi’a-specific identity formation, it it also a necessary and inescapable product of the 
inscription of the ethno-religious Shi’a subject into the global ideological postmodern 
order.33 As Žižek argues:  
 
Today’s postmodern ethnic or religious “fundamentalism” and xenophobia are not 
only not “regressive” but, on the contrary, offer the supreme proof of the final 
emancipation of the economic logic of the market from the attachment to the 
ethnic Thing. (Žižek, 2000: 215) 
 
                                                             
33  This process of ethno-religious inscription into the global market productive of the 
sectarianised Shi’a subject is explored in detail in Chapter 5. 
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In this sense, the diasporic Shi’a subject can be seen as an ideological construction, one 
that is simultaneously the contingent product of contemporary discursive and political 
alignments and that channels the desires and attachments of individuals by promoting 
iterative practices of identification. Such a conception thus takes seriously the very real 
affective and emotional attachments individuals cultivate towards the Shi’a subject 
(whereby to be “Shi’a” is understood as a fundamentally positive and emancipatory 
identity articulation aimed at ethno-religious “belonging”) at the same time as it seeks to 
deconstruct those attachments and expose the way in which they are channelled by the 
manipulation of desire through the workings of discursive power. In this sense, the 
notion of a coherent and stable “Shi’a identity” functions as an ideological fantasy that 
channels the desire of individuals to identify with this subject at the same time as it 
unconsciously produces sectarianism as the by-product of such identity practices 
through its inscription in the contemporary (ideological) power structures of liberalism, 
equality, humanitarianism, minority rights, and consumer capitalism. 
 
Diasporic Fantasies: Ethics, Ideology, and Subject Formation 
Where does such a theoretical framework lead, in practice, when it comes to the study of 
transnational political identities such as ethno-sectarian categories of identification? 
Firstly, adopting a Lacanian conception of the subject as a discursive product of the 
Symbolic order makes it possible to avoid the trap of reifying group identities (such as 
the tendency to reify the sectarian categories of “Sunni” and “Shi’a” as primordial 
essences) and instead focus on the ways in which individuals perform their identification 
with the sectarian subject (the “I” or “me” who articulates themselves as “Sunni” or 
“Shi’a” in a relationship of mutual exclusivity and political antagonism). In this sense, the 
focus of inquiry is no longer on the nature and essence of sectarian identity per se, but 
rather on the practices and processes that are productive of the sectarian subject as a 
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discursive formation and which lead to its (re)articulation and (re)iteration across 
contexts.  
 
Secondly, the Lacanian foregrounding of antagonism and alienation produced by the 
lacking subject throws into sharp relief the contingent nature of individual and collective 
practices of identification with the sectarian subject and calls into question the 
discursive underpinnings that have produced this subject in the first place. In other 
words, a Lacanian lens allows us primarily to view all social identities as products of 
contingent and antagonistic discursive power (and therefore political by definition) – in 
this case the identity of the sectarian subject – and therefore to study the workings of 
such identities through a methodological focus on the articulatory practices of 
identification enacted by individuals and groups in relation to these identities, at the 
same time as it maintains an analytical distance between individuals and the sectarian 
identities they espouse.  
 
Thirdly, adopting a Lacanian-inspired approach to ideological fantasy exposes the extent 
to which the construction of a cohesive or coherent “Shi’a identity” is fundamentally 
lacking, and predicated on a desire for the (impossible) fullness of identification. In this 
sense, while the promotion and articulation of a Shi’a-specific identity is necessarily 
sectarian (in that it prioritises ethno-religious categories of identification over all 
others), this sectarianism is an unconscious by-product of identity-formation, obscured 
by the fantasy of a coherent “Shi’a identity”. In other words, rather than being an 
ideological construction in and of itself, which would be suggestive of some kind of 
coherent belief system with normative implications for the individuals who express it, 
sectarianism can be understood as the necessary but unconscious effect of practices of 
identity formation operating within the context of ideological fantasy. By emphasising 
the role ideology in the sectarianisation of the Shi’a subject, it is thus possible to 
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foreground the role of fantasy and desire in maintaining subjective attachments to the 
sectarian unconscious; thus precipitating a methodological focus on individual lived 
experience. 
 
In this way, clearly delineating between the individual and the subject not only sidesteps 
the realist and constructivist problem of the ontologically prior self, but adopting a 
processual approach to identity formation and articulation also helps to account for the 
multiple, shifting, fragmented, situated, contextual, hybrid and contingent ways in which 
such identities come to be articulated and manifested in the fabric of everyday life. In the 
case of diasporic Iraqi Shi’is, once the focus is shifted away from any kind of posited 
unitary Shi’a politico-religious identity and towards the construction and articulation of 
the Shi’a subject through an antagonistic identification with the lacking subject of 
discourse (i.e. away from the individual and towards the contingent processes 
underpinning the formation of such identities in the first place), the question transforms 
from one pertaining to the functioning of a Shi’a sectarian identity to one preoccupied 
with the formation and articulation of a sectarianised Shi’a subject and the various power 
structures invested in fostering and maintaining the political salience of that subject. It 
is this Shi’a subject (itself contingent, lacking, and reliant on antagonism) that serves as 
the object of analysis here. I should stress, however, that I am not claiming the sectarian 
Shi’a subject to be the only articulation of Shi’a identity currently available to individuals 
in the diaspora; rather, this subject is a product of specific discursive practices embedded 
in contemporary politics and discursive modernities (hence the emphasis on 
contingency) and points to the changing salience of “Shi’a” diasporic identity over time 
and across contexts. 
 
In particular, it is my contention that the diasporic encounter between politicised 
constructions of Shi’a ethno-religious identity and hegemonic liberal discourses of 
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humanitarianism, minority representation, and consumer capitalism has produced the 
ideological contours of a Shi’a-specific identity construction that inevitably results in 
sectarianism as its unconscious by-product. As a result of this emphasis on the 
relationship between sectarianism, liberalism, and modernity, part of the contribution 
of this thesis will be to illuminate the link between the ethical cultivation of a 
humanitarian sensibility and the promotion of intra-communal antagonism and violence 
through unconscious attachments to sectarianism. Contemporary society is arguably 
living through an “ethical turn”, whereby claims and grievances that once would have 
found political expression are increasingly being articulated in the language of 
apoliticised morality (Bourg, 2007; Davis and Womack, 2001; Eastwood, 2015; Fassin, 
2014; Rancière, 2007). This has the dual effect of simultaneously decontextualising 
political conflicts at the same time as it flattens and distils the relevance of collectives 
and institutions in favour of cultivating a moral sensibility geared towards the nebulous 
concept of “humanity” (Rancière, 2007: 31–34). As Rancière notes: “properly understood 
[the ethical turn] signifies a mode of symbolic structuration of the community that 
empties out the political core that constitutes it” (2007: 32). Fassin goes on to expound 
on the way this turn to humanism has resulted in the evacuation of antagonistic moral 
sentiment from the political sphere: 
 
 A significant evolution of contemporary society has been the banalization of 
moral discourse and moral sentiments in the public sphere, the insistence on 
suffering and trauma in the interpretation of a multiplicity of social issues, the 
focus on human rights and humanitarianism in international politics, as well as the 
invocation of ethics in a wide range of human activities, from finance or 
development to medicine and research, from the re-discovery of bodily practices 
of the self in religious and secular worlds to the social expectation of the subjects’ 
autonomy. (Fassin, 2014: 433) 
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While there is considerable scholarly contention regarding whether or not the concept 
of ethics can be equated to that of morality, within the field of the anthropology of ethics, 
at least, there is a certain amount of consensus regarding the analytical distinctness of 
these two terms (Davis and Womack, 2001; Eastwood, 2015; Fassin, 2011, 2014; 
Faubion, 2012; Hutchings, 2010; Laidlaw, 2013). Drawing on this literature, this thesis 
adopts a definition of morality that sees it primarily as the ideological pursuit of the 
“good” (in the Aristotelian sense), while conceptualising ethics as those “codes of 
behaviour or sets of values that set out what is right to do within particular contexts” 
(Hutchings, 2010: 6). In this sense, while ethics and morality are inextricably 
intertwined, the former can be understood as a specific set of practices geared towards 
the achievement of the latter – in other words, ethics is key to processes of ideological 
subject formation (Eastwood, 2016; Faubion, 2012; Foucault, 2012).  
 
Part of the focus of this thesis, therefore, will be on the ways in which the “banalization 
of moral discourse” (Fassin, 2014: 433) has entered into articulations of Shi’a identity by 
paying attention to the kinds of ethical discourses that contribute to the formation of an 
ideological (and politicised) Shi’a-specific minority identity. Just as the invocation of 
humanitarian intervention in the context of war can paradoxically legitimate the further 
use of violence (Bellamy, 2006; Chesterman, 2001; Coker, 2001; Douzinas, 2003; Fassin, 
2011; Weizman, 2011), or the invocation of humanitarian aid can work to perpetuate the 
stigmatisation and marginalisation of the non-Western world (Belgrad and Nachmias, 
1997; Chesterman, 2001; Hoffmann, n.d.; Kapoor, 2013, 2014; Macrae, 1998), this thesis 
contends that the rise of normatively-inflected discourses in relation to the assertion of 
a Shi’a-specific identity may also function as an ideological construct that unconsciously 
works to produce a form of sectarianism that is itself founded on a logic of ethical 
humanitarianism. In this sense, sectarianism can be understood as a direct (if 
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unconscious) product of the contemporary world, in which globalised norms of justice, 
equality, humanitarianism, and minority rights are gaining increasing salience and 
representation across different contexts.  
 
For this reason, a focus on the ethical parameters of the Shi’a subject as a product of 
identity-formation should be seen not as a commentary on whether or not this subject is 
“good” in the normative sense, but rather as an exposition of the ways in which the 
production of the Shi’a subject is predicated on an ethical and ideological preoccupation 
with “being (a good) Shi’a”. This emphasis on the Shi’a subject as an ethical subject thus 
serves to highlight the underlying affective, emotive, and contingent processes working 
to produce this subject as a product of discursive political power. As Mahmood (2011: 
xiii) highlights: “political projects are not only the result of coalitional organising, 
ideological mobilisation, and critical deliberation. They are predicated upon affective, 
ethical, and sensible capacities that are often ignored as consequential to the analysis of 
politics.” 
 
Within the contemporary neoliberal capitalist moment, the ethical commitment to 
humanitarianism, justice, and minority rights thus functions as an ideological fantasy 
that works to bind individuals to particular iterations of the Shi’a subject (for example, 
in claims towards “Shi’a rights” and “Shi’a pride”) that simultaneously obscures the 
sectarian unconscious produced by such identity formations. In this sense, the 
sectarianised Shi’a subject can be understood as part of a wider global trend towards the 
specificity and particularisation of ethno-religious, cultural, and racial identity 
categories as cultivated by neoliberal discursive power and the segmentation of the 
“market for identities” produced by the workings of consumer capitalism (Comaroff, 
1996; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009; Modood and Werbner, 1997; Navaro-Yashin et al., 
2002). Ultimately, this thesis does not seek to offer any kind of normative judgement 
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regarding the cultivation, articulation, and propagation of the sectarianised Shi’a subject; 
rather, I am interested in documenting the multiple and shifting ways in which this 
subject has emerged within the contemporary diasporic imaginary and is itself reflective 
of wider processes of minority identity formation and subjectivity within the modern 
world. 
 
Methodology: (Re)defining Sectarianism 
 
Every particular study is a many-faceted mirror… reflecting the exchanges, 
readings, and confrontations that form the conditions of its possibility, but it is a 
broken and anamorphic mirror (others are fragmented and altered by it). (De 
Certeau, 1988: 44) 
 
The problematic nature of researching identity – something that is by definition 
subjective, elusive, and open to interpretation – needs to be confronted head on and not 
evaded in a study such as this. As well as being politically, historically, and contextually 
determined, “the subject is a shifting and always changing intersection of complex, 
contradictory, and unfinished processes” (Flax, 1993: 108). For this reason, I do not 
understand the evidence gathered during the research process as offering a holistic or 
comprehensive view of the social world, but rather as offering a “partial” (Soss, 2006) 
and fragmentary glimpse at the multiple and complex processes that come together to 
create specific forms of political identity – in this case, that of the sectarianised Shi’a 
diasporic subject. The theoretical approach of the thesis thus lends itself to a qualitative 
study in which the object of research is the play of the political in “its multiple 
metamorphoses”, as manifested at the site of everyday practice (Navaro-Yashin, 2002: 
3). 
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Due to the thesis’ focus on the multiple (re)articulations of the sectarianised Shi’a subject 
across time and space, I inevitably prioritised the personal and experiential in my 
methodological approach as a way of gaining access to the everyday processes involved 
in the production, management, and policing of this subject. The methods adopted for 
this research were therefore primarily qualitative, in order to build a more 
comprehensive picture of the “social process of meaning-making” as embedded in 
different contexts (Soss 2006: 139). The primary research for the thesis was conducted 
over a period of 18 months between June 2014 and December 2015, and combined 
elements of ethnographic participant observation, interviews (I conducted a total of 32 
semi-structured and 50 informal interviews, as well as innumerable conversations and 
interactions throughout the research process), and discourse analysis of primary 
sources. In addition, and as a result of my focus on the Shi’a diasporic subject as 
imagined, articulated, and performed by practicing Shi’is, I attended a number of 
religious gatherings (known as majalis, sing. majlis), both at private homes and at 
hussainiyyat throughout the research process, including a total of ten ‘Ashura majalis and 
the 2014 and 2015 annual ‘Ashura and Muharram marches on London’s Edgware Road. 
In June 2015, I also participated in a three-week pilgrimage tour to Iran aimed at second-
generation diasporic Shi’is, which included visits to the cities of Qom, Mashhad, Esfahan, 
and Tehran, as well as two weeks of English-language hawza classes in Qom and 
Mashhad. 
 
While the methodological approach of this thesis is thus primarily qualitative and 
interpretive, my experience of conducting fieldwork for this project has similarly 
required the cultivation of an ethnographic sensibility with regards to the (re)iterative 
process of the research itself. For this reason, the theoretical and empirical focus of the 
thesis has changed throughout the research process in response to my findings. Rather 
than seeing this as a flaw, I have come to understand the (re)iterative process of field 
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research as being fundamental to the expansion of knowledge within my chosen field. As 
Kapiszewski, Maclean, and Read argue: “iteration (the updating of elements of research 
design as information acquired in the field is analysed) is critically important to way in 
which field research contributes to the generation of political knowledge and 
development of theory” (Kapiszewski et al., 2015: 18). The thesis’ ultimate focus on 
sectarianism as an unconscious by-product of identity formation should thus be 
understood as an empirically-grounded product of my research findings, and not as a 
pre-formulated hypothesis constructed within the confines of the allegorical ivory tower 
prior to entering the field. 
 
Although the bulk of the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted over a period of 18 
months in 2014-2015, the scope of the research itself extends far beyond this time-frame 
and encompasses the entirety of my interactions with Iraqi Shi’is in London since early 
2011. Indeed, the initial inspiration for the study conducted here – ultimately in a very 
different iteration than first imagined – came from my personal relationship with Iraqi 
Shi’is who had been deported under the Saddam Hussain regime as being “of Iranian 
origin” (taba’iyya Iraniyya).34 Originally, my interest was primarily in collecting personal 
testimonies of these deportations and documenting the ways in which the enduring 
legacy of the Ba’th regime under Saddam Hussain had shaped the identities of these 
individuals in the diaspora. However, through spending time amongst Iraqi Shi’is in 
London I came to realise that although the deportations were significant, they were only 
a small part of a larger puzzle when it came to articulations of Shi’a ethno-religious 
identity within the diasporic British context. In particular, I was surprised to encounter 
narratives and discourses that emphasised the importance of “Shi’aness” and Shi’ism in 
ways that replicated the logic of other kinds of minority identity constructions through 
an emphasis on justice, equality, humanitarianism, and minority rights in ways that 
                                                             
34 See the discussion in Chapter 1. 
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transcended the national or cultural origins of the various individuals who expressed 
such attachments. In this way, I was able to trace an emerging shift among diasporic Iraqi 
Shi’is away from nationally-bound identifications with “Iraq” and towards a 
transnational and trans-ethnic concept of “Shi’aness” couched in ethno-religious terms. 
 
Set against the background of rising sectarian tension in the Middle East – especially the 
fomenting sectarian violence in Iraq and Syria and the rise of radical Sunni groups such 
as Islamic State (ISIS) – the timing of my research thus played a significant factor in 
shaping the kinds of data I was able to procure. The foregrounding of sectarianism within 
the thesis – a term that I was initially keen to avoid at all costs, both as a result of its 
negative connotations and as a result of my fear of inadequately representing the 
complexity of Shi’a identity by reducing it to its sectarian manifestations – is thus a direct 
reflection of the kinds of discourses, attachments, and articulations I encountered in the 
field. In particular, my primary theoretical intervention to reconceptualise sectarianism 
as an unconscious by-product of minority identity formation has grown out of direct 
interaction with individuals and groups who primarily see themselves as building an 
emancipated and positive “Shi’a identity” that can be used to combat the perceived rising 
tide of “anti-Shi’ism” and “Shi’aphobia” around the world. 
 
In this sense, the thesis’ prioritisation of sectarian identification should not be seen as an 
attempt to flatten or gloss over the heterogeneity of Shi’a identity formations within the 
British diasporic context, but rather as a preoccupation with one particular discursive 
formation of what it means to be “Shi’a” in the contemporary world that seeks to explore 
the multiple, fluid, and ambivalent ways in which individuals can come to articulate their 
sense of shared “Shi’aness” at the same time as it acknowledges the political salience of 




At the time of writing, intra-communal sectarianism between Muslim communities in the 
West is becoming more pertinent than ever, and the enduring conflicts in the Middle East 
and elsewhere within the Islamic world are increasingly being translated into the 
domestic spheres of countries such as the UK – whether through the recent spate of 
attacks perpetrated by British-born Muslims inspired by the nihilistic doctrines of ISIS 
and other such militant groups or through the ongoing securitisation of Islam and the 
British Muslim population via government policies such as Prevent. By presenting an 
alternative understanding of sectarianism that seeks to foreground the significance of 
modern projects of minority identity formation and articulation, it is my hope that this 
thesis will form part of a wider scholarly intervention that seeks to understand the 
mechanisms and processes that work to produce sectarian antagonisms, rather than 
simply seeing these antagonisms as uncritically “bad” things to be combatted through 




Since the primary theoretical preoccupations of this thesis revolve around the multiple 
and differential processes of subject-formation productive of the sectarianised Shi’a 
diasporic subject, each of the five substantive chapters presented here can be seen to 
represent five different discursive sites within which this subject has come to be 
cultivated and articulated – and thus five different manifestations of the Shi’a subject 
across time and space.  
 
Chapter 1 adopts a Lacanian-inflected analysis in order to explore the emergence of a 
politically-invested discourse regarding the role and function of the signifier “Iraq” 
within the Iraqi-Shi’a diasporic imaginary. As a whole, the chapter traces the ongoing 
shift from nationalistic to ethno-sectarian forms of identity construction within the Iraqi 
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Shi’a diaspora through an exploration of the historical, affective, and contemporary 
forces productive of various forms of identification and belonging within the diasporic 
imaginary. The first part of the chapter focuses primarily on the history of Iraqi Shi’a 
migration to the UK and the specific context of the Ba’th regime under Saddam Hussain 
to foreground the ways in which Shi’a ethno-religious identity has been discursively 
marked from the outset due to the structurally sectarian nature of Ba’thist Iraq and the 
traumatic experience of exile and migration endured by Iraqi Shi’is. In particular, I 
document the ways in which nostalgic attachments to the signifier “Iraq” as the lost 
homeland of exile have both endured and been transformed within the diasporic context.  
 
Continuing this preoccupation with the discursive signifier “Iraq”, the second part of the 
chapter traces the way in which the rupture precipitated by the US-led invasion of 2003 
and the ensuing ethno-sectarian violence within Iraq, as well as the contemporary rise 
of militant (Sunni) Islamist group ISIS, has led to the fragmentation of diasporic identity 
formations such that “Iraq” has come to be articulated primarily as “Shi’a-Iraq” through 
its status as the spiritual and historical “home” of Shi’a Islam and the contemporary 
discursive battleground between (“good”) Shi’a Islam and (“bad”) Sunni Islam. Overall, 
Chapter 1 presents an historically and empirically grounded exposition of the discursive 
identity shift from nationalistic to ethno-sectarian identity categories within the 
contemporary diasporic imaginary that, I argue, is productive of a particular kind of 
sectarianised Shi’a diasporic subject in which “Shi’aness” is increasingly being decoupled 
from “Iraqiness” and constructed as an identity category in its own right. 
 
Chapter 1 thus lays the empirical and theoretical groundwork for the discussion in 
Chapter 2, which focuses primarily on the move towards forms of identification and 
belonging that foreground Shi’a ethno-religious specificity. In particular, I focus on the 
cultivation of what I call the “ideal” Shi’a subject through the enduring power of the Shi’a 
 61 
theological establishment and on the historical emergence of a politically-inflected Shi’a 
discursive ethics founded on victimhood and emancipation and its transformation in the 
contemporary moment through the rise of militant Sunni groups such as ISIS. The first 
part of the chapter focuses on the transnational nature of Shi’ism through a study of the 
religious and political authority of the clerical establishment in Iraq and Iran. In 
particular, I seek to draw out the ways in which the intersection of Shi’a clerical authority 
with enduring transnational religious and political networks – including the geopolitical 
influence of the Iranian Islamic Republic – has contributed to the formation of an 
idealised Shi’a subject embedded in networks of scholarly interests and patronage. This 
preoccupation with the ideal Shi’a subject is then fleshed out through an historical 
exploration of the politicisation of Shi’a religious mythology throughout the latter part 
of the twentieth century and on the cultivation of a Shi’a-specific ethics of victimhood 
and emancipation through the Karbala paradigm.  
 
Taken together, the first two chapters of the thesis thus provide the necessary historical 
and political background to understand the contemporary shift from Iraqi-Shi’a subject 
to (Iraqi-)Shi’a subject by exploring the kinds of subjective attachments available to 
individuals when identifying with the signifiers “Iraqi” and “Shi’a” over time and space. 
In Chapter 3, I turn to the context of diasporic London in order to understand the ways 
in which the encounter with the British social and political context has been formative 
in shaping the contours of the sectarianised Shi’a subject – in other words, to what makes 
this subject diasporic. Part of this project involves exploring the relationship between 
(Shi’a) Islam and the British state, as well as the ways in which (Iraqi) Shi’is move, 
engage, and live within the urban setting of diasporic London.  
 
Crucially, Chapter 3 makes the case that the British government’s implementation of 
multiculturalism founded on a logic of ethnonormativity has been influential in defining 
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the types of ethnic, religious, and political subjectivities available to diasporic (Iraqi) 
Shi’is, while the domestic social context of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment post 
9/11 has contributed to the emergence of a Shi’a-specific ethics of victimhood and 
identification, often defined in opposition to “radical” Sunni Islam. Moreover, the 
significance of the diasporic encounter, in which Shi’a Muslims from various national and 
cultural backgrounds have increasingly come together under the identity category 
“Shi’a”, has contributed to the cultivation of a transnational and trans-ethnic ethno-
religious understanding of “Shi’aness” predicated on sectarian belonging. 
 
Having thus traced the emergence of the sectarianised Shi’a subject among Iraqi Shi’i 
diasporans in the UK as a discursive product of multiple factors and power relations, the 
final two chapters of the thesis concern themselves primarily with the way in which this 
subject is currently being articulated, performed, and conceptualised within the 
contemporary diasporic imaginary. In particular, it is my contention that the 
development of a transnational and trans-ethnic conception of “Shi’aness” as a bounded 
identity category is a product of the encounter both with liberal normative discourses, 
such as those of “equality”, “justice”, and “human rights”, and of the commodification of 
identities on the global marketplace. Chapter 4 explores the first half of this equation 
through a detailed analysis of what I call the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” which, I argue, 
has emerged as a direct product of the diasporic encounter between Western liberal 
humanitarian norms (understood as ideological constructs) and the complex political, 
theological, and social history of Shi’ism as a minority religious identity. Moreover, the 
rise of “Shi’a Rights” is fundamental both to the production of the Shi’a subject as an 
ethical subject and to the unconscious sectarianisation of that subject through the 
discursive prioritisation of Shi’a rights over those of all other minorities. In other words, 
while the contemporary diasporic Shi’a subject represents a positive articulation of Shi’a 
identity (where it has become an ethically “good” thing to identify as “Shi’a”), this subject 
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also works to unconsciously (re)produce sectarianism through the necessary creation of 
an Other against which to define itself. 
 
In the fifth and final chapter, I continue my preoccupation with contemporary 
articulations of the (sectarianised) Shi’a subject by excavating the ways in which this 
subject has been permeated by the logic of neoliberal capitalism and inscribed into the 
global economy through practices of commodification and fetishisation. In particular, I 
explore the discursive construction and symbolic resonance of the identity category 
“Shi’a” as it has come to be represented within the international marketplace through 
the proliferation of what I call “Shi’a objects”. Significantly, it is my contention that the 
symbolic construction of “Shi’aness” as an ethno-religious identity category in its own 
right has been facilitated by the logic of consumer capitalism whereby the production of 
minority identities is bound up with the workings of the global market. In this sense, the 
sectarianised Shi’a subject can come to be understood as a thoroughly modern product 
of contemporary forces of power, globalisation, capitalism, and consumerism in a 
manner that replicates other kinds of group-based minority identity formations, and not 
as a throwback to some kind of essentialised or primordial sectarian “essence”. 
 
In this way, the thesis progresses thematically from an historically-grounded 
understanding of the Iraqi-Shi’a subject as experienced and articulated through the lived 
reality of exile, diaspora, and melancholia (Chapter 1), to iterations of the (Iraqi-)Shi’a 
subject through the integration of Shi’a politico-religious theology and myth with the 
contemporary sectarian politics of Iraq and ISIS (Chapter 2), to the cultivation of a 
transnational and trans-ethnic Shi’a subject as mediated through the British domestic 
context (Chapter 3) and as articulated in relation to contemporary hegemonic discourses 
of humanitarianism and minority rights (Chapter 4) and the global workings of 
consumer capitalism (Chapter 5). Taken together, each of the five substantive chapters 
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offers a snapshot into one particular aspect of Shi’a ethno-religious subject-formation 
within the contemporary diasporic imaginary. While it is impossible to capture every 
facet of the sectarianised diasporic Shi’a subject – itself an ideological production that is 
multiple, fluid, contextual, and ambivalent in its various iterations – I have focused on 
five elements of discursive identity formation that I believe are key to the cultivation, 
production, articulation, and imagination of the sectarianised Shi’a subject within the 
contemporary diasporic context. 
Chapter 1 – Iraq, Interrupted: 
From Nationalism to Sectarianism 
 
 
Prologue: “Iraq Disappears” 
 
Iraq disappears with        
every step its exiles take 
and contracts whenever 
a window’s left half-shut 
and trembles whenever 
shadows cross its path. 
Maybe some gun-muzzle 
was eyeing me up an alley. 
The Iraq that’s gone: half 
its history was kohl and song 
its other half evil, wrong 
 
Adan Al-Sayegh, Rotterdam 1997 
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Within the diasporic imaginary productive of  the Iraqi-Shi’a subject, the idea of “Iraq” 
functions as a symbol35 – a hollowed-out signifier whose discursive contours have been 
filled with a variety of material and affective attachments. Iraq as an ideal and as a 
territorial entity has symbolic significance for exiled Iraqi Shi’is not only as the locus of 
diasporic attachment to the lost homeland, but also as a site for the inscription of Shi’a 
piety and mythology via the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala. Moreover, the meaning 
and content of the signifier “Iraq” has changed over both time and space partly as a direct 
result of the experiences of exile and diaspora, and has been further implicated in the 
symbolic and material violence of the contemporary sectarian politics of the Middle East. 
In this sense, and as evocatively described in the Al-Sayegh poem quoted above, “Iraq” 
as historical homeland has “disappeared” with “every step its exiles” have taken away 
from it; but the “Iraq” that has “gone” was a fantasy – nothing but “kohl and song”. There 
is also a significant genealogical element to the “disappearance” of Iraq within the 
diasporic imaginary, as each subsequent generation born outside the “homeland” is less 
and less likely to harbour direct memories of Iraq pre-exile. In other words, the diasporic 
experience has changed not only what it means to be “Iraqi” in the context of exile and 
displacement, but also the very meaning and symbolic resonance of the notion of “Iraq” 
itself. 
 
But if the “Iraq” of exile has been lost, what has it been replaced by? In the contemporary 
diasporic imaginary, what kinds of discourses circulate regarding this lost Iraqi 
homeland, and what, if any, is the relationship between being “Iraqi” and being “Shi’a”. 
For example, how is it possible for a third-generation British-born Shi’a Muslim of 
Pakistani origin to claim Iraq as her “home”;36 or for a Canadian-born Iraqi Shi’i to decide 
                                                             
35 It should be noted that I am using the term “symbol” here in its idiomatic, not Lacanian sense. 
References to the Lacanian Symbolic order are capitalised following scholarly convention in order 
to distinguish it from common usage. 
36 Facebook post by Saarah B. on 14 November 2016 tagging her location as Najaf, Iraq, with the 
description “home is where the heart is”. 
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to move to Karbala, away from her family and her social networks, in order to be closer 
to her “roots”. 37  Similarly, how does it make sense for a second-generation non-
practicing Iraqi of Shi’a background to declare that he feels “less Iraqi” today than ten 
years ago; 38  or for a group of second-generation British Shi’is from different ethno-
national backgrounds to circulate a map of Iraq superimposed with the words: “the 
residence of our Shi’a”? 39 Such examples raise questions not only about the meaning and 
content of “Iraq” as a symbolic signifier, but also of its changing relationship to varying 
articulations of Shi’ism and “Shi’aness” within the diasporic context.  
 
From the perspective of a Lacanian-inflected discourse analysis, “Iraq” functions as  a 
nodal point (“point de capiton”) within a discursive system that is productive of a specific 
type of diasporic Iraqi-Shi’a subject (Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Howarth et al., 2000; 
Lacan, 2002, 2004; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Žižek, 1989). And yet this is a signifier with 
multiple and shifting meanings, and that can never be eternally “fixed” within a lacking 
and incomplete system of signification. For this reason, each iteration of the signifier 
“Iraq” requires particular affective attachments that gloss over the inherent instability 
within the system itself, and undergird the potential for subjective identification. It is 
these fantasies of “Iraq”, and the type of subject each (re)iteration of this signifier 
engenders within the diasporic context, that occupies the heart of this chapter. 
Moreover, a key enquiry undertaken throughout is the way in which the changing 
resonance of “Iraq” has been affected by the experience of exile and diaspora, and has in 
turn shaped the emergence of a sectarianised Iraqi-Shi’a diasporic subject. If Iraq has 
“disappeared” – i.e. faded in relevance when it comes to identity- and subject-formation 
within the diasporic imaginary – what kinds of subjectivities have emerged in its place? 
 
                                                             
37 Informal conversation with Zayneb H, 15 June 2015. 
38 Interview 5. 
39 Image shared through Whatsapp on 17 February 2015. 
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Introduction 
The sectarianisation of the diasporic Iraqi-Shi’a subject explored throughout this thesis, 
whereby nationalistic forms of identification have been superseded by forms of 
politicised ethno-religious belonging, has not happened in a vacuum. The subject, as 
outlined in the Introduction, is itself a product of ideological and discursive power, and 
is thus an effect of power relations that expose the workings of of political contingency 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). In order to present a study of the sectarianised Iraqi-Shi’a 
diasporic subject, therefore, it is necessary to interrogate the ways in which the meaning 
and content of the identity categories “Iraqi” and “Shi’a”, themselves products of 
contemporary power structures, have changed over both time and space, both 
independently and in relation to each other.  
 
While the symbol of “Iraq” continues to loom large in the affective attachments of 
diasporic Iraqi Shi’is, both as the lost homeland of exile and the historical birthplace of 
Shi’a Islam, it is my contention that in the contemporary diasporic imaginary, these two 
symbolic visions of Iraq – “Iraq-as-homeland” and “Shi’a-Iraq” – have become decoupled 
both from each other and from any underlying sense of Iraqi ethno-national belonging. 
The result of this, I would like to suggest, is that the enduring attachment to Iraq as the 
lost homeland has been transformed in the diasporic space into a primary attachment to 
Iraq as the mythological and spiritual “home” of Shi’a Islam, in which contemporary 
political and sectarian conflicts have come to be inscribed with a Shi’a-specific logic of 
victimhood and identification. In such iterations, the physical territory of Iraq has been 
transformed from place of exile into the symbolic homeland of the Shi’a faith; where a 
Shi’a ethics of piety and ethno-religious belonging has been inscribed into the landscape 
of the country through the cultivation of affective and material links to the southern 
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shrine cities and through the politicisation of sectarian categories as a result of rising 
intra-communal violence post-2003.40  
 
Moreover, this alternative symbolic function of “Iraq” as the contemporary battleground 
between (“good”) Shi’a Islam and (“bad”) Sunni Islam has led to forms of attachment 
which no longer require any ethno-national ties to Iraq itself but are instead invested 
with racialised and ethnicised notions of Shi’a belonging. In this sense, the symbolic 
function of “Iraq” is no longer relevant to Iraqis alone, but undergirds the formation of a 
sectarianised (transnational and trans-ethnic) Shi’a subject within the diasporic 
imaginary. In the context of diasporic London, where Shi’is from different ethno-national 
backgrounds increasingly come together under the all-inclusive banner of “Shi’ism” 
(Ridgeon, 2012; Scharbrodt and Shanneik, 2018; Spellman-Poots, 2012; van den Bos, 
2012), the discursive effects rippling from the shift from “Iraq-as-homeland” to “Shi’a 
Iraq” are not limited to the experience of Iraqis themselves, but have taken on new 
resonance for all practicing Shi’is, especially with the recent rise of ISIS and other 
militant Sunni groups operating within Iraqi territory that represent both a physical and 
existential threat to certain forms of Shi’a identity constructions.  
 
For this reason, the shift from nationalistic to sectarianised identifications within the 
Iraqi Shi’a diaspora should be seen as part of a wider trend away from forms of 
identification narrowly bound to the territorial entity of the nation-state and towards 
more fluid forms of subject-formation that emphasise in-group commonalities and 
reflect shifting global patterns of liberalism, commodification, and capitalism (as 
explored throughout this thesis). In this sense, while the focus of this chapter is on the 
                                                             
40  One effect of this shift towards “Shi’a Iraq” has plausibly been the reconfiguring of the 
geographically imagined entity of “Iraq” from that of Mesopotamia – the “land of two rivers”; the 
“birthplace of civilization” – inspired by pre-Islamic history and culture to a territorial space 
configured by the Southern Shi’a shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala. 
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development and transformation of the signifier “Iraq” in shaping the contours of the 
Iraqi-Shi’a subject over time and space, the insights offered here should also be seen to 
speak to wider discursive and power alignments that are productive of a particular kind 
of sectarianised Shi’a subject within the diasporic context.   
 
This chapter traces the emergence of a politically-invested discourse regarding the role 
and function of the signifier “Iraq” within the Iraqi-Shi’a diasporic imaginary. In 
particular, the focus is on the shift from Iraq as lost homeland (as experienced through 
the loss of exile and mediated by the encounter with Saddam Hussain’s Ba’thist regime) 
to “Iraq” as a discursive place-holder for the cultivation of an ideologically-driven “Shi’a 
consciousness” (cf. Meer, 2010). This discursive shift, I suggest, is reflective of a broader 
shift in the identificatory practices of exiled Iraqi Shi’is for whom attachments to a 
specifically Iraqi form of ethno-national belonging have become tempered with, and 
eventually superseded by, an attachment to particular ways of being Shi’a. The genesis 
for this shift plausibly began as a reaction to the structural sectarianism experienced 
under the Ba’th regime – including the forcible expulsion of significant numbers of Iraqi 
Shi’is from the land they considered home41 – and has developed against the backdrop 
of rising sectarian and communal violence within Iraq itself and the wider Middle East, 
as well as within the diasporic context of the British state. For this reason, it is important 
to understand the emergence of the sectarianised Iraqi-Shi’a diasporic subject as a 
product of both historical and contemporary power alignments; whether that be the 
political power of Saddam Hussain and the Ba’th Party, the religious and theological 
power of the Shi’a religious establishment (explored in Chapter 2), the bureaucratic 
power of British multiculturalism policies (explored in Chapter 3), or the violent and 
                                                             
41 During the 1980s, and following the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the ensuing Iran-Iraq war, 
Saddam Hussain deported an estimated 200,000 Iraqi Shi’is of alleged “Iranian origin” over the 
border into the Islamic Republic (Cole, 2002; McLachlan and Joffé, 1984; Metz, 2004). 
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symbolic power of contemporary militant groups such as Islamic State (ISIS) and 
Iranian-backed Shi’a militias. 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to trace the material and discursive architecture 
that underpin the shift from nationalistic to sectarian forms of identification – from 
“Iraq(i)” to “Shi’a” – and to understand the ways in which this shift has shaped the 
emergence of the sectarianised Iraqi-Shi’a subject within the diasporic context. Through 
an exploration of the Iraqi domestic and British diasporic contexts, this chapter thus lays 
the groundwork for Chapter 2, which focuses primarily on the cultivation of the ideal 
Shi’a subject through the enduring power of the Shi’a theological establishment and on 
the historical emergence of a politically-inflected Shi’a discursive ethics founded on 
victimhood and emancipation and its transformation in the contemporary moment 
through the rise of militant Sunni groups such as ISIS. Taken together, the first two 
chapters of the thesis provide the necessary historical and political background to 
understand the contemporary emergence of the sectarianised (Iraqi-)Shi’a subject by 
exploring the kinds of subjective attachments available to individuals when identifying 
with the signifiers “Iraqi” and “Shi’a” over time and space. 
 
Saddam’s Ghost: Shi’ism, Discourse, and the Diasporic Imaginary 
 
Because of Saddam, many Iraqis had to go around the world. At the beginning, 
Saddam was bad, but now, Alhamdulillah [thanks to God], Saddam has made 
the Shi’a, the followers of Ahlulbayt, spread all over the world. (Sheikh 
Morteza Maddahi)42  
 
 
                                                             
42 Statement made during an English-language theology lesson in Qom, Iran, 8 June 2015, Source: 
author’s fieldnotes. 
 71 
We can say thank you to Saddam for spreading Shi’ism to the world. (Interview 
7) 
 
Despite the diversity of the Iraqi Shi’a diaspora in the UK, comprising of individuals from 
different political, religious, socio-economic, and educational backgrounds, the largest 
wave of Iraqi exiles who came to settle in the UK throughout the 1980s and 90s had one 
fundamental thing in common: they left Iraq (either voluntarily or by force) as a result 
of the policies and actions of Saddam Hussain’s Ba’th regime. While a sense of Iraqi 
national belonging remained very strong amongst first-generation diasporic Iraqis (Shi’a 
or otherwise) during the 1980s and 90s (Al-Ali, 2007; Al-Ali and Al-Najjar, 2013; Al-
Khalidi et al., 2007; Al-Rasheed, 1994; Saleh, 2011), I would like to suggest that their 
experience of exile was intimately tied to the enduring legacy of the Iraqi Ba’thist state – 
both in fostering forms of political opposition against Saddam Hussain and in cultivating 
modes of identification and belonging that asserted discursive formulations of the 
category of “Iraqiness” and “Shi’aness” that explicitly opposed themselves to Ba’thist 
state discourse. Since the vast majority of those who made up the second wave of Iraqi 
migration to the UK left Iraq for politically-motivated reasons, and thus were victims of 
forced or coerced migration, there is an extent to which they felt the need to assert their 
sense of nationalistic belonging to Iraq in direct opposition to the Ba’thist state’s 
attempts to delegitimise these individuals’ attachments to their country of origin (Al-Ali, 
2007; Al-Ali and Al-Najjar, 2013; Al-Rasheed, 1994; Alkhairo, 2011; Kadhum, 2016; 
Saleh, 2011).  
 
For this reason, in order to build a comprehensive understanding of the diasporic Iraqi-
Shi’a subject in the late twentieth century, it is first necessary to understand the 
relationship between the diaspora and the Iraqi Ba’thist state, and in particular of the 
enduring and haunting effects of Saddam Hussain’s authoritarian regime. In this sense, 
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the Iraqi-Shi’a diaspora can itself be understood as a direct product of Ba’thist state 
power under Saddam Hussain. Iraq under Saddam – the Ba’thist Iraq of the memory of 
exile – thus functions as one particular articulation of the signifier “Iraq” within the 
diasporic imaginary; an Iraq whose material and symbolic significance has helped shape 
the contours of subjectivity within the diaspora.  
 
“We are not Iranian”: Shi’ism as Other in Ba’thist Iraq 
In the Introduction, I presented a brief historical chronology of Iraqi emigration 
throughout the late twentieth century, and particularly of the role of the Ba’thist regime 
under Saddam Hussain in shaping the demographics of the Iraqi diaspora as a result of 
the state’s persecution and marginalisation of politically and/or religiously active Shi’is. 
Here, I turn to the discursive and psychic underpinnings of Ba’thist constructions of 
“Iraq” and “Iraqiness”, in order to highlight how the material and symbolic elements of 
the experience of exile came to be woven together in the diasporic imaginary to produce 
a particular kind of political (and politicised) Iraqi-Shi’a subject. Significantly, the 
political, economic, and social, marginalisation of the Shi’a under Saddam, coupled with 
the politicised construction of Shi’ism as “Iranian” and “other” by Ba’thist state discourse 
(Bengio, 1998; Davis, 2005; Davis and Sassoon, 2012; Lewental, 2011; Sassoon, 2011) 
came to redefine the boundaries of what it meant to be both Iraqi and Shi’a within 
Saddam’s Iraq.  
 
Consider the following statement from one of my interviewees, a prominent critic of the 
Ba’th regime: 
 
The Ba’th institutionalised the basic idea that your nationality, your identity, was 
connected with your belief about yourself. So you were an Arab if you thought 
yourself an Arab… The Ba’th actually institutionalised that in 1977 with the 
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Legal Reform Law,43 and if you look at the language it says an Iraqi is one who 
believes in the principles of the Ba’th revolution, who believes in the leading 
role of the party… and if you waver in any shape or form in those beliefs your 
very Iraqiness is called into question. (Interview 1) 
 
In other words, the very foundation of Ba’thist discourse was built on the 
institutionalisation of ethno-national identity in which claims to be Iraqi were only 
legitimised if they conformed to a recognisable discursive pattern (i.e. that of Arab 
Ba’thism) (Bengio, 1998; Davis, 2005; Davis and Sassoon, 2012; Sassoon, 2011; Tripp, 
2002). As the interviewee notes, according to this logic, those who did not conform were 
not Iraqi by definition and therefore eligible for expulsion from the national body (either 
symbolically or literally).  
 
Despite the overwhelming consensus among scholars of Iraq that the Ba’th regime under 
Saddam Hussain was not ideologically sectarian, there are a number of factors that 
worked to render the Ba’thist state structurally sectarian in its fostering of patrimonial 
ties according to which Arab Sunnis were afforded disproportionate privileges through 
the institutionalisation of tribal and familial forms of loyalty and patronage (Adib-
Moghaddam, 2007; Al-Ali, 2007; Al-Marashi, 2003; Baram, 1997; Batatu, 1978, 1981; 
Bengio, 1998; Dodge, 2005; Sassoon, 2012; Tripp, 2007).44 One particular manifestation 
of the structural inequality of the Ba’thist state was the violent persecution and 
repression of all forms of political opposition. Moreover, under the Saddam regime, all 
forms of Shi’a religious practice were publically banned – not necessarily as a result of 
                                                             
43 In 1977, the Iraqi government issued an amendment to the original 1924 Iraqi Nationality Law 
that allowed anyone of “Arab” heritage to apply for Iraqi citizenship (barring Palestinians). 
According to Nakash, “the Ba’th used the nationality law… to deny a great number of Shi’is, 
including Fayli Kurds, Iraqi nationality, citing their Iranian origins” (Nakash, 2011: 87).  
44 Shi’a Muslims nominally make up around 60-70 per cent of the Iraqi population, but since at 
least the Ottoman era have historically been marginalised in both political and social spheres by 
the dominant Sunni minority. 
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discrimination per se, but due to Saddam Hussain’s paranoia of the potential for an 
Iranian-aligned Shi’a “fifth column” inside Iraq, coupled with his well-documented dislike 
of any kind of large public gathering not sanctioned by the state (Al-Marashi, 2003; 
Baram, 1997; Bengio, 1998; Davis, 2005; Sassoon, 2012; Tripp, 2007). Against the 
backdrop of the Shi’a Islamic Revolution in Iran, it is possible to see how Saddam’s 
preoccupation with his own political hegemony resulted in the ostracism and 
marginalisation of Iraqi Shi’is within Iraq as a result of their (alleged) sympathy for the 
newly-minted Iranian regime.45 In Ba’thist discourse, this combination of political and 
historical factors led to the discursive construction of Iraqi Shi’is as potentially deviant, 
materially bolstered by the deportation of several thousand Iraqis of alleged “Iranian 
origin” (taba’iyya Iraniyya) over the border into Iran during the 1980s and 90s (Adib-
Moghaddam, 2007; Cole, 2002; Davis, 2005; McLachlan and Joffé, 1984; Metz, 2004; Salbi, 
2005).46  
 
Ironically, many of the individuals deported into the Islamic Republic by the Ba’th regime 
on the grounds of being “Iranian” considered themselves to be Arab and Iraqi and 
therefore felt little affinity – beyond perhaps religious commonality – to the country in 
which they found themselves.47 For this reason, rather than simply “returning” Iranians 
living in Iraq to their “home” in Iran, as Saddam Hussain possibly thought, the 
deportations of the 1980s thus resulted in uprooting significant numbers of self-
                                                             
45 The systematic persecution of Iraqi Shi’is marked a culmination of many years of Ba’thist tactics 
of displacement and control employed against various populations deemed to be a “threat” to the 
Ba’thist national cause (the Kurds, for example, were continually displaced and persecuted 
throughout the Ba’th regime, climaxing in the 1988 Anfal, which involved the mass extermination 
of Kurdish villages in northern Iraq). 
46 Estimates of the number of Iraqis deported during this period vary widely, from as low as 
15,000 (Batatu, 1981) to as high as  300,000 (Interview 4). A significant number of (Shi’a) Faili 
Kurds were also deported during this period. The history of the Failis differs significantly from 
that of Arab Shi’a in Iraq, and for this reason they do not form part of the focus of this study. 
47 Indeed, as a number of studies have highlighted (Alshamary, 2013; Baram, 1981; Batatu, 1981; 
Cole, 2002; Dabashi, 2011a; Faleh, 2003; Haddad, 2011; Marr, 1985; Nakash, 2003a, 2003b; Nasr, 
2004), Iraqi Shi’ism has historically been qualitatively different to its Iranian counterpart, most 
significantly when it comes to the differences in nationalistic identifications of Iraqi and Iranian 
Shi’is. 
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identifying Iraqi-Shi’is and dispersing them along the border of a foreign and alien 
country. In the context of the war, Iranian state propaganda against Arabs was as 
vociferous as Ba’thist discourse against Iran, and as a result, many deportees made all 
attempts possible to flee, often by way of Syria, with a significant proportion eventually 
settling in the UK. 48  
 
The historical and political context of the Iraqi Ba’thist state in the latter part of the 
twentieth century thus laid both the material and discursive groundwork for the 
emergence of a sectarianised Iraqi-Shi’a diasporic subject – both as result of the physical 
expulsion of Shi’is from the Iraqi nation-state and of the discursive othering of Shi’ism as 
“Iranian” and “non-Iraqi” by definition. For first-generation diasporans grappling with 
the material, psychic, and emotional effects of exile, these combined factors plausibly led 
to the emergence of a narrative of victimhood and marginalisation that justified their 
expulsion from Iraq on sectarian grounds. Unable to lay claim to either the (Arab/Sunni) 
“Iraqi” identity constructed by the Ba’th or the “Iranian” ethno-national identity they 
were accused of, individuals seeking to identify with their country of origin were required 
to find other explanations for their physical and discursive rejection by the Iraqi state 
under Saddam; the most obvious candidate being their status as Shi’a Muslims, which had 
precipitated such rejection in the first place. As one interviewee explained: 
 
There were so many [deportees who] have no relatives in Iran, they have no 
relation to Iran, they don’t speak the language, they don’t know any language 
other than Iraqi [Arabic]; but [the Iraqi government] accuse [them] of being 
                                                             
48 Although a number of Iraqis, especially those lacking the funds or contacts to leave, remained 
in Iran, some stranded in refugee camps on the border for several years. However, there are no 
reliable figures available for the numbers of deportees who stayed in Iran versus those who left, 
or even for the proportion of Shi’is who were directly deported and those who fled from fear of 
deportation. For this reason, this study must necessarily take a qualitative and not quantitative 
perspective of the types of political subjectivity engendered by such processes, in order to tie 
them to contemporary forms of political engagement and mobilisation. 
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Iranian. But we found out by experience [that] actually the choice was the Shi’a 
who were being accused of being Iranian by the rulers. That’s what they were 
after, the Shi’a. They suspect that they may side with Iran when the war comes… 
Definitely it was sectarian. The government [was] targeting the Shi’a sect… It 
was ethnic cleansing. (Interview 4)49 
 
In this sense, the cumulative effect of Ba’thist discourse intent on casting the deportees 
as “Iranian” and “other”, and the deportees’ contrary insistence that “we are not 
Iranian”50 served to construct the Iraqi-Shi’a diasporic subject during the late twentieth 
century as a) politically invested in opposition to the Ba’thist regime, and b) affectively 
invested in a sense of victimhood and persecution predicated on identification with 
(either secular or religious) forms of Shi’a belonging. Rather than simply ridding itself of 
rogue elements, as Saddam possibly thought, I would like to suggest that the Ba’thist 
regime’s deportation of Shi’is “of Iranian origin” instead produced a discursive rupture in 
diasporic Iraqis’ own subjective understandings of themselves; thus paving the way for 
the formation of new, sectarianised forms of attachment to the homeland of “Iraq” within 
the diasporic space (since if they couldn’t claim to be “Iraqi” in the same sense as that 
defined by the Ba’th regime, they had to seek alternative ways to claim both their national 
and religious belongings).  
 
While it remains possible for individuals within the diaspora to identify with either the 
identity category of “Iraqi” and “Shi’a” in multiple and shifting ways, the political context 
of Iraqi state- and nation-building practices throughout the late twentieth century laid 
the groundwork for the discursive emergence of a hybridised and Iraqi-Shi’a subject in 
                                                             
49  It should be noted here that there is no concrete evidence to suggest the Ba’th regime 
intentionally targeted Shi’is for ideological reasons, but rather the deportations were more likely 
than not a result of the state’s desire to rid itself of elements it deemed a potential threat to its 
rule. 
50 A sentiment I encountered repeatedly during the course of my fieldwork – even among Iraqis 
whose family had historical ties to Iran and spoke Persian as a second language.  
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which notions of “Iraqiness” were rendered politically and discursively problematic in 
relation to notions of “Shi’aness”. For this reason, it would seem that the enduring legacy 
of the Ba’thist regime in classifying Iraqi Shi’is as taba’iyya, and therefore Iranian and 
non-Arab by association, has been subsumed into diasporic fantasies and imaginaries of 
what it means to be “Iraqi” or “Shi’a” that have coalesced to produce a diasporic Iraqi-
Shi’a subject in which sectarian forms of belonging and identification have become 
increasingly salient. Indeed, despite the scholarly consensus that the Ba’th regime was 
not ideologically sectarian, the vast majority of my research participants produced 
narratives that explicitly condemned the Ba’th for their persecution of Shi’is along 
sectarian lines.  
 
The Ba’th regime under Saddam Hussain thus engaged in a number of material and 
discursive practices that led to the alienation and exclusion of Iraqi Shi’is from the Iraqi 
state- and nation-building project and whose enduring legacy was to physically and 
psychically produce the Iraqi-Shi’a diasporic subject as a discursive construction 
explicitly opposed to Ba’thist understandings of the identity categories of both “Shi’a” 
and “Iraqi” – and the presumed mutual exclusion between the two. This is not to say that 
only one particular formulation of the Iraqi diasporic subject was produced by such 
practices, but rather that the discursive and political significance of simultaneously 
asserting an Iraqi and a Shi’a identity was made problematic as a result of the Ba’thist 
regime’s attempt to forcefully and violently separate these two categories of 
identification.  
 
This transition from Iraqi ethno-nationalism to Shi’a politico-religious sectarianism that 
plausibly began with the forcible expulsion of Iraqi Shi’is under Saddam, has further been 
augmented by the contemporary political context of civil war and sectarian violence that 
continues to plague the current Iraqi nation-state. In particular, the 2003 US-led invasion 
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created a significant rupture with the romanticised and nostalgic “Iraq” of exile and led 
to the birth of a new “Iraq”; the Iraq of symbolic and material violence, coupled with a 
sense of Shi’a “resurgence” (Cole, 2002; Nasr, 2004, 2007; Walker, 2006). It is to the 
symbolic significance of this new, violent, sectarianised Iraq that I now turn. 
 
 
From Saddam to Sadr: Iraq, Interrupted 
While an emerging attachment to (religious or secular) Shi’a forms of belonging in the 
diasporic space arguably resulted from the discursive and physical ostracism of Iraqis 
“of Iranian origin”, pre-2003 there was a significant extent to which diasporic Iraqis’ 
assertions of their religious affiliation were inextricably tied to their sense of national 
belonging – hence the hybridised formulation “Iraqi-Shi’a”. One interviewee summarised 
this feeling when describing the lack of integration by Iraqis into wider British society: 
“We thought we would go back; that Saddam would fall and we could go home”.51 Indeed, 
the epicentre for Iraqi opposition politics throughout the 1980s and 90s was located in 
London, with a number of prominent figures going on to form part of the post-2003 Iraqi 
government. As prominent Iraqi activist Kanan Makiya noted ruefully: “It’s amazing how 
many of the political class in Iraq hold British passports” (Interview 1).  
 
Such enduring nationalistic attachments to Iraq are typical of first-generation 
diasporans, who tend to romanticise the place of origin as a lost homeland and mobilise 
around idealised visions of the home state (Adamson, 2008; Acton, 1862; Axel, 2001; 
Boyarin, 1993; Brah, 1996; Brubaker, 2005; Hall, 1990; Koinova, 2009; Said, 2001; 
Werbner, 2002; among others). The US-led invasion of 2003, therefore, precipitated a 
rupture for Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora who, on the one hand, cultivated nostalgic 
attachments to Iraq as a lost homeland and, on the other, saw the political vacuum left 
                                                             
51 Interview 23. 
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by the overthrow of Saddam Hussain as an opportunity to promote a “Shi’a vision” of 
Iraq as a counter to decades of Sunni-dominated rule. In this sense, the political and 
social fallout of the 2003 invasion and ensuing civil conflict abruptly shattered both the 
diasporic political projects aimed at mobilising against the Saddam regime (thus opening 
up space for a more “Shi’a” political vision of Iraq) and the romanticised vision of Iraq 
harboured in the diasporic imaginary – sustained in part by diasporans’ limited or no 
access to the country, aided by an international media blackout52 and a nostalgic longing 
for the past. As one young British-born Iraqi Shi’i reflected: 
 
That’s why 2003 was such a big deal. Because up until then Iraq was very much 
a myth. It was almost like a black hole that people talked about but that you 
never really knew whether or not it existed. I grew up with stories about Iraq, 
and all these memories and this nostalgia. But then in 2003 it became a reality. 
I remember at the beginning there was all this talk about Iraq becoming the next 
Dubai in 10 years, of Starbucks in Najaf – and then the shit hit the fan, if you’ll 
excuse my language. (Interview 10) 
 
For many diasporic Iraqis, 2003 thus represented a watershed moment in which their 
previous conception of their relationship to and understanding of their country of origin 
(the “myth” of Iraq identified by the above participant) was suddenly and violently 
challenged in ways that unsettled the boundaries of the Iraqi-Shi’a subject and 
precipitated a movement away from Iraqi nationalistic identifications and towards more 
explicitly sectarianised forms of belonging (whether symbolically or through active 
political participation and mobilisation). Much of the blurring of these categories of 
identification, and the ensuing politicisation and sectarianisation of the Iraqi-Shi’a 
diasporic subject, I would like to suggest, is a result of the psychic and political rupture 
                                                             
52 With the notable exception of the 1991 Gulf War. 
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precipitated by the 2003 invasion and the consequences this had on the subjective 
fantasies sustained in the diasporic imaginary. Moreover, 2003 also resulted in the 
physical and material, as well as psychic, rupturing of the diasporic imaginary, whereby 
many or the more prominent diaspora political and social figures took the opportunity 
to return to Iraq to be part of the transitional political process there. As one interviewee 
put it: “All the [Iraqis] who became political and active returned [after 2003]. What is left 
here now is a hollow shell” (Interview 1). 
 
Shattering the Myth of “Iraq” 
If the Iraqi-Shi’a diasporic subject of the 1980s and 90s was characterised in political 
terms by opposition to the Saddam regime and an orientation towards (secular or 
religious) forms of Shi’a identification, it was characterised emotionally and affectively 
by nostalgia for a lost homeland and longing for return to the land of exile. In the words 
of Zainab Saleh, for exiled Iraqis, “the space [of diaspora] is that of nostalgia – nostalgia 
for an imagined place (Iraq), for an imagined time (the golden age of the 1950s) and/or 
imagined experience (that of Iraqis who lived during that golden age)” (Saleh, 2011: 
231). Indeed, numerous studies have highlighted the prominence of nostalgia for the 
homeland and the desire for return in the experience of first-generation diasporic Iraqis 
living abroad (often tempered with quasi-mythological references to ancient Iraq 
through invocations of the civilisations of Mesopotamia, Babylon, Sumeria, and Assyria) 
(al-Ali, 2007; al-Khalifa, 2003; Alkhairo, 2008; al-Rasheed, 2004; Flynn, 2013; Jones-
Gailani, 2014; Kubba, 2003; Salbi, 2005; Saleh, 2011; Witteborn, 2008). Consider the 
following account from an Iraqi woman forced to leave as a young girl: 
 
I can still picture every corner of our house in Najaf… When I first came to the 
UK I had this recurring dream that I was with my cousins [in Iraq], and I told 
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them: “It’s not a dream anymore, we’re back.” But then I opened my eyes and I 
saw we’re still here [in London]. (Interview 8) 
 
Iraq here is imbued with an imaginary quality; both in the literal sense of the word 
through its appearance in a dream and in the Lacanian sense through its implicit 
equation with the Imaginary as represented by the originary myth of childhood 
innocence. But this idealistic and utopian fantasy projected by Iraqis in the diaspora was 
permanently and violently disrupted in 2003 when exiled Iraqis were finally able to 
return to the land of their birth only to discover a country ravaged by decades of 
dictatorship, war, violence, sanctions and insurgency. As one interviewee put it: “Iraq 
used to be the bride of the khaleej [Gulf]; now it is zubala [rubbish]”. Post-2003, the 
thwarted desire for the lost homeland thus produced a psychic rupturing between 
previous identifications with “Iraq” as the land of exile and (be)longing and 
contemporary politically-charged vision of “Iraq” as a desolate war-zone tied up with 
notions of sectarianism, insurgency, violence, and invasion. The vast majority of Iraqi 
Shi’is exiled in the 1980s and 90s found, post-2003, that they no longer had any real 
sense of belonging to the Iraq they saw reflected in the television and satellite images 
dominating the 24-hour news cycle, and so resigned themselves to a life in diaspora (al-
Ali, 2007; al-Khalifa, 2003; Alkhairo, 2008; al-Rasheed, 2004; Flynn, 2013; Kubba, 2003; 
Salbi, 2005; Saleh, 2011). Once the dream of return had been shattered the diasporic 
imaginary, previously a liminal space of exile and refuge, became a permanent space of 
resignation and adjustment.53  
 
                                                             
53 There are no accurate figures pertaining to the number of Iraqis who remained in the UK post-
2003; just as there are no accurate figures for the number of Iraqis in the UK as a whole. However, 
it should be noted that a number of politically active Iraqis, especially those involved in diasporic 
opposition movements such as the Iraqi National Congress, the Iraqi Democratic Union, the Iraqi 
National Front and the Iraqi National Accord, did indeed return to Iraq post-2003 – but since my 
focus in this thesis is on forms of subjectivity and identification engendered in the diaspora, the 
experiences of these individuals will not be delved into in any significant detail here. 
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Moreover, this sense of alienations from previous diasporic identifications with “Iraq” 
was further exacerbated by the sense of creeping political and social disillusionment 
following the events of 2003. As prominent Iraqi exile and statesman Adnan Pachachi 
writes in his memoir:  
 
The first thing that struck me on my return [in 2003] was the belief of many Iraqis, 
especially the young, that the US presence, even as an occupying power, would 
benefit Iraq… All those hopes and expectations soon disappeared, to be replaced 
by anger, frustration, and resentment. (Pachachi, 2013: 125–6) 
 
While there are a number of factors that contributed to this sense of disillusionment, both 
amongst Iraqis in Iraq and exiles in the diaspora, the imposition of a new Iraqi 
government based on sectarian quotas arguably played a key role in, on the one hand, 
shattering any myth of a unified or coherent Iraq and, on the other, in the increasing 
sectarianisation of Iraqi political and social identity, both domestically and in the 
diaspora. As one of my interviewees put it:  “Post-2003 sectarian identities have become 
more institutionalised… Iraq has been moving towards what some people have called the 
‘Lebanisation’ of Iraqi politics. Iraqis became categorised through communal categories 
– so you had to be Sunni, or Kurd, or Shi’a; there was no other choice” (Interview 22). 
 
In this sense, the psychic rupture precipitated by the 2003 invasion has led to a 
problematising of Iraqi diasporic identification; whereas prior to 2003 Iraqis in the 
diaspora were able to articulate their sense of “Iraqiness” – of their attachment to the 
subject constructed as “Iraqi” – in relation to the enduring fantasy of the lost homeland 
(often defined in opposition to the Ba’thification of Iraq under Saddam), post-2003 this 
fantasy could no longer be sustained, thus resulting in forms of diasporic identification 
in which the appellation of “Iraqiness” had no relationship to the contemporary 
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(sectarianised) reality of the Iraqi state and instead referred to this lost Iraq, the 
imaginary “Iraq” of exile (which had now “disappeared”, as in the Al-Sayegh poem quoted 
at the beginning of this chapter). The rupture of 2003 thus precipitated a movement 
away from the hybridised Iraqi-Shi’a subject of the 1980s and 90s, and towards 
identificatory practices that took to heart the problematic association of “Iraqiness” with 
“Shi’aness” where one identity category was no longer able to stand in for the other. In 
this way, Iraqi Shi’is (whether within Iraq or in the diaspora) were increasingly required 
to identify with the category of “Shi’a”; whether as a way of aligning themselves with the 
post-2003 Shi’a-led government or as a way to gain social intelligibility within a 
discursive field that necessitated particular forms of ethno-religious categorisation.  
 
Diaspora and Melancholia 
The best way to understand this rupture between pre- and post-2003 forms of 
(be)longing and identification with the imagined homeland of Iraq, I would like to 
suggest, is through the psychoanalytic notion of melancholia. First outlined by Freud in 
his 1917 essay “Mourning and Melancholia”, melancholia is distinguished from 
mourning by the ongoing unconscious attachment to the lost object. While mourning 
involves coming to terms with the loss of a real object (say, the death of a loved one), 
melancholia on the other hand involves the individual’s rejection of the loss of an 
unconscious object, or rather, of the subjective fantasy attached to that object (Freud, 
1994). In melancholia, while the individual may acknowledge the loss of the object itself, 
they are unable to acknowledge the loss of their unconscious attachment to that object – 
or rather, to the object of fantasy (in Lacanian terms, the objet a) – and thus continue to 
identify with that object even after it no longer exists. Melancholia thus represents a 
condition in which “the object relationship [is] shattered [but] the result [is] not the 
normal one of withdrawal of the libido from this object and a displacement onto a new 
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one, but something different… an identification of the ego with the abandoned object” 
(Freud, 1994: 249, original emphasis).  
 
In Freudian terms, then, the psychic rupture caused by the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
produced exactly this kind of melancholic longing in which the object of fantasy (Iraq), 
which had previously been imbued with nostalgic longing, was disrupted by the reality 
of the political and social situation in the country in the wake of the US led intervention. 
In this sense, the vision of “Iraq” sustained in the diasporic imaginary (both in the literal 
and Lacanian senses of the term), and which formed the basis for diasporic forms of 
nationalistic attachment and identification, was abruptly and permanently lost. Of 
course, this imagined “Iraq” had never really existed in the first place, but the experience 
of exile and the lack of real information about the country during the Saddam era meant 
that the fantasy could thrive unchecked. Only in 2003 when the world’s media turned its 
attention to Iraq and the country’s borders were made passable for diasporans for the 
first time since the early 1980s was this fantasy abruptly confronted with the reality of 
its own fabrication. In other words, as long as Iraq remained inaccessible to Iraqis in exile 
– both in terms of physical access and in terms of material information emerging from 
the country – they were able to maintain their imaginary attachment to the “Iraq” of their 
rose-tinted memories. But when this fantasy was violently removed from them as a 
result of the 2003 invasion, rather than accepting the loss of the object of desire (the 
“Iraq” of their “dreams”), many diasporic Iraqis were simply unable to come to terms 
with this loss and instead maintained psychic attachments to “Iraq” through a 
mechanism of melancholia. 
 
This melancholic attachment to the unattainable object of desire is reflected in the 
following song lyrics, written after the 2003 US-led invasion by a young Iraqi-born man 
whose family fled Iraq when he was just a baby: 
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I woke up when I was just a young boy, 
And saw that life’s not what it seems. 
I realised long ago, 
It’s a dream within a dream. 
I remember when father once held my hand, 
Told me a story about a faraway land, 
Land of hope, land of mystery, 
The land I never got to see. 
 
She cries, “son can you help me? 
Your father, he abandoned me.” 
I weep, I’m just lost here, 
I don’t know where I’m meant to be. 
They say: “Boy, don’t loose your identity, 
Remember who and what you’re supposed to be, 
Part of a distorted community 
Of the land I never got to see. 
 
She was once the endless beauty of time  
Now… she’s a dying rose 
Lost her elegance, vibrancy, and charm, 
Broken by life’s endless blows. 
Times of Babylon and the golden gate, 
Wiped away by ravage and by hate. 
Savaged throughout history, 
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The land I never got to see.54 
 
These lyrics strongly evoke a sense of loss and longing that arguably came to define the 
experience of exile and displacement for many (though not all) Iraqis in the diaspora 
throughout the late twentieth century.55  More than this, the poetic verses chart the 
diaspora’s changing relationship with Iraq – from mythical place of origin (“land of hope, 
land of mystery”); to politically-fraught land of exile (“part of a distorted community”); 
to locus of identity (“remember who you are”); to disillusionment and betrayal (“broken 
by life’s endless blows”). It is these last two orientations that speak most strongly of 
melancholic desire, especially in the enduring sense of longing and attachment to the lost 
homeland despite recognition that this homeland no longer exists in any real sense – as 
evoked in the repeated refrain of “the land I never got to see”. According to Freud, 
melancholia does not just involve enduring attachment to and identification with the 
object of loss, it also involves a mechanism of self-punishment and self-criticism which 
occasionally takes on the form of a reproach directed at the lost object for having allowed 
itself to be lost in the first place (Freud, 1994).  
 
In the case of Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora, then, it can plausibly be argued that the 
melancholia produced by the rupture of 2003 has resulted in a simultaneous orientation 
towards and away from Iraq – towards “Iraq” as the object of fantasy and away from the 
reality of Iraq as the object of melancholia. In this sense, the psychic rupture precipitated 
by the 2003 invasion has led to a problematising of Iraqi diasporic identification; 
whereas prior to 2003 Iraqis in the diaspora were able to articulate their sense of 
“Iraqiness” – of their attachment to the subject constructed as “Iraqi” – in relation to the 
enduring fantasy of the lost homeland (“land of hope, land of mystery”), post 2003 this 
                                                             
54 Excerpt of song lyrics by M. Madani. Source: author’s fieldnotes. 
55 This is perhaps less true of those activists and political figures who went back after 2003 and 
became involved in domestic Iraqi politics. 
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fantasy could no longer be sustained without recourse to the problematic mechanism of 
melancholia, thus resulting in forms of diasporic identification in which the appellation 
of “Iraqiness” had no relationship to the contemporary reality of the Iraqi state and 
instead referred to this lost Iraq: “the land I never got to see”. Interestingly, a few years 
after writing the lyrics quoted above, the same man travelled to Iraq and reported feeling 
a sense of dislocation and alienation on being confronted with the real-life manifestation 
of his object of desire: “I felt more Iraqi before I went to Iraq; now I don’t know what I 
am.”56 In other words, the result of this melancholic attachment to Iraq as an object of 
fantasy was to produce forms of identification that directly conflicted with the reality of 
Iraq itself and instead worked to either sustain nostalgic fantasies of “Iraq” within the 
diasporic imaginary or to produce forms of identification that no longer took “Iraq” as 
their core constitutive formulation.  
 
While the Freudian conception of melancholia illuminates the dual process of 
attachment and rejection invoked in diasporans’ identifications with Iraq, Sara Kaplan 
(2007) draws on an alternative conceptualisation of melancholia to explain how 
melancholic attachments can undergird political orientations in the diasporic context. 
Contrary to Freud’s understanding of melancholia as a form of individual psychosis, 
Kaplan puts forward a notion of melancholia that sees it “not as a private, backward-
looking phenomenon of paralysing psychic conflict, but as an embodied individual and 
collective psychic practice with the political potential to transform grief into the 
articulation of grievances” (Kaplan, 2007: 513). Understood in this way, it is possible to 
see how melancholia can undergird the kinds of attachments and imaginaries that can 
be seen reflected in claims of in-group or out-group belonging and difference. In the case 
of Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora, the melancholic attachment to “Iraq”, coupled with a Shi’a-
specific ethics of victimhood and marginalisation, can thus lead to forms of sectarianised 
                                                             
56 Interview 5. 
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identity-claims mobilised for political gain – such as the returnees who sought to 
capitalise on the sectarian quotas imposed post-2003, for example.  
 
From this perspective, diasporic melancholia doesn’t just work to shape forms of psychic 
attachment and identification to the subject constructed as “Iraqi”, it also undergirds 
political orientations towards Iraq as a homeland manifested as an “historically and 
geographically specific militant articulation of present and future political desires that is 
rooted in the unending mourning of the past” (Kaplan, 2007: 521). When this 
melancholic political orientation is combined with the experience of Shi’a religious and 
cultural practices in the diasporic space (explored in Chapter 2) – and in particular with 
the political salience of specifically Shi’a forms of identification as outlined in the first 
part of this chapter – it is possible to see how the mechanism of melancholia can lead to 
imbuing the Iraqi diasporic subject with an explicitly Shi’a politico-religious flavour. In 
this way, the mechanism of melancholia can be seen to undergird both forms of diasporic 
political mobilisation oriented towards Iraq and diasporic articulations of Shi’a-specific 
identity that are decreasingly tied to the political entity of the Iraqi state. Melancholia 
thus helps explain the differential orientations of diasporic Iraqi Shi’is towards Iraq, as 
well as the shift away from nationalistic towards sectarianised forms of identification 
that I am most interested in this thesis. This is all the more pertinent when considering 
the way in which religious and national forms of identification have become 
problematised through the experience of exile and diaspora as outlined above. 
 
Iraq in Fragments: Violence and Religion post-2003  
If 2003 represented a moment of rupture with regards to diasporic attachments to 
“Iraq”, then it also represented a moment of rupture with the discursive content of the 
signifier “Iraq” as articulated in diasporic fantasies. Specifically, the rose-tinted vision of 
Iraq as a land of cosmopolitanism, where people of diverse races, religions, and creeds 
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were able to live in harmony with each other, was abruptly shattered in light of the 
flaring inter- and intra-communal violence that engulfed the country in the years 
following the invasion. I was struck by how many of my interviewees insisted that 
sectarianism in Iraq was nothing more than an American import, making claims such as 
that “before 2001 we never had even heard about something called Sunni or Shi’i” 
(Interview 6), or that “we didn’t think in our generation about Sunni and Shi’i” (Interview 
4). However, the fantasy of “Iraq” as a country of tolerance and opportunity that 
undergirded previous diasporic attachments and identifications was, in the harsh light 
of day, exposed as just that – a fantasy. Interestingly, such comments also seem to 
contradict some of the previous statements made by other interviewees, suggesting that 
there may be socio-economic or generational differences in the way in which different 
Iraqis experienced and negotiated issues such as sect on a daily basis. On the other hand, 
it is also possible that such claims towards an asectarian past are equally couched in 
nostalgia and fantasy, and serve as an attempt to gloss over the structurally and 
administratively sectarian nature of the Iraqi state under the Ba’th.  
 
One of the most interesting facets of the psychic and discursive rupture created by 2003 
and the years following it, was how it exposed for the first time the diverse attachments 
and fantasies that diasporans had been cultivating towards the “Iraq” of their desires; 
thus exposing the unconscious of the Iraqi diasporic subject. As one of my interviewees 
put it, reflecting on the high tempers that inevitably flared during any gathering of Iraqis 
in London: “it's almost as if my Iraq is not their Iraq”; 57  while another interviewee 
referred to the “clash of ideologies” amongst diasporic Iraqis.58 In other words, they all 
considered themselves “Iraqis”, but the content and workings of that particular signifier 
                                                             
57 Interview 23. 
58 Interview 19. 
 90 
functioned differently for different people, a fact that was only brought to light once such 
fantasies were confronted with the reality of post-war Iraq. 
 
This notion of individual Iraqis harbouring different visions of and attachments to “Iraq” 
is certainly not unusual; one of the constants of any discursive identity construction is 
its inherent internal instability and incoherence. However, as explored above, prior to 
2003 diasporans were able to mostly gloss over such internal divisions due to the shared 
trauma of exile and the cultivation of a phantasmatic attachment to the “Iraq” of memory 
(not the mention the impetus to construct a unified Iraqi identity provided by the various 
diasporic oppositional political organisations – though this itself was highly 
problematic). Only when faced with the violent reality of post-2003 Iraq were such 
internal rifts – what Lacan would term the unconscious of the nationalistic Iraqi 
diasporic subject – thrown into sharp relief. In this sense, 2003 marked a shift towards 
the fragmentation of Iraqi(-Shi’a) diasporic identity, where diasporans’ differing visions 
and fantasies of “Iraq” suddenly took on political significance in light of the events 
unfolding within the country itself. Of course, it would be an overstatement to suggest 
that the salience of ethnic and sectarian identity categories only really came to the 
surface in the wake of the 2003 invasion (even if that is the narrative that many 
diasporans would have us believe). Rather, the rupture created by 2003 threw into sharp 
relief the underlying processes that had already been shaping a politicised and ethno-
sectarian Iraqi-Shi’a subject in the diasporic setting through the mechanisms of trauma, 
abjection, melancholia, haunting, fantasy, and identification explored throughout this 
thesis.  
 
One example of the way in which the fragmentation of Iraqi ethno-national identity came 
to be inscribed with a political logic of violence and exclusionism is the various 
attachments fostered by sectarian insurgency and civil war of 2006-8. Although the war 
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took place within the geographical confines of Iraq itself, its repercussions were felt 
widely, including in the diaspora. Space limitations prevent me from going into an in-
depth analysis of the various insurgent groups and currents operating within Iraq at that 
time, but suffice it to say that from the relative safety of diasporic London, a significant 
number of the Iraqis I interviewed felt that the violence cemented their feeling of being 
“Shi’a”, either as a besieged and victimised group or in opposition to the radical politics 
of prominent Shi’a figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr (Interviews 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 
13, 18, 19, and 27). One young British-born man, for example, offered the following 
analysis: 
 
This guy [Muqtada al-Sadr], he’s a gangster… He’s Jabba the Hutt; he’s the 
gangster in Star Wars, he’s the big, fat, ugly slug… the intergalactic gangster… 
Which is the biggest problem. This is the thing that people don’t understand. Is 
the Western media are loving it. All of this fitna59 that’s happening, it’s because 
of Western media portrayal… ‘Cos they would never put you a cool Shi’i scholar 
saying something nice – no, they put you one of these dirty old farts or crazy 
people saying something atrocious, [to] get the Sunni blood boiling. And when 
they wanna [sic] put on a Sunni, they’ll put one of these crazy people who are 
war-hungry, and this is it. This is what sells. And it’s… this is why UKIP is getting 
stronger, this is why the BNP is getting stronger. But even the BNP see the truth 
is hard to keep away from people… [Even] Nick Griffin. He’s like: “I went to 
Syria, I went to the Middle East, I came back, and I realise the problem is these 
extreme Sunni people. The Shi’is don’t have anything to do with it, they don’t 
give a shit about any of that stuff and mostly people here are actually pretty 
chilled.” And it’s true. All of us, when England play, we put on our England shirts 
                                                             
59 The Arabic word fitna comes from a verbal root meaning “to tempt, seduce, or lure” and is a 
significant concept in Islam mostly used to refer to a state of moral or civil strife (usually 
conceived of as an act of sedition against the will of God). 
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and support England, do you know what I mean? These guys, these Sunni people, 
they want to create an Islamic state here. That’s something you need to 
understand. (Interview 6) 
 
What emerges from the above quote, despite the vocal hatred and disdain for Muqtada 
al-Sadr, is a strong sense of Shi’a victimhood and self-righteousness, as well as a 
disregard for Sunni ethno-religious sentiment and/or political objectives. In the 
narrative presented here, Sunnis/Salafis are unproblematically constructed as “other” 
(“these guys”) while ordinary Shi’is (“all of us”) are cast as the victims, both as a material 
effect of Sunni violence and as a symbolic effect of Shi’a retaliation in the form of al-Sadr’s 
Mehdi Army. It is also interesting to see how the interviewee draws links between the 
communal violence in Iraq and a sense of rising xenophobia and Islamophobia in Britain 
(implicit in the references to UKIP and the BNP) – both of which he constructs in 
opposition to the interests of Shi’a minorities (“the Shi’is don’t have anything to do with 
it”). Here, the man is implicitly staking a claim for a particular kind of Shi’a identity (that 
notably doesn’t include prominent Shi’a figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr), one that is 
constructed as passive victim in the face of Sunni aggression and populist xenophobia. 
 
The above quote is just one example of how the communal violence taking place within 
Iraq in the years post-2003 became inscribed with a narrative of Shi’a victimhood and 
suffering that arguably has its roots in the emancipatory logic of the Karbala Paradigm 
(as explored in Chapter 2). Of course, it is difficult to know how representative the 
thoughts and narratives of this one particular individual are when it comes to the 
experience of diasporic Iraqi Shi’is as a demographic group,60 but in discursive terms it 
                                                             
60 It should be reiterated at this juncture that the aim of this thesis is not to offer a representative 
overview of an essentialised Iraqi-Shi’a “identity” as encountered in the diasporic context, but 
rather to explore one particular articulation of that identity construction and trace the discursive 
shift that has led to what I am calling the “sectarianisation” of the Iraqi-Shi’a subject as 
experienced through the ideological apparatus of neocapitalism. 
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is possible to see how events in Iraq came to inform diasporic attachments to both the 
symbolic signifier “Iraq” and the identity construction “Shi’a”. In this sense, the violent 
sectarianism in Iraq itself contributed to a discursive construction of both “Iraqi” and 
“Shi’a” identity within the diaspora that was no longer able to accommodate the 
hybridisation of previous years. Indeed, the siege mentality cultivated by diasporic Iraqi 
Shi’is in relation to the violence in Iraq arguably led to the splitting of nationalistic and 
ethno-religious identity categories in which it no longer made sense to claim to be both 
“Iraqi” and “Shi’a” – the lines had already been violently drawn, and sides had to be 
chosen.  
 
As well as cementing and institutionalising sectarian divisions within Iraq itself, there 
was an extent to which post-2003 Iraqi domestic politics had an impact on the discursive 
construction of what it meant to be “Shi’a” along ethno-sectarian lines. For example, one 
interviewee remarked how when encountering Iraqis from Sunni backgrounds in 
London there was often a sense of antagonism resulting from their conflicting narratives 
of what it meant to be Iraqi: “Sunnis would say that the Shi’a [government] had ruined 
Iraq, but under Saddam things were much worse for the Shi’a” (Interview 5). The 
political and social divisions within Iraq thus fostered alternative and competing stories 
about which group held the most power that coupled with the Shi’a experience of exile 
and displacement during the 1980s and 90s, fomented an enduring sense of Shi’a 
victimhood and misunderstanding that was further compounded by the sectarian 
violence of the 2006-2008 civil conflict. 
 
If the political and social currents underlying the discursive shift away from an Iraqi(-
Shi’a) diasporic subject and towards an (Iraqi-)Shi’a diasporic subject (i.e. away from 
nationalist and towards ethno-religious identity categories) had been fomenting for 
years through the experience of exile, trauma, loss, nostalgia, melancholia, and 
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victimhood, the discursive and psychic rupture of 2003 and the ensuing violent 
institutionalisation of sectarian identities within Iraq itself thus proved to be the tipping 
point for the fracturing of the Iraqi-Shi’a subject within the diasporic imaginary. Just as 
Iraq itself fragmented along ethno-sectarian lines, where decades of political tyranny 
and suppressed resentment boiled over into violent anger at the “other”, so too the Iraqi-
Shi’a diasporic subject became trapped in a discursive fracturing in which the two 
constitutive elements of the identity category as previously constructed were placed in 
violent and oppositional conflict with each other. For Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora, their 
sense of “Iraqiness”, which had previously served as a reactionary identity against the 
othering discourse of the Ba’thist regime, was no longer politically salient in the post-
2003 climate of sectarianism and violence, and thus became further tempered – if not 
eclipsed – by a solidifying sense of “Shi’aness” as a contra to Sunni violence.  
 
This is not to claim that all Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora turned away from their national 
roots and towards an exclusionist and sectarian Shi’a identity – of course, the reality is 
far more nuanced – but from a discursive perspective it is possible to trace the lines in 
the sand as it became less and less salient for individuals to articulate identifications with 
the “Iraq” of nostalgia and memory and, against the background of political and social 
sectarianisation in Iraq, made increasing sense to present versions of “Shi’ism” and 
“Shi’aness” invested with the trauma and suffering of targeted minorities in Iraq. In this 
way, the socio-symbolic system constructed by the various power structures operating 
within both Iraq and the diaspora during the latter part of the twentieth century worked 
to produce particular iterations of the Iraqi-Shi’a subject where the conflict between the 
“Iraq” of fantasy and the Iraq of reality cultivated increased orientations towards a 
discursively-constructed “Shi’aness” that did not, on the surface, harbour the same 
problems and fractures as the identity category “Iraqi”.  
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While this is almost certainly a trend that took place over time, the violent explosion of 
ISIS on the scene in 2014, coupled with a political climate of rising Islamophobia and 
xenophobia in the UK and Europe as a whole (as highlighted in the above interview 
quote), certainly accelerated the process and led to the politicisation of an emerging Shi’a 
diasporic subject. This is something I turn to later in the thesis, but first I want to briefly 
explore the geographic element to the fracturing of Iraqi ethno-national identity in the 
tumultuous years post-2003. Specifically, it is my contention that the opening up of Iraq’s 
borders coupled with the violence and danger of travelling to Baghdad and northern 
regions resulted both in the physical and territorial partitioning of the country along 
ethno-sectarian lines, but also came to shape the kinds of affective and material ties 
available to diasporic Iraqis with regards to their “home” country that worked to shape 
particular iterations of what it meant to be “Shi’a” in relation to the political, social, and 
material reality of Iraq of post-2003.  
 
Sectarianised Geographies: Towards a “Shi’a Iraq” 
By the time Saddam Hussain was overthrown in 2003, the vast majority of Iraqi Shi’is 
exiled in the UK had not set foot on the soil of their home country for the best part of 30 
years. Due to the political and politicised nature of the Iraqi Shi’a diaspora, in which 
individuals either fled or were forcibly expelled from Iraq due to their political and/or 
religious beliefs, most Iraqi Shi’is who came to settle in London had had little or no 
contact with Iraq itself since the moment of their exile. Many even went on to naturalise 
as British citizens following the expiration or annulment of their Iraqi documents. With 
no Iraqi documents, it was near impossible for exiled Iraqis to travel back to their home 
country during the years of international sanctions when Iraq effectively sealed itself off 
from the outside world. One middle-aged woman, for example, who left following the 
arrest of her brother for his involvement with the (Shi’a) Islamic Da’wa Party, didn’t hear 
from her family in Iraq for almost 20 years (it later emerged her brother had died in 
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prison).61 Following the US-led invasion and the reopening of Iraq’s borders, diasporans 
were finally able to see the country they had been dreaming about for so long – but the 
Iraq they found was not the Iraq they had left behind. 
 
While 2003 represented a watershed moment for first-generation diasporans finally 
able to travel “home” after decades in exile, for the second and third generation of Iraqi 
Shi’is born in the UK, 2003 was the first time they were able to see the country of their 
parents’ and grandparents’ memories with their own eyes. The reality of post-2003 Iraq 
however, ravaged by decades of sanctions and torn apart by a brutal civil war where rival 
sectarian militias battled for political and social dominance, did not match up to the rosy 
vision they had been led to expect. Moreover the violence and instability within Iraq itself 
meant that certain parts of the country remained off-limits to returning exiles, especially 
those from Shi’a backgrounds. For this reason, many Iraqi Shi’is returning to Iraq found 
themselves limited to travelling within Shi’a majority areas as an attempt to protect 
themselves from the rising sectarian violence within the country. As one second-
generation young woman noted: 
 
When we go to Iraq, I only ever spend my time going between the houses of 
different family members in Baghdad since it’s not safe to go other places. Only 
in Najaf and Karbala can we actually go out and walk around on the streets – it’s 
safe because they’re Shi’a areas and no one will attack us.62 
 
In this way, and especially for second- and third-generation diasporans, any direct 
understanding of “Iraq” as a geographical entity has become fragmented into distinct 
areas and enclaves categorised according to sectarian affiliation. Indeed, this fracturing 
                                                             
61 Informal conversation with Um Z. 
62 Informal conversation with K, June 2015. 
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of any sense of a unified Iraq within the diasporic imaginary is reflective of structural 
patterns of power and control operating contemporaneously within Iraqi territory itself 
– from the “Sunni triangle” of Anbar province to the “Shi’a enclaves” of the southern 
shrine cities; each controlled by political and religious actors operating independently 
from each other (and often from the government). During the peak of the civil conflict in 
2006-2008, in particular, it became almost impossible for individuals of one sect to move 
freely or safely in areas controlled by power groups operating under a different sectarian 
banner. In this sense, Iraq post-2003 became geographically, as well as ideologically 
divided, in which fiercely-guarded territorial lines were drawn to distinguish the domain 
of one sectarian militia from the next; with the Shi’a dominating the south, the Kurds 
claiming the north, and the Sunnis ruling areas of Mosul, Tikrit, and the central provinces 
(Cockburn, 2008; Damluji, 2010; Dodge, 2014; Haddad, 2014; Ismael and Fuller, 2009; 
Visser, 2010; Yousif, 2010). Such geographical divisions within Iraq have persisted both 
materially and affectively – one interviewee described how the Iraqi army were not 
welcome in Sunni-majority areas because they were often seen as nothing but glorified 
Shi’a militia backed by the Iraqi and Iranian governments:  
 
Some people say that the Iraqi army and government is sectarian and that it’s 
controlled by the Shi’a. So when the army goes into a Sunni village with a Ya 
Hussain flag draped on one of their tanks, it’s easy to see how it gets seen as a 
sectarian thing. Some Shi’a might say, “Yes, finally. we’re on top!”, but… a 
Sunni person in that village might see the flag and think it represents Shi’a 
revenge – that they want revenge for what happened to the Alhululbayt and also 
for what happened to them under Saddam. But for a Shi’a soldier they might 
have simply brought the flag as a good luck charm. So there’s a lack of 
communication and trust. (Interview 9) 
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Such geographical and territorial divisions are further compounded by the significance 
of the southern Shi’a shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala, both of which serve as seats of 
Shi’a pedagogical and theological power as well as representing two of the holiest 
pilgrimage sites for Shi’a Muslims around the world (not to mention the operational 
headquarters of a number of significant Shi’a militias during the height of the sectarian 
violence). Karbala, in particular, also holds spiritual and affective resonance for 
practicing Shi’is as the location of the Battle of Karbala and the mythological birthplace 
of ritualised Shi’a Islam (Cole, 2002; Dabashi, 2011; Shanneik, 2015). Since the Saddam-
era ban on Shi’a religious practice was lifted in 2003, the annual ‘Ashura and Arba’een 
commemorations in Iraq have attracted millions of Shi’is from around the world, and 
represent some of the largest global pilgrimage events annually. 63  Conversely, Najaf 
represents the seat of Shi’a theological scholarship and is home to the highest-ranking 
Shi’a scholar, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani. Najaf is also the home of the mausoleum of 
Imam Ali, who Shi’is believe to be the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad.  
 
Both Najaf and Karbala thus form part of a global pilgrimage network of Shi’a shrines 
that work to shape the affective, emotional, and politico-religious contours of what it 
means to “be Shi’a” in any given historical moment. As Zaidi explains: 
 
[T]hese shrines emerged as important spaces and sites onto which competing 
claims of authentic authority and ideology were played out. For shrine 
authorities, religious scholars and students, pilgrims, merchants, and activists, 
the shrines provide a window into the distinct ways that sectarianism was 
                                                             
63 Estimates of the number of Shi’a pilgrims vary; however, in 2014 the Iraqi government issued 
a statement saying that more than 17 million Shi’is had participated in the Arba’een pilgrimage 
over a period of 40 days – with at least a million coming from Iran alone. Source: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-30462820, accessed 4 August 2017. 
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produced and the range of practices that constituted “being Shi’a”. (Zaidi, 2015: 
5) 
 
It is within this context that it is possible for a third-generation British Shi’i of Pakistani 
origin to upload a picture of herself in Najaf to Facebook accompanied by the words: 
“Home is where the heart is” (“home” in this case being used in a spiritual and affective, 
rather than literal sense). It is because of the emotional and symbolic significance of 
(southern) Iraq for Shi’ism that it makes sense for Shi’is of all national and ethnic 
backgrounds to feel affiliation to Iraq as the birthplace and “home” of Shi’a Islam. “Iraq”, 
in this iteration, is no longer a territorial nation-state evocative of national and ethnic 
belonging, but a transcendent space of spiritual and affective Shi’a belonging as 











Fig. 1 – Facebook post by SB on on 14 November 2016 
(Source: Author’s fieldwork) 
 
This orientation away from Iraqi nationalism and towards a “Shi’a Iraq” is also 
exemplified by the following image, which was sent to me by a second-generation Iraqi 














Fig. 2 – Map of Iraq superimposed with quote by Imam Ali shared via Whatsapp  
on 17 Feb 2015. (Source: Author’s fieldwork) 
 
Here, a map of Iraq is superimposed with a quote by Imam Ali declaring the country “the 
residence of our Shi’a”. Interestingly, no background or context is provided for the quote 
itself (I myself was unable to track down the source); rather, the repeated iteration of 
the word “our” juxtaposed with the image of Iraq as a geographical entity (inclusive of 
Iraqi Kurdistan) works to gloss over all other iterations of “Iraq” and reduce the 
territorial state to a single sectarian essence. Rather than paying attention to the complex 
ethno-religious politics operating within Iraq, the image functions as a mythologised 
ideal whereby only one segment of the population is recognised and represented 
cartographically. Considering the fact I received this image in early 2015, during a period 
in which the Iraqi army was fighting to regain large swathes of territory from ISIS, the 
symbolic significance of this Shi’a vision of “Iraq” should not be understated, and ties into 
the the increasing sectarianisation of Iraqi political and civil society discussed earlier.  
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In both the examples above, the “Iraq” being claimed as the “home” and “residence” of 
Shi’a Islam (and by extension all practicing Shi’is, regardless of ethno-national origin) is 
qualitatively different from the “Iraq” of nostalgia and exile previously claimed by the 
first generation of Iraqi diasporans. Arguably, the transformation of “Iraq” as a place of 
national and ethnic belonging into “Shi’a Iraq” predicated on a politico-religious identity 
claim has been exacerbated by the experience of diaspora and exile, whereby Iraqi (and 
non-Iraqi) Shi’is living across the world are only able to safely visit areas of Iraq that are 
dominated by their co-religionists and thus considered “safe” (Zaidi, 2015). In this sense, 
the violent civil conflict of post-2003 Iraq not only led to the “sectarianisation” of Iraqi 
political and civil society (Haddad, 2014; Ismael and Fuller, 2009; Visser, 2007, 2010; 
Yousif, 2010), it also worked to carve up the urban and rural fabric of the country along 
sectarian lines in ways that have had enduring effects on the types of subjectivities 
available within the diasporic imaginary. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the various meanings and iterations of the signifier “Iraq” 
across time and space, and particularly how the experience of exile and displacement, 
coupled with the violent sectarian politics of Iraq itself post-2003, have shaped the kinds 
of identifications possible to Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora. Fundamentally, it is my 
contention that the shifting meaning of “Iraq” within the diasporic imaginary – from the 
Iraq of memory and exile to the “Shi’a Iraq” of the southern shrine cities – is reflective of 
a wider identificatory shift away from nationalistic forms of belonging and towards a 
(transnational and pan-ethnic) conception of what it means to be “Shi’a”.  
 
In this sense, contemporary discursive articulations of Iraq as the spiritual “home” of 
Shi’a Islam have worked to claim a mythologised and politicsed “Iraq” as pertinent not 
just to Iraqis themselves, but to all practicing Shi’a Muslims. For this reason, the 
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orientation towards “Shi’a Iraq” within the diasporic imaginary can be seen to undergird 
the formation of the sectarianised diasporic Shi’a subject in which politico-religious 
forms of identification and belonging have greater resonance and power than any kind 
of ethno-national or state-based identity. This is especially true of second- and third-
generation diasporans, whose experiences of Iraq are necessarily mediated firstly via the 
memories of their parents and grandparents, and secondly by the violent reality of 
negotiating a war-zone torn apart by ethnic and civil divisions.  
 
While this chapter has focused on the ways in which ideas and identifications circulating 
around the signifier “Iraq” have been transformed by the diasporic experience, I have 
only briefly touched on the various iterations and manifestations of what it means to be 
“Shi’a” within the diasporic context. The following chapter seeks to rectify this lacuna, 
firstly by exploring the ways in which Shi’a politico-religious identity has developed over 
time and in relation to a number of significant political and historical developments, and 
secondly by charting the ways in which the enduring influence and power of the Shi’a 
religious establishment works to construct and sustain specific forms of Shi’a religious 
subjectivity in the diasporic context. The identity shift in orientations towards “Iraq” 
precipitated by the diasporic experience cannot be understood in isolation from a Shi’a-
specific logic of victimhood and marginalisation cultivated both through the inscription 
of ritualised myth into politicised religious consciousness and the pedagogical 
instruction of Shi’a ethics through the shaping of the idealised pious Shi’a subject. It is 
only via an understanding of the specificities of Shi’a Islam as a religious sensibility and 
political orientation that the emergence of the sectarianised (Iraqi-)Shi’a diasporic 
subject is rendered intelligible. 
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Chapter 2 – Sayyids, Shrines, and Symbols: Shaping the 




The construction of identity, whether individual or collective, is necessarily a 
multifaceted and contingent process, encompassing a variety of discursive, political, and 
socio-economic factors. While the first chapter of this thesis focused on the changing 
content of the signifier “Iraq” within the diasporic imaginary productive of the (Iraqi-
)Shi’a subject across time and space, this chapter is primarily preoccupied with the 
signification of what it means to be “Shi’a”, and how this has been transformed in the 
diasporic context to become the basis of an emergent political identity.  
 
Simultaneously functioning as an aesthetic register of religious ritual and a political 
alignment towards collective action, Shi’ism as a philosophical doctrine and producer of 
religiously-inflected subjects involves the intersection of transnational religious 
authority with local and politically-embedded practices of religious observance. To be 
“Shi’a” in the sense of articulating a visible commitment to religious doctrine means, at 
least momentarily, to align with a particular subject position or identity category that 
can be recognisably differentiated from other forms of religious and/or political 
orientation; one that is invested at once with the directive of an overarching 
transnational network of clerics and scholars and with the particularities and minutiae 
of daily lived experience and religious practice. Within the context of diasporic London, 
the changing nature of what it means to be “Shi’a” also takes place within a socio-political 
milieu in which attitudes towards Islam and Muslims themselves have been shaped by 
the contemporary sectarian politics of conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere.  
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The shift away from nationalistic identifications with the symbolic signifier “Iraq” and 
towards ethno-sectarian iterations of politico-religious belonging outlined in Chapter 1 
is further augmented in this chapter through a detailed study of the way in which the 
categories “Shi’a” and “Shi’ism” function in the contemporary diasporic imaginary in 
ways that are productive of the sectarianised Shi’a subject under investigation. 
Primarily, it is my contention that the inscription of contemporary political antagonisms 
onto the identity category “Shi’a” – a category already heavily imbued with politico-
religious significance as a result of the intersection between transnational clerical 
authority and the politicisation of Shi’a religious mythology throughout the latter part of 
the twentieth-century – has led to the emergence of a sectarianised Shi’a subject within 
the diasporic imaginary. In particular, the emphasis here is on the historical 
development of a politically-inflected Shi’a discursive ethics founded on victimhood and 
emancipation and its transformation in the contemporary moment through the rise of 
militant Sunni groups such as Islamic State (ISIS). 
 
The first part of this chapter focuses on the transnational nature of Shi’ism through a 
study of the religious and political authority of the clerical establishment in Iraq and Iran. 
In particular, I seek to draw out the ways in which the intersection of Shi’a clerical 
authority with enduring transnational religious and political networks has contributed 
to the formation of an idealised Shi’a subject embedded in networks of scholarly 
influence and patronage and shaped by the discursive forces of Shi’a theology as 
narrowly defined and practiced by the religious establishment. Part of this project 
involves scrutinising the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in producing certain 
narratives and discourses regarding what it means to be “Shi’a” in the contemporary 
world – and how such discourses are challenged or tempered in the diasporic context. In 
this sense, the symbolic and material authority of the Shi’a clerical establishment, 
transnational religious networks, and the Iranian regime can be seen as productive of 
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the discursive contours that foster attachments to a pious and idealised Shi’a subject – 
attachments that have come to inform (but not entirely determine) the kinds of 
identifications and subject-positions available to (Iraqi) Shi’is in the diaspora. 
 
Having thus examined the institutional and material networks productive of certain 
kinds of Shi’a subjectivity, I turn to the symbolic and aesthetic registers of Shi’ism as a 
system of ritual practice in order to contextualise the transformation of Shi’ism from a 
mythological and ritualistic repertoire into a performative iteration of political 
emancipation. In particular, I emphasise the ways in which the historical context of the 
late twentieth century, including the rise of politicised Shi’ism in Iraq and the wider Arab 
world and the significance of the Shi’a Islamic revolution in Iran, laid the groundwork for 
a politically-inflected Shi’a aesthetics of ritual that emphasised the ethical imperative to 
“be Shi’a” as a category of belonging and practice predicated on a politics of victimhood 
and emancipation. This, in turn, has been further augmented by recent developments 
both as a result of rising sectarianism in the Middle East and the resulting socio-political 
climate in the UK. 
 
Finally, I turn to the contemporary moment in order to explore the ways in which the 
symbol of “ISIS” functions as an empty signifier in the (Iraqi-)Shi’a diasporic imaginary 
and lies at the constitutive heart of a contemporary ideological attachment to a Shi’a 
ethics of sectarianism. It is ISIS, or rather the symbolic signifier “ISIS” understood as the 
ultimate force of “evil” – the final incarnation of the brutality of sectarian violence – that 
represents the suturing point between Shi’a politico-religious discourses of victimhood 
and persecution and Western media discourses of barbarism and depravity; and that 
thus serves as the Lacanian empty signifier around which a Shi’a ideology of ethical 
sectarianism has begun to coalesce within the diasporic context. 
Clerical Authority: Towards a Transnational Shi’a Subject 
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The Shi’a ‘ulama (derived from the Arabic word ‘ilm, meaning “knowledge”; sing. ‘alim) 
are a transnational community of scholars trained in theology and jurisprudence in the 
Shi’a religious seminaries known as hawzas (from the Arabic hawza ‘ilmiyya meaning 
“the territory of knowledge”), the most prestigious of which are located in the shrine 
cities of Iraq and Iran.64 As well as being qualified scholars and practitioners, the ‘ulama 
derive their authority from their status as interpreters of divine law. According to 
Twelver Shi’ism, only the twelve Imams, members of the Ahl al-Bayt (literally “people of 
the house” and direct descendants of the Prophet Mohammed, often transcribed as 
AhlulBayt) have direct access to the word of God and therefore the right to political rule. 
However, since the disappearance of the twelfth Imam in 874 AD (Shi’is believe that the 
Mahdi has gone into occultation and will reappear on the day of judgement), 
responsibility for the interpretation and transference of religious knowledge has fallen 
to the ‘ulama.  
 
For this reason, the discursive authority of the ‘ulama is not merely limited to their status 
as religious scholars, but also has the power to shape and define what it means to be Shi’a 
at any particular temporal juncture and is therefore deeply invested in the construction 
and maintenance of what I am calling the “ideal” Shi’a subject. This is a subject defined 
by submission to the theological authority of the Shi’a clerical establishment, occupied 
with religious piety and observance, and invested in the ethno-political conflicts of 
Iranian and Iraqi manifestations of Shi’ism. I will begin with a brief history of the ‘ulama, 
before turning to an exploration of the way in which the institutionalisation of Shi’a 
clerical authority promotes a particular vision of the ideal (pious) Shi’a subject. 
Shi’ism Without Borders: Religion and Clerical Authority 
                                                             
64 The cities of Najaf, Karbala, Kadhimiya (now part of Baghdad), and Samarra in Iraq, and Qom 
and Mashhad in Iran are all home to significant shrines housing the remains of some of Shi’a 
Islam’s most influential Imams, and represent key pilgrimage sites for practicing Shi’is from 
around the world. 
 107 
While the nature and content of Shi’a Islamic theology has changed across time, and has 
historically been deeply implicated in the local political and social contexts in which it 
has been found (Deeb, 2005; Louër, 2011; Machlis, 2014; Nakash, 2003a, 2003b; 
Salloukh et al, 2015; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2007), the rise of Shi’a transnationalism can be 
traced back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the Safavid rulers 
encouraged clerics from today’s Bahrain, Lebanon, and Iraq to settle in Persia as part of 
their campaign to convert the resident population to Shi’ism and to foment personal and 
political ties with coreligionists across the region. The changing relationship between 
the Shi’a religious establishment and political activism has also been shaped by the 
transnational influence of the shrine cities of Iraq and Iran; so much so that the networks 
of students and scholars that spread from the seminaries to head Islamist movements 
across the Middle East and South Asia from the early 1960s onwards became known as 
the “Shi’a International” (Mallat, 2003).  
 
Despite the status of the Shi’a ‘ulama as “the quintessential transnational actor” (Corboz, 
2015: 1), before launching into an account of the Shi’a clerical establishment it is first 
necessary to delineate what exactly is meant by the term “transnational” as applied 
throughout this thesis. Although any exiled group is by definition “transnational” in that 
it involves the displacement of individuals across national borders, diasporic 
transnationalism is understood here as “the emergence of a social process in which 
migrants establish social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders” and 
in particular the forging and maintenance of “multi-stranded social relations that link… 
[migrant] societies of origin and settlement” (Glick Schiller et al, 1992: ix). In this sense, 
what makes the (Iraqi-)Shi’a diasporic subject a transnational subject is not merely its 
association with transnational Shi’a Islam, but the active forging and sustaining of 
personal, political, economic, social, and religious ties across international borders (Al-
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Ali and Koser, 2002; Adamson, 2005, 2010, 2013; Koinova, 2009; Leichtman, 2010; 
Lyons and Mandaville, 2010; Ong, 1999; Werbner, 2002).  
 
Despite a variety of theological and doctrinal differences regarding the role of the 
‘ulama,65 over time these religious scholars have become increasingly institutionalised 
to the effect that they have come “to assume the executive functions originally invested 
in the Imams” (Corboz, 2015: 5). The right to interpret divine law for the benefit of the 
wider Shi’a population, however, cannot be assumed by any ‘alim but only by a marja’ al-
taqlid (source of emulation, pl. maraji’), leading to the establishment of a network of 
influential maraji’ based in the shrine cities of Iraq and Iran and known as the marja’iyya. 
As a result of this theological context, maraji’ “are the holders of [Shi’a] religious 
authority par excellence” (Corboz, 2015: 6). 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the religious authority of the marja’iyya increasingly 
became centralised in the hawzas of Najaf (Corboz, 2015; Louër, 2011; van den Bos, 
2015; Walbridge, 2001), and the shrine city has become a byword for Shi’a clerical 
authority today. A significant aspect of this institutionalisation was the marja’iyya’s 
assumption of the right to collect the khums (literally “fifth”) a religious tax set at one-
fifth of the giver’s annual disposable income and originally comprising the sahm al-imam 
(the share of the Imam) in return for their services. In turn, the maraji’ are responsible 
for reallocating the funds back to the community through networks of patronage and 
charity. In this sense, the authority of the marja’iyya derives not only from their status as 
highly educated interpreters of divine law, but also from the networks of capital and 
                                                             
65  The most significant being the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih – a principle of Shi’a Islamic 
jurisprudence according to which a designated scholar assumes political guardianship in the 
absence of the twelfth Imam. The doctrine is most closely associated with the figure of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, who used it as a basis for the Iranian Revolution of 1979; indeed, support for wilayat 
al-faqih is often seen as synonymous for support for the Iranian regime, and represents a 
significant political and theological division within the clerical establishment. 
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investment in which they are embedded – individual Shi’is can choose which maraji’ to 
whom they send their khumus, thus solidifying their ties to the clerical establishment on 
a material as well as psychological level. 
 
Within the diasporic context, the various maraji’ are represented by a number of 
religious and charitable organisations (more on this in Chapter 3), many of which are 
used to conduit funding and resources from diasporic Shi’is back to the shrine cities of 
Iraq and Iran (including through donations such as the zakat and khums). In this way, 
clerical networks of charity and patronage have successfully spread across national 
borders to represent a globalised and transnational form of Shi’a theological influence. 
Such examples point to the prominence of the clerical establishment in firstly shaping 
what it means to be “Shi’a” through the institutionalisation of theological and doctrinal 
authority and secondly, through the globalisation of clerical influence as a result of the 
transnational spread of material and symbolic networks of authority and patronage. Part 
of the enduring power of the marja’iyya is the prominent role individual scholars are able 
to play in defining what it means to “be Shi’a” through the institutionalisation of power 
structures in which a marja’ comes to represent the highest possible source of authority 
regarding the ways in which individual practicing Shi’is should engage with their faith. 
It is to this that I now turn. 
 
Fashioning the Shi’a Subject 
Despite the lack of a formal institutionalised procedure for the designation of a singular 
source of emulation, the ‘ulama nevertheless follow an informal hierarchy according to 
the degree of religious knowledge possessed by an ‘alim and denoted by a series of 
honorific titles, progressing from Sheikh as the lowest sign of emulation to Grand 
Ayatollah as the highest. Since the ordinary practicing Shi’i is not considered to possess 
the required scholarly authority to interpret the word of God, they must rely on their 
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chosen marja’ to act as an intermediary and to offer guidance on proper religious and 
spiritual practice. This choosing of a scholar to emulate is known as taqlid (lit. “to 
emulate/imitate”), and the decision is considered definitive; once an individual Shi’i has 
established which scholar they wish to emulate, they are (according to orthodox Shi’a 
theology) obliged to follow their rulings on all issues even if they personally disagree 
with them (Al-Hakim, 2010; Walbridge, 2001). 66  The practice of taqlid therefore 
promotes the formation of a pious and obedient Shi’a subject who is willing to follow the 
establishment in all decisions.  
 
For this reason, the influence and authority of the marja’iyya is not derived solely from 
their status as learned scholars and involvement in transnational networks of power and 
patronage; it also has very real material and discursive effects on the shaping of Shi’a 
consciousness and religious practice. The very fact that each individual Shi’i is required 
to choose a mujtahid (Islamic jurist, i.e. scholar) to follow on matters of behaviour and 
religious practice, means that the marja’iyya play a significant role in shaping the 
discursive parameters of the pious Shi’a subject. Consider the following excerpt, taken 
from a book entitled A Code of Practice for Muslims in the West in Accordance with the 
Edicts of Ayatullah al-Udhma as-Sayid Ali al-Hussain as-Seestani [sic], which I came across 
in an English-language religious bookshop in Qom, Iran: 
 
Taqlid means acting according to the opinion of the jurist (mujtahid) who has all 
the necessary qualifications to be emulated. So you do what the mujtahid’s 
expert opinion says you should do, and abstain from what his expert opinion 
says you should abstain from without any research [in Islamic sources] on your 
                                                             
66 There are a number of complex and contested rules for taqlid, the details of which I will not 
outline here. 
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part. It is as though you have placed the responsibility of your deed squarely on 
his shoulders. (Sistani et al., 2001: 49, emphasis added) 
 
What is interesting here is not merely the elevation of the mujtahid over and above the 
ordinary practicing Shi’i – who is not considered “qualified” enough to undertake their 
own research on religious issues – but the active transference of all moral and social 
responsibility from the individual to the scholar: “It is as though you have placed the 
responsibility of your deed squarely on his shoulders.” Indeed, in the words of Walbridge 
(2001: 4): “To many Shi’a the opinions of the marja’ are the ‘final word’ on an issue.” To 
see this in practice, consider the following exchange between Sheikh Mohammed Shabani 
and H, a British-born Iraqi-Lebanese Shi’i, during a hawza class in Mashhad, Iran: 
 
H: Why should I follow a marja’; why can’t I know [the answers] myself? 
Sheikh: If you yourself can know all about religion and know all the answers to 
all the problems you want to solve, you should be a marja’ to yourself. If not, 
you should follow a marja’. For example, if you are a doctor, you do not need 
another doctor. But if you are an ordinary man and you get sick, you go to the 
doctor. 
H: But there are so many maraji’ now; how do I know which is best? 
Sheikh:  You can search. If you are an ‘alim you can find one yourself. If not, 
you can ask two scholars and if they both tell you to follow the same marja’ you 
must accept their judgement. 
(Author’s fieldnotes, 8 June 2015) 
 
On a discursive level, the practice of taqlid thus actively encourages the dissolution of 
individual agency and the production of a malleable pious Shi’a subject whose actions are 
always-already predicated on the opinion and rulings of others. In other words, the 
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institution of the marja’iyya is invested in producing a discursively-defined Shi’a subject 
whose political and social agency is willingly transferred upwards towards the scholars 
themselves.67 In such a conceptualisation, the ideal Shi’a subject cultivated and shaped by 
transnational Shi’a clerical authority is almost wholly stripped on any capacity for 
individual agency or reflection, and reveals itself as nothing more than a cog in a well-
oiled machine that is being driven (depending on your political inclinations) either by 
Najaf or by Iran. 
 
Contesting the (Ideal) Shi’a Subject 
The problem with such a rigid understanding of the relationship between the marja’iyya 
and ordinary practicing Shi’is is twofold. Firstly, it assumes a linear relationship between 
the practice of taqlid and the transference of agency to the mujtahid; and secondly it 
confuses the discursive Shi’a subject – the ideal subject produced and cultivated by Shi’a 
clerical authority – and individual subjectivity and agency. This is where Lacanian 
discourse analysis proves useful in untangling the conceptual threads, as in Lacanian 
theory the subject is nothing more than “a place-holder, a linguistic category” (Epstein, 
2010: 17), a discursively-defined position that is conceptually distinct from the individual 
as acting subject. In this sense, the obedient and malleable Shi’a subject encouraged by 
the clerical establishment is nothing more than an ideal type, a projected image of the 
pious practicing Shi’i that is often at odds with the lived reality of individual Shi’is 
themselves (recall H’s questioning of the logic behind the practice of taqlid). Indeed, even 
the most strict and orthodox Shi’is I encountered during my fieldwork actively sought 
new and innovative ways to overcome factional and doctrinal differences between the 
rulings of various maraji’ in order to go about their daily lives.  
                                                             
67 It should be noted here that the discursive contours of this obedient, pious, and malleable ideal 
Shi’a subject are not wholly defined by the clerical establishment but are often further 
complemented through instrumentalised references to Shi’a religious ritual and mythology, such 
as the Battle of Karbala and the rituals surrounding ‘Ashura – more on this later in the chapter. 
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Take the example of K and A, a young British-born couple in their early 20s who both 
follow Ayatollah Sistani. The pair met during a religious pilgrimage to Mecca and have 
been married since 2013. They both define themselves as practicing Shi’is and see 
religion as a significant part of their lives (K has worn the hijab since the age of 12 and A 
is active in a number of Shi’a institutions and youth groups in London). However, since 
both their families tend to follow either Khoei or Fadlallah, both of whom have different 
rulings than Sistani when it comes to fasting during Ramadan and the timing of the Eid 
feast, the pair told me that they drive from London to Worcester and back every year on 
the last day of Ramadan (a round trip of 266 miles) in order to travel the prerequisite 
distance of at least 224 miles in order to count as “travelling” and thus be exempt from 
fasting so that they can celebrate Eid with their families. 68  Such examples, although 
anecdotal, show that despite the discursive and material forces underlying the Iraqi-Shi’a 
subject, individual Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora often find creative and innovative ways to 
engage with or contest specific forms of subjectivity if they conflict with their more 
immediate interests (in this case, to celebrate Eid as a family).  
 
Thus while the transnational Iraqi-Shi’a subject is at least partly determined by the 
politico-religious contours of the Shi’a clerical establishment, individual Iraqi Shi’is are 
nevertheless able to negotiate and transform the boundaries of this subject – and their 
relative identification with it – in contextually-specific ways. In this way, the practice of 
taqlid, by which individuals subsume their personal opinions to the authority of a chosen 
scholar, thus ensures that intra-clerical disputes and political divisions are translated to 
the level of everyday practice for ordinary Shi’is and form a central role in shaping the 
contours of the ideal Shi’a subject (though not without ambivalence and contestation).  
 
                                                             
68 Author’s fieldnotes, 29 July 2014. 
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In this sense, the institution of the marja’iyya forms a key (though not conclusive) role in 
the shaping of the transnational Shi’a politico-religious subject, and imbues this subject 
both with the contested politics of the various factions of the transnational ‘ulama and 
with a specifically Iraqo-Iranian flavour as a result of the locally situated nature of the 
prominent hawzas. This is not to claim that all practicing Shi’a Muslims across the world 
necessarily look predominantly to Iraq and Iran as models of religious piety and political 
activism – despite the increasing salience of the signifier “Iraq” in iterations of diasporic 
Shi’a identity, as outlined in Chapter 1 – but that the transnational Shi’a subject is 
discursively embedded in networks of religious power and authority that are intimately 
tied to the domestic contexts of both Iraq and Iran. In particular, the religious shrines and 
seminaries of Najaf, Karbala, Qom, and Mashhad loom large in the Shi’a transnational 
imaginary, especially when it comes to the transference of religious authority and 
knowledge and performances of Shi’a piety in the diasporic space.69 Increasingly, the 
political and religious links between the two countries are coming to shape the 
experience of Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora, especially as the social, economic, and political 
divisions that exist among members of the transnational clerical establishment come to 
be translated into locally-situated rivalries within the London context. It is to the 
significance of Iran as the symbolic political representative of Shi’a Islam in the 




Shi’a Geographies: Iran and the Waxing “Shi’a Crescent” 
  
                                                             
69 Pilgrimage networks also form an important part of the transnationalisation of the Shi’a subject 
and the enduring influence of the Iraqi and Iranian shrine cities. This is something I explore 
further in Chapter 5. 
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A spectre is abroad in the Middle East: the spectre of a Shi’ite threat. In recent 
months opinion-makers not only in Washington, but also in the region have 
discerned a fundamental threat to the status quo in the Middle East in the form of 
a global Shia, controlled from Teheran. (Bröning, 2008: 60) 
 
Since the toppling of Saddam Hussain and the rise to power of the Shi’a Da’wa Party in 
post-2003 Iraq, mainstream media and policy discourses have been saturated by the 
somewhat sensationalist notion of an emerging  “Shi’a crescent” 70  stretching across 
Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and dominated by the Islamic Republic of Iran (Amos, 2010; 
Barzegar, 2008a; Haqani, 2008; Nasr, 2004, 2006, among others). At the heart of this 
notion of rising Shi’a political dominance in the Middle East is the spectre of a strong and 
antagonist Iran, sitting at the centre of a network of Shi’a political, religious, and social 
networks that transcend national borders and reach out far across the region and 
beyond. In this vision, Iran is painted as akin to a metaphorical spider sitting amidst a 
Shi’a transnational web, able to tweak and pull various strings in different directions as 
and when it sees fit; and always in ways that promote both its domestic national interests 
and ensure the maintenance of its regional and international power.  
 
Despite the problematic and acontextual nature of such an image (not to mention the 
zealousness verging on paranoia with which it is propagated in some policy and media 
                                                             
70 The concept of a “Shi’a crescent” derives from a remark made by King Abdullah II of Jordan in 
December 2004 during an interview with the Washington Post in which he called attention to the 
potential threat constituted by what he characterised as a growing Iranian influence in the region. 
The term quickly entered US policy discourse – in 2006, for example, the Council on Foreign 
Relations held a symposium entitled ‘The Emerging Shi’a Crescent’ that aimed to address US 
foreign policy interests in the region – and was most notably propagated by US presidential 
advisor and academic Vali Nasr, whose various books and policy papers o the topic outlined his 
theory of a “Shi’a rise” in the region (Nasr 2004, 2006). It should be noted, however, that both the 
term “Shi’a crescent” and the notion of rising Shi’a political influence in the Middle East is hotly 
contested, most prominently by scholars such as Proctor (2008) and Bröning (2008), as well as 
by numerous policy  makers and journalists across the Middle East and the West. 
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circles), there are elements of truth in this portrayal when it comes firstly to the influence 
and reach of Shi’a transnational religious networks across the Middle East and beyond 
(as explored above) and secondly to the symbolic significance of Iran as the only country 
in the world governed and ruled by a Shi’a Islamist government.71 In this sense, while it 
may be easy to dismiss the notion of a rising “Shi’a crescent” as “mythical” (Proctor, 
2008), “alarmist”, and “imaginary” (Bröning, 2008: 72), in order to develop a full and 
nuanced account of the ways in which Shi’a political and religious ideology is productive 
of certain forms of political subjectivity it is necessary to take seriously the material and 
symbolic resonance of Iran as the quintessential “Big Shi’a” (an intentional perversion of 
the concept of the “Big Other” in Lacanian theory) in order to understand the various 
ideological and discursive forces productive of the Shi’a subject under inquiry.  
 
Imagining Iran: The “Backbone” of the Shi’a World 
Much as “Iraq” has increasingly been imbued with Shi’a ethno-religious symbolism as 
historical locus of the Battle of Karbala and contemporary battleground of sectarian 
tensions in the Middle East, so too does the symbolic signifier “Iran” hold a palimpsest of 
affective colourings for practicing Shi’is as a result of the Islamic Republic’s status as the 
only Shi’a-run country in the world. Particularly since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, 
which despite being a product of domestic political and economic circumstances drew 
heavily on Shi’a Islamic mythology and doctrine in order to justify its revolutionary zeal 
(more on this later), Iran has sought to achieve geopolitical significance as the global 
representative of Shi’a Islam. In the words of Ayatollah Ali Khameini, speaking in 1986, 
Iran “will survive, defend and protect our revolution and help others in the same cause 
of Islam to establish the rule of God wherever they are in the world” (Haynes, 2001: 154).  
                                                             
71 Interestingly, secular Iranians often refer to Islam in general and Shi’ism in particular as an 
“Arab” import; while Sunni political groups in Iraq and in countries such as Saudi Arabia 
increasingly point to the rise of Shi’a religious and political networks in Iraq and elsewhere as 
evidence of “Iranian influence” in the region – highlighting the problematic nature of such ethno-
culturist attempts to simplify Shi’a Islam into a singular essentialised essence. 
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In this sense, Iran can be seen as the archetypal “Big Shi’a”, akin to the Lacanian “Big 
Other”, in relation to which the Shi’a subject comes to define itself. For ordinary 
practicing Shi’is, the symbolic resonance of Iran as the historical home of revolutionary 
Shi’ism (through the 1979 revolution) and the contemporary centre of Shi’a geopolitical 
influence through material networks of patronage, funding, and allegiance (what has 
been referred to as Iran’s exporting of “mullahs, money, and militias” (Slavin, 2008)) thus 
comes to play a significant role in defining what it means to be “Shi’a” within the 
contemporary moment. In particular, Iran has been active in cultivating symbolic and 
material ties with transnational political and religious groups since at least the 1979 
revolution, and especially since the rise to power of Shi’a Islamist parties in post-Saddam 
Iraq.72 For Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora, Iran often served a place of refuge from political 
and/or religious persecution under the Saddam regime; as well as representing the most 
significant Shi’a politico-religious force in the contemporary world. Indeed, for many 
Shi’is exiled from Iraq as a result of the tasfirat, Iran became not only a temporary home, 
but a place of sanctuary in an otherwise hostile region – many Iraqis declared taba’iyya 
Iraniyya still have family ties to Iran as a result of this historical population transfer. For 
this reason, Iran continues to loom large in articulations of the (Iraqi-)Shi’a diasporic 
subject, even if Iranian influence is itself more ambivalent and contested than such 
discourses imply.  
 
This discursive power of Iran to mould the content of the orientation “Shi’a” holds true 
even in the face of political contestation with the Iranian regime itself. As one of my 
interviewees, a young British-born Iraqi Shi’a woman, put it: “I don’t support [the Iranian 
regime], but if anyone insults Iran I get defensive because I feel like they’re insulting all 
                                                             
72 A full inquiry into the various links between the Iranian regime and Shi’a political factions in 
Iraq falls outside of the scope of this thesis, which is preoccupied with the diasporic (Iraqi-)Shi’a 
subject, and is therefore not pursued further here. 
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Shi’is.”73 Indeed, one young British Shi’a man of Iraqi origin, even went to far as to declare 
that he would be willing to “fight for Iran” if necessary: 
 
A:  I’d fight for my religion as well. If somebody tries to attack Iran I’d go fight 
for Iran. 
EDE: For Iran? 
A: For Iran. 
EDE: Why Iran? 
A: Because the only backbone that the Shi’a world has at the moment is Iran, 
whether you wanna agree with their political stance [or] you don’t. If Iran falls, 
there would be a massacre for all Shi’as all around the world. All around the 
world. (Interview 6) 
 
In this iteration, the signifier “Iran” is being used to denote Shi’a religious identification, 
even in the absence of political accord with the Iranian regime itself. In this sense, “Iran” 
manifests discursively as a hollowed-out symbol, a representation devoid of nuance or 
context that works to produce a particular iteration of the Shi’a subject; one invested in 
political antagonism with the non-Shi’a world where the dominance of “Iran” acts as sole 
bulwark against a global “massacre for all Shi’as”.  
 
Contrary to those scholars who claim that it is Iran’s political message that resonates 
across the “Shi’a crescent” (Amos, 2010; Barzegar, 2008a; Haqani, 2008; Nasr, 2004, 
2006, among others), the above examples point more to the symbolic significance of 
“Iran” as a discursive placeholder for “the Shi’a world”, rather than to the revolutionary 
appeal of the Islamic Republic’s ideological brand of Shi’a Islamism or the doctrine of 
wilayat al-faqih. For Iraqi Shi’is, especially those forced to leave Iraq during the 1980s 
                                                             
73 Conversation with S. Author’s fieldnotes, 2 June 2014. 
 119 
partly as a result of Saddam Hussain’s paranoid obsession with an Iranian-backed Shi’a 
“fifth column” inside Iraq, Iran holds symbolic resonance more as a result of historical 
and material ties between the two countries than from any political commitment to 
Iranian regional dominance. In the words of prominent Iraqi diasporan Ghanem Jawad:74 
 
When discussing Iranian influence the most important factor to bear in mind is 
that Iraqi Shi’is are very receptive to traditional Iranian influence but they reject 
the ideological influence of the Islamic Republic on the grounds that it is 
divisive.75 
 
Despite the very real differences between certain Iraqi and Iranian interpretations of 
Shi’ism (Alshamary, 2013; Baram, 1981; Batatu, 1981; Cole, 2002; Dabashi, 2011a; Faleh, 
2003; Haddad, 2011; Marr, 1985; Nakash, 2002, 2003a; Nasr, 2004), historical and 
material links between the two countries have nevertheless led to multiple convergences 
that can occasionally muddy the water when it comes to drawing clear ethno-national 
boundaries between Iraqi and Iranian Shi’is. Indeed, as one of my research participants 
confessed to me: “I get confused about which one I am; if I’m with Arabs they think I’m 
Iranian, and if I’m with Iranians they think I’m Arab.”76 Much of this blurring of the 
boundary between “Iraqi” and “Iranian” categories of identification is the natural 
product of historically close ties between the two countries, especially as a result of their 
geographical proximity and the existence of transnational religious, educational, and 
political networks cultivated by the clerical establishment. Indeed, it was partly as a 
                                                             
74 At the time of the interview, Jawad was serving as head of Culture and Human Rights at the Al-
Khoei Foundation in London; he currently runs the Humanitarian Dialogue Foundation based in 
Edgware Road, a nominally secular institution that nevertheless receives funding from the Shi’a 
clerical establishment. 
75 Source: http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0405_iraqi.htm, accessed 14 August 2017. 
76 Conversation with R Author’s fieldnotes, 24 May 2014. For a more in-depth discussion of the 
blurred boundaries between Iraqi and Iranian Shi’is in the diaspora, see Degli Esposti (2017). 
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result of such ties that led to significant numbers of Iraqi Shi’is being branded as 
“Iranian” (taba’iyya Iraniyya) by the Saddam regime. 
 
This is not to claim that all Iraqi Shi’is necessarily feel some affinity to Iran, and vice versa 
(indeed, many Iranians are fiercely nationalistic and consider themselves to be 
fundamentally different from “Arab” Iraqis), but that when it comes to defining the 
(Iraqi-)Shi’a subject, there is a fundamental national and cultural ambivalence that 
persists between Iraqi and Iranian manifestations of Shi’a politico-religious belief and 
practice. Often, this ambivalence is manifested via a discursive invocation of “Iran” as 
representing the “Shi’a subject” more broadly, and the possible identifications open to 
practicing Iraqi Shi’is in particular.  
 
In the diasporic context, where the minority status of Shi’a Islam within the UK means 
that many Shi’a religious establishments are frequented by both Iraqi and Iranian Shi’is 
(as well as Shi’is from other ethno-national backgrounds), the significance of Iran as the 
“backbone of the Shi’a world” has been emphasised even as specific orientations towards 
Iraqi or Iranian national belonging have faded (Gholami, 2016; Scharbrodt et al., 2017; 
Scharbrodt and Shanneik, 2018; Spellman-Poots, 2012; van den Bos, 2012). In this sense, 
a shared articulation of “Shi’aness” among practicing Shi’is in the UK (regardless of 
origin), often coloured with orientations towards Iran as the symbolic “Big Shi’a”, is more 
significant in shaping the contours of the diasporic Shi’a subject than any specific 
political or ideological attachment to Iranian Shi’ism.  
 
“Mullahs, Money, and Militias”77 
As well as its status as the only Shi’a-majority government in the contemporary world, 
Iran has long represented a significant regional power in the Middle East due both to its 
                                                             
77 (Slavin, 2008) 
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historical dominance bolstered by its strategic position on the Persian Gulf and, more 
recently, as a result of its extensive natural resources such as gas and oil. Moreover, since 
the (Shi’a) Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has played an active role in supporting and 
expanding Shi’a interests in region, including providing funding, training, and arms to 
militia groups in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. Coupled with the 
theological and doctrinal influence of Shi’a clerics operating out of the Iranian shrine 
cities of Mashhad and Qom, it is possible to see how Iranian material and discursive 
power has come to play a significant role in defining what it means to be “Shi’a” in the 
contemporary world. It is this perception of Iran as the provider of “mullahs, money, and 
militias” (Slavin, 2008), that lies at the heart of the notion of a waxing “Shi’a crescent” in 
the Middle East. Most recently, rising sectarian tensions within the region, compounded 
by enduring antagonism between Iran and its geopolitical rival Saudi Arabia, have 
bolstered the conception of Iran as a key source of Shi’a transnational religious, political, 
economic, and discursive power. 
 
In London, for example, the Islamic Centre of England (ICE), founded in 1995, is widely 
known to be directly funded by the Iranian government. Unlike most other Shi’a religious 
institutions in London ICE is not registered as a charitable organisation, meaning that it 
is under no obligation to make its accounts publically available. The Centre offers a wide 
variety of events and services, including holding an annual Imam Khomeini Conference, 
which it hosts in collaboration with its youth branch AhlulBayt Islamic Mission (AIM). 
Unlike ICE, which mostly models itself as a community and religious centre (its website, 
for example, describes the organisation rather innocuously as providing “spiritual 
guidance for the Muslim community at large”78), AIM, founded in 2003, is much more 
actively involved in promoting a specific vision of (Shi’a) Islam through its events, 
outreach programmes, and social media presence (including a YouTube channel, 
                                                             
78 ICE website, accessed 2 July 2016. 
 122 
Facebook page – boasting more than 479,000 likes – and a Twitter profile). The 
organisation’s website, for example, offers a modernised and hybridised version of Shi’a 
Islam geared towards the younger generation, with blog posts sporting titles such as 
“The Tweeting Ayatollah”, “Rock Star Imams”, and “The Struggles of a ‘Towel Head’” (a 
reference to derogatory slang for a hijabi).79  
 
Both ICE and AIM serve the dual roles of acting as communal meeting points for like-
minded Shi’is in the diaspora and as proselytisers of a revolutionary and Iranian-
inflected brand of Shi’a Islam through the spreading of the teachings of Imam Khomeini 
and other Islamic jurists who support wilayat al-faqih. Such examples point to the way 
in which Iranian political and religious influence has been institutionalised in the 
diasporic context, often through reliance on pre-existing transnational networks of 
patronage and funding set up by the clerical establishment. Having highlighted above the 
symbolic and doctrinal significance of the marja’iyya in producing and maintaining the 
discursive contours of the ideal Shi’a subject, it is also important to acknowledge the role 
of Iran when it comes to the transnational spread and influence of the Shi’a religious 
establishment. Many of the most prominent clerical lineages have important historical 
and contemporary connections to Iran, both as a geographic entity and as a source of 
material and theological support (Corboz, 2015). Moreover, Iran has significant ties to 
the ruling Da’wa Party in Iraq, which subscribes to the Iranian doctrine of wilayat al-
faqih and has been documented as receiving funding and support from the Iranian 
regime – even if, historically the party has had an ambivalent relationship with Tehran 
(Barzegar, 2008a; Nasr, 2004; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2007; Slavin, 2008).   
 
                                                             
79 AIM website (http://www.aimislam.com), accessed 4 July 2016. 
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Three of Shi’ism’s most prominent Shi’a clerical lineages – the al-Khoei, al-Hakim, and al-
Sadr families – have significant historical and material ties to Iran. 80 The al-Hakim family 
in particular, despite their Iraqi origins, are closely associated with the Islamic Republic 
as a result of their exile in Iran during the Saddam era, where they established the 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) (now known as the Islamic 
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)). Founded in Tehran in 1982, SCIRI arguably represents 
“the most pro-Iranian faction of the broader Iraqi Shi’i Islamic movement” (Corboz, 
2015: 17), and came to play a prominent role in Iraqi opposition politics throughout the 
1980s and 90s. SCIRI’s military wing, the Badr Corps, which grew out of the Iran-Iraq 
war of 1980-88, became notorious as an Iranian-funded militia during the sectarian 
violence of post-2003 Iraq. Having cultivated ties with the US throughout the 1990s, 
SCIRI found itself  in a good position to profit from the post-2003 sectarian political 
landscape in Iraq, and at the time of writing ISCI commands 12 out of 325 seats in the 
Iraqi Council of Representatives.81 
 
The al-Sadr family, too, have close links to the Islamic Republic. Among the most 
influential members of the family in the twentieth century were Grand Ayatollah 
Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr (1935-1980), the founding father of the Da’wa Party; Musa al-
Sadr (1928-1978?), who founded the Lebanese militant Amal movement; Grand 
Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr (1943-1999), a well-respected cleric 
who opposed the Ba’th regime and called for the release of Shi’a political prisoners; and 
Muqata al-Sadr, the founder of the Mehdi Army, a Shi’a militia popular with 
disenfranchised working-class Iraqi Shi’is in post-2003 Iraq (now reformulated as the 
anti-ISIS Saraya al-Salam, “Peace Companies”). Additionally, members of the Sadr family 
                                                             
80 Despite their material links to Iran, it should be noted that the al-Khoei family have made efforts 
to distance themselves from the Iranian regime and in particular the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih. 
81 In recent years, ISCI has attempted to distance itself from its Iranian patrons by emphasising 
its “Iraqi” origins; nevertheless, the movement is still strongly associated with the Islamic 
Republic and continues to receive funding and support from Tehran. 
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have headed the Iranian Red Crescent, served in the Iranian parliament, and married into 
political and clerical networks in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon (Corboz, 2015; Slavin, 2008).  
 
In this sense, the Shi’a clerical establishment’s social and material links to Iran – through 
personal, political, and financial ties of patronage, scholarship, and association – have 
fostered a particular understanding of Shi’a transnational identity in which what it 
means to be “Shi’a” is always-already coloured with the politico-religious flavour of the 
Islamic Republic. The case of Muqtada al-Sadr serves as an interesting exemplar, since 
despite his lack of institutionally sanctioned religious authority (he has yet to achieve a 
high level of eminence within the ‘ulama) and his appeals to populist Iraqi nationalism, 
both of which might suggest a lack of affinity with the Iranian regime, Muqtada has 
nevertheless “relied on Iran for military support for his Mehdi Army, as a buffer against 
the United States, and as a mediator in his quarrels with the Iraqi government and 
breakaway Shi’ite factions” (Slavin, 2008: 5). What this shows is that Iranian influence 
remains a significant factor in the shaping of the Shi’a transnational subject, especially 
when it comes to defining the politico-religious contours of what it means to “Shi’a” in 
the contemporary moment (often defined in opposition to a “Sunni” aggressor; though 
more on this later).  
 
Nevertheless, and contrary to the simplistic doctrine of an unstoppable “Shi’a crescent” 
headed by a muscular Iran, the relationship between Iran and transnational Shi’ism – 
and especially between Iraqi Shi’a political factions and the Iranian regime – is more 
ambivalent, multifaceted, and contradictory than might first appear. For example, 
despite SCIRI’s ties to the Iranian regime and professed founding goal to export the 
Iranian revolution to Iraq, since 2003 the organisation has put a significant amount of 
effort into symbolically distancing itself from Iran and emphasising its Iraqi roots as a 
way to garner domestic support. In the words of Corboz (2015: 154), in post-2003 SCIRI 
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discourse “the revolutionary power of Shi’ism was emphasised, but in its Iraqi 
colouring”. Indeed, when  SCIRI changed its name to ISCI in 2007, removing the word 
“revolution” to reportedly “reflect the changing situation in Iraq” and “as a step to the 
Iraqisation of the Islamic parties in Iraq” (Karouny, 2007), the organisation also 
publically declared its religious allegiance to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and not to 
Khomeini or Khamenei. Such discursive manoeuvring is indicative of the political fault-
lines that continue to exist between Iraqi and Iranian manifestations of Shi’ism, and in 
particular of the ways in which Shi’a political emancipation in Iraq has historically been 
tied to manifestations of Iraqi nationalism in a way that belies the all-encompassing 
influence of Iran as the ultimate power over the shaping of the Shi’a transnational subject  
 
“There is no Big Other”:82 The Shi’a Subject Beyond Iran 
The above examples demonstrate how the relationship between the Iranian state and 
the (Iraqi-)Shi’a diasporic subject is more fluid, multifaceted, and disputed than might 
first be assumed; and that there is no direct causal link between the Iranian regime’s 
funding and support for Shi’a Islamist parties and institutions in Iraq and elsewhere and 
support for the Iranian political project in the diaspora. Rather, Iran occupies a 
discursively complex position serving alternately as the symbolic core of Shi’a Islamist 
politics and religious sentiment, and an antagonistic and interfering state whose military 
aggression and political ambition is stifling the possibility for home-grown Shi’a 
opposition parties in Iraq (Roschanack, 2007; Slavin, 2008; Wastnidge, 2015). 
Furthermore, the factional and populist nature of the Shi’a clerical establishment, where 
different clerical lineages compete for the loyalty and funds of individual practicing 
Shi’is, means that in religious terms Iran does not hold as much authority over ordinary 
Shi’is as may be first assumed. Indeed, even within Iran a significant proportion of 
                                                             
82 (Lacan, 2004) 
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practicing Shi’is choose to follow maraji’ who are not linked to the Iranian revolutionary 
project and who actively reject wilayat al-faqih83 (Slavin, 2008).  
 
For many diasporic Iraqi Shi’is, therefore, the sphere of Iran’s transnational influence 
emanates more from its symbolic status as a majority-Shi’a country and the only Shi’a-
run government in the world than from any personal commitment to the Islamic 
Republic’s political or religious project.84 Indeed, even despite both the historical links 
between the two countries and the symbolic role of Iran as the “backbone” of Shi’a Islam, 
there remain a significant number of Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora who are intensely 
opposed to the Islamic Republic, either politically or theologically. As one of my research 
participants noted: “Just because Iran is Shi’a doesn’t mean all Shi’is support it. My mum, 
for example, hates Iran, even though she herself is half Iranian and spent time living 
there.”85  
 
Indeed, despite efforts by the Iranian regime to fund and orchestrate institutions and 
programmes across the world, within the context of diasporic London the radius of the 
Islamic Republic’s influence is narrower than is perhaps first assumed. ICE and AIM are 
only two among the more than 50 Shi’a organisations in London (most of which have 
links to the marja’iyya in Najaf and are unmistakably Iraqi in their political and 
nationalistic leanings, or are connected to alternative visions of Shi’a Islam through the 
Khoja or South Asian communities) and have limited appeal among the diaspora as a 
whole. As one interviewee put it to me: “If you go to the Islamic Centre, then you are 
saying to everyone that you support Iran and you support wilayat al-faqih – and there 
                                                             
83  Examples include such Ayatollah Sistani, the late Ayatollah al-Khoei, the late Ayatollah 
Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, and Ayatollah Fadlallah. 
84 This is not to say that there are no Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora who support wilayat al-faqih, 
indeed many do, but that Iranian influence in the diaspora is not limited to this particular political 
project but also assumes a significant symbolic dimension regardless of the personal political 
conviction of individual Shi’is. 
85 Interview 5.  
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are a lot of people who don’t want to be associated with that” (Interview 5). Moreover, 
the complex history of exile and migration from Iraq to the UK, and the haunting 
association of taba’iyya Iraniyya, means that many diasporic Iraqi Shi’is actively attempt 
to distance themselves from Iran. One family I spent time with during my fieldwork, for 
example, actually changed their surname from Shahroukhshahi (an obviously Iranian 
name) to the Abujeloud in order to appear more “Arab”.  
 
In this sense, it is possible to see how the symbolic signifier “Iran” comes to adopt 
alternative meanings in different contexts; whether that be as a representation of 
transnational clerical authority, global Shi’a power, Iranian nationalism (contra to Iraqi 
nationalism), the Iranian regime, the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih, or Iran as a geopolitical 
power in the international system. Each of these iterations, in turns, manifests as an 
alternative articulation of the Shi’a subject, whether that be one coloured by Iraqi 
nationalistic opposition to Iranian influence, an orientation towards a transnational and 
trans-ethnic “Shi’a international, or a declaration of Shi’a Islamist ideology predicated on 
an Iranian revolutionary zeal.  
 
“Iran”, in such articulations, represents the archetypal Other – or “Big Shi’a” – to the Shi’a 
subject. In Lacanian theory we know that “there is no Big Other”, since the Symbolic 
order within which it is articulated is necessarily incomplete and unstable(Howarth, 
1998; Lacan, 2002; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). However, it is this very instability that 
requires the subjective iteration (or rather, re-iteration) of the Other’s desire in a 
desperate attempt by the subject to construct itself in relation to that desire. It is 
precisely this subjective predicament that forms the basis of the transition from 
alienation (within the symbolic order) to anxiety regarding the true desire of the Other – 
which Lacan summaries in the anxious question “Che vuoi?”, “What do you want?” (Lacan, 
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2002). It is this thwarted attempt to subsume subjective desire into Other’s desire that 
is fulfilled by the role of ideological fantasy (Žižek, 1989, 2000, 2012). 86 
 
In Lacanian terms, then, the symbolic signifier “Iran” cannot represent a stable and 
inflexible “Big Shi’a” to the Shi’a subject; rather, the various representations of “Iran” 
represent various iterations of the Shi’a subject in a doomed effort to paper over the 
instability inherent in the Symbolic order. For this reason, not only is it misleading to 
overstate the role of Iran as the geopolitical power behind a transnational “Shi’a 
crescent”, it is also important to understand the limitations of the symbolic signifier 
“Iran” when it comes to defining and shaping the meaning and content of what it means 
to be “Shi’a”. From the material and doctrinal influence of the marja’iyya, to the symbolic 
resonance of Iran as the archetypal “Big Shi’a”, the Shi’a subject is thus subjected to a 
variety of discursive forces that work to shape it as an unattainable ideal-type.  
 
Moreover, the very instability at the core of any identity iteration necessitates a 
perpetual process of identification and re-identification that foregrounds the role of 
performativity – the mechanism via which performances of any particular identity 
category are themselves constitutive of that very identity (Butler, 1997, 2011a, 2011b; 
Puar et al., 2012). One further significant factor in the production of the Shi’a subject yet 
to be explored is the role of Shi’a ritual and theology, especially with regards to the 
politicisation of Shi’a religious mythology throughout the latter part of the twentieth 
century and the performative practices associated with Shi’a ritual and commemoration. 
It is to this transformation that I now turn, as a way to underscore the contemporary 
discursive articulation of the Shi’a subject as an ethical subject.  
 
From Mu’awiya to ISIS: Towards a Shi’a Political Ethics 
                                                             
86 The role of fantasy and desire in shaping the Shi’a subject is explored further in Chapter 4. 
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Shi’ism is the shimmering memory of an event, a dream, a single traumatic 
incident, condemned forever to try to remember itself in vain… Shi’ism is a 
poem, a eulogy, an epic, a panegyric pausing for a moment for history to 
recollect itself and start anew. Shi’ism is Karbala. (Dabashi, 2011: xi–xii) 
 
Although there is no single, unitary “thing” that can be called “Shi’ism”, just as there is no 
single, monolithic community that can be called “Shi’a”, there are multiple convergences 
of religious, social and political narratives and ritualistic enactments that coalesce 
around the identity category constructed (but not wholly contained) by the word “Shi’a”. 
The ideological split between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims originally occurred over a 
succession dispute following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD, with Shi’is 
believing that Muhammad appointed his cousin and son-in-law, Ali, as his rightful 
successor (the term “Shi’a” comes from the Arabic Shi’at Ali, meaning “the followers of 
Ali”). This initial dispute eventually culminated in an uprising orchestrated by the 
Prophet’s grandson (and Ali’s son) Hussain in 680 AD following the death of the (Sunni) 
caliph Mu’awiya I that resulted in the massacre of Hussain and his family at the Battle of 
Karbala by Mu’awiya’s son Yazid I. Although doctrinal differences between Sunni and 
Shi’a Islam are not always apparent, and the two sects share many similarities when it 
comes to the everyday practice of Islam, Shi’a Muslims observe several different rituals 
than their Sunni co-religionists; most notably their ritual commemoration of the Battle 
of Karbala during ‘Ashura and Arba‘een, the tenth and fortieth days of the Islamic month 
of Muharram respectively.  
 
The traumatic memory of the Battle of Karbala, with its political and theological 
repercussions for adherents of Shi’ism, thus arguably “generated the central Shi’a 
paradigm” (Hegland 1998: 251), a moment of rupture around which all forms of Shi’a 
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identification and ritual practice coalesce (albeit alternatively re-iterated). Although for 
much of Shi’a history this narrative of trauma and suffering occupied the realm of 
mythology and memory (Feder, 2014), during the latter half of the 20th century, and 
particularly as a result of the Iranian Revolution, the “Karbala paradigm” was 
“transformed from an originary myth… into a mobilising narrative of political struggle 
and self-sacrifice” (Khalili 2007: 29). Karbala, and the mnemonic and commemorative 
rituals associated with it, thus became central to the articulation and performance of a 
specifically Shi’a religious identity; an identity that was imbued with political status 
through its implication in contemporary power structures of political emancipation and 
revolution. In performative theory expressions of identity, although appearing 
naturalised, are actually the effects of social and political discourses that reinforce and 
crystallise the supposed “identity” each time they are performed or articulated. Through 
this process, “identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are 
said to be its results” (Butler 2006: 34). The Karbala paradigm is thus central to both the 
production, (re)iteration, and performance of the Shi’a subject within the diasporic 
discursive imaginary. 
 
In the diasporic space, such rituals and narratives of defiance and resistance held 
affective and emotive resonance for individuals and communities who found themselves 
exiled from their homelands and forced to rebuild their lives. For Iraqi Shi’is in 
particular, who had been unable to freely express their religious affiliation or to engage 
in such religious rituals and practices under the watchful eye of the Ba’th Party in Iraq, 
the Karbala paradigm took on new meaning as a ritualised politics of religious expression 
and emancipation through the suffering of exile and loss. 
 
The ‘Ashura narrative is the attempt to recover the dangerous memory of 
Karbala and apply it to the social, religious, and political context of Iraqi Shi’i 
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communities… In the context of exile it becomes the narrative of loss, 
dislocation, emerging realities and new religious articulations. (Flynn, 2013: 
226). 
 
For this reason, the various religious rituals and practices associated with the 
commemoration of Karbala are key to understanding the politics of performativity and 
identification when it comes to defining what it means to be “Shi’a” in the contemporary 
world. In particular, the (re)articulation, (re)imagination and (re)iteration of the Karbala 
paradigm in the diasporic space is fundamental to the shaping of a politicised (Iraqi-
)Shi’a diasporic subject; one invested in the dynamics of contemporary power structures 
and undergirded by a particular form of Shi’a ethics. Here, I seek first to provide a brief 
sketch of the political contexts in which Shi’a rituals and myths became transformed into 
mobilising narratives of emancipation throughout the latter part of the twentieth 
century, before turning to the ways in which these rituals have been performatively 
enacted within the diasporic space. Indeed, as Yuval-Davis highlights,  “religious 
practices and beliefs can become some of the most intractable and inflexible symbolic 
border guards to belonging to specific collective boundaries”, to the construction and 
policing of collective identities (Yuval-Davis 2011: 117). Religious ritual, in other words, 
emerges as an aspect of performative identity (or rather, of the re-iterations of failed 
identification) that can be perceived, experienced, and analysed through its use of 
aesthetic and affective practices (cf. Mandoki, 2007). 
 
Finally, I turn to the contemporary moment in order to explore the ways in which 
sectarianised narratives of Shi’a victimhood and persecution have been constructed 
around symbolic representations of Sunni aggression as defined by Western media 
discourse (most notably through the empty signifier “ISIS”), and how such narrative are 
themselves predicated on the historical model of the Karbala paradigm. In this sense, the 
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politicisation of Shi’a ritual aesthetics through a suturing of historical precedence and 
contemporary context has come to define the possible articulations of the Shi’a subject 
in the diasporic imaginary.  
 
From Mythology to Revolution: Shi’ism and the Politics of Emancipation 
Despite significant scholarly emphasis on the revolutionary nature of Shi’a theology and 
practice (Hegland 1998; Cole 2002; Jabr 2003; Khalili 2007; Gale and Hopkins 2009; 
Ridgeon 2012; Flynn 2013; Flaskerud 2014, among others) – indeed, Shi’ism has been 
characterised by some scholars as the quintessential “religion of protest” (Dabashi 
2011a) – the politicisation of Shi’ism is actually a relatively recent phenomenon, and 
arose out of the political and social contexts of countries with significant Shi’a 
populations (most notably Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon) in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. In particular, “the historic shift within Shi’ism from passive eschatological 
expectations for salvation to active confrontation with temporal forces” (Feder, 2014: 
95–96) owes much to the influence of scholars such as Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-
Sadr and Ali Shariati, whose writings were later re-interpreted by Ayatollah Khomeini to 
provide the inspiration for the Islamic revolution in Iran.  
 
For example, al-Sadr’s 1955 text re-examining the figure of Fatima (the daughter of the 
Prophet) in Islamic history “represents the earliest efforts in modern Shi‘i discourse to 
reinterpret parables in an activist spirit” (Feder, 2014: 83). Written in the context of Shi’a 
economic and political marginalisation in Iraq, which had mostly been ruled by a Sunni 
minority since the creation of the Iraqi state in 1921,87 Sadr’s reinterpretation of Fatima 
                                                             
87 Although the majority of political figures in twentieth-century Iraq were indeed Sunni, there 
were also a number of prominent Shi’is among the ruling elite, including Sayyid Salih Jabr, Sayyid 
Muhammad al-Sadr, and Fadhil al-Jamali (who was Prime Minister in 1953 and 1954). 
Nevertheless, the widespread perception – both at the time and retrospectively – is that Sunnis 
tended to dominate the elite social and political classes in Iraq throughout the twentieth century, 
despite their relative demographic minority (Batatu, 2012; Bengio, 1998; Davis, 2005; Haddad, 
2014; Sassoon, 2011; Tripp, 2002). 
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from passive victim to indignant revolutionary laid the groundwork for a theological 
shift within Shi’a Islam that reimagined Shi’ism as a historic battle against the forces of 
tyranny and injustice. Similarly, the transformation of the Karbala myth throughout the 
1960s and 70s by Iranian leftist intellectual Ali Shariati (who coined the term “red 
Shi’ism” to describe his revolutionary brand of Shi’a emancipatory struggle) became 
influential in a number of Shi’a political and religious movements within the intellectual 
and political climate of the late twentieth century. As Brunner outlines: 
 
The deeply rooted feeling of historical injustice [felt by disenfranchised Shi’is 
in Middle East] was the more easily translatable into revolutionary activism as 
the Shi’ite tradition provided the adequate model, namely, the remembrance of 
Husayn’s [sic] suffering in Karbala… it was leftist intellectuals influenced by 
Marxism and Third World solidarity such as Ali Shariati (d. 1977) who attacked 
the traditional clergy over political issues and who saw Husayn’s martyrdom as 
the revolutionary way out of oppression. The slogan “every day is ‘Ashura, 
every place is Karbala” that was coined by Shariati proved to be the most 
successful catchword of the Shiite awakening and came to be quoted also 
elsewhere and at different times, notably in the context of the nascent Hezbollah 
in Lebanon and its struggle against Israel… According to this logic, Husayn did 
not suffer a crushing military defeat, but actively fought a numerically superior 
enemy, and, through his readiness to undergo martyrdom, set an eternal role 
model for the suppressed Shi’ites everywhere. (Brunner, 2009: 140) 
 
In other words, the revolutionary nature of Shi’a rituals and myths is not inherent to Shi’a 
theology, but rather crystallised against the political, social, economic, and intellectual  
background of the Middle East during the late twentieth century. It was this intellectual 
and theological tradition that laid the groundwork for Ayatollah Khomeini’s reimagining 
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of Shi’a theology in the late 1970s, and provided the discursive underpinnings of the 
1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. In particular, Khomeini drew heavily on the normative 
logic of the revolutionary Karbala paradigm to bequeath “his country an ideology that 
divided the world between the oppressed and the oppressors… [and] enshrined the 
principle of resisting tyranny” (Takeyh, 2009: 2). The Iranian Revolution thus pulled 
together diverse strands of Shi’a mythology to produce an ethical framework in which to 
be “Shi’a” was simultaneously to be invested in an enduring struggle against injustice 
and oppression: 
 
The moral conviction of “the [Shi’a] Islamic ideology” leads… towards the 
ethical imperative that both the ideology and the [Iranian] Revolution so 
strongly imply. Renuciatory demands are self-imposed on part of these 
ideologues, particularly in the case of Khomeini, in order to denounce the 
ideological opposition not on merely political but, more important, on moral 
grounds. The central idea of “justice”… is integral to this moral obligation to 
change the shape of a communal order in which “injustice” is perceived to 
reign supreme. The immediate effect of assuming such high moral grounds is 
a deeply rooted communal solidarity… in which every activist believes him or 
herself to serve the cause of nothing less than absolute and universal justice. 
(Dabashi, 1993: 505–506) 
 
It is this injunction to “be (a good) Shi’a”, discursively constructed as an ethical 
imperative to be “just”, that, I argue, forms the core of contemporary articulations of the 
sectarianised Shi’a subject. Consider the following quote, taken from an interview with a 
British-born Iraqi Shi’a man: 
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They say: “Oh, there’s only a few Shi’is, there’s more Sunnis, we must be right.” 
No, there might be a few Shi’is, but we stand for what we believe – we don’t believe 
in quantity, we believe in quality. And at the end of the day, if you look at it, after 
all these years… Do we have a problem in our stomach, are we crazy, why are we 
always opposing this? Now the world can see why we’ve been opposing this for 
1,300 years. Who would, in their right mind take his family through hell just to say 
that, “You know what, I’m not going to bow down to you. You’re wrong, what 
you’re spreading is wrong”. Nobody would do that. If you have 70,000 people in 
front of you and you’ve got 72 people on your side, and you can hear the drums of 
war, and you know you’re going to get killed. And after everyone gets killed, and 
you’ve got your baby in your hand, and they shoot an arrow at your baby, and 
slaughter your children in front of you, and you still say: “No, you’re wrong”. 
Nobody does that in their right mind; that means there must be something there. 
(Interview 6) 
 
Not only does the interviewee construct a coherent historical narrative that inscribes the 
Karbala paradigm onto the contemporary context (“we’ve been opposing this88 for 1,300 
years”), he also draws on the historical memory of Karbala to justify Shi’a moral 
authority in the face of Sunni aggression (“we stand for what we believe”). The language 
used here is particularly interesting, with the constant repetition of “right” and “wrong” 
working to discursively construct a Shi’a-specific ethics of victimhood and struggle 
against oppression. In this way, it is possible to see how the historical transformation of 
Shi’a theology from founding mythology to revolutionary project forms a crucial role in 
contemporary articulations of the Shi’a subject. Without the re-imagination of Shi’a 
Islamic history undertaken by twentieth-century scholars, the Shi’a subject would be a 
                                                             
88 Interestingly, the interviewee never adequately defines what “this” is, but rather constructs it 
as a straw man to contrast with his discursive articulation of Shi’a moral authority. 
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religious subject tout court – it is the Karbala paradigm that has turned the Shi’a subject 
from passive victim into a mobilising narrative of emancipation and revolutionary 
struggle.   
 
Embodying Shi’ism: Ritual, Mourning, and the Shi’a Subject 
While such articulations of the Shi’a subject can be seen as undergirding a Shi’a-specific 
ethics of victimhood and emancipation, Shi’a religious rituals similarly offer the 
opportunity for individuals to engage with and define what it means to be “Shi’a” in the 
contemporary moment. Ritual practices can therefore be understood as performative 
enactments of religious identity (as defined by the contours of the Shi’a subject) in the 
Butlerian sense, simultaneously appealing to and calling into being the very identity 
category they claim to represent (Butler, 1988, 2011a, 2011b). To engage in Shi’a 
religious rituals is, to some degree, to mark oneself and one’s body as being Shi’a, at the 
same time as the enactment of the ritual itself comes to define the boundaries of the 
identity category of “Shi’aness”.  
 
The channelling, moulding, and directing of bodies, minds, and voices inherent in Shi’a 
ritualistic performance all contribute to materially produce the collectively articulated 
Shi’a subject they claim to represent. In this sense, the ritualistic practices of Shi’a 
religious observance emerge as an aspect of performative identity (or rather, of the re-
iterations of failed identification) that can be perceived, experienced, and analysed 
through their aesthetic and affective practices and that, in turn, come to constitute the 
meaning and content of the Shi’a subject thus performed. In particular, the mourning and 
commemorative rituals associated with ‘Ashura and Muharram – themselves implicated 
in the transformative potential of the Karbala paradigm – work to discursively construct 
a Shi’a subject that is simultaneously invested in the historical invocation of Shi’a moral 
authority and the articulation of this authority within the contemporary context.  
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The inscription of Shi’a identity through bodily performances is especially evident in the 
emphasis placed on physicality during the ‘Ashura rituals, as manifested in practices of 
mourning and commemoration such as crying, wearing black, and stylised forms of self-
flagellation. These practices are mostly performed in the pre-scripted social setting of 
the majlis (religious gathering, pl. majalis), and are regulated and enforced both by top-
down directives imposed by scholarly authority and by informal policing by individuals 
and collectives. The emotional and affective resonance of the ‘Ashura rituals are 
especially pertinent, as the communal participation in acts of mourning and 
commemoration works to produce a collective sense of what it means to be “Shi’a” 
through the performative enactment of the Karbala paradigm. As one of my interviewees 
put it: “Shi’is gather in pain and in the feeling of sadness, which brings people together 
more than humour. Shi’ism is not just a community, it’s a way of life; there’s a pull, an 
emotional attachment there” (Interview 21). 
 
Crying – the physical shedding of tears and outpouring of emotion – is a key component 
of ‘Ashura commemorations. In Shi’a theology, the shedding of tears for the Ahl al-Bayt is 
seen as an expression of religious commitment, a visible manifestation of Shi’a belief. 
Interestingly, however, in the majalis I attended, it was almost exclusively the older 
generation who displayed the greatest levels of emotion, often wailing and screaming in 
marked contrast to the silent tears and bowed heads of the younger women. Indeed, as 
one young British-born Iraqi explained, she found the emotive pull of the story to depend 
in part on the skill of the reciter, and wasn't always able to physically summon tears. “If I 
can’t cry I just hide my face and pretend.”89 The invocation of pretence is particularly 
interesting here, as it suggests a certain degree of self- and other-regulation with regards 
to the ritualised practice of crying, and that there may be social stigma attached to the 
                                                             
89 Informal interview with K, 28 October 2014 
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absence of tears in the ritual setting. Similarly, one young man told me that he felt too 
much emphasis was placed on the shedding of tears during ‘Ashura and that it detracted 
from people's true spirituality: “I don't understand why people cry; these guys died 
thousands of years ago [sic].”90 In this way, the embodied practice of crying has itself 
become a battleground for the negotiation of Shi’a religiosity, and the types of Shi’a 
subject such religiosity engenders. 
 
Throughout my fieldwork, I encountered numerous altercations between the older and 
younger generation,  especially when it came to the “correct” way to perform or enact 
Shi’a religious rituals – I even witnessed an argument between two women in which the 
elder emphatically told the younger that “‘Ashura is for children,” thus undermining the 
young woman's attempt to negotiate her “Shi’aness” (author's fieldnotes, 3 November 
2015). Indeed, the older generation often expressed puzzlement regarding the younger 
generation’s enactment of their faith; one man noted ruefully that he felt the second 
generation to be “on another wavelength” (Interview 31), while another remarked that 
the younger generation “take the worst of religion” (Interview 7). Conversely, the 
younger generation expressed a more ambivalent relationship regarding their national 
and ethnic origins – as one young woman explained: “I think more people associate 
themselves as being British Shi'a than being British-Iraqi Shi'a. We've kind of created our 
own culture” (Interview 28).  
 
Such examples point to a wider discursive shift in which the identity category of “Shi’a” 
is becoming decoupled from a national identification with Iraqi origins, and instead takes 
on its own meaning as an expression of a marginalised minority religious sect invested 
in the moblising narrative of the Karbala paradigm. Moreover, the historical and political 
precedent of the Battle of Karbala is increasingly being invoked in the contemporary 
                                                             
90 Informal interview with A, 11 October 2014 
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context as a way to make specific claims regarding the nature and content of the category 
“Shi’a”. In recent years, the discursive moral authority of the Shi’a subject provided by 
the Karbala paradigm has been further augmented by the rise of sectarian politics in the 
Middle East, and in particular as a result of the enduring threat represented by ISIS. 
 
“ISIS are the Yazid of Today” 
 
If the Brigades of Abu Fadhil made them 
Run from Sham and only God can save them 
Running towards Abu Fadhil so tell them 
ISIS you ran in the wrong direction 
(Author fieldnotes, 29 October 2015) 
 
These are the lyrics from the first verse of an English-language latmiyya (recitation) 
entitled “ISIS You Ran in the Wrong Direction” and performed on the seventh night of 
‘Ashura 2015 at the Islamic Centre of England, as part of a majlis organised by the 
Centre’s youth movement Ahlulbayt Islamic Mission (AIM). The lyrics combine historical 
references to the Battle of Karbala (via the invocation of the figure of Abu Fadhil, a 
respectful term for Imam Hussain’s half-brother Abbas) with the contemporary politics 
of the Middle East (via the reference to ISIS), and provide an interesting exemplar of the 
way in which the Karbala paradigm is being reinterpreted in the contemporary diasporic 
context to undergird particular iterations of the diasporic Shi’a subject. In particular, the 
juxtaposition of Shi’a iconography with contemporary sectarian politics serves to place 
this particular latmiyya within a wider politico-religious paradigm in which current 
political conflicts are invested with historical transgressions; thus transforming ISIS 
from a specifically  modern phenomenon based on the convergence of contemporary and 
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contingent factors into a wider transcendental force that encapsulates the victimisation 
and vilification of Shi’ism throughout history.  
 
In this sense, the term “ISIS” here functions as a straw man; an empty signifier in the 
diasporic imaginary constitutive of a particular type of Shi’a subject. Indeed, since the 
fall of Mosul in June 2014 to ISIS forces, the self-declared “caliphate” has come, in Shi’a 
discourse, to represent the same forces of “evil” that fought and killed Imam Hussain on 
the battlefields of Karbala. As one of my interviewees put it, speaking about the rise of 
ISIS in Iraq:  
 
These are the same people whose forefathers killed Imam Hussain… It is the 
same people who fought the Prophet. It’s the same people who tried to do all 
these bad things in the world, you see them today. History repeats itself. It’s an 
ideology, and the problem is that now it’s become apparent to the whole world 
that’s it uh… you know, it’s a flawed ideology. That they don’t know what to 
do anymore. Even the Sunnis, between me and you, they’ve realised that their 
ideology and what they believe in is a pathway to ISIS. Because it’s flawed. 
(Interview 6) 
 
In other words, the representation of ISIS as the spectral embodiment of “evil” 
simultaneously invokes the Karbala paradigm as a politico-religious narrative of Shi’a 
victimisation and emancipation, as well as implicating localised practices of Shi’ism in 
wider sectarian politics that pits the essentialised categories of “Sunnis” and “Shi’is” in 
an eternal conflict of “us and them”. Undoubtedly, the invocation of “ISIS” holds greater 
resonance in the context of diasporic London, where the UK media have contributed to 
the demonisation of (Sunni) Muslim militancy and cultivated a besieged mentality that 
pits the “liberal” and “enlightened” West against the “barbaric” and “medieval” threat of 
 141 
radical Islamist terrorism (Aretxaga, 2000; Feldman, 2012; Nacos, 2016; Stern and 
Berger, 2015; Weiss and Hassan, 2016). In Western media reporting, the discourse of 
“Islamic terrorism”, most recently through the invocation of ISIS, thus functions as a 
primary marker of in- and out-group identity. As Jackson outlines: 
 
[T]he terrorism discourse – the terms, assumptions, labels, categories and 
narratives used to describe and explain terrorism – has emerged as one of the 
most important political discourses of the modern era, alongside climate change, 
human rights, global poverty and arms proliferation. As a term of elite and 
popular discourse, terrorism has come to possess clearly observable ideographic 
qualities. That is, like “freedom”, “democracy” and “justice”, “terrorism” now 
functions as a primary term for the central narratives of the culture, employed in 
political debate and daily conversation, but largely unquestioned in its meaning 
and usage. (Jackson, 2007: 394) 
  
In other words, the localised politics of Shi’a-Sunni sectarianism in the Middle East have 
been re-appropriated and transformed in the diasporic space into a narrative of 
victimhood and political emancipation through a combination of the revolutionary force 
of the Karbala paradigm and the contemporary discursive vilification of (Sunni) Islamist 
militancy. Indeed, one of the narratives I frequently encountered during my fieldwork 
among practicing Shi’is was the assertion that they were not “that kind” of Muslim; an 
implicit reference to the current political climate in the UK and wider Western world 
where to be “Muslim” is seen as an ambivalent and problematic positioning in relation 
to wider non-Muslim society.  
 
Perhaps the most evident manifestation of attempts to claim and define the discursive 
place of  Shi’a Islam in Europe and the West is in the annual ‘Ashura and Arba‘een 
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marches that take place in central London on the tenth and fortieth day of Muharram 
respectively. Beginning at Marble Arch and progressing through Hyde Park (although for 
the last two years the ‘Ashura march has moved to go up Edgware Rd), the marches draw 
thousands of devout Shi’is from various backgrounds onto the streets and avenues of 
central London to profess their faith and to mourn the killing of Imam Hussain. These 
marches manifest aesthetically as a mass of black-swathed91 bodies and large, Arabic-
inscribed banners, punctuated with the melodic cadences of latmiyyat in various 
languages and the rhythmical beating of bodies and drums. Alongside the religious 
banners, the national flags of Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Kurdistan, Bahrain, and a 
host of other nations can be seen (as well as the flags of Shi’a religious and political 
parties such as Hezbollah), along with various smaller placards and banners bearing 
religious and political slogans in English such as: “Genocide committed to those who 
stood against tyranny”; and “Every land is Karbala and every day is ‘Ashura” (a slogan 
made popular by Imam Khomeini during Iran’s Islamic revolution).  
 
For the past two years, alongside such slogans of Shi’a doctrinal ideology, a sea of black 
signs inscribed with red and white letters have proclaimed “Down with ISIS”, or 
alternatively “ISIS are the Yazid of today”, and even “Shi’a Muslims are the biggest victims 
of terrorism”. Such public and visible articulations of Shi’a religious and sectarian 
identity in explicit opposition to the  politics and practises of ISIS draw on contemporary 
social and media tropes of Islamism and terrorism to articulate an unequivocally Shi’a 
political and religious message. As in the private invocations of ISIS-as-evil as a 
mechanism through which to inscribe the Karbala paradigm on contemporary political 
conflicts, the public contrasting of “Shi’a-as-victim” with “Sunni[/ISIS]-as-oppressor” 
constructs an explicitly sectarian narrative as a way to make specific claims regarding 
the political place of Shi’ism in the contemporary world. In this way, the marches are 
                                                             
91 Black being the colour of mourning to commemorate the death of Imam Hussain and his family. 
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seen as a way of publically and visibly claiming a politically-invested manifestation of 
Shi’a religious identity, couched in the language of international justice and minority 
rights. As one young British-born Iraqi Shi’i put it: “It’s good to show that we’re not just 
a minority oppressed group, that we have a presence… that we have a voice” (author 
interview with Maryam A, 30 October 2015). Another woman I walked alongside during 
the 2014 ‘Ashura march told me that: “We want people to stop and asks us what it’s 
about. That’s the whole point.”92 
 
In contrast to the internally-oriented aesthetics and ritual practices of the Muharram 
majalis, the ‘Ashura and Arba’een marches are specifically targeted at those external to 
the British Shi’a community; those who may not even have any previous exposure to 
Islam or to Shi’ism (Spellman-Poots, 2012). In particular, the foregrounding of Shi’a 
victimhood through the invocation of the Karbala paradigm is used as a way to tie Shi’a 
religious identity to contemporary sectarian politics in the Middle East and elsewhere 
and to make a claim for the politically emancipatory role of Shi’ism.93 Moreover, such 
articulations of Shi’a politico-religious identity eschew the particular ethno-national 
origins of different Shi’is and instead seek to construct a unitary transnational and trans-
ethnic Shi’a subject invested in constructing a form of “European Shi’ism” (van den Bos, 
2012) as a foil to the demonistation of Islamic “terrorism” in the Western media. Take 
the following conversation, held on Whatsapp between V, a British-born Iraqi Shi’a 
woman, and M, a Syrian Shi’a man who came to England as a child, regarding the 2014 
‘Ashura march: 
 
M: It’s time to English-ify [sic] our slogans and banners 
                                                             
92 Private conversation with SM during the 2014 London ‘Ashura march 
93 The politically emancipatory role of Shi’ism, especially through the invocation of “Shi’a Rights”, 
is explored further in Chapter 4. 
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V: I agree to an extent, but I think it’s good to have a few because it teaches non-
Muslims to differentiate rather than assume any Arabic flag is ISIS 
M: It’s definitely important to have a few Arabic banners or slogans to normalise 
that Arabic isn’t linked to terrorism, but not in the current climate. The average 
somebody walking by in the street will see a load of Muslim-looking people 
wearing all black, shouting passionate Arabic slogans waving big black flags with 
white writing on them. Now the most recent  image similar to that the average Brit 
has seen is ISIS militants. So we’re not exactly giving off the best impression. 
V: The current climate is why it needs to be emphasised… people are going to 
jump to conclusions with or without the flags… It’s not about the number of flags 
or chants, it’s about getting the message across in the most efficient way and that’s 
by talking to people and handing out leaflets, whether you’re holding an English 
flag or an Arabic one. 
(Author fieldnotes, 4 November 2014) 
 
This exchange demonstrates an acute awareness both of the potential reception of non-
Muslims to “a load of Muslim-looking people wearing all black” and of the current 
political and social climate that has served to make “ISIS” a salient marker of “bad” 
Muslim identity against which these young Shi’is explicitly want to position themselves. 
Despite disagreeing on the specific mechanisms by which to do so, both are in agreement 
about the importance of “getting the message across” and of visibly manifesting their 
commitment to Shi’a politico-religious ideology. In this sense, the spectre of “ISIS” is 
invoked firstly to make claims regarding the moral authority of the Shi’a subject as one 
of victimhood and emancipation and secondly, to place such claims within the broader 
political and social context of the Shi’a diaspora.  As one elderly Iraqi man put it when I 
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inquired as to why so many people had decided to take part in the 2014 march: “They 
are here because of ISIS.”94  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the ways in which iterations of the identity-category “Shi’a” have 
changed across time and contexts, and in its contemporary articulation combines 
elements of Shi’a religious piety, political emancipation, and current sectarian tensions 
in the Middle East. In particular, the emphasis has been on documenting the varying 
forms of Shi’a subjectivity cultivated in relation to the religious authority of the clerical 
establishment, the symbolic and political power of Iran as the archetypal “Big Shi’a”, and 
the mobilising and transformative potential of the Karbala paradigm. In the context of 
the diasporic imaginary, where invocations of (Sunni) Islamic “terrorism” as embodied 
in the spectre of “ISIS” undergird a Shi’a-specific ethics of victimhood and moral 
authority that is nevertheless geared towards an external, non-Muslim, audience, the 
sectarianisation of the contemporary Shi’a subject can be understood as a product of 
such ideological, political, and social convergences.  
 
Moreover, this sectarianised Shi’a subject is itself increasingly inscribed onto 
transnational and trans-ethnic conceptions of Shi’a identity in ways that replicate the 
globalisation of other forms of minority identity category in the contemporary world 
(more on this in chapters 4 and 5). Coupled with the argument presented in Chapter 1, 
the political, historical, social, and theological context of the identity-category “Shi’a” 
presented in this chapter contributes to an understanding of the diasporic (Iraqi-)Shi’a 
subject that sees it as part of a wider shift away from nationalistic forms of identification 
and towards globalised understandings of what it means to “be Shi’a” in the 
contemporary world.  
                                                             
94 Informal conversation with Abu Z, 4 November 2014. 
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While chapters 1 and 2 have thus focused on the historical and discursive architectures 
underpinning the formation of the sectarianised (Iraqi-)Shi’a diasporic subject, neither 
has explicitly explored the significance of the material setting of London and wider 
political and social milieu of Britain in producing and sustaining certain iterations of this 
subject within the context of diaspora and exile. This is the project of Chapter 3, which 
provides an embedded understanding of the ways in which the material and symbolic 
environment of diasporic London has proved fundamental in shaping a particular form 








Thus far, the first two chapters of this thesis have focused on exploring the various 
historical and political contours underpinning the emergence of a sectarianised 
diasporic (Iraqi-)Shi’a subject by examining in turn the content and meaning of the 
identity categories “Iraqi” and “Shi’a” across time and space. In particular, the focus has 
been on the shift away from national orientations and towards a transnational and trans-
ethnic understanding of the Shi’a subject (a subject that is, by definition sectarian 
through its prioritisation of Shi’a ethno-religious identity). In this chapter, I turn to the 
context of diasporic London in order to understand the ways in which the encounter with 
the British social and political context has been formative in shaping the contours of the 
sectarianised Shi’a subject – in other words, to what makes this subject diasporic. The 
focus on London is significant since, as outlined in the Introduction, the city represents 
the focal point of Shi’a activity in the UK, both in terms of demographics and in terms of 
political and religious institutions. 
 
Part of this inquiry will involve briefly sketching the relationship between (Shi’a) Islam 
and the British state, as well as tracing the ways in which diasporic engagement with and 
within the urban fabric of London has come to shape the subjective encounters of (Iraqi) 
Shi’is within the city. Crucially, I argue that the British government’s implementation of 
multiculturalism founded on a logic of ethnonormativity has been influential in defining 
the types of ethnic, religious, and political subjectivities available to diasporic (Iraqi) 
Shi’is, while the social context of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment post 9/11 has 
contributed to the emergence of a Shi’a-specific ethics of victimhood and identification, 
often defined in opposition to “radical” Sunni Islam. Indeed, the significance of the 1991 
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Gulf War and 2003 invasion of Iraq within the British social context arguably contributed 
both to the problematisation of the identity categories “Iraqi”  and “Arab” at the same 
time as they catapulted intra-communal tensions within Islam into the wider British 
imaginary (Aly, 2015). In this way, the initial shift from nationalistic (“Iraqi”) to sectarian  
(“Shi’a”) forms of identification first outlined in Chapter 1 came to bear fruit within the 
diasporic context as a result of the alignment of various political and social factors 
through which a sectarianised and diasporic Shi’a subject has been able to emerge. In 
other words, the sectarianisation of the contemporary (Iraqi-)Shi’a subject is not only a 
product of the experiences of exile and diaspora, it is also intimately linked to the 
promotion of certain forms of minority ethno-religious identity categories within the 
British context.  
 
The first part of this chapter will focus on the political and social milieu of Britain in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, particularly the rise of multiculturalism 
as a way of defining and policing immigrant communities. The emphasis on “difference” 
required by the multiculturalism project plausibly resulted not only in the discursive 
construction of a patchwork of ethnic and religious “communities”, it fostered the active 
division of space and resources along such arbitrarily drawn communal lines. Moreover, 
set against the backdrop of rising Islamophobia in the UK in response to the perceived 
threat of Islamist militancy since 2001, such policies have nurtured a sense of in- and 
out-group solidarity necessary for the crystallisation of communal identity boundaries 
productive of the sectarianised Shi’a subject.  
 
The UK government’s active promotion of communal interests along ethno-religious 
lines can also be seen reflected in the urban fabric of London (the most significant 
metropolitan centre for Shi’a Muslims in the UK), where the fragmentation of space has 
led to the creation of what has been dubbed the “Shi’a triangle” within the northwestern 
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borough of Brent. In this way, the the material diversification of different Shi’a religious 
establishments within London has led to a fragmentation of the city-as-lived, in which 
the vast majority of practising Shi’is engage with only small isolated pockets of the urban 
environment on a daily basis. Moreover, the growing number of specifically Shi’a schools, 
charities, religious institutions, and community centres has resulted in what I call the 
“sectarianisation” of space in Brent, in which individuals hailing from different branches 
of Islam inhabit different spaces within the city despite often living in close proximity to 
each other. This “sectarianisation” of space thus forms part of the wider shift away from 
nationalist or ethnic identity categories of belonging and towards a trans-ethnic and 
globalised notion of “Shi’aness” documented in Chapters 1 and 2. In this sense, the 
physical carving-up of the city is reflective not merely of micro-level practices and lived 
experience, but also of transnational political and socio-economic trends, including the 
influence of the Shi’a clerical establishment and the political significance of Sunni-Shi’a 
sectarianism in countries such as Iraq.  
 
In the final part of the chapter, I turn to the contemporary experiences of young British-
born Shi’is, especially with regards to the increasing glossing over of ethnic and national 
origins in favour of an orientation towards a trans-ethnic notion of “Shi’aness” that is 
itself intimately tied to the British domestic context. Unlike first-generation diasporans, 
who often harbour strong emotional and affective ties to their countries of origin, the 
growing population of British-born Shi’is are actively involved in reinventing what it 
means to be both “British” and “Shi’a” in the contemporary context. In particular, the rise 
of English-language religious organisations and programmes point both to the 
diversification and distillation of Shi’a (ethno-)religious identity in Britain. It is this 
transformation of what it means to be “Shi’a” across ethnic and national boundaries and 
within the context of modern Britain that makes the sectarianised (Iraqi-)Shi’a subject a 
diasporic subject. 
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(Shi’a) Islam in the UK: Constructing a “Community” 
 
The advent of a religiously-inflected Muslim political agency in Europe has widely been 
understood as an unwitting consequence of the multicultural policies pursued by various 
countries in an attempt to deal with a burgeoning immigrant population (Aly 2015; 
Cesari, 2004; Grewal, 2014; Meer, 2009, 2010; Modood, 2003, 2005, 2007; Ramadan, 
2002; Roy, 2004; among others). This is nowhere more true than in Britain where, in the 
words of Tariq Modood (2005: 12), “Muslim identity is seen as the illegitimate child of 
British multiculturalism.” Recent studies of Muslim political identity in the British 
context have productively drawn out the parallels between Muslim civic and political 
rights movements and the political claims made by gender and race activists (Modood, 
2005), and emphasised the role of liberal ideas of equality, human rights, and 
multiculturalism in shaping Muslim political consciousness (Meer, 2010). In particular, 
studies have highlighted the trend towards the racialisation of Islam as a primary marker 
of identity, in which the term “Muslim” has come to function “effectively as an ethno-
religious category in the West” (Bloul, 2008: 7).  
 
There exists a wide-ranging and pre-existing literature that productively traces the 
various ways in which the political logic and practical policies of multiculturalism have 
led to the emergence of an ethnicised and racialised Muslim political identity both in 
Britain and in Europe as a whole (Aly 2015; Cesari, 2004; Grewal, 2014; Haddad, 2002; 
Meer, 2009, 2010; Modood, 2003, 2005, 2007; Morey 2010a, 2010b; Ramadan, 2002; 
Roy, 2004; Triandafyllidou et al, 2006, 2012). However, it is my contention that while 
such studies have done an excellent job of illuminating the contemporary politics of 
Muslim minority political consciousness in Britain and elsewhere, there has often been 
very little exploration (beyond a cursory acknowledgement) of the heterogeneity and 
diversity within Islam itself, and especially of the various ideological, theological, 
political, and sectarian divisions within immigrant Muslim populations. In particular, 
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despite the growing interest in Shi’a minority groups in Europe (as exemplified by the 
works of scholars such as Flynn, 2013; Gholami, 2014; Ridgeon, 2012; Scharbrodt, 2011, 
2017;  Shanneik, 2014, 2015; Spellman, 2004; Spellman-Poots, 2012; van den Bos, 2011; 
among others), the majority of these works tend to progress from an Islamic studies or 
anthropological framework in which the emphasis is on religious ritual and practice and 
not on forms of political mobilisation and/or consciousness that are developing amongst 
Shi’a communities as a result of the encounter with European social and political 
contexts. This chapter intends to go some way in filling this empirical and conceptual gap 
by focusing on the fracturing of Muslim political consciousness in Britain along sectarian 
lines and the rise of an explicitly Shi’a politico-ethno-religious identity.  
 
Ethnonormativity and Multiculturalism 
Although the term “multiculturalism” has come to acquire a whole host of alternative, 
and sometimes contradictory, meanings – leading some to dub it a “portemanteau term 
for anything from minority discourse to postcolonial critique” (Bhabha, 1996: 55) – 
within the context of European politics, multiculturalism is most often used to refer to 
the claims made by post-immigration minority groups on the state (Modood, 2007). It is 
this latter meaning that serves as the starting point for the discussion here, in which 
multiculturalism is taken to mean “the political accommodation by the state and/or a 
dominant group of all minority cultures defined first and foremost by reference to race, 
ethnicity, or religion” (Triandafyllidou et al, 2012: 5; emphasis added). Multiculturalism, 
in an important sense, is therefore tied up with notions of ethnicity, race, and religion, 
and especially the apportion of political and/or civic rights to individuals and groups 
who are seen to belong to such categorisations. It is precisely this injunction to “be 
ethnic/racial/religious” by the state – in which minority groups only gain rights and 
recognition by proclaiming their differences – that underlies what I am calling the 
“ethnonormative” logic of multiculturalism as a discursive producer of marked ethno-
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racial identities (cf. Aly, 2015). 
 
While multiculturalism has been variously interpreted and adopted in different 
European countries, the politics of multiculturalism in Britain has historically been 
deeply implicated both in the postcolonial legacy of British imperialism and in the black-
and-white dualism precipitated by the racial politics of the transatlantic slave trade 
(Baumann, 1999; Gilroy, 2004; Haddad, 2002; Modood, 2005). Since it is not the purpose 
of this thesis to go into a historical genealogy of racial politics and immigration in the UK 
context, it is sufficient to note here that the expression and interpretation of the term 
“multiculturalism” within British politics has, for historical and political reasons, always 
been imbued with underlying assumptions regarding the naturalness of categories such 
as “race”, “ethnicity” and “culture”. As Baumann notes: 
 
Britain’s political culture encourages so-called minorities to strive for 
emancipation as if they were sports teams: They are approached as so-called 
“communities”, and politicians, the media and almost everybody else sees 
them as tightly knit “cultural groups” held together by the same traditions, 
value systems, and history. It is perfectly clear that this is not true; but this is 
the misperception under which they must hope to achieve civil emancipation 
(1999: 76) 
 
Within the British context, in other words, in order for a minority group to receive 
political and civic recognition by the state, there is a requirement to demonstrate and 
perform ethno-cultural “difference”; even when such performances lead to the 
reification of problematic categories of group boundaries and “identities”. It is the 
implication of British policies and practices of multiculturalism within a framework of 
“ethnic governmentality” (Aly, 2015: 30) that has arguably led to the pervasiveness of an 
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ethnonormative logic when it comes to the representation and rights of minority groups 
in Britain.  
 
The term “ethnonormativity”, a reformulation of the notion of heteronormativity taken 
from the literature on gender studies and critical feminism (most notably the work of 
Judith Butler), is used here to refer to “a deeply embedded set of beliefs about essential 
sameness and difference that naturalise the notion of ‘ethnicity’ and provide it with the 
status of a proper (ontological) object” (Aly, 2015: 199). In this sense, I use the concept 
of ethnonormativity to refer to the reification and naturalisation of posited “ethno-
religious identities”. Ethnonormativity thus not only refers to the foregrounding of 
ethnic and cultural categories of belonging and identification, but also to the “process of 
differentiation – which is also heavily marked by racial and cultural value judgments” – 
through which such categories come to be intelligible in the first place (Morey, 2010a: 
531).  
 
As a product of social and political discourse, ethnonormativity thus works as a form of 
disciplinary power (Foucault, 1991) that serves to both produce and render intelligible 
the ethnic and cultural identities it seeks to police. Multiculturalism, by operating within 
the framework of such an ethnonormative logic, is therefore complicit in the production 
and reification of ethno-cultural categories through the institutionalisation of modes of 
civic and political representation and belonging along “ethnic” lines (Aly, 2015; 
Baumann, 1999; Bloul, 2008; Lentin, 2012; Modood, 2005; Morey 2010b; 
Triandafyllidou et al, 2006, 2012). Under this understanding, the ethnonormative logic 
of multicultural policies do not merely interpolate pre-existing ethnic, racial, cultural, 
and religious minority identities, they actively call them into being at the same time as 
they set the parameters by which individuals and groups are required to be/do/perform 
ethnicity, race, culture, and religion (or sometimes combinations of the above). 
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If “ethnic identity” is not predicated on pre-existing ontological premises but is instead 
a discursive construction embedded in hegemonic power structures, then we can come 
to see how the emergence of specifically (Shi’a) Muslim ethno-religious identity in 
Britain is itself a product of the ethnonormative logic of multicultural practices, 
specifically the injunction to be/do/perform ethnicity, race, and religion. We can see, too, 
how religion as an identity category has itself come to be racialised and ethnicised as a 
result of the modes of political participation and recognition required by 
multiculturalism that are predicated on the existence of such discrete markers of 
difference. As Nasar Meer astutely notes in his work tracing the advent of what he calls 
“Muslim-consciousness” in Britain, there has been a “genealogical shift from race to the 
emergence of religion as a salient marker of difference in specifically understanding how 
expressions of British-Muslim identity have developed” (2010: 55). More specifically, 
such forms of Muslim political and civic identity can be understood as “quasi-ethnic 
sociological formation[s]” (ibid: 62), which are themselves discursive products of the 
ethnonormative logic of multicultural discourses that come to “impinge upon the sorts 
of consciousnesses minorities develop for themselves” (ibid: 200). 
 
Securitising “British Islam” 
In the context of multicultural London, where diasporic Muslims from different ethnic, 
cultural, national, and socio-economic backgrounds increasingly come together within 
the parameters of religiously-defined spaces, it is possible to see how a communal sense 
of “Muslim identity” has ben able to crystallise as a result of cross-pollination amongst 
hitherto separate communities. On the other hand, from the perspective of wider (non-
Islamic) British society, to whom Islam often appears as a foreign import, differences 
between Muslims from diverse national or ethno-cultural backgrounds are often glossed 
over while their “Muslimness” is emphasised as an expression of difference. As Aly 
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(2015: 208) states: “European Muslims have increasingly come to be understood qua 
Muslims, with this aspect of their ‘identity’ viewed as trumping others.” Moreover, such 
conceptions of a unified “Muslim identity” in Britain have become increasingly 
securitised and problematised as a result of the UK government’s focus on counter-
terrorism policies post 9/11. But how do such understanding of a communal “British 
Islam” – itself a product both of the material encounter of Muslims from different 
immigrant backgrounds and the ethnonormative logic of multiculturalism discourses 
that made “Islam” a salient category of identity – come to be tempered by inter-sectarian 
divisions within Islam itself? This is an especially pertinent question in light of a growing 
anti-Muslim sentiment within Britain, as well as increasing intra-communal tensions as 
a result of violent sectarian conflicts in countries such as Syria and Iraq.  
 
Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2011 and the 
London bombings on 7 July 2005, the British government has engaged in a number of 
counter-terrorism initiatives and policies in order to combat the threat of home-grown 
Islamist radicalism in the UK. One of the most significant of these policies is the Prevent 
strategy, which forms part of the government’s CONTEST counter-terrorism initiative 
(the other strands are Prepare, Protect, and Pursue). Created by the Labour government 
under Tony Blair in 2003, Prevent’s remit was widened in 2011 under Conservative 
prime minister David Cameron to cover all forms of extremism (Carlile, 2011; Home 
Office, 2011); however, there remains a widespread perception that the policy 
disproportionately targets Muslims (Heath-Kelly, 2012; HM Government, 2011; 
Richards, 2010; Thomas, 2010). Moreover, against the background of British 
ethnonormativity and multiculturalism, Prevent’s focus on Muslims and Islamic 
extremism has effectively fostered a “monocultural focus [that] has been a vehicle for 
surveillance and intelligence” that has resulted in “enforcing the otherness of Muslim 
communities” (Thomas, 2010: 446–447). 
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For example, in a 2015 article in The Muslim News (a publication run by Shi’a Khojas in 
London) the author accuses the Prevent strategy of “misappropriate[ing] the language 
of safeguarding while marginalising and stigmatising both Muslim parents and 
children… How much confidence can the Muslim community have in Prevent when 
serious abuses are being reported already?” (Birt, 2015). Indeed, within the context of 
British discourses of multiculturalism and ethnonormativity, there is a strong sense in 
which ““[c]ounter-terrorism measures are contributing to a wider sense among Muslims 
that they are being treated as a ‘suspect community’ and targeted by authorities simply 
because of their religion” (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011: 11).  
 
In this way, policies such as Prevent have not only led to the problematisation of Muslim 
identity in the UK by labelling Muslims as a “suspect community” (Pantazis and 
Pemberton, 2009), but they have effectively worked to construct a cohesive sense of 
“Muslim identity” in Britain that glosses over the heterogeneity inherent within Islam 
itself and British Muslims in particular. As Awan argues, “state measures to prevent 
extremism have created an element of racial profiling of certain sections and factions 
within the Muslim community” such that all Muslims come to be seen within the same 
(pejorative and securitised) framework (Awan, 2012: 1165). Specifically, this is a 
framework based on a particular discursive construction of radicalised Islam, often 
based on the (Sunni) Salafi or Wahhabi traditions (with elements of cultural 
reductionism thrown in for good measure): women in niqabs, men with long beards, 
gender segregation, female genital mutilation, etc. In other words, the combination of 
British government policies of multiculturalism, ethnonormativity, and counter-
terrorism, coupled with the demonisation of Islam by the mainstream media, has created 
a pervasive Orientalist discourse (cf. Said, 2003) through which “Muslims are 
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homogenised as backwards, irrational, unchanging, fundamentalist, misogynist, 
threatening, [and] manipulative” (Poole, 2002: 18).  
 
This homogenising of Muslim experience and identity within the British context is 
problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, it constructs “Muslimness” as a coherent 
and unproblematic identity category that is conceived of as inherently antagonistic to 
wider (non-Muslim) British society, without ever actually exploring the ways in which 
individual Muslims engage with this identity category. Secondly, it ignores the 
heterogeneity of British Muslim experience such that to articulate an orientation 
towards “Islam” becomes analogous with expressing support or condoning one specific 
version of radicalised and militant Islam. The practicing British Muslim is thus caught in 
a bind between attempting to promote a positive Muslim identity at the same time as 
seeking to distance themselves from the pejorative conceptions of Islam that permeate 
wider society. This is especially pertinent for self-identifying Muslims who represent 
minority branches of the religion, rather than the dominant Sunni/Salafi/Wahhabi 
version portrayed in the tabloid press. 
 
“We’re not that kind of Muslim” 
For Iraqi Shi’is in the UK, there are a number of reasons why individuals might not feel 
part of a wider community of “British Islam” (and not merely due to the negative 
construction of Muslims within wider British discourse). Firstly, the vast majority of 
Muslims in Britain tend to come from South Asian backgrounds (mostly from India or 
Pakistan) and predominantly came to the UK as economic migrants. Moreover, just as in 
the wider Islamic world, Sunni Muslims make up between 85-90 per cent of all Muslims 
in the UK (Abbas, 2007; Hopkins and Gale, 2009; Meer and Modood, 2009; Spellman-
Poots, 2012), thus dominating the Islamic religious and cultural scene. Demographically 
speaking, therefore, there are significant differences between the vast majority of 
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working-class, South Asian, Sunni Muslims in Britain and the mostly middle-class, Arab, 
Shi’a Muslims (notwithstanding the political and ideological divisions between different 
schools of Sunni and Shi’a Islam).95 Against the background of what one interviewee 
called “anti-Muslim propaganda” (Interview 25), many Shi’a Muslims feel both 
misrepresented and misunderstood by conceptions of “Islam” propagated by the British 
media and wider society. As one young Iraqi Shi’a woman put it: “I think there’s a lot of 
cultural practices that Shi’is do that [people] don’t understand… I feel that [people] 
misunderstand what Shi’is are.”96 Another young Iraqi Shi’a woman who came to the UK 
as a child, expressed her belief that Shi’is needed to be more assertive in distinguishing 
themselves from other Muslims in the UK: “The Shi’a are all silent. You always hear about 
‘Muslims’, but they’re inevitably [South] Asian and Sunni; you never hear about Shi’is or 
Iraqis – we don’t have a voice. We need to show people that it’s not us that do all these 
crazy things.”97 
 
This desire for Shi’is to distance themselves from the wider (Sunni) Muslim community 
was something I repeatedly came across during my fieldwork – there was an enduring 
sense that “we are not that kind of Muslim”; although the meaning and resonance of this 
phrase often changed across time and contexts. In particular, a number of my research 
participants highlighted the rise of Islamist terrorism post-9/11 and the prevalence of 
Wahhabi and Salafi brands of Islam within Britain as a way to stress their alleged 
difference from “those kinds of Muslims”. Consider the following excerpt from an 
interview with a young British-born Iraqi Shi’a man discussing how he feels 
uncomfortable walking down Edgware Road in London due to the large numbers of 
Sunni Muslims there: 
                                                             
95 It should be noted that Khojas – Shi’a Muslims from Africa of South Asian origin – also make up 
a considerable proportion of Shi’is in the UK. However, like their Arab co-religionists, Khojas 
mostly come from higher socio-economic backgrounds than South Asian Sunnis. 
96 Informal conversation with HA, 4 June 2015. 
97 Informal conversation with NM, 16 August 2015.  
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A: You see all these beardy-weirdys with their mini-skirts and their – 
EDE: What are beardy-weirdys? 
A: The weirdos with beards. I feel uncomfortable. 
EDE: You have a beard. 
A: Yeah but I’m not like… my beard is not filthy like their beards. I don’t wear 
those mini-skirts with Reebok classics [laughs]. Do you know what I mean? It’s 
become… you know, sometimes I get, I feel uncomfortable walking there. 
(Interview 6) 
 
Here, the comments regarding “beardy-weirdys” (a pejorative reference to the Salafi 
style of wearing a long beard and shaving the moustache) and “mini-skirts” (referring to 
the thobe, a kind of short robe worn by Salafis) work to mark the speaker as being 
different to the (Sunni) Muslims he is describing – even though he himself sports a beard.   
 
This emphasis on difference was often attributed by the Shi’is I encountered to be a result 
of the rise of Salafi and Wahhabi branches of Islam in the UK, and especially the 
geopolitical influence of the Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. As one young 
Iranian Shi’a man who volunteered at the Al-Khoei Centre told me: “all of this hate, even 
ISIS, where is it coming from? It’s coming from Saudi Arabia.”98 In particular, the growing 
profile of what my interviewees called “takfirism” – extreme interpretations of Sunni 
Islam that consider Shi’a Muslims (as well as Jews and Christians) to be kafir (“heretics”) 
– has fostered a sense of Shi’a difference and victimhood. For example, in an interview 
with the BBC published on 6 March 2015, one young British-born Shi’a woman 
proclaimed that: “If you have a green bracelet or anything that shows you are Shi’a, they 
[Sunnis] look at you as if you are not even Muslim, or you don't exist” (Wyatt, 2015). 
                                                             
98 Informal conversation with PT, 22 June 2015. 
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Interestingly, in such iterations, the nuances and differences within Sunni Islam itself are 
glossed over and the signifier “Sunni Muslims” is unproblematically constructed as a 
homogeneous ethno-religious category that represents the other of “Shi’a Islam”. As one 
young Sunni man commented within the same BBC article: “We've constructed the idea 
that they [Shi’a Muslims] are ‘other’ to us, and I think to an extent both parties are to 
blame” (ibid). 
 
While the growing influence of extremist interpretations of Sunni Islam within the UK 
have certainly contributed to an enduring sense of Shi’a difference and victimhood 
(Scharbrodt, 2011), there is also an important respect in which geopolitical conflicts in 
the Middle East and wider Islamic world have also fostered intra-communal Sunni-Shi’a 
antagonism within the diasporic context. In particular, the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, 
the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, and the recent conflicts in Iraq, Syria, 
and Yemen, have all nurtured different ideas of what it means to be “Sunni” and “Shi’a” 
Muslim in the contemporary world. These conflicts proved to be significant points of 
both rupture and convergence in the diasporic experience of (Iraqi) Shi’is in Britain. As 
Aly (2015: 71) highlights with regards to the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 
subsequent US response: “The Gulf War did not simply happen in a distant, dusty and 
forbidding Middle East, it was also played out in the daily lives of young people in 
London.”  
 
For Iraqi Shi’is living in exile, the 1991 Gulf War and 2003 invasion of Iraq in particular 
represented two points of discursive rupture when it came to their self-identification 
with what it meant to be “Iraqi” within the diasporic context. While I have already 
highlighted the significance of the 2003 Iraq War and ensuing sectarian conflict in 
shaping diasporic orientations towards Iraq in Chapter 1, within the UK domestic context 
both 1991 and 2003 contributed to discursive constructions of “Iraqiness” as something 
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pejorative and potentially threatening to wider British society. As one of my research 
participants noted ruefully: “Iraq is the new black”;99 while Aly (2015: 74) describes how 
many Iraqis were labelled “Arab pigs” in the British tabloid press during the early 1990s. 
In other words, to identify as “Iraqi” or “Arab” has become politically charged within the 
context of contemporary Britain as a result of conflicts in the Middle East. The political 
resonance of Iraqi national identification was thus rendered problematic in the diasporic 
setting; plausibly paving the ground for a shift away from nationalistic and towards 
religious and sectarian identity categories productive of the diasporic (Iraqi-)Shi’a 
subject.  
 
Such examples point to the significance not only of the British domestic context, where 
“Islam” and “Muslims” have become inextricably associated with the threat of militancy 
and terrorism, but also of the wider geopolitical context in which wars in the Middle East, 
along with the ongoing power struggle between (Sunni) Saudi Arabia and (Shi’a) Iran, 
have fostered particular iterations of Shi’a Muslim identity in Britain that seek to 
distance themselves both from securitised depictions of Sunni Islam and from pejorative 
iterations of Iraqi and Arab national identities. Most recently, with the rise of ISIS and 
other fundamentalist strands of Sunni Islam, this sense of “Shi’a exceptionalism” has 
been further augmented, especially as a result of a number of recent attacks specifically 
targeting Shi’a minorities in the Islamic world (many of which have had significant death 
tolls). For example, in a press release dated 7 November 2014, the Al-Khoei Foundation 
made the following statement: 
 
This Muharram we have seen increased violence perpetuated by extremists 
against peaceful Shi’a Muslim worshippers who have been commemorating 
‘Ashura. The justification promoted by these groups for these acts is that Shi’is 
                                                             
99 Informal conversation with Yassin Alsalam (a.k.a “The Narcicyst”), 25 September 2015. 
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are heretics and deserve to be killed… The potential risk to Shi’a institutions in 
the West, and Europe in particular, is now real and authorities need to be aware 
and alert to this threat. (Al-Khoei Benevolent Foundation, 2014. Source: 
Author’s fieldnotes)  
 
Such affirmations of Shi’a difference (often predicated on a sense of Shi’a exceptionalism 
and victimhood – however warranted – that mirrors the logic of the Karbala paradigm 
explored in the previous chapter) arguably contribute to a fracturing of “Muslim 
identity” in the UK, in which different practicing Islamic communities inhabit different 
discursive spaces within wider British discourse. In the context of the “securitisation of 
Islam” (Cesari, 2009) in Europe post-9/11, it is understandable that Shi’a Muslims, who 
consider themselves to be “a minority within a minority” (Sachedina, 1994) in Britain, 
might wish to “emphasise their moderate and integrationist understanding of Islam and 
appear as outspoken critics of radical and militant expressions of Sunni Islam” 
(Scharbrodt, 2011: 519).  
 
For (Iraqi) Shi’is in Britain, in other words, the move away from Iraqi or Arab ethno-
national identification and towards a Shi’a-specific ethno-religious identity can be 
understood as  direct result of particular power structures and discursive identity 
constructions operating within the diasporic imaginary – especially the 
problematisation of both (Sunni) Muslim and Iraqi/Arab identity categories against 
which the diasporic Shi’a subject seeks to position itself. But the significance of diasporic 
London in producing this subject is not limited to the various discursive and political 
power structures operating within contemporary Britain; there is also an important 
sense in which the physical experience of living within the urban fabric of London itself 
has come to shape the reality of diasporic (Iraqi) Shi’is in ways that have fostered 
orientations towards a pan-ethnic and transnational Shi’a subjectivity.  
 163 
 
‘Najaf in Brent’: The Sectarianisation of Space in London 
The city as a site of lived experience provides a unique manifestation of the social 
relations of which it is a part (Foucault, 1991; Harvey, 1989a, 1989b, 2013; Lefebvre, 
1991, 1996; Sarkis, 1993; Schmid, 2006; Sibley, 2003). In particular, the cultural and 
ethnic fabric of the urban environment is both a product of, and productive of specific 
ethno-cultural notions regarding identity, belonging, self, and other. In so-called “global” 
cities such as London, the social reality of living in close proximity to difference – 
whether manifested in terms of class, culture, race, ethnicity, religion, or otherwise – is 
a key part of the urban landscape, and has profound implications for the forms of political 
and social subjectivities cultivated within and as a result of such an environment 
(Adamson and Koinova, 2013; Sassen, 2001). For immigrants and minority groups, in 
particular, the ethnic and cultural make-up of the city can contribute to a subjective sense 
of marginalisation and alienation as different areas come to be divided up and 
“ghettoised” through mechanisms of social and geographical exclusion (Metcalf, 1996; 
Sibley, 2003). The way in which migrants and other minorities interact with the spaces 
around them can tell us much about the social, political, and religious engagements they 
invest in, as well as the very real way in which they experience their local milieu (Amin 
and Thrift, 2002; Brenner, 2000; Soja, 1989). In this way, a focus on the urban 
environment can contribute to a detailed textural understanding of identity, difference, 
and subject formation in the daily lives of minority groups such as  those of (Iraqi) Shi’is 
living in Britain. 
 
When it comes to the urban environment of London, it is my contention that the 
increasing diversification of different Shi’a religious establishments has led to a 
fragmentation of the city-as-lived, in which the vast majority of practising (Iraqi) Shi’is 
engage with only small isolated pockets of the urban environment on a daily basis. 
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Moreover, the growing number of specifically Shi’a schools, charities, religious 
institutions, and community centres has resulted in what I call a “sectarianisation” of 
space in the northwestern Borough of Brent, in which individuals hailing from different 
branches of Islam inhabit different spaces within the city despite often living in close 
proximity to each other. Moreover, this “sectarianisation” of space can be understood as 
part of the wider shift away from nationalist categories of belonging and towards a trans-
ethnic and transnational notion of “Shi’aness”. In this sense, the physical carving-up of 
the city is reflective not merely of micro-level practices and lived experience, but also of 
globalised political and socio-economic trends in the production of minority identity 
categories. 
 
Space and Subjectivity: The “Shi’a Triangle” 
 
Britain’s equivalent [of the Shi’a crescent”] is a triangle… Fanning out from a 
point among the Arab cafes of central London’s Edgware Road, the Shi’i centres 
of population and influence are to be found to the north and west in the boroughs 
of Brent, Westminster and Harrow. (Bowen, 2014: 135) 
 
Although Shi’a Muslims in London, as in the rest of Britain, remain in the minority in 
comparison to their Sunni counterparts, there is a particular sliver of northwest London 
where Shi’a religious institutions not only hold their own, but have even come to 
dominate the Islamic scene. This concentration of Shi’a religious institutions and activity 
in the boroughs of Brent, Westminster, and Harrow – especially the neighbourhoods of 
Brent Park, Cricklewood, Kilburn, Queen’s Park, Wembley and Willesden (see Fig. 1). – 
has resulted in the tongue-in-cheek moniker of “Najaf in Brent” (Bowen, 2014), a 
reference to the Shi’a religious seminaries of the southern Iraqi city of Najaf. Due to the 
material and symbolic authority exercised by the marja’iyya over ordinary practicing 
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Shi’is (as explored in Chapter 2), the existence of “Najaf in Brent” is intimately tied to the 
Shi’a religious establishment in Iraq and Iran through the institutionalisation of religious 
doctrine and practice.  
 
As well as being institutionally dominant comparative to other Shi’is, Iraqi Shi’is in 
London have well-established and active religious and civil society institutions through 
which individuals are able to mobilise, both in terms of orientation towards Iraq itself 
and in terms of their political and religious views towards entities such as the Iranian or 
Iraqi regimes, and, more recently, against ISIS. It is this network of Shi’a politico-religious 
institutions, many of which are explicitly geared towards social and political engagement 
in Iraq, that has contributed to the sectarianisation of the symbolic and material 
diasporic space in which different parts of London have come to be associated with 
different theological and political interpretations of what it means to be “Shi’a” and 
“Iraqi” in Britain. As previously stated, many (middle-class) Iraqi Shi’is were expelled 
under Saddam Hussain precisely because of their connection to the religious schools and 
seminaries of these cities (as well as their alleged – and real – ties to Iran), and have 
continued to maintain these links in exile. The majority of London-based institutions 
thus have direct links to the Shi’a hawzas in the shrine cities and serve as the official 
representative of different maraji’, conducting outreach and other forms of religious and 






Fig. 3 – Map showing the main religious institutions in the “Shi’a triangle” 
of northwest London (Source: Author’s fieldwork) 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, because Shi’a jurisprudence requires individuals to 
follow a particular marja’ in matters of religious practice and jurisprudence, different 
institutions in London affiliated to different maraji’ have thus come to reflect different 
schools of thought within Shi’a Islam, and especially when it comes to political 
orientations towards the Islamic Republic of Iran via the following of the late Ayatollah 
Khomeini (see Table 1). 
 
Name  Ethno-national 
background 
Location Marja’ Followed 
Al- Khoei Islamic 
Centre 
Iraqi Queen’s Park Khoei/Sistani  
Al-Sadiq & Al-Zahra 
schools 
Iraqi Queen’s Park Khoei/Sistani  
Islamic Centre of 
England 
Iranian Maida Vale Khomeini  
Imam Ali Foundation Iraqi Willesden Sistani  
Rasul Al-Atham  Iraqi Cricklewood Shirazi  
Dar Al-Islam Iraqi Cricklewood Sadr (linked to the Islamic 
Da’wa Party of Iraq) 
Imam Al-Jawad Centre Iraqi Willesden Sistani 
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Belaghiya Iraqi Brent Cross Sistani 
Holland Park Mosque Iranian Holland Park Khomeini/ Khamanei 
AhlulBayt Foundation Iraqi Willesden Sistani 
World AhlulBayt 
Islamic League 
Indo-Pakistani Kensal Green Sistani 
Muhammadi Trust Indo-Pakistani  Willesden Sistani 
Imam Hussain Mosque Lebanese Kilburn Fadhlallah/Sistani 
 
Table 1. – Major Shi’a Institutions in London by background and affiliation 
(Source: Author’s fieldwork) 
 
In practice, this means that the personal and political rivalries between different schools 
of Shi’a thought have been written into the urban fabric of London through the 
institutionalisation of the marja’iyya in the city. As one of my research participants, a 
British-born Iraqi Shi’i, explained, mapping out the various spheres of different Shi’a 
theological and political influence in London: 
 
A: [Al-Khoei Foundation, Ahlulbayt Foundation, Salaam Foundation, Imam Ali 
Foundation and al-Hakim Foundation]; this is one big happy family. This is Najaf 
in Brent. Then you have the [Islamic Centre of England].… this is what I call 
“Iran”, when we say Iran we mean the government. [Then] over here we have 
another sect, we’ll call these Shiraziyya, Shirazis. And they have Rasul Al-
‘Atham, which is the biggest hussainiya in London. 
EDE: Where’s that? 
A: Cricklewood.  
EDE: And who are they? 
A: They’re the Shirazis [i.e. followers of Ayatollah Shirazi]… They basically call 
themselves the Karbala’is. They’re the… if I put it to you, these are the extreme 
right, in terms of their theology. 
EDE: So extremely orthodox? 
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A: Yeah. They’re the ones with the tatbir100 and everything. Full on… And if we 
say these guys [points to Dar Al-Islam], are Da’wa101 and that, they’re the lefties. 
EDE: Ok. And who are Najaf? They’re not political? 
A: They’re not political, but they’re in the middle. We say that they’re, what we 
call it, the right path… Whoever’s backed by Najaf is in charge of everything. 
(Interview 6) 
 
This polarisation of political and theological opinion within the Shi’a religious 
establishment means that in London, the choice of which Shi’a religious institution to 
frequent is often indicative of the politics of the individuals concerned, and is thus 
physically mapped onto the fabric of the city. For example, the Iraqi-run Dar Al-Islam is 
both a religious institution and the headquarters of the Islamic Da’wa Party in London; 
for this reason, Shi’is who frequent this establishment tend to have political leanings 
sympathetic to the current Iraqi government. At the other end of the political spectrum, 
the Iranian-run Islamic Centre of England (ICE) has close ties to the Islamic Republic and 
although tends to maintain good relations with Najaf harbours a number of fundamental 
theological disagreements especially with regards to the Iranian state doctrine of wilayat 
al-faqih.  
 
Arguably the largest and most influential Shi’a religious and cultural establishment in 
London (as well as the oldest Iraqi-run Shi’a institution in the UK) is the Imam Al-Khoei 
Benevolent Foundation (known as the Al-Khoei Foundation). Founded in 1989 by Abu 
al-Qasim al-Khoei, to represent the marja’iyya globally, the Foundation was the first of a 
number of transnational charitable and philanthropic institutions established through 
                                                             
100 Controversial ritual cutting of the forehead practiced by certain strands of Shi’a Muslims and 
banned by the religious establishment in Najaf (though not officially banned in Iran, the practice 
is denounced by Ayatollah Khamenei). 
101 Dar Al-Islam serves as the institutional representation of Iraq’s Islamic Da’wa Party in the UK. 
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the patronage of the al-Khoei family (other foundations were later set up in Bangladesh, 
India, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, and the US). Indeed, it is difficult to understate the 
significance of the Al-Khoei Foundation as an unparalleled force for extending the 
transnational influence of the al-Khoei family across the world: 
 
The establishment of a foundation to manage the affairs of a source of emulation 
had no precedent in the history of Shi’ism. The decision to headquarter it away 
from the centres of learning where the clerical establishment is traditionally 
based, let alone in the West, was equally innovative… In so doing, the 
foundation… offered a hybridised version of clerical leadership by combining a 
modern NGO-type structure and the marja’iyya’s traditional networking 
practices. (Corboz, 2015: 57) 
 
Thus not only did the al-Khoei family institutionally cement itself as a source of religious 
authority and philanthropic support, the choice to headquarter the Foundation in 
London was indicative of both the increasingly transnational nature of Shi’ism and of the 
role of London as a political and religious centre for exiled Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora. 
Following Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei’s death in 1992, the role of supreme marja’ was 
transferred to his student, Ali al-Hussain al-Sistani, along with the religious leadership 
of the Al-Khoei Foundation (though the administrative and practical leadership of the 
foundation remains in the hands of the al-Khoei family). As well as serving as a 
representative of Sistani, the Foundation hosts a mosque, a library, a community centre, 
and the Al-Sadiq (boys) an Al-Zahra (girls) private schools102 – the only Shi’a schools in 
the UK. As part of its educational remit, in 2009, the Foundation established the Centre 
for Academic Shi’a Studies (CASS) under the directorate of Yousif al-Khoei (the grandson 
                                                             
102 More on Shi’a educational establishments later in the chapter. 
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of Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei and nephew of Abdul Majid) with the stated aim of “promoting 
original, contemporary, and impartial scholarship on Shi’a Islam and Muslims.”103  
 
Part of the Foundation’s power and influence comes from the period of Abdul Majid al-
Khoei’s directorship (prior to his assassination in Iraq 2003), during which it established 
prominent links to the British government under Tony Blair and proved influential in 
shaping British and US policy agendas towards the regime of Saddam Hussain in Iraq. 
However, while its ties to the UK government continue to make the Al-Khoei Foundation 
“the main bridge between the Shi’a in Britain and wider society” (Bowen, 2014: 141), the 
institution’s willingness to work with the Home Office on issues such as counter-
terrorism and extremism, often in an advisory capacity to senior government figures, has 
made many ordinary practicing Shi’is suspicious of its motives and power.  Nevertheless, 
CASS and the Al-Khoei Foundation continue to be among the most influential Shi’a 
institutions in diasporic London today, and play a significant role in the shaping of the 
diasporic (Iraqi-)Shi’a subject. As the centre’s current legal representative affirmed to 
me: “In terms of Shi’a organisations, I don’t think anyone can compete with us.”104 
 
Being Iraqi(-Shi’a) in London 
The various political and religious divisions within the Shi’a establishment are thus 
reflected in the multiple and competing institutions vying for the patronage of  Shi’is in 
London. Nevertheless, one of my predominant observations gleaned from frequenting 
such institutions is that for practicing Iraqi Shi’is in London, the choice of which 
hussainiyya to attend on a particular day is often shaped as much by social and familial 
ties than by religious doctrine or ideology. During the Islamic month of Muharram, for 
example, I noticed that individuals would often attend different institutions on different 
                                                             
103 CASS website, accessed 26 June 2016 
104 Author’s fieldnotes, 10 September 2015. 
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days, or even attend several in the same night, often dictated by the preferences of family 
and friends.105 One of my research participants, Um Zainab, a middle-aged Iraqi woman 
with a close-knit female friendship group, even spent several hours a day during 
Muharram calling up each of her friends to find out where they were going that evening 
and to arrange transport and lift sharing. For Abu Dalia, on the other hand, a young Iraqi-
born man who moved to the UK as a child, the most important factor in deciding which 
hussainiyya to attend is the quality and type of the food handed out at the end of each 
religious service (as he told me: “Karbala’iyya make the best qeema”).106 
 
Despite internal communal divisions, then, the concentration of Iraqi Shi’a religious 
centres and institutions in one corner of northwest London has arguably shaped the 
lived experience of practicing Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora such that individuals often 
speak about feeling part of an “(Iraqi-)Shi’a community” that is defined through its 
relation to the material and social fabric of the city of London. More than this, the very 
geography of London itself has come to define the boundaries of particular religious and 
social groupings, concentrated around the different Shi’a religious and political 
establishments. For example, a recurring trope encountered during the research process 
was of the difference between Iraqi Shi’is living and frequenting different areas of 
London, especially the neighbourhoods of Kingston, Ealing, and Wembley. As one of my 
research participants explained: 
 
The [Iraqi] Shi’a community breaks down into different ethnicities and different 
schools of thought; it’s group thinking. For example, you have what’s known as 
the Wembley Iraqis, the Ealing Iraqis, and the Kingston Iraqis. The Wembley 
                                                             
105 For the younger generation, the choice of which hussainiyya to attend is often dictated by the 
particular orator speaking on a given night, with some English-language speakers attracting large 
and devout followings. 
106 Informal conversation with Abu D, 15 November 2015. Source: Author’s fieldnotes. 
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Iraqis tend to be traditional, religious and working class; the Ealing Iraqis tend to 
be liberal and higher class, but still religious; and the Kingston Iraqis tend to be 
liberal and secular, they often see themselves as British. Me, for example, I’m 
from Wembley, because I grew up there, but I’m “Ealing”: I’m not traditional-
style religious, I focus more on principles. (Interview 19) 
 
In this way, the proliferation of Shi’a religious, political, and civil society institutions in  
different parts of London (especially Wembley, which is in the borough of Brent) is seen 
as shaping the levels of religious conservatism and political orientation of Iraqi Shi’is 
living in this area. This, in turn, serves to contribute to the consolidation of a specifically 
Shi’a politico-religious identity, one in which Iraqi national belonging becomes tempered 
with and superseded by ethno-sectarian articulations and inscribed onto the physical 
fabric of the city (Degli Esposti, forthcoming 2018). Such articulations can be seen as part 
of the discursive construction of Shi’a spaces within London by practicing Iraqi Shi’is, 
and serves to illustrate how religious-inflected spatialities come to shape individual and 
collective understandings of identity, and vice versa. 
 
As well as shaping the lived reality of Iraqi Shi’is in London through the 
institutionalisation of Shi’a religiosity into the fabric of the city itself, Shi’a religious and 
civil society establishments in the UK also offer a place for the fostering of communal ties 
and social belonging. For example, many of the young British-born Iraqis Shi’is I 
interviewed described how as children growing up in London in the 1990s their parents 
would regularly take them to the hussainiyya as a way to meet other Iraqis exiled in the 
UK and to exchange gossip and news. One interviewee, a secular Iraqi from a Shi’a 
background who fled the country as a young man in 1980 out of fear of being targeted 
by Saddam Hussain’s regime, spoke about how he would often visit hussainiyyat in 
London during the 1991 Gulf War as a way to keep up to date with developments in Iraq: 
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I don’t consider myself a religious man but I started to go to the mosque, or to the 
hussainiyya in ‘91 just to get the fresh news from Baghdad. Because there by faxes 
the news was coming by minutes [sic]. (Interview 4) 
 
In this sense, the hussainiyyat and other Shi’a institutions acted as social and community 
“glue” that kept exiled Iraqi Shi’is together and allowed them to stay in touch both with 
each other and with developments “back home” in Iraq. In the London context, the 
hussainiyyat engendered a sense of community by acting as a physical meeting place for 
diasporic Iraqi Shi’is; one that was simultaneously inscribed with religious meaning 
through the observance of rites and practices and that was oriented towards religious 
and political engagement with domestic developments in Iraq. This is analogous to the 
experience of many migrant religions, in which religious institutions come to take on 
renewed social (and often even political) significance in the host state (Levitt, 2001, 
2004; Menjivar, 1999; Metcalf, 1996; Schiffauer, 1988; among others).  
 
Thus, only in exile did the notion of “Shi’ism” as an institutionally-defined religious and 
political community come to play a dominant role in the self-perception of Iraqi Shi’is 
who had, while in Iraq, identified themselves through varying political, social, and 
demographic affiliations (Flynn, 2013). For example, many Shi’is prior to leaving Iraq 
saw themselves as primarily Najafis or Kerbala’is107 (inhabitants of the southern Iraqi 
cities of Najaf and Karbala), Communists or Da’wa Party members, secularists or 
nationalists – rather than as Shi’is in and of themselves. Indeed, many scholars have 
stressed the significance of regional, ethnic, socio-economic, political, and tribal 
                                                             
107 Indeed, these regional rivalries have even seeped into the diasporic experience through the 
way in which different Shi’a religious establishments are seen as being “Najafi” or “Karbala’i” – 
one hussainiya in particular, Rasul al-‘Atham, is even known informally as “al-Karbala’iyya” (“the 
Karbala’i one”). 
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identities in Iraq prior to the US-led invasion of 2003, and the relative lack of salience 
afforded to identities based on religious sect (Batatu, 2012; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 
2001; Nakash, 2003; Tripp, 2002; Zubaida, 2002).  
 
In the London context, then, it wasn’t so much the commonality of Shi’a religious 
conviction (many Iraqi migrants had vastly divergent views of religion) than the 
experience of meeting and socialising within a religiously-defined space that led to the 
construction of a sense of communal religious and political identity articulated around 
the notion of “Shi’aness”. Moreover, this notion of an “Iraqi” community in London came 
to be intimately tied to a sense of common Shi’a identity – whether religious, political, or 
social – as a result of the way in which Iraqi-run hussainiyyat doubled as spaces of 
communal belonging and religious practices. As one young man told me, British-born 
Iraqi Shi’is tend to “see their Iraqiness as Shi’aness; they show how Iraqi they are by 
being more and more Shi’a” (Interview 22), while another affirmed that “traditionally, 
Shi’a Islam was about being a good Muslim and getting on with people; whereas now it’s 
about being seen as being Shi’a, as marking yourself out to be different” (Interview 5). 
 
Fragmented Realities: Ethno-Sectarianism in the City   
In this sense, the institutionalisation of Shi’ism in the urban fabric of London, and the 
material and discursive links between Shi’a spaces in the city and those in Iraq and Iran, 
have contributed to the crystallisation of an ethno-sectarian sense of communal and 
religious identity in which Shi’a religiosity has come to supersede Iraqi national 
belonging to be replaced with a more pan-ethnic sense of “Shi’aness”. Moreover, the 
physical inscription of Shi’a religiosity onto London’s urban landscape has also resulted 
in bracketing off areas of the city as Shi’a-dominant “ghettos” where Muslims from 
different theological schools rarely attend the same religious or community institution, 
even if they live in close proximity to each other. One example of this is the proximity of 
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Regent’s Park Mosque and the Islamic Centre of England – each of these establishments 
is formally a religious centre, and thus in theory open to Muslims (and non-Muslims) of 
all denominations; and yet in practice the former is frequented almost exclusively by 
Sunnis and the latter by Shi’is. As one of my interviewees explained, describing his 
experience of living in Marylebone: 
 
AM: I hate this area that I live in because we have this stupid Regent’s Park 
Mosque here… 
EDE: What’s wrong with Regent’s Park Mosque? 
A: They’re very undercover, but they support terrorism.  
EDE: What do you mean? 
A: Like, for example, they invited [X].108 He is like the biggest person who, who 
hates Shi’is and called for everyone to cut Shi’is heads off. They invited him to 
give lectures there. 
EDE: Really? 
A: Yeah. And we’ve even done, in our lobby group, we’ve done experiments. One 
of our friends, he went to pray in a Sunni mosque and they told him to leave. 
EDE: So you never pray in Sunni mosques? Even though Regent’s Park Mosque 
is right here you never go? 
A: No – It’s very sad. The other day somebody went to Regent’s Park Mosque, 




Although it is difficult to verify the truth of this information, what is clear is that this 
young man does not identify with the type of Islam promoted at Regent’s Park Mosque 
                                                             
108 Name deleted to preserve anonymity. 
109 Small clay tablet used by Shi’a Muslims during prayer. 
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and therefore never goes to pray there, even though it is the closest religious centre to 
him; preferring instead to travel further north to frequent the Imam Jawad Foundation 
and Al-Khoei Centre (N.B. this is the same man who referred to Salafis as “beardy-
weirdys”110 and expressed feeling uncomfortable walking down Edgware Road). In this 
sense, we can see how the politics of sectarianism finds physical manifestation in the 
urban environment of London through the creation of alternately Shi’a- and Sunni-
dominated areas and the shift away from inclusive Islamic religious centres in the city 
and towards those defined by affiliation to a particular strand of Islam (and even to 
different schools within those strands). 
 
In the case of (Iraqi) Shi’is in London, the reification of Shi’a “groupness” (Brubaker, 
2002) through the proliferation of Shi’a religious and civil society organisations has thus 
contributed to the crystallisation of what it means to be “Shi’a” in the context of Islamic 
London in a way that often explicitly constructs different Islamic sects in a logic of mutual 
exclusion. In particular, the consolidation of the “Shi’a triangle” in northwest London111 
has led to a concentration of Shi’a Muslims in certain neighbourhoods and to the 
perceived polarisation of the city between “Sunni” East London and “Shi’a” (North)West 
London. In practice, this has come to mean that even though Sunnis and Shi’is in London 
may both inhabit the same physical space – such as living on and around Edgware Road 
– individuals belonging to differently practicing Islamic denominations no longer move 
among those spaces in the same way; preferring instead to frequent religious institutions 
geared specifically to their specific (sectarian) needs. It is for this reason that individuals 
such as AM come to feel “uncomfortable” when walking down the street in certain parts 
                                                             
110 See p. 160. 
111 Despite colloquial claims to the “Shi’a Triangle” and “Najaf in Brent”, it is difficult to verify the 
extent to which Shi’a Muslims do indeed dominate the institutional and demographic landscape 
of northwest London since there is little reliable data on the number of institutions of other 
religious denominations in this area. However, for the purposes of this thesis, it is important to 
note that the perceived dominance of Shi’a Muslims in Brent forms part of the discursive 
construction of space in the city, and is therefore tied to the kinds of social, political, and religious 
identities cultivated within such spaces. 
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of the city; the discord between their psychic and discursive understanding of their place 
in the urban fabric and the physical reality of the built environment can lead to a sense 
of unease and a desire to surround themselves with the “familiarity” of those who think 
and act like themselves. This all-too-human need for the familiar becomes politicised 
when the dividing lines between sameness and difference, “us” and “them”, become 
defined by ethno-religious categories such as Islamic sect.  This is not to say that Sunnis 
and Shi’is do not mix at all – far from it – but rather that when community spaces become 
politically-charged, the result is a sectarianisation of religious and institutional space. 
 
What are the implications of this sectarianisation of the city-as-lived when it comes to 
the formation of the diasporic Shi’a subject? Moreover, what is the significance of the UK 
context in defining and policing what it means to be “Shi’a” today? I have already 
explored the ways in which the meaning and content of the identity categories “Iraqi” 
and “Shi’a” have changed across time and space (in chapters 1 and 2, respectively); here, 
I wish to turn to the emergence of a trans-ethnic and transnational conception of 
“Shi’aness” invested in the British domestic context – in other words, to the advent of 
“British Shi’ism” within the diasporic imaginary. 
 
Be(com)ing British Shi’a: The Shaping of the Diasporic Imaginary 
The distillation of the sectarianised (Iraqi-)Shi’a diasporic subject, a category of 
belonging predicated on an ethnonormative conception of “Shi’aness” discursively 
bound by the institution and material fabric of the city of London and defined in 
opposition to the UK government’s pejorative and securitised construction of (Sunni) 
Islam, thus owes much to the significance of the British social and political context 
productive of the (Shi’a) diasporic imaginary. For the growing number of British-born 
Shi’is, this is the context that permeates their everyday lives; and thus holds greater 
resonance for them than the social and political contexts of their parents’ and 
grandparents’ countries of origin. Just as there is an increasing prevalence of British-
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born Sunni Muslim identifying as part of a wider “British (Sunni) Islam” (Cesari, 2004; 
Grewal, 2013; Hopkins and Gale, 2009; Mandaville, 2001; Meer, 2008, 2010; Meer and 
Modood, 2009; Metcalf, 1996; Modood et al., 1997, 2006, Modood, 2003, 2006; Modood 
and Werbner, 1997; Roy, 2004; among others), so too is the shift from nationalistic to 
religious-sectarian identity categories amongst diasporic (Iraqi) Shi’is in the UK being 
increasingly manifested as an orientation towards “British Shi’ism”. 
 
To reiterate, this is not to claim that all practicing Shi’a Muslims in the UK (Iraqi or 
otherwise) tend to prioritise their religious and sectarian identities over their ethno-
national origins or political convictions (identity, after all, resides on a spectrum). 
Indeed, many Shi’is across all generations actively seek engagement with the domestic 
contexts of their countries of origin (the Iraqi Youth Group, Iraqi Youth Foundation, and 
Iraqi Youth Network being but three examples of diasporic youth involvement in Iraqi 
politics). Rather, it is my contention that the orientation towards a trans-ethnic and 
transnational conception of “British Shi’ism” is a relatively new and growing 
phenomenon, and is borne out of the diasporic context of Britain itself.  
 
The identity-category “Shi’a” has, in the British domestic context, thus come to transcend 
its doctrinal origins and instead been invested with a form of universal political 
significance that is performatively (re)iterated through the public and private enactment 
of religious rituals and political narratives. For the younger generation, their Iraqi (or 
Pakistani, or Lebanese, or Bahraini, or Afghan, or Khoja, etc.) “origins” are becoming less 
significant than their orientation towards specifically Shi’a modes of performance and 
belonging. As one young man, reflecting on his childhood growing up in Britain in the 
late 1980s/early 1990s, remarked: “Iraqi identity was never particularly prominent for 
us… our identity was primarily Muslim Shi’a” (Interview 10). In particular, the rise of 
English-language Shi’a religious and community institutions and programmes have 
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contributed to the crystallisation of a sense of “British Shi’ism” amongst British-born 
practicing Shi’is in the UK (and in London in particular). 
 
Language and Learning 
The tendency for subsequent generations of migrants to adopt the language of their host 
country has been well documented in the academic literature (Al-Ali and Koser, 2003; 
Cummins, 1981; Dustmann, 1994; Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003; Hree et al., 2013; Selmer 
and Lauring, 2015); indeed, English is fast becoming the primary language for a growing 
number of British-born Shi’is (Iraqi or otherwise) (Flaskerud, 2014; Scharbrodt et al., 
2017; Scharbrodt and Shanneik, 2018; Spellman-Poots, 2012). In the diasporic setting, 
language functions as the great equaliser; only by speaking English can practicing Shi’is 
from diverse ethno-national backgrounds come together and communicate effectively – 
thus contributing towards a communal sense of what it means to be “Shi’a” within the 
British context. But the significance of English goes beyond its status as the primary 
language of cross-cultural communication for diasporic Shi’is. As Shin and Kubota (2008: 
206) argue: “language.. is embedded in sociopolitical and economic relations of power” 
and plays a key role in “the construction as well as transformation of… cultural and 
linguistic images of the Self and the Other.” In this sense, the growing prevalence of 
English within Shi’a religious and cultural institutions in the UK points towards a specific 
iteration of the Shi’a subject that is deeply embedded in the linguistic and discursive 
context of the diasporic experience. 
 
The increasing prevalence of English is thus significant not merely for the construction 
of a sense of “Shi’aness” rooted in the British domestic context, it also actively works to 
break down linguistic and cultural barriers between practicing Shi’is from different 
ethno-national backgrounds and allows them to engage with each other within the 
diasporic setting. Moreover, the rise of English-language Shi’a religious and cultural 
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institutions in the UK has also facilitated Shi’a political mobilisation in the diaspora by 
firstly allowing such institutions to make claims and demands from British domestic and 
state institutions (the Al-Khoei Foundation being the most prominent example), and 
secondly by connecting UK-based institutions with similar Shi’a establishments around 
the world. In this sense, the advent of English-language Shi’a religious and political 
practice in the diaspora has worked to promote a globalised and transnational 
conception of “Shi’a identity” that is no longer linguistically or geographically bound. The 
rise of English has thus supplemented the existing transnational focus of Shi’ism as 
epitomised by the marja’iyya and turned it into a global (and globalised) phenomenon. 
 
English is not only the language of choice for the majority of British-born Shi’is when it 
comes to everyday communication; it is also increasingly becoming the primary 
language of religious education and instruction in a variety of different settings and 
contexts. For example, the Al-Khoei Foundation-affiliated Al-Sadiq and Al-Zahra schools, 
the only Shi’a schools in the UK, offer an English-language curriculum to fee-paying 
students from ages 3-16 (pre-school to Year 2 is mixed, and Years 3 - 11 is single sex). 
Founded in 1991, the school(s) mostly adheres to the UK national syllabus, with extra 
courses in Arabic, Qur’an, and Islamic Studies taking around 10 percent of the timetable 
(Ofsted, 2014). According to the school’s website, it purports to offer “an education based 
upon academic excellence coupled with principles of morality, tolerance and spiritual 
understanding” to prepare pupils to live “in a fast changing secular environment which 
often manifests itself in a declining trend in moral and social behaviour.” 112  In the 
school’s last Ofsted inspection in 2014, the report concluded that:  
 
The school curriculum ensures that pupils make progress in all the required areas 
of learning. It is broad and balanced, and takes account of an appropriate range of 
                                                             
112 http://www.al-khoei.org/about-2/the-foundation, accessed 2 July 2017 
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subjects in addition to its stated Islamic aims. It prepares pupils well for life in 
modern Britain and caters effectively for pupils’ spiritual, moral, social and 
cultural development. (Ofsted, 2014) 
 
Along with the Al-Sadiq and Al-Zahra schools, London is also home to a number of Shi’a 
higher education institutions, most notably the International Colleges of Islamic Science 
(ICIS), founded in 1989 by Dr Sayyid Fadhil al-Milani, and the Islamic College of 
Advanced Studies (ICAS), founded in 1998. While ICIS mostly functions as a religious 
seminary, offering Arabic-language courses on Islamic law and jurisprudence, ICAS 
(which receives most of its funding from Iran; Bowen, 2014) provides undergraduate 
and postgraduate qualifications accredited by the University of Middlesex. Nevertheless, 
for  many ordinary practicing Shi’is the most significant exposure they receive to Shi’a 
teaching and religious practice occurs not from such institutions but during the ‘Ashura 
majalis of the Islamic month of Muharram.  
 
Since the first English-language majlis was held at the Imam Jawad Centre in the early 
2000s, there has been a veritable explosion of new organisations and privately-run 
majalis specifically geared towards a younger, English-speaking audience. A poster 
circulated of the main UK-based public majalis for Muharram 2015, for example, listed 
28 English-language events out of a total of 49 (roughly 50 percent). Of these, 19 included 
lectures and/or latmiyyat in both English and another language (mostly Arabic, Urdu, or 
Farsi), whilst the remaining seven were conducted entirely in English. The self-
proclaimed pioneer of the trend towards English-language majalis, exiled Iraqi scholar 
Sayyid Fadhil Bahrululoom, explained the significance of English during an interview 
conducted by Ahlulbayt TV in December 2013: 
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I asked the shabab [young people] when they came to see me why we need a 
majlis in English, and they said “Because we don’t understand most of the khataba 
[speakers].” The majalis, most of them were packed, the Arabic majalis, and they 
grew every year, but the shabab, the children, always used to play outside, 
sometimes making troubles to neighbours, because the child he get bored [sic]. 
All of them, they never understood what was going on… And when we started 
[the English majalis], all of those [children] who were outside the majalis, they 
attend the majlis. Because unfortunately, our parents’ generation whose first 
language is Arabic, they don’t realise that their children’s first language is not 
Arabic, or Urdu, or Farsi, it’s English. So we should deliver the message [of Imam 
Hussain] in English.113  
 
Here, the instigation of English-language majalis is seen as key to ensuring the continued 
transmission of the “message of Imam Hussain” across the generations. Significantly, the 
provision of English-language religious events is also seen as an extension Shi’a religious 
piety in which the “serving of Imam Hussain” is seen as a (politico-)religious duty aimed 
at making specific claims regarding the place of Shi’ism in the world (Bahrululoom, 
2013). As Sayyid Fadhil commented during an interview with myself in summer 2014, 
“unlike the Kurds and the Jews”, Shi’is “haven’t made use” of the atrocities committed 
against them; “Even now, everyone’s talking about the Christians and Yazidis, but not the 
Shi’a who have fled Mosul and who are being persecuted and slaughtered by Da’esh 
[ISIS]” (Interview 7). The implication being that the growing prevalence of English will 
allow Shi’is to make their voices heard (recall NM commenting that “the Shi’a are all 
silent”) in a way that is globally accessible.  
 
                                                             
113 Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KkGGDWrj5MY, accessed 27 October 2015. 
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The rise of English-language academic and religious education amongst diasporic Shi’is 
in Britain, therefore, isn’t only significant for the way in which it promotes a trans-ethnic 
and transnational Shi’a subject that is increasingly divorced from its Arabic (and Arab) 
ethno-linguistic roots and invested in a globalised sense of “Shi’aness”, English is also 
becoming the language of choice for second- and third-generation Shi’is who wish to 
make their voices heard and promote their specific vision of Shi’a spirituality and ethics. 
Indeed, as the poster for the fourth annual Imam Hussain English Poetry Competition 
articulated, each poem should be “aimed at non-Muslim readers” and attempt to “link 
the message of Imam Hussain to struggles facing humanity in modern times” (Author’s 
fieldnotes). The discursive power of English, in other words, plays a key role in the 
construction and dissemination of a globalised ethical Shi’a subject invested in a positive 
affirmation of “Shi’a identity”. 
 
“We’ve kind of created our own culture” 
The advent of a “British Shi’a” identity is thus very much a product of the diasporic 
experience; both in terms of the dilution of ethno-national origins through the 
experience of exile and diaspora and in terms of the significance of the British domestic 
context in fostering a sense of what it means to be both “British” and “Shi’a” in the 
contemporary world. As one young man noted, reflecting on his British identity, asserted 
that: “This is my country; I’ll fight for my country and I’ll die for my country… Honestly, 
I would fight for Great Britain” (Interview 6). While another young woman emphasised 
her sense of being both British and Shi’a: “I think that more people associate themselves 
as being British Shi’a than being British-Iraqi-Shi’a. We’ve kind of created our own 
culture. Generally for most people your religion takes a higher status because it’s a way 
of life” (Interview 28). 
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A significant part of this burgeoning “British Shi’a culture” is the proliferation of youth-
led organisations and events, whether that be those geared towards religion and piety 
(such as the Imam Hussain Conference, the Imam Hussain Legacy Exhibition, the Imam 
Hussain Slam Poetry Competition, the Islamic Unity Society, or the Ahlulbayt Islamic 
Mission), charity and activism (such as the Al-Ayn Foundation, the Iraqi Children’s Aid 
and Repair Endeavour, the Imam Hussain Blood Donation Campaign, and the “Who Is 
Hussain?” campaign), or media and education (including Alhlulbayt TV, Safeer TV, the 
Young Hussainy magazine, or the Centre for Academic Shi’a Studies). The accumulation 
of Shi’a-specific religious and cultural institutions, events, and community networks 
(increasingly run in English by the younger generation of British-born Shi’is) this 
contributed to the distillation of a “Shi’a identity” within the British context. As one 
young Iranian Shi’a woman remarked in a blog post on “Shi’aphobia”: 114 
 
When I’m in my Shi’a mosque, I can express my love for the Ahlul-Bayt without 
that love being perceived as excessive, un-Islamic, or self-seeking. I’m not met 
with suspicion if I’m really a Muslim and I don’t have to account for a different 
interpretation of Islamic history or exegesis of the Qur’an. (Shereen Yousuf, 16 
July 2015)115 
 
Here, the writer’s sense of what it means to “be Shi’a” is being defined in opposition to 
those Muslims who would seek to classify Shi’is as “excessive, un-Islamic, or self-seeking” 
(a reference to a particular strand of radical Sunni Islam), and consolidated through the 
creation of Shi’a-only religious spaces. This sense of a Shi’a-specific identity defined in 
opposition to (particular interpretations of) Sunni Islam is partly, as explored above, a 
                                                             
114 The concept of  “Shi’aphobia” is explored in detail in Chapter 4 and as such not addressed 
directly here, 
115  http://www.patheos.com/blogs/hindtrospectives/2015/07/shiaphobia-at-the-intersection-
and-why-it-matters/, accessed 2 July 2017. 
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result of the social and political context of Britain; but it also contributes to positive 
articulations of “Shi’a identity” by giving substance and content to the category of 
“Shi’aness”. While attachments to places, languages, and cultures of migrant origin fade 
with each subsequent generation born in exile, there is an important sense in which 
attachments to religious identities become distilled within the diasporic imaginary – this 
is an effect that has been well-documented in the literature on migrant religions (Alfonso 
et al., 2004; Axel, 2002; Ebaugh, 2003; Levitt, 2003; Mandaville, 2001; Menjivar, 1999a; 
Vertovec, 2004). In this sense, the production of the sectarianised Shi’a subject can be 
seen as a direct result of the various discursive, material, social, and political power 
structures circulating and operating within the diasporic imaginary. One young British-
born Iraqi Shi’a woman I met during a pilgrimage trip to Iran, for example, remarked that 
she “didn’t mind” whether her future husband was “Iraqi, Pakistani, Iranian” or any other 
nationality, but affirmed could “never marry” a Sunni because she considered herself to 
be “just too Shi’a”: 
 
Even if you get a sympathetic Sunni, there are some things they just don’t 
understand – like Muharram. Also, if [I married a Sunni and] we had kids and they 
do some things the Shi’a way and some things the Sunni way that would just be 
confusing for them. I feel like growing up Muslim in the West we already have 
enough to be confused about… Shi’ism is the only thing we have left to hold on 
to; we’ve already lost our culture. (Interview 27) 
 
Interestingly, this same young woman (who is an ‘alwiyya – female descendent of the 
Prophet) later went on to marry a third-generation Pakistani Shi’a man who she met 
during the same pilgrimage trip116 – a match that would have been unheard of amongst 
                                                             
116 Anecdotally, I collected testimonies to the effect that such trips are often used for match-
making purposes by pious young Shi’is who otherwise might fins it difficult to mingle with the 
opposite sex. 
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first-generation diasporans. For this young woman, the religious identity of her future 
husband (Shi’a Muslim) was more important to her than his potential ethnic or national 
origins – indeed, throughout my fieldwork I encountered examples of British-born Shi’is 
socialising with Shi’is from different backgrounds, but all of whom were drawn together 
as a result of their shared sense of “Shi’aness”. 
 
For many young British-born Shi’is, it is thus increasingly impossible to separate their 
faith from their everyday life as British citizens of a multicultural city, where they are 
required to both articulate their difference in order to be recognised as a minority group 
and to adjust the demands of their religion to accommodate the reality of the 
environment in which they find themselves. During a pilgrimage trip to Iran for second-
generation British Shi’is in June 2015, for example, I observed a conversation between 
R, a British-born Pakistani, and Z, a British-born Iraqi, discussing Ayatollah Sistani’s 
fatwa telling people to boycott Starbucks coffee chains: 
 
R: I’m sorry, but Sistani needs to try living in the West. He’s a great ‘alim 
[scholar], but some things you need to experience in order to understand. 
Z: I agree. And in any case, I don’t think one person boycotting Starbucks is going 
to change the world. I’d rather have my caramel macchiato! 
(Author’s fieldnotes, 19 June 2015) 
 
Here, the two women are negotiating their Shi’a identity in relation both to the 
transnational influence of the clerical establishment and to their own personal 
experiences of being born and brought up “in the West”; and carving out a path between 
the two that combines their commitment to Shi’ism as a religion and their attachment to 
being British and Western. As F, the woman who went on to marry a Pakistani Shi’i, told 
me during the same trip: “As much as I love coming to these places and doing ziyara 
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[pilgrimage], I don’t think I could ever live here. It’s just too different [from the UK]” 
(Interview 27). 
 
Such examples point to the emergence of a particular way to be and do “Shi’aness” within 
the British domestic context that increasingly incorporate the experience of exile and 
diaspora, the lived reality of multicultural Britain, the transnational influence of the Shi’a 
clerical establishment, and the political contours of sectarian conflicts in the Middle East. 
The sectarianised Shi’a diasporic subject thus reveals itself as a discursive construction 
resulting from a diverse web of interconnected power relations – whether that be the 
enduring trauma of exile, the transnational legacy of the marja’iyya, or the symbolic 
resonance of ISIS as the epitome of evil against which the Shi’a subject seeks to define 
itself. Moreover, the various articulations and manifestations of this subject are deeply 
embedded in the British domestic context, and are reflective of the various discourses of 
multiculturalism, ethnonormativity, Islamophobia, minority rights, and Shi’a spatialities 
within the UK and London specifically. It it the ensemble of these discourses that thus 




This chapter has supplemented the argument made in the previous two chapters 
regarding the shift from nationalist to religious (and sectarian) forms of identification 
and belonging by tracing the emergence of a trans-ethnic and transnational Shi’a subject 
within the diasporic context. Significantly, it is my contention that the particularities of 
the British social and political context, coupled with the experience of exile and diaspora 
and the transnational influence of the Shi’a clerical establishment, have contributed to 
the decoupling of Shi’a ethno-religious identity from any meaningful sense of Iraqi 
national origins, especially for second- and third-generation diasporans born in the UK 
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who consider themselves to be “British”. The gradual shift from the Iraqi-Shi’a subject, 
to the (Iraqi-)Shi’a subject, to the diasporic Shi’a subject, tout court, thus reflects a 
complex combination of historical, political, and social factors that contribute to 
individuals’ sense of subjective and collective belonging. While the significance of Iraq 
(or rather, “Iraq”117) continues to have resonance within the diasporic imaginary, in 
articulations of “British Shi’ism” it has become nothing more than a hollowed-out 
signifier representative of specific types of orientations and attachments towards a 
sectarianised Shi’a subject.  
 
For this reason, the remainder of the thesis will focus less on the specific experiences of 
diasporic Iraqi Shi’is in the UK and more on the ways in which the diasporic Shi’a subject 
(imagined as a trans-ethnic and transnational identification with Shi’a ethno-religious 
belonging) has been differentially articulated within the diasporic imaginary. Part of this 
will involve exploring how the encounter with Western discourses of liberalism, justice, 
and minority rights (explored in Chapter 4), as well as the hegemonic influence of global 
(neo-)capitalism (Chapter 5), have been constitutive of the sectarianised Shi’a subject 
within the diasporic context. In this sense, chapters 4 and 5 represent a discursive and 
empirical shift from the previous three chapters, in which the primary focus is on the 
contours and articulations of the Shi’a subject itself, divorced from the ethno-national 
background of the individuals who identify with it. This move away from nationalistic 
and towards sectarian and religious forms of identification should thus be seen as part 
of a wider global movement towards the particularisation and compartmentalisation of 
identity categories. 
Chapter 4 – “Shi’a Rights”: Towards an Ethical Shi’a Subject 
 
                                                             




The first three chapters of this thesis have traced the emergence of the sectarianised 
Shi’a subject among Iraqi Shi’i diasporans in the UK as a discursive product of multiple 
factors; including the experience of exile and migration, the politicisation of Shi’a 
religious mythology, the influence of the Shi’a clerical establishment, and the discursive, 
material, and institutional fabric of diasporic London. Rather than continuing to excavate 
the origins of the sectarianised Shi’a subject, the final two chapters concern themselves 
primarily with the way in which this subject is currently being articulated, performed, 
and conceptualised within the contemporary diasporic imaginary. In particular, it is my 
contention that the development of a transnational and trans-ethnic conception of 
“Shi’aness” as a bounded identity category is a product of the encounter both with liberal 
normative discourses, such as those of “equality”, “justice”, and “human rights”, and of 
the commodification of identities on the global marketplace. In this sense, the 
sectarianisation of the diasporic Shi’a subject can be understood not as arising from 
some kind of primordial or ahistorical sectarian “essence”, but rather as thoroughly 
modern phenomenon reflective of contemporary political, social, and discursive trends. 
 
This chapter seeks to explore the first half of this equation, documenting how the 
diasporic encounter with (“Western”) liberal norms has led to the emergence of what I 
term the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”. 118  While Shi’is have been persecuted and 
marginalised as a minority religious group throughout history (Barzegar, 2008a, 2008b; 
Dabashi, 2011; Louër and King, 2012; Machlis, 2014; Nasr, 2006; Ridgeon, 2012; Walker, 
2006), the emergence of a specifically Shi’a ethno-religious minority identity, I would 
                                                             
118  The term “Shi’a Rights” (with a capital “R”) thus refers to a specific set of discursive and 
normative claims pertaining to Shi’a Muslims founded on the logic of ethical humanitarianism, 
and is conceptually and analytically distinct from the term “Shi’a rights”, which denotes the 
political, social, and civic rights of Shi’a Muslims as differentially experienced across different 
historical and geographical contexts. 
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like to suggest, is a relatively new phenomenon. Indeed, this new Shi’a-specific identity 
represents the convergence of Shi’a political and religious mythology with Western 
liberal discourses of “equality”, “justice”, and “minority rights”. The discourse of “Shi’a 
Rights” is a direct product of this encounter, and thus lies at the heart of contemporary 
articulations of the Shi’a subject within the diasporic imaginary. Moreover, the rise of 
“Shi’a Rights” is fundamental both to the production of the Shi’a subject as an ethical 
subject and to the unconscious sectarianisation of that subject through the discursive 
prioritisation of Shi’a rights over those of all other minorities. In other words, while the 
Shi’a subject represents a positive articulation of Shi’a identity (where it has become a 
normatively “good” thing to identify as “Shi’a”), this subject also works to unconsciously 
(re)produce sectarianism through the necessary creation of an Other against which to 
define itself. 
 
The chapter will begin by sketching the emergence of the concept of “Shi’a Rights” within 
the diasporic imaginary in relation to the discourses of international humanitarianism 
and human rights in order to argue that the former is a product of the encounter with 
the latter (both through globalisation and as a result of the diasporic experience itself). 
In this sense, the crystallisation of the sectarianised Shi’a subject as articulated through 
the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” should be seen as a thoroughly modern phenomenon; 
where the “modern” is understood not as the antithesis of “tradition” but rather as a 
preoccupation with “dominant global and transnational discourses” (Deeb, 2011: 15). In 
particular, the shift away from nationalistic identity categories towards a transnational 
and trans-ethnic conception of the Shi’a subject can be understood as a response to 
globalised discourses of humanitarian transcendence and religious commonality, as well 
as a product of the diasporic experience of encountering Shi’is from diverse ethno-
national backgrounds (as explored in Chapter 3). 
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In this sense, the differential manifestation of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” across 
contexts can be seen as productive of the specific type of Shi’a subject under 
investigation – a subject that is simultaneously invested in particularistic historical and 
political grievances while being a reflection of universalistic contemporary global power 
structures and discursive hegemonies. Part of this project will be to trace the ways in 
which the material and symbolic violence meted out to Shi’a minorities around the world 
(both historically and contemporaneously) has led to a distillation of a Shi’a-specific 
identity category through the politicisation of victimhood. For this reason, the advent of 
“Shi’a Rights” should be understood, at least in part, as a response to the very real threat 
of Shi’a persecution by non-Shi’is. This political context, in turn, has contributed to the 
politicisation of in- and out-group boundaries such that to be “Shi’a” increasingly means 
to be “not-Sunni” in ways that unconsciously (re)produce sectarian dynamics. Moreover, 
it is my contention that the various articulations of “Shi’aness” facilitated by the 
discourse of “Shi’a Rights” and its preoccupation with victimhood are productive of an 
ethical Shi’a subject, whereby to be “(a good) Shi’a” is seen as to be implicated in 
particular understandings of ethical subject formation. 
 
Having thus laid the groundwork for a contextual understanding of the discourse of 
“Shi’a Rights” as a product of modernity (with all the difficulties and ambivalence that 
entails), the second part of this chapter will turn to the way in which this discourse has 
been institutionalised within the diasporic imaginary. For this purpose, I focus on a select 
number of organisations and institutions – in particular the organisation Shi’a Rights 
Watch – in order to highlight the ways in which the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” has 
become one of the dominant contemporary articulations of Shi’a-specific subjectivity. 
The institutionalisation of this discourse thus facilitates particular ways of being and 




Finally, I turn to the ideological implications of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”, specifically 
the way in which the prioritisation of Shi’a rights necessitates a specific and bounded 
understanding of “Shi’aness” that pits the ethical Shi’a subject against a threatening and 
antagonistic Other. Ultimately, I argue that the increasing narrowing of “Shi’a identity”, 
as manifested by the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” is productive of an unconscious 
sectarianism via which “Shi’ism” is most often articulated in opposition to a negative 
construction of “Sunnism” as its discursive Other. To reiterate, this is not to claim that 
individual Shi’is themselves are sectarian – often far from it – but that sectarianism is a 
necessary, if unconscious, by-product of the increasing specificity of Shi’a identity as 
characterised by the ethical Shi’a subject.  
 
“Shi’a Rights” in Context 
Earlier in this thesis, I illuminated the ways in which the historical appeal to the 
martyrdom of Imam Hussain at the Battle of Karbala came to take on political overtones 
throughout the late twentieth century as an articulation of Shi’a persecution and 
suffering. While the argument in Chapter 2 focused on the various contextual and 
contingent political and ideological forces that worked to transform the Karbala 
paradigm from an originary myth into a blueprint for Shi’a self-determination, here I 
wish to focus instead on the ways in which this discourse of Shi’a victimhood has come 
to undergird what I am calling the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”.  
 
Significantly, it is my contention that the encounter with Western liberal discourses of 
“human rights”, “justice”, “equality”, and “minority representation” (both as a result of 
the diasporic experience and of the increasing globalisation of such discourses in the 
contemporary moment) has worked, through the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”, to construct 
a Shi’a subject whose contours are determined by a certain preoccupation with ethical 
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norms. In other words, the Shi’a subject implicated in the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” is 
necessarily an ethical subject as a result of its emergence within what Didier Fassin calls 
the contemporary “banalisation of moral discourse and moral sentiments” (Fassin, 2014: 
433). The advent of the ethical Shi’a subject is thus inextricably intertwined with 
contemporary articulations of humanitarian principles, and as a result can be 
understood as a thoroughly modern subject, rather than as the ultimate expression of an 
underlying and primordial sectarian “essence”.  
 
From Human Rights to “Shi’a Rights”: The Emergence of a Discourse 
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1948, the concept of “human rights” has thoroughly permeated the 
discourse of international activism to become “the marker and measure of a global civil 
society embracing all ‘humans’” (Stychin, 2004: 954). While a critique of the banalisation 
and normalisation of the notion of “human rights” falls outside of the scope of this thesis, 
it is important to acknowledge the extent to which this concept is itself predicated on an 
understanding of “humanity” that is deeply rooted in philosophical and political 
discursive traditions that are a heart “Western, liberal, and individualist” (Peterson, 
1990: 308; cf. Hopgood, 2013).  
 
For this reason, the globalisation of the term “human rights” can be seen both as a 
historical product of Western colonial and military dominance, and as a mechanism for 
the international enforcement of globally-recognised moral norms. As Donnelly (2007: 
283) puts it: “Norm creation has been internationalised.” On the other hand, the global 
human rights regime – what Hopgood (2013) calls “Human Rights” (capitalised) – 
consists of “a global structure of laws, courts, norms, and organisations that raise money, 
write reports, run international campaigns, open local offices, lobby governments, and 
claim to speak with singular authority in the name of humanity as a whole” (Hopgood, 
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2013: ix). The international dominance of the concept of “human rights”, along with the 
globalisation of the “Human Rights” regime, has thus led both to the production of an 
international discourse through which marginalised or underrepresented individuals 
and groups are able to articulate their grievances, and to the creation of a supra-
governmental legal and political system via which these individuals and groups are able 
to seek “justice” for the wrongs perpetrated against them. It is against this historical, 
discursive, and institutional background that the emergence of the concept of “Shi’a 
Rights” should be understood.  
 
While a sense of Shi’a victimhood and exceptionalism is hardly new, and may even be 
considered to be integral to the faith itself (Barzegar, 2008b; Cole, 2002; Dabashi, 2011; 
Nasr, 2007), the incorporation of pre-existing and contemporary Shi’a grievances into a 
humanitarian framework based on the discourse of “human rights”, is arguably a 
thoroughly modern  phenomenon, and can only have arisen within the international 
political and humanitarian system that has been developed over the last fifty years. 
While the term “Shi’a Rights” isn’t always explicitly invoked, it is my contention that the 
discourse of “Shi’a Rights” is one that is modelled on and replicates the language of 
international humanitarianism and human rights. In this sense, the discourse of “Shi’a 
Rights” can be seen, on the one hand, as a reflection of the pervasive power of 
humanitarian norms and, on the other, as a strategic choice by Shi’a actors that enables 
them to translate their specific grievances into a globally-understood normatively-
inflected political discourse.  
 
Taken together, these two facets of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” work to produce a 
specific kind of Shi’a subject; one that is simultaneously invested in bracketing off a 
bounded and coherent concept of “Shi’aness” and in promoting the transnational and 
trans-ethnic facets of this “Shi’aness” in order to facilitate its spread across international 
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borders. Consider the following excerpt, taken from a blog post entitled “Resist Like 
Hussain” published on the (English-language) website of the Ahlulbayt Islamic Mission 
(AIM), the youth branch associated with the (Iranian-run) Islamic Centre of England. The 
passage is worth quoting at length: 
 
I finally get how “Everyday is Ashura and every land is Kerbala”119 [sic] after 
reading Naomi Klein’s international bestseller Shock Doctrine earlier this year. In 
this meticulously documented book, Klein laid out how extreme acts of violence 
perpetrated against populations around the world are not so random after all. She 
says they’re actually the modus operandi of an elite group of capitalists bent on 
destablising nations and quashing all resistance in its path to plunder every corner 
of the globe, from Chile to Poland to Iraq. 
[…] 
But there’s hope. One figure who provides an antidote to these oppressive policies 
is Hussain, son of Fatima, for not only did his uprising against injustice survive 
brute force 1400 years ago but it’s now gone global through continued resistance 
and endurance. 
[…] 
Today’s social justice movements energised by the 2011 Arab Spring face tanks, 
bullets and pepper spray and also risk subversion. They need to gain inspiration, 
insight and guidance from Hussain, whom Prophet Muhammad likened to a ship 
of salvation: “Whoever embarked upon it was saved, and whoever turned away 
from it perished.” That’s because Hussain, his family and his companions serve 
as role models for demonstrating how to maintain truth, dignity and resistance in 
the face of the most brutal forces of repression. 
 
                                                             
119 This phrase was first coined by Iranian leftist Ali Shariati to promote a particular politicized 
and emancipatory interpretation of Shi’a struggle and sacrifice, and was later popularised by 
Ayatollah Khomeini during the Iranian Revolution of 1979. 
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Upon returning home to Medina [after the Battle of Karbala], the resistance 
carried on as Zainab spread news about the tragedy of Kerbala, gaining supporters 
who handed down the story generation after generation until millions now gather 
on ‘Ashura Day to remember Hussain’s supreme sacrifice, empathise with him 
until grief-stricken and moved to commit to his struggle anew. 
[…] 
But like Hussain then, his followers today suffer violent opposition. 
“Never in our history have there been such cruel attacks on religious 
observances,” Afghan President Hamid Karzai said last year when three 
simultaneous explosions killed 63 people during Ashura Day rallies. 
 
Indeed, the resistance continues and will do so as long as people everywhere – of 
all religions, races and classes – heed Hussain’s final call before succumbing to 
wounds alone on the dusty fields of Kerbala: “Who is out there to help me?!” 
 
As India’s first President Rajendra Prasad once said: “The sacrifice of Imam 
Hussain is not limited to one country, or nation, but it is the hereditary state of the 
brotherhood of all mankind.”120 
 
Although this passage does not explicitly mention the phrase “Shi’a Rights”, it clearly 
draws heavily on the discourses of international humanitarianism and human rights 
through the invocation of “truth, dignity, and resistance” in the face of “brutal 
oppression” that encompasses “the brotherhood of all mankind”. Moreover, the passage 
represents the suturing of Shi’a religious mythology (as represented in the Karbala 
paradigm) with contemporary political movements and preoccupations (such as the 
reference to The Shock Doctrine, the Arab Spring, and the targeting of Shi’a worshippers 
in Afghanistan). In this way, the discursive logic of “Shi’a Rights” mimics that of 
                                                             
120 Source: http://www.aimislam.com/resist-like-hussain/, accessed 12 July 2017. 
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numerous other emergent forms of international activism, from movements such as the 
Arab Spring (Anderson, 2011), Gay Pride (Stychin, 2004), and Black Lives Matter 
(Gallagher et al., 2017), to organisations that make use of such discourses to promote 
their own political agendas, such as the Jewish Defence League (Seibold, 1973), the Black 
Panthers (Cleaver and Katsiaficas, 2014), and the English Defence League (Garland and 
Treadwell, 2010). Indeed, as Modood notes in relation to Muslim forms of mobilisation 
in Britain: “the claims Muslims are making in fact parallel comparable arguments about 
gender or ethnic equality” (Modood, 2009: 193). 
 
While the discursive underpinnings of the notion of “Shi’a Rights” may be rooted in an 
increasingly globalised orientation towards international humanitarianism and human 
rights, the driving force behind this emergent discourse is arguably the current political 
situation in the Middle East and elsewhere, where Shi’is are increasingly finding 
themselves on the receiving end of systematic symbolic and material violence. The rise 
of fundamentalist interpretation of Sunni Islam – as manifested by militant groups such 
as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and more recently ISIS, Al-Shabab, and Al-Mourabitoun – in 
particular, has been implicated in a number of attacks specifically targeting Shi’is around 
the world, and has certainly compounded the pre-existing sense of Shi’a victimhood and 
marginalisation. It is this encounter between Shi’a politico-religious mythology (in the 
form of the Karbala paradigm), the globalised discourse of humanitarianism and human 
rights, and the ongoing persecution and killing of Shi’a minorities around the world that 
has arguably led to the emergence of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”; where to be Shi’a is 
to be constructed as a specific kind of political and religious subject that is enshrined 
within the ethical parameters of international humanitarianism and human rights law.  
 
“Shi’aphobia”: Shi’ism as a Minority Identity 
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Within the diasporic imaginary, a key element constitutive of the discourse of “Shi’a 
Rights” is the sense of Shi’ism being a minority (politico-)religious identity, both in terms 
of the proportion of Shi’is to Sunnis within the global Islamic population (estimated to 
be between 10-15 percent) and as a result of Shi’i immigration to Western countries, 
where Muslims already occupy the position of marginalised ethno-religious minority. 
Increasingly, for British-born second- and third-generation diasporans,  there is also an 
important extent to which their understandings of what it means to be “Shi’a” as a 
minority identity category is inextricably tied up with the notions of equality, justice, and 
human rights that (often uncritically) saturate the social, political, and media discourse 
in the UK.  It is as a result of the combination of these factors that many of my research 
participants, as practicing Shi’is in Britain, expressed feeling part of “a minority within a 
minority” (cf. Sachedina, 1994). Combined with an enduring sense of Shi’a victimhood 
and persecution, which takes a historicist discursive trajectory to link the massacre of 
Imam Hussain and his family at the Battle of Karbala with the contemporary targeting of 
Shi’is around the world, this sense of Shi’ism as a persecuted minority identity is 
fundamental to the construction of the sectarianised Shi’a subject as implicated in the 
discourse of “Shi’a Rights”. The emergence of the term “Shi’aphobia” is but one example 
of how this discourse has come to be articulated in the contemporary context. 
 
The expression “Shi’aphobia” (modelled on and often invoked in relation to the term 
“Islamophobia”) at once articulates a sense of Shi’a victimhood and specificity at the 
same time as it is imbued with implicit claims towards minority representation and 
equal rights that undergird the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”. “Shi’aphobia” is geared 
towards a particular kind of audience, and makes use of a particular normative 
framework in which Shi’a Muslims are presented as the (undeserving) victims of 
(mostly) Sunni oppression. In a paper published in the Journal of Shi’a Islamic Studies 
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(JSIS),121 for example, Shereen Yousuf makes the following claim regarding the nature of 
“Shi’aphobia” in the Western context: 
 
Shi’aphobia emerges in the US, Canada, and Western Europe through the 
normalised use of rhetorical tropes that grant the Sunni majority in these regions 
permission to silence, ignore, or entirely erase the realities of systematic 
violence against Shi’i Muslims on a global scale… conceptualising of a 
“Shi’aphobia” provides the discursive space to identify and name the process 
through which Shi’i identities and subjectivities are constructed in regions where 
they occupy a marginalised position. (Yousuf, 2016: 57) 
 
This passage is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is a scholarly article 
published within a peer-reviewed journal (albeit one on the margins of mainstream 
academia) that is specifically geared towards the burgeoning field of “Shi’a studies”. On 
the journal’s website, for example, it states that JSIS “conscientiously aims to provide a 
scholarly platform for critical and informed articles in all fields of Shi‘a studies.”122 Unlike 
the wider and better-known discipline of Islamic studies, the emerging field of Shi’a 
studies specifically marks out Shi’a Islam as a separate entity worthy of study in its own 
right at the same time as it implicitly decries the mainstream field of Islamic Studies for 
not duly recognising the beliefs and practices of Shi’a Muslims (for if it did, why the need 
for a separate field of study?). In this sense, the field of “Shi’a studies” can itself be seen 
as an attempt to bracket-off the Shi’a experience in a way that prioritises Shi’a-specific 
identities and subjectivities and constructs them as being qualitatively and analytically 
different from the experiences of other Muslims.  
                                                             
121 An academic journal published by the London-based (and Iranian-funded) Islamic College of 
Advanced Studies (ICAS). 
122  Source: https://www.islamic-college.ac.uk/publications/jsis/#1465231226842-e4eb524c-
4585, accessed 13 July 2017. 
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Secondly, the construction of “Shi’aphobia” as a “hegemonic discourse” that is 
manipulated by the “Sunni majority” to “silence” the lived reality of Shi’a suffering and 
persecution (ibid: 40-41) is reflective of a number of contemporary discursive trends. 
Such an iteration simultaneously lays the blame for Shi’a-targeted violence at the door 
of the “Sunni majority” (without attesting to the multiplicity and nuances of Sunni Islam) 
at the same time as it glosses over the heterogeneity of Shi’a experience to present an 
essentialised image of the Shi’a-as-victim. By advocating the conceptualisation of 
“Shi’aphobia” as a “discursive space” through which to understand “Shi’a identities and 
subjectivities” around the world, the very real threat of Shi’a persecution in various 
countries is, in this iteration, decontextualised from its specific manifestations and 
instead constructed as a global phenomenon of “systematic violence” against Shi’is 
perpetrated by the “Sunni majority”. Notwithstanding the reality of both symbolic and 
material violence meted out to Shi’a minorities in various parts of the world, Yousuf’s 
articulation of “Shi’aphobia” works to flatten, rather than highlight, the diversity of both 
Shi’a and Sunni Islam; discursively constructing the two Islamic sects as locked in an 
eternal confrontation in which the Shi’a are always imagined as the victim and the Sunnis 
as the aggressor.  
 
This preoccupation with Shi’a victimhood (both real and imagined), I would like to 
suggest, forms the discursive core of the concepts of both “Shi’aphobia” and “Shi’a 
Rights” that is productive of a particular kind of sectarianised Shi’a subject-as-victim that 
is defined in opposition to a quintessentially antagonistic Sunni Other. For example, 
throughout my fieldwork I frequently encountered stories and anecdotes regarding the 
relative status and recognition of Shi’a minorities (in Britain and elsewhere), often 
accompanied with a condemnation of Sunni discrimination directed towards Shi’is. One 
of my interviewees, G – a middle-aged Iraqi woman who works part-time as an Arabic 
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teacher in a Shi’a Saturday school in Willesden – told me that the reason she started 
teaching was that she wanted her son to learn Arabic but refused to send him to a 
mainstream Islamic school following a negative experience with a Sunni teacher: 
 
But the teacher, I think he was Pakistani, told [my son] that the Shi’a were 
infidel. Can you believe it? He was saying that the Shi’a do this and this, and 
that is why they are not true believers, and my son, who was only five years old 
at the time, tried to argue with him and said: “We’re Shi’a and we don’t do that!” 
(Interview 18) 
 
A similar narrative is given by a young British-born Shi’a man describing an incident in 
the (Sunni dominated) Regent’s Park Mosque: 
 
The other day somebody went to Regent’s Park Mosque, they put down a torba, 
they wanted to pray, they kicked it in front of him – from in front of him! 
(Interview 6) 
 
This sense of a lack of understanding and/or compassion for Shi’is by the Sunni majority 
is not limited to the experience of Shi’is in the UK, as reflected in a blog post published 
by a US-based Shi’i woman on the interfaith website Patheos: 
 
Years of intrafaith discussions with not-so-veiled questions have taught me that 
Sunni Muslims are suspicious of the degree to which to which we [Shi’is] love 
the Ahlul-Bayt, suggesting that we have made them “God-like,” which is clearly 
un-Islamic. In my humble opinion, this discomfort stems from Sunni-centric 
approach to how certain figures are revered in relation to Tawhid. As a Shi’a, I 
feel that the narrations, supplications, and general literature attached to the Ahlul-
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Bayt are crucial in drawing me closer to Allah, especially given the degree to 
which many of them were marginalised themselves and expressed devotion to 
Allah from that positionality. This is important to recognise because here in the 
U.S., Sunni Muslims occupy the “normative” position and homogenise what it 
means to be Muslim on the basis of their sect.123  
 
This sense of Sunni dominance thus transcends the specificity of the British domestic 
experience and rather speaks to a sense of marginalisation by Shi’is in various parts of 
the world, which in turn works to constitute the discursive contours of the Shi’a subject 
produced in the transnational diasporic imaginary. Such anecdotes, while reflective of 
personal experiences, draw on the same discursive tropes that underpin articulations of 
“Shi’aphobia” and “Shi’a Rights”; namely, the experience of Shi’a victimhood and 
persecution by the Sunni majority. Although the terms “Shi’aphobia” and “Shi’a Rights” 
are not explicitly used in any of these examples, the narratives given here are clearly 
embedded in the same discursive hegemony from which these terms have emerged. 
Moreover, the sense of injustice and discrimination articulated by these individuals 
underlies an orientation towards a Shi’a-specific identity category that can positively 
affirm itself in the face of such antagonism. In this sense, the concept of “Shi’aphobia” 
works to produce a specific kind of Shi’a subject invested in the politics of emancipation 
and visibility. Many of my research participants articulated a sense that Shi’a Muslims 
needed to “speak out” or to “show that we have a voice”, especially within the context of 
diasporic Britain where they felt the need to distinguish themselves from pejorative 
conceptions of (Sunni) Islam reflected in mainstream media and political discourse 
(recall the discussion in Chapter 3).  
 
                                                             
123  Source: http://www.patheos.com/blogs/hindtrospectives/2015/07/shi’aphobia-at-the-
intersection-and-why-it-matters/, accessed 13 July 2017 
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The terms “Shi’a Rights” and “Shi’aphobia” are thus productive of a discursive space via 
which specific understandings of “Shi’aness” as a minority identity are able to find 
articulation. Take the following example, an excerpt from a blog post written on The 
Muslim Vibe by young British Pakistani Zameer Hussain and entitled “How I Tackled 
Shi’aphobia at School”: 
 
I started my career as a Religious Education (RE) teacher in September 2013 in a 
school that has nearly 1500 pupils ranging from the ages of 11-18. Of these pupils, 
approximately 75% of them come from a Muslim background. Due to the nature 
of comments Shi’as usually have to endure, I chose to hide my identity as a Shi’a 
Muslim from my pupils… Perhaps I was insecure about it. My main concern was 
the possible reaction that I have endured in my life after telling people I am a 
follower of the Shi’a school of thought. As I had just started my career, I didn’t 
want my confidence to be harmed. 
 
Fast-forward to September 2014, I was (somehow) appointed as Head of RE at 
my school and I was now in charge of the curriculum, results, teaching and 
progress of every pupil in the school who studies RE as well as the members of 
staff who teach it. With the spiritual boost from my experience of going to Karbala 
that year during Arba’een under my belt, I was now not afraid of displaying my 
faith and I slowly started to reveal to my pupils (using subtle hints and comments) 
the beliefs I held. I would pray in the prayer room with my hands down, get asked 
questions about the ring and wristbands I wear with the names “Ali” and 
“Hussain” written on them and about why I take a day off work for religious 
purposes (for ‘Ashura) when the rest of the school’s Muslims come in. Now when 
the pupils would ask me whether I was a Sunni or Shi’a, I would give a straight 
answer and then ask a question back: “Has that changed your opinion of me?” The 
reactions were surreal and comical, from the literal jaw-drop to the surprise and 
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amazement… My experience is summed up by a comment two pupils made to me 
a few weeks ago: 
 
“Sir, I’m not going to lie. We have heard some crazy things about Shi’a Muslims 
but you have made us realise you are normal and how many of those things we 
were told were wrong.” 
 
I do not want the readers of this article to think I am some sort of Shi’a preacher 
at my workplace; this goes against the standards of the profession I adhere to. This 
is the way I approach all subjects I teach. As well as removing “Shi’aphobia”, my 
curriculum also aims to remove Islamophobia in general, anti-Semitism and all 
other forms of prejudice and discrimination towards people of faith or non-faith. 
However, from a personal point of view, Shi’a Muslims are being killed because 
of misconceptions, as are others. I am in the lucky position to help change this 
maybe.124 
 
Here, the author traces a personal journey which begins with his reluctance to reveal his 
“Shi’aness” to his (mostly Sunni Muslim) students, and ends with his acceptance and 
pride in identifying with, articulating, performing, and displaying his minority religious 
identity. The parallels between this narrative and similar stories of individuals coming 
to terms with and speaking publically about their sexual, political, gendered, disabled, or 
ethno-racial identities is striking, and places Zameer’s story within a recognisable 
discursive trope: the “coming-out discourse” and the “processes of liberation and self-
actualisation” that this entails (Samuels, 2003: 235). As Swain and Cameron (1999) 
argue in relation to “coming out” as disabled: 
 
                                                             
124  Source: https://themuslimvibe.com/muslim-lifestyle-matters/education/how-i-tackled-
shi’aphobia-at-school, accessed 13 July 2017. 
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Coming out… is a process of redefinition of one’s personal identity through 
rejecting the tyranny of the normate, positive recognition of impairment and 
embracing disability as a valid social identity. Having come out, the disabled 
person no longer regards disability as a reason for self-disgust, or as something to 
be denied or hidden, but rather as an imposed oppressive social category to be 
challenged and broken down… Coming out, in our analysis, involves a political 
commitment. (Swain and Cameron, 1999; quoted in Samuels, 2003: 237) 
 
Zameer’s experience of “coming out” as Shi’a at his school thus mimics the logic of other 
coming-out discourses, and represents a positive articulation of Shi’a religious belief that 
envisages “Shi’aness” as a liberatory and emancipatory minority identity. Moreover, as 
Swain and Cameron make explicit, coming out should be understood as a “political 
commitment” (my emphasis) to a specific way of being and performing minority 
identities – in this case, that of “Shi’aness”. In other words, the discourse of “coming out” 
employed in the above example underlies a specific manifestation of the Shi’a subject 
that is both particularistic and discursively bounded in opposition to (Sunni) 
antagonism, and thus invested in the politics of identity and sectarianism.  
 
Through such examples, it is possible to see how the concept of “Shi’aphobia” functions 
discursively in much the same way as that of “Shi’a Rights”; working to promote a sense 
of Shi’a specificity and exceptionalism through the invocation of global discourses of 
humanitarianism and human rights. After all, just as “Shi’a Rights” could be incorporated 
by the term “human rights” (since Shi’is, too, are human beings), so could “Shi’aphobia” 
be adequately represented and articulated through the concept of “Islamophobia” – the 
need to present and articulate separate, Shi’a-specific terms thus speaks of a 
preoccupation with a bounded and coherent sense of “Shi’aness” that can be upheld as a 
minority identity in its own right. Moreover, both these discourses work to produce a 
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specific kind of Shi’a subject predicated on an ethical commitment to international 
humanitarianism and global liberal norms. It is to this ethical Shi’a subject that I now 
turn. 
 
Shaping the Ethical Shi’a Subject 
In Chapter 2, I explored how the politicisation of the Karbala paradigm was key to the 
development of a Shi’a-specific ethics of piety and mobilisation. Here, I wish instead to 
turn to the ways in which this Shi’a ethics has been imbued with the discourses of 
international humanitarianism and human rights within the contemporary moment to 
produce an ethical Shi’a subject that combines the religious mythology of Shi’ism with 
the moral authority of (secular) liberal norms. In particular, I am interested in tracing 
the ways in which the ethical imperative to “be (a good) Shi’a” is implicated in 
contemporary power structures and discursive alignments and constitutes a form of 
subject formation that has led to the crystallisation of an ethical Shi’a subject that is 
simultaneously (and seemingly paradoxically) invested in both secularism and 
sectarianism.  
 
While the globalisation of (Western) liberal norms through the spread of international 
humanitarianism and the human rights regime has certainly contributed to 
contemporary articulations of the Shi’a subject, it is my contention that this subject is also 
heavily imbued with the political and social realities of the modern secular state – 
especially when it comes to the everyday experiences of diasporic Shi’is living in 
countries that adopt such secular forms of governance and governmentality. As 
Mahmood (2015: 3) argues: “Secularism… is not simply the organising structure for what 
are regularly taken to be a priori elements of social organisation – public, private, 
political, religious – but a discursive operation of power that generates these very 
spheres, establishes their boundaries, and suffuses them with content, such that they 
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come to acquire a natural quality for those living within its terms.” In the diasporic 
imaginary, the encounter between secular discursive power and Shi’a politico-religious 
ethics has arguably resulted in the emergence of a particular kind of ethical Shi’a subject 
predicated on the discursive logic of secular humanitarianism. As outlined elsewhere in 
this thesis, ethics understood as the ensemble of behaviours geared towards self-
betterment is ultimately a practice of subject formation; one that “simultaneously shapes 
and is shaped by the political choices and the moral economies of contemporary 
societies” (Fassin, 2009: 48) – in other words, one that is invested in and reflective of 
contemporary political power alignments. 
 
The discourse of “Shi’a Rights” thus combines elements of both a Shi’a-specific ethics of 
piety and emancipation with the secular logic of liberal humanitarianism. For example, 
while a sense of Shi’a victimhood, as I argue above, is key to the formation of the ethical 
Shi’a subject, the language and discourses through which this victimhood is articulated 
are increasingly being stripped of their specific Shi’a religious content and mimic instead 
the language of international social and humanitarian movements. Throughout my 
fieldwork, I repeatedly came across the use of terms such as “injustice”, “tyranny”, 
“atrocities”, “genocide”, and “Holocaust” to describe both historical and contemporary 
acts of violence against Shi’a minorities. One interviewee even told me that he thought 
the Shi’s needed to be “more like the Jews” in terms of raising international awareness 
regarding atrocities committed against them:  
 
Under Saddam, the tasfiraat and mass graves of 1990-99 were like a genocide, 
but the Shi’a haven’t made use of it. Even now, everyone’s talking about the 
Christians and Yazidis, but not [about] the Shi’a. (Interview 7) 
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Speaking not long after the massacre of an estimated 1,500 Shi’a air force cadets at Camp 
Speicher by ISIS forces,125 another interviewee expressed a similar sentiment, saying 
that: “We need more coverage of events like this so people understand what is 
happening” (Interview 9). Interestingly, neither interviewee explicitly draws on Shi’a 
religious mythology or the Karbala paradigm here, instead choosing to express a sense 
of Shi’a victimhood in the secular language of international activism and 
humanitarianism. In this sense, the concept of “Shi’a Rights” implicitly invoked by both 
speakers can be seen as part of a wider discursive network of Shi’a activism and 
mobilisation based on the logic of international humanitarianism and human rights. 
Consider the following passage, taken from an online article produced by the Ahlulbayt 
Islamic Mission (AIM) and entitled “Why the Genocide Against the Shi’a?”: 
 
Today we witness the Shi’a genocide in Pakistan which is the product of a 
twisted mentality systematically promoted by the US and its puppet Arab 
regimes. Yesterday we witnessed the start of an ongoing oppression and 
bloodshed of Shi’as in Bahrain. It would also be worthwhile to remember the 
Shi’as in Iraq, particularly at the time of Saddam Husain’s corrupted [sic] 
regime. And who knows who will be the next target tomorrow among the 
Shi’as? Over the course of history, thousands and thousands of Shi’a believers 
have been killed, tortured, their body parts severed, their belongings looted, their 
women violated and their children orphaned without any mercy or 
compassion.126 
 
                                                             
125 Camp Speicher is an Iraqi military academy in Tikrit, northern Iraq. In June 2014, the camp 
was captured by advancing ISIS forces, who systematically killed between 1,500-1,700 of the 
3,000 resident cadets. Although accounts of what happened vary, most sources agree that the 
cadets were separated according to sect and that ISIS forces specifically targeted those of Shi’a 
Muslim background. 
126  Source: http://www.aimislam.com/why-the-genocide-against-shi’as/, accessed 23 January 
2017. 
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Again, the language here, while echoing elements of the Karbala paradigm, is 
predominantly rooted in the (liberal, secular) discourse of humanitarianism; with key 
linguistic signifiers including “genocide”, “oppression”, “bloodshed”, “corrupt[ion]”, 
“mercy”,  and “compassion”. Such discursive positioning, drawing heavily on empathy 
and pathos, thus seeks to render the specificity of the Shi’a experience intelligible to a 
global audience at the same time as it is productive of an ethical imperative to “be good”. 
It is this combination of secular humanitarianism and Shi’a ethics that undergirds 
contemporary articulations of the Shi’a subject as an ahistorical, transnational, and 
trans-ethnic discursive alignment.  
 
For individual practicing Shi’is, the ethical imperative to “be (a good) Shi’a” thus 
increasingly blurs into and becomes interchangeable with the ethical imperative to “be 
(a) good (Shi’a)” – i.e. from one productive of the Shi’a politico-religious subject to an 
ethical self-transformation undergirded by a preoccupation with secular liberal 
humanitarianism. This is especially visible in the increasing transformation of the 
Karbala paradigm and the memory of Imam Hussain from a Shi’a-specific politico-
religious myth to a model for ethical behaviour and self-improvement applicable to all 
humanity (regardless of their religious affiliation). For example, the 2014 ‘Ashura march 



















Fig. 4 – “Why Are We Here?” 
Source: Author’s fieldnotes 
 
 
This flyer is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is clearly aimed at the non-
Shi’a public who might not know what the march is about, as evidenced by the title “Why 
are we here?” Secondly, the juxtaposition of historical personalities such as Gandhi, 
Moses, Buddha, Plato, and Confucius with the figure of Imam Hussain simultaneously 
places the Shi’a religious ritual of ‘Ashura within a discursive field intelligible to the 
average member of the UK public at the same time as it implicitly invokes the logic of 
liberal humanitarianism with which these figures are associated. Moreover, all of the 
historical personalities mentioned are internationally-known either for their 
commitment to intellectual and spiritual betterment (Plato, Alexander Fleming, 
Confucius) or for their struggle against tyranny and oppression (Moses, Jesus Christ, 
Buddha, Gandhi, etc.). The flyer thus represents an example of contemporary Shi’a 
ethical subject formation, where the grievances of Shi’a Muslims have been separated 
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from their specific politico-religious origins and translated into a language of self-
betterment and emancipation intelligible to a global audience.  
 
Similarly, during the 2014 Arba’een march in London, several volunteers walked up and 
down Park Lane handing out roses to members of the public which were accompanied 
by a tag bearing the following message: 
 
Hussain’s Epic Legacy Inspires Millions 
Hussain inspires me to… 
Give back.  
Be caring to all of humanity. 
Care for people around me.  
Stay strong in what I stand for. 
Help those less fortunate than me. 
Resist oppression in all forms. 
What will your legacy be?127 
 
Again, the message here combines elements of Shi’a religious piety with an ethical 
imperative aimed at self-betterment and founded on a logic of secular humanitarianism. 
In particular, the final rhetorical question (“What will your legacy be?”) encourages the 
reader to engage in similar practices of ethical improvement by continuing the “legacy” 
of Imam Hussain’s philosophy and behaviour. Such examples point to the way in which 
the construction of the Shi’a subject as an ethical subject is increasingly embedded in a 
(secular, liberal) discourse of international humanitarianism and human rights oriented 
towards specific kinds of self-betterment. While this subject is thus embedded in the 
                                                             
127 Message produced by the Who Is Hussain? campaign and handed out during the 2014 London 
Arba’een march. Source: Author’s fieldnotes. 
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discourse of secular liberalism, it nevertheless is a profoundly religious subject, and is 
invested with specific notions of Shi’a piety and ethics – it is for this reason that I believe, 
following Deeb (2011), that it is a mistake to claim religion and secularism as radically 
opposed to one another when in such instances they manifest as two facets of the same 
process of subject formation. 
 
Having outlined the various discursive contours undergirding the concept of “Shi’a 
Rights” and its role in the production of the ethical Shi’a subject, I now turn to examine 
the various organisations that make use of this discourse in order to explore how the 
institutionalisation of “Shi’a Rights” is increasingly implicated in a global network of Shi’a 
activism and mobilisation that has contributed to the (unconscious) sectarianisation of 
the contemporary Shi’a subject.   
 
Institutionalising “Shi’a Rights” 
The discourse of “Shi’a Rights” thus sets up an ethical imperative founded on the 
(secular) logic of international humanitarianism in which to be “a good Shi’a” is 
commensurate with “being a good person”. This discourse undergirds a growing web of 
international Shi’a organisations and institutions (many of which actively make use of 
pre-existing Shi’a transnational religious and organisational networks) that actively seek 
to raise awareness of “Shi’a Rights” and human rights abuses perpetrated against Shi’is 
around the world. Perhaps the most prominent of these is the organisation Shi’a Rights 
Watch (SRW), a US-based advocacy and lobbying group loosely modelled on Human 
Rights Watch. 
 
Shi’a Rights Watch 
Founded in 2011 by self-styled “Shi’a Sentinel” Mustafa Akhwand, an Iraqi-Iranian born 
in 1980 and naturalised as a US citizen in 2008, SRW claims to “protect the rights of Shi’a 
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Muslims worldwide” through media monitoring, documenting “violations against Shi’a 
communities”, canvassing, and advocacy campaigns such as International Shi’a Day. The 
organisation also publishes monthly statistical analyses of “anti-Shi’a incidents”, which 
are aggregated into bi-annual reports documenting “human rights violations towards 
Shi’a people”, as well as running a mobile app detailing country-specific information on 
the treatment of Shi’a Muslims. SRW’s motto, displayed prominently on their website 
and all marketing material, is: “Defending Justice and Rights”.  
 
In the “About Us” section of SRW’s official website, the organisation outlines its vision 
and scope in the following words: 
 
Shi’a Rights Watch… is the world’s first independent organisation dedicated to 
define and protect the rights of Shi’a Muslims around the world. SRW is a non-
governmental, not-for-profit research entity and advocacy group headquartered in 
Washington D.C. U.S.A. Shi’a Rights Watch holds a 501(c) status, as well as a 
Special consultation status (ECOSOC) with the United Nations. Shi’a Rights 
Watch aims to draw international attention to countries where Shi’a rights are 
violated. The aim is to give a voice to the oppressed and hold oppressors 
accountable for their crimes. SRW achieves its objectives through strategic 
investigations supported by targeted advocacy in order to bring about informed 
action.128 
 
Here, the language and norms of the international human rights regime is used to frame 
the issue of “Shi’a Rights” as one that is both international and that requires certain forms 
of ethical action. Moreover, this call to action is codified and institutionalised according 
to the normative hegemony of the United Nations and the global human rights discourse. 
                                                             
128 Source: http://shiarightswatch.org/about-us/, accessed 2 January 2017 (emphasis added).  
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In the words of SRW founder Mustafa Akhwand, one of the key missions of the 
organisation is to mobilise the language and institutions of the global human rights 
regime in a way that specifically addresses the rights of Shi’a Muslims: “There was 
[already] a language of human rights to talk about humans in general, but there was no 
way to talk about what was happening to the Shi’a in a way that people [could] 
understand… We [SRW] are working for the rights of everyone, but specifically for the 
rights of the Shi’a” (Interview 30). 
 
This linguistic move – in which “the rights of the Shi’a” are equated with “the rights of 
everyone” – is indicative of the underlying logic of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”, where 
an appeal to international humanitarianism is used to draw attention to the specific 
grievances of Shi’a Muslims in ways that are reflective of other international activist 
movements (Gallagher et al., 2017; Lettinga and van Troost, 2014; Risse and Sikkink, 
1999; Seibold, 1973; Seif, 2014; Stychin, 2004). Although there is certainly an extent to 
which this is a strategic choice by SRW in order to make Shi’a grievances intelligible to 
an international audience, it is my contention that the invocation of international 
humanitarian norms has also been internalised in the formation of the ethical Shi’a 
subject such that being “Shi’a” has become synonymous with being “good”. To further 
emphasise this point, consider the following, also taken from SRW’s website: 
 
SRW stands up for victims of prejudice, and supports activism in order to prevent 
discrimination, support political freedom, and help ensure people’s human rights 
and religious freedom. SRW enlists the local public and international 
communities to support the cause of human rights for all.129 
 
                                                             
129 ibid. (emphasis added) 
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Here, the claim to Shi’a specificity is all but dropped entirely, and the emphasis is on 
“people”, “the public”, “international communities” and “human rights for all”; thus 
equating Shi’a rights with human rights, tout court. By explicitly invoking claims of moral 
universalism and international humanitarianism, SRW is working to discursively 
produce a Shi’a subject that is increasingly divorced from its religious roots and instead 
constructed as secular preoccupation with ethical self-betterment. In order to further 
explore this, it is worth considering two advocacy campaigns run by SRW, and the way 
in which the discursive parameters set by the organisation have been replicated across 
different contexts. The first of these is the institutionalisation of International Shi’a Day, 
while the second is the campaign to have the term “Anti-Shi’ism” recognised as the 
official term for anti-Shi’a discrimination. 
 
International Shi’a Day 
 
International Shi’a day intends to increase awareness about the struggles, rights, 
and achievements of Shi’a Muslims. This population is an underrepresented 
minority, violated against and marginalised. Global action is needed to 
accelerate Shi’a rights.130 
 
International Shi’a Day is an annual advocacy and awareness campaign run by SRW that 
takes place on the 12 June and which began in 2015 as a response to the massacre of Shi’a 
air force cadets by ISIS forces at Camp Speicher in Iraq on 12 June 2014.131 Since 2015, 
International Shi’a Day has expanded to include both off- and online activism through 
campaigns such as “Roses for Roses” (a scheme that involves volunteers handing out 550 
roses for two consecutive days “as a metaphorical representation of the 550 imprisoned 
youth in Bahrain”), public pledges by celebrities and prominent human rights activists, 
                                                             
130  http://internationalshiaday.com, accessed 12 January 2017. 
131 The event is upheld by SRW as “the most prolific sectarian mass killing against Shi’as since the 
time of Saddam Hussain’s rule.” (SRW) 
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and a social media campaign using the hashtags #612Shi’aDay and #IntShi’aDay. The 
campaign also includes a YouTube video entitled “How to Become a Real Hero” that 
details the steps required for individuals to get involved in the work of SRW: 
 
 
Fig. 5 – Screen grab of campaign video for International Shi’a Rights Day.132 
 
Much like the overall mission of SRW, International Shi’a Day and the campaign 
surrounding it can be seen to replicate much of the same language and discourse of 
“human rights” and the associated ethical imperative to “be good” (constructed here as 
being a “hero”). In the screen grab of the video above, for example, of the “4 easy steps” 
to becoming a “hero”, two specifically refer to the issue of “human rights”, including a call 
for people to become trained human rights professionals. Later in the video, the same 
breezy tone and cheery stick-figure are juxtaposed with graphic images of violence and 
suffering, including rows of bloodstained body-bags and gaunt vacant-eyed children 
pictured standing in dusty streets strewn with rubbish. The video ends with the phrase: 
“Millions of Shi’a Muslim victims are counting on you.”  
 
                                                             
132 Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WQFjlmIlJ_Y, accessed 14 January 2017 
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The language and format of the International Shi’a Day campaign is thus familiar to those 
accustomed to the strategies of NGOs and human rights organisations (images of body 
bags and starving children being particular and much-critiqued favourites). Indeed, it is 
is precisely this familiarity – this mirroring of the language and strategies of the 
international human rights regime – that works to produce the Shi’a subject as an ethical 
subject. Moreover, despite the seemingly apolitical language employed by SRW and the 
campaigns around International Shi’a Day, there is an important sense in which the Shi’a 
subject being produced by these discourses is profoundly political, especially to the 
extent to which it is invested in a specific way of being and doing (ethical) “Shi’aness”.  
 
However, this political facet of “Shi’a Rights” is rarely acknowledged within the discourse 
itself (much as the political nature of humanitarianism is rarely acknowledged by 
international human rights organisations). As Mustafa Akhwand stressed to me, SRW is 
“not a political but a human rights organisation” that “seeks to combat” what he sees as 
an ingrained “political and ideological view of the Shi’a” and to foreground Shi’a rights as 
akin to the right to religious freedom. Indeed, Mustafa repeatedly expressed his view that 
“the Shi’a are being oppressed because they are Shi’a” (Interview 30). While this may be 
partially and contextually true in some instances (at Camp Speicher, for example, the 
cadets were reportedly divided up according to their sectarian affiliation), such an 
assertion also obscures the fact that much of the anti-Shi’a discrimination and violence 
taking place across the Muslim world is a direct result of political, not religious, factors. 
To speak of violence or discrimination against Shi’a Muslims in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, 
Lebanon, Nigeria, or elsewhere without due acknowledgment of the socio-political 
factors at play in each of these contexts is all but meaningless, and arguably reproduces 
an essentialised understanding of Shi’a Islam that casts Shi’is as the eternal victims via 
recourse to the mythological force of the Karbala paradigm. Consider Mustafa’s response 
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when I asked him whether SRW might be contributing to a perceived Shi’a 
“resurgence”133 in the Middle East and elsewhere: 
 
Shi’a oppression has existed for 1,400 years. But in recent years, especially after 
the revolution in Iran, Shi’as [have] got a better sense of how to make their voices 
heard and to speak to the international community. (Interview 30) 
 
In this way, the presentation of anti-Shi’a discrimination devoid of any context or 
understanding – such as in the showcasing of rows of blood-stained body bags without 
any mitigating information, or the claim that Shi’a Muslims constitute 
“an underrepresented minority, violated against and marginalised” – constructs Shi’a 
victimhood both as a quality inherent to the belief and practice of Shi’a Islam (“the Shi’a 
are being oppressed because they are Shi’a”) and as an immutable fact that has existed 
since time immemorial through the invocation of the Karbala paradigm (“Shi’a 
oppression has existed for 1,400 years”). While religious and political discrimination, 
persecution, and violence is certainly a very real threat for many Shi’is around the world 
– indeed, the recent rise of Shi’a-targeted violence by ISIS in Iraq is a case in point – the 
point here is not to prove or disprove the veracity of such claims, but rather to show the 
way in which the decontextualistion of Shi’a violence and oppression from the political 
and social circumstances in which it arises results in a kind of essentialisation of Shi’ism 
predicated on an enduring and fetishized sense of victimhood.  
 
To be Shi’a in Iraq, or in Syria, for example, comes with a whole palimpsest of other 
meanings and associations that cannot be divorced from the context in which they arise. 
For this reason, to speak of persecution against Shi’as as a “global” phenomenon that is 
                                                             
133 For a discussion of the (problematic) notion of a Shi’a “resurgence” or waxing “Shi’a crescent”, 
see Barzegar (2008a, 2008b), Bröning (2008), Cockburn (2008), Machlis (2014), Nasr (2004, 
2006, 2007), Terhalle (2007), Walker (2006). 
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simply reducible to religious sect runs the risk of reproducing exactly the kind of 
essentialist sectarian logic it initially seeks to avoid. As one of my research participants 
pointed out, from the perspective of a Sunni Iraqi living in a working-class area of 
Baghdad and whose family were killed by Shi’a militias in the civil war, for example, the 
concept of Shi’a-specific victimhood would be all but empty, if not perceived as downright 
“insulting”.134 In this sense, the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”, as exemplified by campaigns 
such as International Shi’a Day works in part to obscure, rather than explain, the causes 
of anti-Shi’a discrimination.  
 
Moreover, the move towards the essentialising of “Shi’aness” through the fetishization of 
victimhood projected on a “global” scale begs the question as to the intended audience of 
the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”. Indeed, it would seem that the purpose of this discourse is 
not necessarily to give a voice to the “persecuted” Shi’a Muslims themselves around the 
world who are denied basic rights and therefore unlikely to have access to the kinds of 
channels through which SRW operates? Rather, this discourse is explicitly addressed to 
what Mustafa Akhwand calls “the international community”, a rather nebulous term that 
seems to encompass the United Nations, US Department of State, international human 
rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and 
Western-educated individuals familiar with the kinds of language and strategies 
employed. In other words, the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” works to construct Shi’ism and 
Shi’aness as a political identity worthy of representation on the international stage – a 
fundamentally strategic choice that nevertheless requires glossing over the nuances and 
heterogeneity inherent within Shi’a Islam itself in order to make “Shi’a identity” 
intelligible to a global audience. To further exemplify this point, it is worth turning to 
another facet of SRW’s advocacy work that I believe exemplifies the kinds of subject-
                                                             
134 Informal conversation with M Madani, 14 January 2017. 
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formation operating within the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”: that of the institutionalisation 
of the term “Anti-Shi’ism”. 
 
Anti-Shi’ism 
In 2011, SRW began a campaign to have the word “Anti-Shi’ism” recognised as the official 
term for any form of discrimination or violence against Shi’a Muslims. In a press release 
dated 18 April, 2012, the organisation spelled out its reasoning for the campaign, which 
bears quoting at length: 
 
A New Term in the Human Rights Field  
The term “Anti-Shi’ism” means prejudice against or hatred of Shi’a Muslims. The 
term was first introduced by Shi’a Rights Watch in 2011. The act of Anti-Shi’ism, 
however, has a long history.  
 
Shi’a in History  
Shi’a have a long history of facing injustice. Ever since the death of the Prophet 
of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), Shi’a have faced 
discrimination because they criticised the Caliphs for unjust and violent acts. Shi’a 
advocated non-violence and equal human rights for all; the Caliphs, on the other 
hand, neglected people’s basic human rights. The growth of these ideological 
differences led to the formation of anti-Shi’a extremist groups, such as the 
Wahabbi, Salafi and Nasebi135 sects. Many Shi’a have lost their freedom, dignity, 
and lives throughout history at the hands of such groups. Eleven out of the twelve 
Shi’a Imams and their companions were murdered by either anti-Shi’a groups or 
dictators. It can therefore be concluded that Anti-Shi’ism has been a threat to Shi’a 
since the death of the Prophet Muhammad.  
                                                             
135 A colloquial Arabic term meaning “those who have hatred” that is sometimes to refer to certain 




Current Situation  
In recent years, with the financial support of Saudi Arabia, Anti-Shi’ism has 
increased dramatically throughout the world and includes: the demolition of Shi’a 
shrines in Saudi Arabia; attacks on Shi’a homes in Bahrain; the mass killing 
of Shi’a in Pakistan; road bombs in Shi’a-populated areas of Syria and Iraq; 
targeted attacks on Shi’a and Alawies [sic] in Damascus; and the destruction of 
Shi’a homes in Indonesia and pressure on Shi’a in Malaysia to convert.  
 
Anti-Shi’ism: A Growing Phenomenon  
Anti-Shi’ism is gaining support in many places which is a serious cause for 
concern. As the odious ideology continues to spread, it has infiltrated media 
outlets and human rights organisations which continue to ignore the plight of Shi’a 
Muslims.  
 
Anti-Shi’ism and the Media  
The most modern and disappointing example of Anti-Shi’ism can be witnessed in 
the Media coverage, or lack thereof, of Shi’a suffering. Since the Arab Spring, 
Shi’a have been threatened by extremists, thousands have been murdered and 
injured, many Shi’a women and children have been arrested and tortured, and 
historical sites have been demolished and desecrated. Yet, many media outlets 
remain silent in the face of such inhumane acts against Shi’a Muslims.  
 
Anti-Shi’ism and Human Rights Organisations  
Since the beginning of the 2011 uprising in Middle East, as anti-Shi’ism flared in 
the Middle East, SRW contacted many human rights organisations to take action 
to stop the violence against Shi’a, however no serious action has been taken. As a 
result the number of murders is increasing every day in countries such as Saudi 
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Arabia, Bahrain, Syria, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia... Yet, many human 
rights organisations remain silent and do not get involved. 136 
 
This passage is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, “Anti-Shi’ism” is presented 
as a historical fact that dates from the death of the Prophet Muhammad and extends to 
the contemporary geopolitics of the Middle East; notwithstanding the fact that the very 
notion of “human rights” is arguably a relatively modern phenomenon (Hopgood, 2013; 
Ignatieff and Gutmann, 2003; Macrae, 1998). This coherent narrative, with its echoes of 
the Karbala paradigm, presents Shi’a victimhood as inherent to Shi’a beliefs and 
practices, and constructs Shi’ism as a pure and untarnished religion invested in “non-
violence and equal human rights to all”. According to this narrative, Shi’is are presented 
as long-suffering, silenced, violated, and victimised by a never-ending cast of “evil” 
characters, from the Caliphs of early Islam through to the media and human rights 
organisations in the contemporary moment. 137  This rhetorical strategy mirrors the 
discursive paradigms used by numerous minority groups in calls for communal self-
representation – most notably Jewish activist movements such as the Jewish Defence 
League who regularly label their critics as “Anti-Semitic” as a way of silencing them 
(Seibold, 1973) – and arguably works to produce a Shi’a subject that is invested in an 
essentialised and fetishized sense of Shi’a victimhood predicated on the moral authority 
of international humanitarianism. 
 
Such anti-historicism is further enforced via a narrative arc that equates human rights 
violations with certain branches of Sunni Islam (specifically Wahhabism and Salafism), 
                                                             
136 (Shi’a Rights Watch, 2012) 
137 It should be noted, however, that especially in the context of the Syrian civil war, the narrative 
expounded by the vast majority of media networks (including the BBC and Al Jazeera) does 
indeed gloss over the targeting of Shi’is and Alawis in Syria; but this is likely the result of the 
politics of the conflict itself, and not an inherent act of discrimination against Shi’is per se, as 
presented by SRW.  
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which are labelled as “Nasebi”. The term “nasebi” is a pejorative Arabic colloquialism 
meaning “those who have hatred” and is used to refer to those who bear hatred for the 
AhlulBayt (incidentally, even Salafis and Wahhabis revere the family of the Prophet on a 
doctrinal level). The use of such a term by SRW is interesting, since it places the 
organisation within a specific politically-invested Shi’a sectarian discourse that is 
propagated by a number of radical scholars and thinkers. 138  Moreover, the explicit 
denunciation of Saudi Arabia as the financial backer of “Anti-Shi’ism” immediately places 
SRW on a particular political spectrum (since it could equally be argued, in a similar vein, 
that “anti-Sunnism” is backed and financed by Iran) and undermines the organisation’s 
claims to be apolitical. Again, this is reflective of numerous international activist 
movements, especially those that seek to put forward claims regarding minority 
representation, and should not be seen as particular to the Shi’a case. Rather, it speaks 
to the way in which the production of the Shi’a subject is part of wider global processes 
and power structures that work to produce minority identities across contexts 
(Brubaker, 2002; Van Beek, 2000).   
 
Another interesting element of the “Anti-Shi’ism” campaign (and one to which I have 
hinted above) is the construction of the term itself; it can hardly be a coincidence that 
the form of the word so closely mirrors that of Anti-Semitism, a term that is now widely 
accepted and used across the world. On the official website associated with the 
campaign, for example, the persecution of Shi’a Muslims is referred to as “another 
Holocaust”, a claim that seeks to strategically harness the emotive power associated with 
the Holocaust and apply it to the case of Shi’a victimhood. In this sense, the discursive 
underpinnings of “Anti-Shi’ism” can be seen as seeking to address an assumed existing 
                                                             
138 Perhaps the most prominent example of a self-styled radical Shi’a preacher is Yasser Habib, a 
London-based cleric who is well known for his firebrand views, including insulting the first two 
Islamic Caliphs Omar and Abu-Bakr, both of whom are revered by Sunnis, and for suggesting that 
Aisha, the Prophet’s youngest wife, may have been responsible for his death. 
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international consensus regarding the rights of religious minorities, and to exploit the 
discursive power of Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust to promote the cause of “Shi’a 
Rights”. Consider SRW’s attempts to structure the terms of debate through the 
institutionalisation of the term “Anti-Shi’ism”:  
 
“Anti-Shi’ism” in Dictionaries  
Shi’a Rights Watch, is proud to be the first to introduce “Anti-Shi’ism” as a new 
entry to dictionaries. Shi’a Rights Watch contacted a number of dictionaries in 
2012 and asked them to add Anti-Shi’ism to their vocabulary lists. Recently Shi’a 
rights violations increased around the globe and it is very important that 
dictionaries offer the best word to define hate crimes and discrimination toward 
Shi’a Muslims. Urban, Merriam Webster and Collins dictionaries welcomed the 
new terminology.  
 
SRW and Anti-Shi’ism  
SRW insists that the term “Anti-Shi’ism” must be used in regards to crimes 
against Shi’a. The world is witnessing these heinous acts that are carried out in a 
prejudicial and systematic approach toward Shi’a through the world. The term 
“Anti-Shi’ism” and its derivations offer a realistic depiction of events and their 
impact, and recognise the persecution that targets Shi’a as a group, solely on the 
basis of their beliefs. These crimes are serious, unjust acts that threaten the lives 
and livelihood of Shi’a. These threats must be recognised and must be stopped 
immediately. 139 
 
The language here makes use of emotive and normatively-loaded terms such as “crimes”, 
“heinous”, “unjust”, and “prejudicial” in order to foreground the ethical imperative to “be 
(a) good (Shi’a)”. The injunction to codify and institutionalise the term “Anti-Shi’ism” is 
                                                             
139 ibid 
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further leant symbolic weight through the appeal to the authority of (English-language) 
dictionaries such as Collins and Merriam Webster, while the call to action (“these crimes 
must be recognised and must be stopped immediately”) is justified via recourse to an 
essentialised narrative of Shi’a victimhood and suffering. In this way, the introduction of 
the term “Anti-Shi’ism” seeks not only to define the terms of the debate, but also to shape 
the narrative within which that debate can take place in the first place; a narrative that 
presents Shi’a Islam as a monolithic entity that permanently and historically occupies 
the place of unworthy victim.  
 
The term “Anti-Shi’ism” thus functions as part of the wider discourse of “Shi’a Rights” 
that is productive of a particular kind of Shi’a subject – one that is increasingly geared 
towards a transnational, trans-ethnic, ahistorical, and monolithic interpretation of what 
it means to be “Shi’a” that foregrounds a sense of victimhood as the foundation for Shi’a 
politico-religious emancipation. It is this Shi’a subject that is increasingly finding 
articulation within the diasporic imaginary, and which makes use of the language of 
international humanitarianism in order to produce an ethical imperative to “be Shi’a” 
understood as synonymous with the imperative to “be good”.  
 
Excavating the Diasporic Imaginary 
While SRW might offer the best and most prominent example of the institutionalisation 
of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”, discourses, by their very nature, are not defined or 
contained by a single organisation but grow organically as part of the social Symbolic 
order (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008; Howarth and Torfing, 2005; Lacan, 2002). For this 
reason, it is important to consider how alternative iterations of this discourse – whether 
implicit or explicit – are being articulated across different contexts. As should be clear 
from above, it is my contention that the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” has come to function 
as a specific iteration of the Shi’a subject that emphasises the identity category of 
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“Shi’aness” over and above any differences in national, ethnic, or linguistic background 
among individuals. For Shi’a minorities in the UK and other Western countries, and 
especially for second- and third-generation diasporans, the increasing salience of the 
category “Shi’a” is thus able to fill the gap left by the absence of any strong attachment to 
the ethno-national culture of the alleged “homeland” (as explored in Chapters 1-3). 
Moreover, the diasporic encounter between Shi’a politico-religious mythology and 
practice and certain kinds of globalised liberal humanitarian norms have arguably 
produced a specific kind of Shi’a subject that is increasingly being articulated within the 
diasporic imaginary as a positive affirmation of Shi’a identity. 
 
“Shi’a Rights” in Britain 
In this section, I wish to return to the thesis’ focus on the UK, and specifically to the ways 
in which the ethical Shi’a subject finds expression within the British domestic context. 
Although I in no way seek to claim that all Shi’a Muslims in Britain articulate versions of 
(or are even familiar with) the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”, I am interested to explore the 
various manifestations of this discourse as and when I encountered them throughout my 
fieldwork. The most significant and evident examples of the way in which the discourse 
of “Shi’a Rights” has entered the diasporic imaginary is in the institutional framework of 
Shi’a-run organisations in the UK, and especially of the growth of organisations and 
campaigns geared specifically towards Shi’a Muslims as a distinct and separate minority 
community, such as Integrity, Who is Hussain?, AhlulBayt Islamic Mission (AIM), and 
university AhlulBayt Societies (ABSocs). Such organisations represent the increasing 
diversification of religious institutions within the UK context, in which different Islamic 
sects have created their own splinter organisations that cater specifically to their needs, 
rather than working across theological and community divides.140  
                                                             
140 This is not to say that such organisations do not take participate in inter-faith activities, but 
such activism is more often than not geared towards overcoming divisions between different faith 
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To take one example, until relatively recently Muslim students at British universities 
were able to join and be involved in the activities of university Islamic societies (known 
as ISocs), which represented the diversity of Muslim theology and practice within each 
campus. Although most ISocs were dominated demographically by Sunni Muslims (since 
Sunnis make up the majority of Muslims within the UK and globally), and some had 
attracted a considerable amount of media criticism for their complicity in promoting a 
“radical” interpretation of Islam, ISocs were nominally the primary student body for 
representing and promoting the interests of all Muslim students (including Shi’is). In 
recent years, however, there has been a growth of university AhlulBayt societies 
(ABSocs) geared specifically towards (Twelver) Shi’a Muslims. Although such diversity, 
on the one hand, represents a positive affirmation of Shi’a religious and community 
identity, the often fraught relations between ABSocs and ISocs within the same 
university campus points, on the other, towards the increasing prioritisation of 
“Shi’aness” over and above any sense of “Muslimness” that might be shared with Sunni 
co-religionists. For example, throughout the academic year 2014-2015, the ABSoc of one 
London university I spent time researching, engaged in a self-proclaimed “boycott” of the 
university ISoc in order to protest the perceived “sectarianism” of the latter. In a 
Whatsapp conversation amongst ABSoc members in September 2014, three Shi’a 
undergraduates participated in the following exchange in relation to the boycott: 
 
A: So with all this that’s happening with isoc [sic] and their committee are we 
welcome in isoc or will [we] be treated like 2nd class citizens? 
J: If you join absoc you are not allowed to join isoc 
Q: 2nd [class citizens]?? Ud be lucky [sic] 
                                                             
communities (most notably between Jews, Christians, and Muslims) than towards addressing 
theological and sociological divisions within Islam itself. 
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A: Loool [sic] Here’s me thinking people were more tolerant at [University]141 
 
In the above exchange, humour is used as a way to mitigate the seriousness of the topic 
– the implicit accusation that the university ISoc is sectarian or anti-Shi’a. Interestingly, 
although accounts of why the split between the ISoc and ABSoc arose during this period 
varied considerably (some Shi’a students told me it was because the previous ISoc 
president had been forced out for wanting to collaborate with ABSoc, while others 
merely maintained that ISoc promoted “sectarian divisions”), 142  the most frequently 
recurring discursive trope was of Shi’a victimhood and minority representation. For 
example, take the exchange between two Shi’a students (both part of the university 
ABSoc committee) during the inaugural ABSoc meeting for the beginning of the 2014 
academic year: 
 
A: Why do we have two Islamic societies at [University]? 
H: Because one’s right and one’s wrong.143 
 
While humour is again used here to soften the message (the comment by H was 
accompanied by laughs from the other members), the promotion of two different Islamic 
societies, divided by sectarian affiliation, is suggestive of a crystallising sense of 
“Shi’aness” as a specific politico-religious identity category. The implicit assumption 
here, of course, being that it is the (Shi’a) ABSoc that is “right”, and the (Sunni) ISoc that 
is “wrong” – thus invoking a sense of Shi’a-specific ethics predicated on an orientation 
towards religious difference. 
 
                                                             
141 ABSoc Whatsapp conversation, 25 September 2014. Source: Author’s fieldnotes. 
142 Author’s fieldnotes, 25 September 2014. 
143 ibid. 
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Although the above examples point both to the increasing diversification of UK religious 
institutions and to the rise of a Shi’a-specific discursive identity construction (one that, I 
argue, is productive of the sectarianised Shi’a subject), there is also an important sense 
in which this orientation towards a Shi’a-specific subject is undergirded by a claim 
towards ethical self-betterment and humanitarianism. One such example is the Imam 
Hussain Blood Donation Campaign, which is a charitable project run by the UK-based 
Islamic Unity Society (IUS), a Shi’a-run charity affiliated to the Muslim Council of Britain, 
and backed by the NHS. According to the IUS website, the Imam Hussain Blood Donation 
Campaign is “the first campaign within the UK which aims to increase the number of 
regular blood donors from Muslim communities.”144 The website goes on to say: 
 
At the same time, the campaign seeks to increase awareness about Hussain, 
grandson of Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon them), and the tragedies he 
faced in Karbala when martyred for standing up against oppression and tyranny, 
and for justice and equality. Millions of people Worldwide [sic] are inspired by 
Hussain’s great character and give blood as a way to help others in need and live 
up to these high values.145 
 
Through the blood donation campaign, IUS thus aims to increase awareness about Shi’a 
Islam and the beliefs of Shi’a Muslims (most notably regarding the life and death of Imam 
Hussain). Here, the emphasis is very much on the inspiration of Hussain’s story and the 
value that this story can imbue to others through the ethical imperative to give blood. In 
this way, the campaign replicated the logic of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” through the 
appeal to ethical humanitarianism. Such positive articulations of “Shi’aness” thus form 
part of the discursive landscape within which a specifically Shi’a identity category can 
                                                             
144 Source: https://ius.org.uk/giveblood, accessed 21 January 2017 
145 ibid 
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emerge, and is reflective of the way in which the globalised discourses of 
humanitarianism and human rights operate within the diasporic imaginary. In this sense, 
the increasing visibility of Shi’a Muslims as Shi’a first and foremost (whether manifested 
through the invocation of Shi’a victimhood or the ethical imperative to “be (a good) 
Shi’a”) is part of a wider discursive and social architecture that undergirds the 
construction of the Shi’a subject. This subject, invested in the logic of ethical 
humanitarianism and oriented towards positive articulations of Shi’a activism and 
emancipation, nevertheless unconsciously (re)produces sectarianism in the way it 
works to prioritise Shi’a experiences and unproblematically construct “Shi’aness” as a 
transnational, trans-ethnic, and ahistorical politico-religious identity category. 
Moreover, the ethical imperative to “be Shi’a” is implicitly predicated on the contrary 
imperative to “not-be Sunni” in a discursive logic that articulates “Sunni-ness” as 
inherently antagonistic to “Shi’aness”. In order to explore how this unconscious 
sectarianism works, it is necessary to excavate the ways in which the the ethical Shi’a 
subject functions ideologically within the diasporic imaginary to imagine (and desire) 
the identity category “Shi’a” as mutually exclusive to that of the identity category “Sunni”. 
It is to this project that I now turn. 
 
“Shi’a Rights” and the Sectarian Unconscious 
 
The unconscious is not, as is commonly held, some discrete, hidden domain of 
wild and unpredictable drives; rather, it is a linguistic site in which desire reveals 
itself. (Kapoor, 2014: 1123) 
 
To speak of the unconscious of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” is, necessarily, to also 
enquire into the libidinal attachments and affective investments cultivated by this 
discourse. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is not enough simply to identify the unconscious 
of any particular Symbolic order, but we are also required to understand how this order 
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comes both to sustain itself and to produce particular kinds of (politically-invested) 
subjects. Unlike the Freudian concept of the unconscious, which is understood as a facet 
of the individual psyche and therefore fundamentally subjective in origin, the Lacanian 
unconscious is intimately linked to the social-Symbolic order and thus fundamentally 
collective in its manifestations. This movement from the personal and subjective (Freud) 
to the social and inter-subjective (Lacan) is fundamental to the understanding of 
unconscious desire as implicated in processes of subject formation (Copeland, 2008; 
Dolan, 1995; Glynos, 2001; Howarth et al., 2000; Jameson, 1981; Kapoor, 2014; Lacan, 
2004; Soler, 2014; Stavrakakis, 2002).146  The unconscious, then, is not some hidden 
kernel of desire cultivated by the individual psyche, but rather an instance of discursive 
rupture that is reflective of Symbolic desire – i.e. of the desire produced as part of the 
Symbolic order and that is key to processes of subject formation (for without desire, 
there can be no subject). 
 
I have already outlined the ways in which the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” is productive of 
a specific kind of sectarianised Shi’a subject – one that promotes Shi’a specificity at the 
same time as it is invested in secular liberal discourses of human rights and ethical 
humanitarianism. But there are two questions that remain if we are to understand the 
formation and functioning of this subject. Firstly, how is this subject positioned in the 
socio-Symbolic order such that it (re)produces sectarian dynamics; and secondly, what 
is the mechanism via which this subject works to shape the desire of individuals in ways 
that are productive of the sectarian unconscious? The first of these questions has already 
been partially answered in the preceding exploration of the encounter between Shi’a 
politico-religious ethics and international humanitarian norms, especially the implicit 
vilification of certain kinds of Sunni Islam; while the second of these questions will be 
                                                             
146  The parameters of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, and especially the concepts of the 
Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real, have been previously discussed in depth in the Introduction. 
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addressed in the final section of this chapter through a Lacanian-inflected analysis of the 
way in which the ethical appeal to humanitarianism inherent in the discourse of “Shi’a 
Rights” functions as a form of ideological desire that works to bind individuals to the 
sectarianised Shi’a subject. 
 
While the emergence of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” is arguably a product of both the 
increasing globalisation of humanitarian norms and the diasporic encounter with 
secular liberalism, there is also an important sense in which this discourse is not only a 
product of the diasporic imaginary, but is actively invested in the cultivation of an 
international and (Western) non-Muslim audience towards which to direct its ethical 
claims (not to mention the younger generation of Western-born Shi’is to whom such 
discourses are both natural and familiar). In this sense, the emergence of the discourse 
of “Shi’a Rights” can be understood as a quintessentially modern phenomenon; only 
within the context of contemporary understandings of secular, liberal humanitarianism 
can the appeal to moral universalism inherent in the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” hold any 
emotive or affective weight; since the concept of “human rights” itself represents an 
example of the globalisation of Western liberal Enlightenment values as imposed on the 
rest of the world (c.f. Hopgood, 2013). Indeed, as Modood (2009) argues in relation to 
parallel forms of Sunni Muslim activism in Britain: “Muslim assertiveness… is primarily 
derived not from Islam or Islamism but from contemporary Western ideas about equality” 
(Modood, 2009: 202; emphasis added). Moreover, the fetishization of Shi’a victimhood 
as perpetrated by the Sunni Other – necessarily invoked through the construction of a 
ethical Shi’a subject predicated on emancipation and minority representation – 
replicates the discursive logic of the contemporary Western socio-Symbolic order, where 
certain interpretations of “radical” or “extremist” Sunni Islam have been constructed as 
the ultimate embodiment of (non-Western) “evil”. In the words of Deeb (2011: 4), within 
contemporary social and political discourse, “various formations of ‘political Islam’ or 
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‘Islamism’ have come to represent the quintessential other, the antimodern antithesis to 
a supposedly secular West.”147  
 
In this way, the Shi’a subject constructed by the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” is 
simultaneously invested in the secular logic of liberal humanitarianism and minority 
representation at the same time as it (re)produces intra-communal antagonisms 
between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims by constructing both “Sunni-ness” and “Shi’aness” as 
essentialised identity categories locked in a logic of mutual exclusivity (as epitomised in 
the statement that “we’re not that kind of Muslim”). The potential for sectarianism 
inherent in the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” is thus unconscious, since the primary purpose 
of the discourse is not to promote intra-communal antagonism but to articulate a 
positive and emancipatory ethical Shi’a subject with which individual practicing Shi’is 
can aspire to identify and which is widely intelligible to a global audience. Under this 
reading, my exploration of the unconscious of the “Shi’a Rights” discourse is less about 
individual Shi’is themselves than about the ways in which difference and otherness are 
marked and articulated within minority communities – especially when this difference 
is perceived to be under threat from a wider socio-political bloc (in this case, Sunni 
Islam) – and how the subjective attachments that come to be cultivated towards such 
defensive identities can themselves work to reproduce and reinforce such differences 
(Ahmed, 1995; Balibar, 2013; Branscombe et al., 1999; Castells, 2010; Hall, 2000, 2013; 
Modood and Werbner, 1997; Steflja, 2010; among others) 
 
Humanitarianism, Ideology, and the Desiring Shi’a Subject 
But if the Shi’a subject produced by the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” unconsciously works 
to (re)produce sectarianism, why does it continue to be articulated and performed in the 
                                                             
147 Recall the discussion in Chapter 3 regarding the desire of Shi’is in Britain to qualitatively 
distinguish themselves from their Sunni co-religionists as a result of the pejorative discourses 
associated with Sunni Islam in the UK.  
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diasporic imaginary; in other words, what attaches the subject to particular iterations of 
“Shi’aness” and not to others? This is where a Lacanian understanding of fantasy and 
ideology prove useful in excavating the (socio-)subjective desire that works to bind the 
Shi’a subject to the sectarian unconscious of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”. In particular, 
it is my contention that the appeal to moral universalism undergirding the specific 
iteration of the sectarianised Shi’a subject through the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” 
functions as an ideological construction that works to obscure alternative  articulations 
of this subject.  
 
When it comes to the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”, it should be immediately apparent that 
there are a number of terms that function as master signifiers that work to structure the 
content and function of this discourse. Terms such as “rights”, “justice”, “equality”, 
“minority”, “victim”, “oppression”, “persecution”, even emotively-loaded terms such as 
“genocide” and “Holocaust” function primarily to “quilt” (Žižek, 1989) together iterations 
of “Shi’a Rights” within a wider discursive field of moral universalism and ethical 
humanitarianism. In this sense, the ultimate master signifier of the discourse of “Shi’a 
Rights” is the analogous discourse of “human rights” (c.f. Hopgood, 2013), and the 
ideological underpinnings of the “Shi’a Rights” discourse is arguably to present itself as 
part and parcel of a global and universal commitment to human rights (recall the motto 
of SRW: “Defending Justice and Rights”). In other words, the commitment to moral 
universalism and humanism functions as the ideological core of the discourse of “Shi’a 
Rights” at the same time as it represents the normative validation of this discourse in a 
language that is widely intelligible to non-Shi’is. 
 
However, as outlined in the Introduction, the problem with this ideological commitment 
to ethical humanitarianism (or indeed any ideological formation) is that it is ultimately 
lacking (Lacan, 2003). Indeed, the discourse of “human rights” itself has been exposed 
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by numerous scholars to be an ideological construct that actually works as a “generalised 
mode of governing” (Fassin, 2009: 50) that (re)produces particularistic forms of identity 
formation under the guise of moral universalism (Chancock, 2000; Donnelly, 2007; 
Fassin, 2009, 2011, 2014; Hafner‐burton et al., 2005; Hopgood, 2013; Ignatieff and 
Gutmann, 2003; Kapoor, 2013; Lettinga and van Troost, 2014; Macrae, 1998; Peterson, 
1990; Solomon, 2000). As Van Beek argues: 
 
The contemporary prevalence of the politics of identity is not a sign of a new 
awakening of nations, this time in the guise of “ethnicity”. Rather it is the product 
of two interrelated world historical processes: (perceived) dislocations due to the 
spread and deepening of capitalist relations, and the increasing reliance of 
practices of representation and democracy – in turn rooted in a distributive 
conception of justice – on the imputed stability and irreducibility of “identity” and 
the groupness it supposedly reflects. (Van Beek, 2000: 528–529; emphasis 
added) 
 
In this sense, the ideological appeal to ethical humanitarianism at the heart of the 
discourse of “Shi’a Rights” functions as a fantasy – its claim to moral universalism seeking 
to obscure the orientation towards particularism that it entails. Without wishing to enter 
into a detailed critique of the discourse of human rights (c.f. Hopgood, 2013), it is my 
contention that the construction of the sectarianised Shi’a subject works in an analogous 
way, where the ideological conflation of “Shi’a Rights” with “human rights” is discursively 
constructed as an unproblematic normative “good”. Within the discourse of “Shi’a 
Rights” (as in the discourse of “human rights”), the concepts of “justice”, “equality”, and 
“rights” are presented as one-dimensional; there is no acknowledgement of the 
complexities and nuances surrounding such terms – rather, they function as empty 
signifiers whose purpose is to designate the normative function of “good” within this 
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particular discursive order. In turn, it is this discursive construction of the “good” that 
undergirds the ethical imperative to “be (a good) Shi’a subject” implicated in the 
discourse of “Shi’a Rights”. For this reason, the commitment to moral universalism can 
be understood as an ideological fantasy whose ultimate purpose is to shape the desire of 
the subject in a way that binds it to the existing ideological order. In particular, the 
Lacanian concept of jouissance can help illuminate the ways in which this fantasy 
functions to promote unconscious attachments to sectarianised iterations of the 
diasporic Shi’a subject. 
 
When it comes to the (sectarianised) Shi’a subject, then, as structured by the discourse 
of “Shi’a Rights”, the subject does not only reproduce the fantasy of moral universalism 
offered by this discourse, it positively derives enjoyment through the internalisation of 
this fantasy as a result of the ethical imperative to “be (a good) Shi’a” produced by this 
discourse. The discourse of “Shi’a Rights” thus functions as an ideological apparatus that 
conditions the Shi’a subject to desire Shi’a politico-religious emancipation and minority 
representation through the appeal to ethical humanitarianism. Nevertheless, as explored 
above, the forms this subject take are necessarily sectarian, since to work towards the 
construction of a Shi’a-specific identity category as a precursor to socio-political-
religious emancipation and representation is to require the existence of a discursive 
other against which this identity category can be defined. In this sense, while the Shi’a 
subject desires to promote its own particularism through its commitment to 
international humanitarianism and moral universalism, the unconscious by-product of 
this positive articulation of Shi’a identity is the construction of a quintessentially non-
Shi’a antagonistic Other (which, in the contemporary moment, is most often imagined as 
the “radical” or “extremist” forms of Sunni Islam). 
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Moreover, the very notion of bracketing-off and promoting particularistic and narrowly-
defined identities according to singular categories (such as “ethnicity”, “race”, “sect”, 
“religion”) is arguably itself a product of the neoliberal capitalist order (Zizek, 2008), 
which requires the “recognition” of such distinct identities in order to regulate the 
segmentation of the global market (Fan, 2002; Navaro-Yashin et al., 2002; Shepherd, 
2008). Since capitalism is primarily driven by the pursuit of profit, the market must 
continue to diversify – creating niches that are increasingly specific – in order to 
maintain a competitive edge. This is what is referred to as “market segmentation”, which 
Reich, Gordon, and Edwards define as: “the historical process whereby political-
economic forces encourage the division of the labour market into separate submarkets, 
or segments, distinguished by different labour market characteristics and behavioural 
rules” (Reich et al., 1973: 359).  
 
Under this reading, the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” can thus be understood primarily as 
an ideological construction: one that seeks to discipline and shape the (sectarianised) 
Shi’a subject via affective attachment to the fantasy of moral universalism, and which is 
undergirded by a neo-capitalist incentive to promote difference as a function of the 
global marketplace. In this sense, the sectarianised unconscious of the “Shi’a Rights” 
discourse functions as a by-product of the subjective ideological commitment to moral 
universalism: only by promoting a (necessarily sectarianised) conception of a 
specifically Shi’a identity can the market niche be secured for the buying and selling of 
this identity through commodification. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the emerging phenomenon of what I have called the 
discourse of “Shi’a Rights” in order to expose the ways in which this discourse functions 
as an ideological construction that works to produce and sustain the sectarianised Shi’a 
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subject. Ultimately, I have argued that not only is the sectarianised unconscious a key 
element of this ideological formation, it is a necessary by-product of the process of 
articulating and defining a specifically “Shi’a” identity in the first place.  
 
In this way, the argument of this chapter can be seen as complementing that of the 
previous three chapters, which were centrally preoccupied with tracing the shift from 
nationalist to ethno-religious and sectarian identifications within the diasporic 
imaginary – from the Iraqi-Shi’a subject, to the (Iraqi-)Shi’a subject, to the diasporic Shi’a 
subject, tout court. The focus of this chapter has thus been on the ways in which this 
emergent diasporic Shi’a subject, divorced from the ethno-cultural or national roots of 
the individuals who identify with it, has come to be articulated within the contemporary 
moment. In particular, it is my contention that the global hegemony of the discourses of 
international humanitarianism and human rights, coupled with an increasing 
orientation towards minority representation within the paradigm of (Western) secular 
liberalism, has led to the development of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” where the 
category of “Shi’aness” is increasingly imagined as a minority identity worthy of 
international representation. 
 
Moreover, the ethical underpinnings of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”, which is 
predicated on particular understandings of what it means to “be (a) good (Shi’a)” is 
central to the enduring attachment of the Shi’a subject to particular ways of being “Shi’a” 
and performing “Shi’aness”. Specifically, the moral universalism undergirding the 
discourse of “Shi’a Rights” functions as a ideological fantasy (in the Lacanian sense) that 
works to bind the subject to the unconscious (re)production of sectarianism at the same 
time as it obscures this sectarianism by cultivating a desire for the bracketing-off of 
“Shi’aness” as a minority identity worthy of recognition and representation in its own 
right. In this sense, while the ethical Shi’a subject produced by the discourse of “Shi’a 
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Rights” is heavily invested in notions of equality, justice, liberalism, and human rights, 
the cultivation of a Shi’a-specific identity through which to claim access to such “Shi’a 
Rights” is inevitably sectarian as it requires the existence of a discursive (non-Shi’a, 
Sunni) Other against which to define itself. Moreover, this fragmentation of identity 
categories into ever smaller subjective units should be understood not as a product of 
some kind of primordial or essentialised Shi’a-Sunni antagonism, but – at least partially 
– as a logical outcome of the workings of contemporary consumer capitalism whereby 
the segmentation of the market forms an integral part of the diversification of minority 
identities. 
 
In the final chapter, I turn to these processes of commodification in order to show how 
the sectarianisation of the Shi’a subject has produced a number of material practices that 
together work to inscribe this subject within the neo-liberal capitalist order. Taken 
together, Chapters 4 and 5 showcase the way in which the sectarianised Shi’a subject is 
both ideologically and materially invested in the maintenance of particular 
contemporary power structures, and how the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” works to 
(partially) obscure the workings of such structures through recourse to the fantasy of 









In this final chapter, I continue my preoccupation with contemporary articulations of the 
(sectarianised) Shi’a subject by excavating the ways in which this subject has been 
permeated by the logic of neoliberal capitalism and inscribed into the global economy 
through practices of commodification and fetishisation. In particular, I am interested in 
exploring the discursive construction and symbolic resonance of the identity category 
“Shi’a” as it has come to be represented within the international marketplace through 
the proliferation of what I call “Shi’a objects”. It is my contention that the symbolic 
construction of “Shi’aness” as an ethno-religious identity category in its own right has 
been facilitated by the logic of consumer capitalism whereby the production of minority 
identities is bound up with the workings of the market and the creation of identity-
consumers (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009). In particular, the way in which consumer 
capitalism functions through “an ever more specialised targeting of consumers” (Yudice, 
1995: 5), where individuals are sold an ever diverse range of “consumable styles” (ibid) 
in which ethnic, cultural, and religious identities are “packaged up to be assumed in 
commodity form” (Navaro-Yashin, 2001: 223). In this sense, the sectarianised Shi’a 
subject can come to be understood as a product of contemporary forces of power, 
globalisation, capitalism, and consumerism in a manner that replicates other kinds of 
group-based identity formations; as much as it is simultaneously a movement towards 
minority representation and emancipation and a product of symbolic and material 
violence against Shi’is around the world.  
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While the previous chapter focused on the rise of a particularistic Shi’a identity discourse 
predicated on the principles of distributive justice, equality, and human rights, this final 
chapter seeks to explore the ways in which this emergent Shi’a identity has both been 
commodified in order to be inscribed into the global marketplace, and is itself indicative 
of the pervasive power of capital and hegemony in producing and sustaining specific 
forms of identity constructions through the increasing segmentation of the market. For 
this reason, the focus of this chapter is on the material and symbolic goods and objects 
that have come to be traded and exchanged in relation to ways of being Shi’a and of 
performing Shi’ism, and the way in which practicing Shi’is have consciously and 
unconsciously “bought in” to the Shi’a subject represented by these commodities. The 
commodification of Shi’a goods and services is part of a global shift towards the 
fetishisation of identities, in which the concept of a Shi’a-specific identity has become 
naturalised in a way that ultimately masks the ways in which this identity is itself “a 
product of modernity, itself inextricably connected with the rise, spread, and deepening 
of capitalism and the international states system” (Van Beek, 2000: 528).  
 
The chapter will begin with a brief exploration of the concepts of commodification and 
identity fetishism, in order to lay the groundwork for understanding how these 
processes are at work in contemporary iterations and performances the sectarianised 
Shi’a subject. Part of this project will involve detailing how the construction of minority 
identity categories through the inscription of material objects necessarily involves the 
delineation of in- and out-group boundaries, and is therefore implicated in the politics of 
sectarianism when it comes to the production of the Shi’a subject. While much of my 
empirical material is undergirded by a Marxist understanding of commodity fetishism 
(Marx, 2010), for the purposes of this thesis I am more interested in the ways in which 
material objects contribute to the symbolic construction of the social world, and in 
particular of social groups – akin to Bourdieu’s notion of “symbolic capital” (Bourdieu, 
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1979, 1984, 1985, 1989). By focusing on the symbolic construction of “Shi’aness” 
through the inscription and proliferation of “Shi’a objects”, I am thus able to foreground 
my preoccupation with the (discursively constructed) Shi’a subject and avoid the 
potential essentialist trap of reducing individuals to their particular and contextual 
iterations of that subject.  
 
Having thus laid the theoretical groundwork informing my approach here, I turn to the 
empirical material garnered from my fieldwork in order to outline how the 
commodification and fetishisation of “Shi’aness” is contributing to specific iterations of 
the Shi’a subject within the global marketplace. Within the chapter, this empirical 
material is divided thematically into two sections. The first section deals primarily with 
the proliferation of what I call “Shi’a objects” – the material commodities that are being 
bought and sold on the marketplace and that have become inscribed with some symbolic 
sense of “Shi’a identity”, whether through their religious and theological value or 
through the cultivation of an ethno-cultural notion of “Shi’aness”. In this way, I am able 
to trace the emergence of the market for “Shi’a objects” and assess the extent to which 
the commodification of “Shi’aness” through the proliferation of such objects is 
productive of the sectarianised Shi’a subject under investigation. 
 
The second empirical section, and final part of the chapter, turns instead to the symbolic 
construction of “Shi’ism” within the virtual – rather than material – world. Specifically, I 
am interested in documenting the ways in which the Internet and social media are being 
used as platforms by practicing Shi’is in order to promote particular ways of being and 
doing “Shi’aness” that is reflective of the wider discursive shift towards the sectarianised 
Shi’a subject I have been tracing throughout this thesis. In particular, it is my contention 
that the diasporic experience has been a significant contributing factor to both the 
emergence and spread of a transnational, trans-ethnic, Shi’a-specific identity category 
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that has, in turn, found expression within the virtual arena. For this reason, the types of 
“Shi’aness” articulated on social media and the Internet more broadly should be 
understood as key constitutive factors in the construction of the contemporary Shi’a 
subject – as part of a wider discursive field of power and capital and not as subjective 
expressions of individual identity. 
 
Ultimately, this chapter should be seen as a complement to Chapter 4. Whereas the 
argument of the previous chapter focused on the inscription of the Shi’a subject into 
contemporary discursive power structures through the emergence of the discourse of 
“Shi’a Rights”, this final chapter seeks to explore the ways in which this subject is equally 
implicated in the logic of contemporary neo-capitalism. In this way, chapters 4 and 5 
document the extent to which the (sectarianised) Shi’a subject should be understood as 
a thoroughly modern subject; a product of the contemporary world and not a 
“throwback” to an underlying sectarian “essence”. The way in which this subject has 
been inscribed within the global marketplace through the processes of commodification 
and fetishisation is thus a testament to both the relevance and resonance of this subject 




While it is increasingly the stuff of existential passion, of the self-conscious 
fashioning of meaningful, morally-anchored selfhood, ethnicity is also becoming 
more corporate, more commodified, more implicated than ever before in the 
economics of everyday life. (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009: 1) 
 
As the above quote exemplifies, there is a paradox inherent in any discussion of the 
contemporary articulation of ethnic, religious, or racial identities. On the one hand, such 
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articulations are increasingly framed as the expression of an “authentic” selfhood, often 
framed through recourse to the “coming-out” discourse associated with the public and 
visible display of identity (Gagné et al., 1997; Rust, 1993; Samuels, 2003; Seif, 2014). This 
conception often amounts to a contemporary form of essentialism, whereby such 
identity articulations are seen as stemming from some kind of natural or underlying 
ethno-religio-cultural-racial “essence” that, in turn, comes to define the “identity” of the 
individual or group in question (Brubaker, 2002, 2014; Comaroff, 1996; Jenkins, 2014). 
On the other hand, these identity categories are also increasingly bound up with the 
workings of the global marketplace such that the boundaries between different 
categories are becoming ever more rigidly defined through the creation of ethno-specific 
market segments (Brekke, 2016; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009; Žižek, 2005). In this way, 
ethnic, religious, and racial identities are simultaneously being constructed as natural 
elements of the social world at the same time as they are being understood as products 
of consumer capitalism and neoliberal economic governmentality. 
 
At the individual level, this paradox effectively means that individuals are forced to 
identify with such distinct and concrete ethno-cultural-religious identity categories 
while also acknowledging that doing so implicates them in the contemporary hegemony 
of neoliberal capitalism. Here, I am less interested in exploring how individuals might 
negotiate this bind than in understanding the ways in which such identity categories 
come to be constructed and inscribed within the global market in the first place. The 
primary question underlying the focus of this chapter, in other words, is what is the 
diasporic Shi’a subject and how is it being produced and articulated through processes 
of commodification and identity fetishism? The emergence of a Shi’a-specific identity 
category within the diasporic context, I maintain, is deeply implicated in the 
contemporary workings of consumer capitalism and, in turn, comes to shape the kinds 
of identifications that individuals are able to make via particular acts of consumption. 
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The diasporic Shi’a subject is thus a significant factor in the shaping of the symbolic and 
discursive world via which individuals are able to make sense of their own “Shi’a 
identity”. 
 
Commodifying Identity: Between Fetishism and Symbolic Capital 
The link between identity and commodification is one that has been oft-explored in the 
literature, most notably in works that make use of Marx’s conception of commodity 
capitalism and fetishism (Appadurai, 1986, 1994; Billig, 1999; Comaroff and Comaroff, 
2009; Navaro-Yashin et al., 2002; Pinto, 2007; among others). Indeed, it has become 
something of a tautology to assert that within the parameters of neoliberal consumer 
capitalism, the acquisition of material goods is often intrinsic to the act of asserting a 
particular political, cultural, or social identity; in the words of Billing (1999: 317), “to 
have is to be.” But what exactly is a commodity, and how does it work to construct and 
constrain the subjective identifications available to individuals? Perhaps the best 
definition is given by Marx himself, who states that:  
 
A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside us, a thing that by its 
properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another. (Marx, quoted in 
Appadurai, 1994: 79) 
 
In other words, a commodity is a material thing (produced through the mechanisms of 
labour and exchange) that provokes some kind of desire in human beings, usually 
through the illusion of satisfying that desire. For Marx, the value of the commodity is not 
intrinsic to the object itself, but a result of the labour that has gone into producing it; 
however, the fact that the commodity comes to be valued extrinsically – for what it can 
do (i.e. represent the contours of a particular kind of identity) not what it is – ultimately 
serves to mask the labour that has gone into producing the commodity in the first place 
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and thus gives the illusion of intrinsic value. This is what Marx intends by the term 
“commodity fetishism”: where the commodity itself comes to stand in for the value of the 
labour that produced it; and where the labour of the production becomes obscured by 
the assumed value of the commodity by virtue of its ability to provoke and satisfy desire. 
Within the capitalist system, it is commodities that are bought, sold, and traded on the 
global market, not the labour that goes into their production – this is the ultimate 
“dissembling or duplicity [that is] built into the very economic structures of capitalism” 
(Eagleton, 2014: 86).  
 
From this brief foray into Marxist theory, it should be clear that consumer capitalism 
functions primarily as a way to channel and mould human desire (as represented by the 
commodity) in the pursuit of profit, which itself can work to produce both individual and 
collective identities as an effect of that desire. In this sense, it is possible to see a 
theoretical bridge between Marxist and Lacanian thought, where the role and function 
of desire becomes central to the question of identity and identification. It is precisely 
because of the link between commodity fetishism and desire, as established by Marx, that 
it is possible to offer an exploration of particular form of identity (and the subjective 
attachments they produce) via an analysis of the material and symbolic objects 
cultivated by individuals in pursuit of such identities. In other words, a focus on the 
material objects (manifested as commodities) associated with particular ways of “being 
Shi’a” can, in turn, shed light on the type of Shi’a subject such commodities work to both 
produce and sustain. From a Lacanian perspective, a focus on commodities can also help 
illuminate the kinds of subjective fantasies that have become inscribed into the global 




While a Marxist lens can help shed light on the link between capitalism, identity, and 
desire, the material focus of much of Marxist thought can also obscure the extent to 
which the construction of identity is equally deeply inscribed within symbolic, as well as 
material, representation. This is where the work of Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1979, 
1984, 1985, 1989, 1991) proves useful in drawing out the link between identity, 
capitalism, and representation. In particular, Bourdieu emphasises the extent to which 
material objects (i.e. commodities) are often instrumentalised by individuals and groups 
as a way of displaying their identification with specific ethno-cultural-religious 
categories: 
 
But on a deeper level, the quest for the “objective” criteria of “regional” or 
“ethnic” identity should not make one forget that, in social practice, these criteria 
(for example, language, dialect, and accent) are the objects of mental 
representation, that is, of acts of perception and appreciation, of cognition and 
recognition, in which agents invest their interests and their presuppositions, and 
of objective representations, in things (emblems, flags, badges, etc.) or acts, self-
interested strategies of symbolic manipulation which aim at determining the 
(mental) representation that other people may form of these properties and their 
bearers. (Bourdieu, 1991: 220; original emphasis) 
 
In this sense, the value of material objects within commodity capitalism is not limited to 
the labour of their production or the fetishisation of the object through rendering this 
labour invisible, it is also a product of the inscription of such objects within a wider socio-
symbolic field whereby the object itself comes to both symbolise and stand in for the 
“identity” it purports to represent. This is especially pertinent when it comes to group-
based identity categories, such as those predicated on ethnic, racial, cultural, or religious 
boundaries. As Bourdieu further argues: 
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Struggles over ethnic or regional identity… are a particular case of the different 
struggles over classifications, struggles over the monopoly of the power to make 
people see and believe, to get them to know and recognise, to impose the 
legitimate definition of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake groups. 
What is at stake here is the power of imposing a vision of the social world through 
principles of division which, when they are imposed on a whole group, establish 
meaning and a consensus about meaning, and in particular about the identity and 
unity of the group, which creates the reality of the unity and identity of the group. 
(Bourdieu, 1991: 221) 
 
The social value that is inscribed onto objects and commodities within a wider discursive 
system of representation is what Bourdieu terms “symbolic capital”, which works to 
“bring into existence what it asserts” – i.e. specific identity categories – through the 
mechanism of recognition (Bourdieu, 1991: 221). In other words, ethnic, cultural, and 
religious objects do not exist in a vacuum, but are embedded in a web of social meaning-
making which renders them “recognisable” and thus intelligible as expressions of 
individual or collective “identity”. Moreover, while individuals may play an active role in 
choosing the types of objects to consume and display in order to signal their “identity”, 
the contours of this identity are a product of the social world, and not of individual 
agency. As Tilley makes clear: “Although material culture may be produced by 
individuals, it is always a social production” (2003: 70; emphasis added). In this way, 
objects and commodities produced, used, displayed, and coveted by practicing Shi’is are 
simultaneously constructed and understood as “Shi’a objects” both by Shi’is and non-
Shi’is and are inscribed in a wider socially-constructed social field denoting “Shi’aness”. 
Such objects work to construct the social and discursive boundary of what it means to 
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be “Shi’a” and work to police the boundaries of the Shi’a subject in a way that is socially 
intelligible.  
 
Adopting an understanding of capitalism and commodification that takes inspiration 
from Bourdieu, rather than adhering to the strict structuralism of Marx, thus precipitates 
a focus on the ways in which both material and virtual objects come to be invested with 
social meaning – and thus be inscribed into the global marketplace through the workings 
of symbolic capital – rather than on the manufacture or circulation of these objects in 
and of themselves as products of labour. Moreover, the processes of differentiation, 
intelligibility, and recognition involved in the production of such symbolic objects is 
necessarily political, since it involves the delineation of in- and out-group boundaries. As 
Bourdieu (1991: 249)states: “Politics is the site par excellence of symbolic effectiveness, 
an activity which works through signs capable of producing social entities and, above all, 
groups”. The commodification of Shi’a objects should thus be understood as part and 
parcel of the socio-symbolic discursive construction of the Shi’a subject, and not as a 
material process that stands outside the boundaries of social reality. It is to the wider 
socio-political implications of such commodification that I now turn. 
 
Essentialising “Shi’aness” on the Global Market 
The production, dispersal, and commodification of Shi’a objects – whether they be ritual 
objects of prayer, fashion items or accessories, or mediated affirmations of “Shi’aness” 
for external consumption – has contributed to the fetishisation and essentialisation of 
Shi’a identity by defining the terms by which this very identity can be expressed or 
articulated by individuals; in other words, to define the contours of the Shi’a subject. The 
accumulation of Shi’a objects works to inscribe “Shi’aness” within a neo-capitalist system 
of consumption and corporatisation; but such branding can only function within a 
discursive system in which the contours of Shi’a identity have already been pre-
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determined. In other words, the marketing and selling of Shi’a objects can only be 
successful when these objects are seen to stand in for the very identity they purport to 
represent – hence allowing individuals to “buy into” assertions of “Shi’aness” through 
acts of conspicuous consumption – which requires a prior understanding of the 
discursive content of the identity category “Shi’a”. As Chancock affirms, “cultures, like 
brands, must essentialise… successful and sustainable cultures are those which brand 
best” (Chancock, 2000: 24–26).  
 
Indeed, it is precisely through the essentialisation of ethno-cultural identity categories 
that neoliberal capitalism is able to carve up the diversity of the global market into 
profitable market segments. For this reason, in order for Shi’a identity to be successfully 
“bought” and “sold” through the exchange of commodities, this identity has to primarily 
function as an essentialised category; one that is recognisable across different spatial 
and temporal contexts. Moreover, it is my contention that the essentialism inherent in 
the corporatisation of a Shi’a-specific identity category has been a significant 
contributing factor in the sectarianisation of this identity. Asserting a Shi’a identity is 
primarily about asserting difference, about defining the boundaries of in- and out-group 
in mutually comprehensible ways. As Comaroff and Comaroff outline: 
 
Those who seek to brand their otherness, to profit from what makes them different, 
find themselves having to do so in the universally recognisable terms in which 
difference is represented, merchandised, rendered negotiable by means of the 
abstract instruments of the market: money, the commodity, commensuration, the 
calculus of supply and demand, price, branding, And advertising. (Comaroff and 
Comaroff, 2009: 24) 
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If the notion of a recognisable Shi’a identity necessarily requires an essentialised 
understanding of Shi’ism as a ethno-religious category of belonging, then it is my 
contention that the manifestations through which this identity category finds expression 
work to replicate and flatten the complex history of Shi’ism and the diverse cultures and 
backgrounds of individual Shi’is into easily recognisable visual and discursive tropes. In 
other words, the commodification of the identity category of “Shi’aness” has, arguably, 
contributed to the sectarianisation of the Shi’a subject through processes of essentialism 
and differentiation. Within the global market represented by the diaspora, “Shi’ianess” 
thus functions as a category of otherness and difference that draws on socially embedded 
tropes regarding the status and place of minorities, as well as on the mythologies and 
practices of Shi’ism itself. This is why it makes sense for my research participants to 
assert that they are “British Shi’a”, or that they have “more in common” with a Shi’a 
Muslim from a different ethno-national background than with a Sunni or non-Muslim 
Iraqi.148 Shi’ism (at least in the diasporic context), has thus come to be defined as a 
pseudo-ethnic minority identity, articulated in relation to the marja’iyya and the 
Ahlulbayt, and performed through the enactment of religious rituals and mythologies 
associated with Muharram, pilgrimage, and expressions of Shi’a suffering and 
persecution. Each of these facets, in turn, has come to be objectified and commodified 
through the market for Shi’a objects.  
 
Indeed, there is an extent to which individual Shi’is are aware of the objectification of 
Shi’a identity, and cultivate a reflexivity regarding the kinds of objects and commodities 
they choose to display to the world. For example, during an ABSoc meeting at a London 
university in October 2014, M, a young Iraqi Shi’i, proposed that members of the society 
                                                             
148  This trend towards the ethnicisation of Shi’ism as a category of belonging, especially in 
multicultural diasporic contexts where a shared Shi’a identity is often used as a way to create 
commonalities between diverse ethno-national groups, was recently highlighted during a 
conference on “Shi’a Minorities in the Contemporary World” held at the University of Chester on 
20 May 2016. 
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should “bring a personal item that is linked to your Shi’a identity to be worn… at the UGM 
[University General Meeting]” (Author fieldnotes, 9 October 2014). Here, M is not only 
demonstrating an awareness that certain commodified belongings serve to mark 
individuals out as having a “Shi’a identity” (i.e. that such objects are inscribed with 
symbolic capital that renders them “Shi’a”), he is also encouraging others to visibly and 
publically display this sectarian ethno-religious identity as a form of self-determination 
and minority representation within the university campus. Such assertions of “Shi’a 
identity” only make sense if articulated within recognisable visual and discursive socio-
symbolic tropes, such as the wearing of black and green, reference to the Ahl al-Bayt, and 
enacting Shi’a religious rituals. Within the context of diasporic spaces such as 
multicultural London, where Shi’is from different socio-economic, ethnic, and national 
backgrounds come together to articulate a common sense of “Shi’aness”, any notion of 
Shi’a identity must first be reduced to its bare essence in order for it to be 
comprehensible and recognisable for the largest number of individuals. It is this 
streamlining and essentialisation of Shi’a identity along (ethno-)religious (rather than 
cultural or national) lines that has allowed for the emergence and growth of a global 
“Shi’a industry” (Spellman-Poots, forthcoming 2017). 
 
The streamlining of Shi’a identity into a recognisable semiotic system of signs and 
objects, while certainly not a new phenomenon, is thus reflective of wider global trends 
regarding the branding and corporatisation of religious and ethnic identity categories. 
As Brekke notes in the aptly titled Faithonomics: “There are markets for religious ideas, 
goods, and services… Many of the services offered by religious organisations and the 
people working in them can be analysed in the same way as products that are sold and 
bought in markets for goods and services” (Brekke, 2016: 21). In this sense, it is possible 
to understand the commodification of Shi’a objects as part of a global market for “Shi’a 
identity” that cross-sects a diverse arena of goods and services.  
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Identity Beyond Commodification 
While the above discussion has illustrated the ways in which neoliberal capitalism and 
the global marketplace have contributed to the emergence of a sectarianised Shi’a-
specific identity category predicated on minority representation and difference, I do not 
wish to imply that this is a closed system within which the outcome has already been 
predetermined by the logic of capital and exchange. Rather, I would like to suggest that 
the production of the Shi’a subject is an open-ended and ongoing process, whose 
outcome is constantly under negotiation as a result of the multiple and fluid ways in 
which individuals can come to identify with this subject. As Comaroff and Comaroff 
remark: 
 
Mass inculcation reaffirms ethnicity – in general and in all its particularity – and, 
with it, the status of the embodied ethnic subject as a source and means of identity. 
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009: 20) 
 
In other words, while it is impossible to reverse the inscription of “Shi’a identity” into the 
global marketplace, the ways in which this identity come to be defined and articulated 
depend, in part, on the affective and symbolic value attributed to the concept of 
“Shi’aness” in the first place. Indeed, when individuals choose to buy and display Shi’a 
objects, or undertake pilgrimage trips to the shrine cities of Iraq and Iran, they are not 
simply thoughtless consumers of Shi’a commodities, but active interpreters of the 
symbolic and emotional meanings these commodities represent. In this way, the Shi’a 
subject is constantly being (re)produced, (re)imagined, and (re)interpreted by the  social 
and material practices of individual practicing Shi’is who come to identify with it. The link 
between subjective (re)iterations of the Shi’a subject and this subject’s socio-symbolic 
construction are thus not eliminated by the inscription of “Shi’aness” into the global 
marketplace. Indeed, as Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) go on to state, the processes of 
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commodification and objectification necessary to such market forces may actually 
enhance the subjective attachments of individuals to this subject: 
 
The process of cultural commodification, and the incorporation of identity in 
which it is imbricated, is less linear, less teleological, more capricious than either 
classical economics or critical theory might suggest. Neither for consumers not 
for producers does the aura of ethno-commodities simply disappear with their 
entry to the market; sometimes… it may be rediscovered, reanimated, regained. 
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009: 20, emphasis added) 
 
From a Lacanian perspective, the “aura” of Shi’a commodities does not derive solely from 
the symbolic and affective values attributed to them by individuals, but also from the 
ideological fantasy that undergirds their consumption. As outlined above, under a Marxist 
reading, commodities are objects that produce desire in the individual; in Lacanian terms, 
this desire is the desire of the lacking subject to achieve full identification within the 
Symbolic order. In other words, the reason why commodities retain their “aura” despite 
their inscription into the capitalist order is because they represent the potential for the 
subject to fulfil its desire for a coherent Symbolic identity. Yet this is a potential that can 
never be fulfilled, since the subject is always-already alienated within the Symbolic order  
(Friedlander and Malone, 2000; Lacan, 2002, 2004; Žižek, 1989). It is this lack at the heart 
of the Shi’a subject (itself a discursive construction) that requires individuals to 
constantly assert their identification with that subject through material practices of 
consumption and commodification.  
 
In other words, the notion of a coherent and unified “Shi’a identity” is itself an ideological 
fantasy undergirded by the neoliberal capitalist order that precipitates a need for 
individuals to identify with a fluid and shifting Shi’a subject. While this subject is currently 
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articulated as sectarianised and differentiated, it is also subject to interpretation and 
change. As a product of diverse discursive, political, economic, and social factors, the Shi’a 
subject acts as a distorted reflection of the contemporary world, and of the various 
manifestations of power within that world. 
 
Having thus outlined the theoretical preoccupations informing the discussion of the Shi’a 
subject within this chapter, I now wish to turn to the empirical material garnered during 
my fieldwork that exemplifies the way in which this subject is becoming increasingly 
commodified and fetishised in order to understand the relationship between the socio-
symbolic production of the Shi’a subject and its inscription within the wider global 
neoliberal marketplace. 
 
“Brand Shi’a”: Fetishism and Religious Objectification 
 
On the day we were to learn our prayers [at school], I happened to arrive early. 
There was only one other person in the classroom, and my heart sped up when I 
saw him. Mohammed, the smartest boy in class, was standing on the other side of 
the room by the windows… I had a crush on Mohammed, but had never been bold 
enough to talk to him. As I nervously put my books on my desk, we talked about 
our homework and I showed him how we pray, holding my hands to my side as 
my mother had taught me the night before. He screwed up his face and stared at 
me as if he had just seen something repulsive. “Oooh,” he said. “You’re Shi’a.” 
(Salbi, 2005: 14–15) 
 
Perhaps one of the most common affirmations I encountered when speaking to first-
generation Iraqis in the UK about identity politics and sectarianism in Iraq pre-2003 is 
the claim that notions of “Sunni” and “Shi’a” held almost no resonance within (educated) 
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Iraqi society, and that most people barely knew who belonged to which sect. Often the 
only indication of someone’s sectarian background would emerge in the subtle 
differences in which Sunnis and Shi’is pray or do their ablutions (as in the above excerpt 
from Zainab Salbi’s memoir about growing up in Iraq during the late 70s/early 80s).  
 
This  narrative of a golden asectarian past is part and parcel of the rose-tinted nostalgia 
often iterated by first-generation diasporans, and glosses over much of the structural 
sectarianism and marginalisation faced by Shi’a communities under the Ba’th regime, 
especially in the South of the country. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which sect in pre-
2003 Iraq was less outwardly visible and less immediately marked than it has come to 
be in the diaspora today. While sect in Iraq may have once been a matter of when and 
how one prayed, for many contemporary Iraqis in the diaspora sect has become a 
tangible and everyday part of the identity they project to the world. Indeed, just as other 
categories of identification have come to be associated with certain visual tropes and 
patterns of commodity consumption, so too has a certain way of being visibly and 
distinguishably “Shi’a” come to be displayed on the streets and in the shop fronts of cities 
such as London. 
 
While Shi’is in Iraq, under the threat of communitarian violence, have become 
increasingly adept at dissimulating and hiding their sectarian origins – whether by 
carrying multiple identity cards with different names, adapting their speech and accent 
styles, or changing their forms of dress (Haddad, 2014) – Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora, free 
from such threats or obligations, have been increasingly free to express their religion 
and/or sect in any way they see fit. Moreover, as a minority religious group Shi’a Muslims 
in the UK have arguably sought to find ways to differentiate themselves from the wider 
(and predominantly Sunni) British Muslim population. Under such circumstances, it is 
hardly surprising that distinctive ways of dress and custom (often stemming from 
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different places of origin) have become crystallised in the diasporic space; with similar 
trends being observed across a variety of different diasporic religious and cultural 
communities (Alfonso et al., 2004; Anthias, 2008; Hall, 2013; Mandaville and Lyons, 
2012; among others).  
 
For example, I recall a Sunni friend of mine remarking on what she called the “Shi’a way” 
of wearing the hijab (Islamic headscarf), which she described as covering the tip of the 
wearer’s chin,149  as well as the prevalence of the colour black: “If you see someone 
wearing all black and crying, you just know they’re Shi’a.”150 While the final comment 
may also be a pejorative reference to certain Shi’a rituals of mourning and 
commemoration during Muharram, it clearly indicates the existence of visible signs of 
difference between Sunni and Shi’a communities within the UK context in ways that 
serve to mark individuals as subjects of a sectarian discursive social logic.  
 
This accumulation of physical and semiotic signs (often a combination of dress, speech, 
name, ethnic or cultural origin, demeanour, etc.) is reminiscent of what Burton, in the 
context of Northern Ireland, dubs “telling”: “a system of signs by which religion [and 
sectarian] ascription is arrived at in practical settings” (Burton, 1979: 62). In this sense, 
dressing, speaking, or acting in a certain way can be sufficient to “mark” an individual as 
either “Sunni” or “Shi’a” within a sectarian logic of mutual exclusivity (as in the quip 
marking the wearing of black and shedding of tears as specifically “Shi’a” traits). While 
some signifiers may stem from inherent differences between Shi’ism and other branches 
                                                             
149 This style of hijab is closely associated with the Iranian Revolution, and is most often worn by 
very devout or orthodox (often older) Shi’a women, especially those who support Khomeini or 
the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih; the younger generation tend to be more flexible and creative in 
the ways they wear the hijab, just as in Sunni communities. It should be noted that this 
unidimensional view of Shi’ism within certain parts of the Sunni community is reflected in some 
Shi’a circles through similar restrictive and non-nuanced visions of Sunnism (for example, that all 
Sunnis are Wahhabis or support ISIS); together, the prevalence of such stereotyping and 
typecasting no doubt contributes to the ongoing divisive and sectarian discourse between the two 
communities. 
150 Informal conversation with YH, 12 January 2015. 
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of Islam (such as the Shi’a style of praying with the hands by the sides, as illustrated in 
the Salbi quote), others form part of a wider socio-symbolic system of meaning that 
works to construct mutually-intelligible categories of “Shi’aness” through the inscription 
of material objects and commodities – whether that be the consumption and display of 
specific “Shi’a objects”, or specific patterns of behaviour that work to mark individuals 
as “Shi’a” and simultaneously define the boundaries of the Shi’a subject being articulated. 
 
Shi’a Objects: Between Piety and Minority Representation 
At the present moment, there is a wide variety of objects and commodities that work to 
mark individuals within the diaspora as belonging to the specific religious and sectarian 
community of “Shi’ism”. These can vary from religious objects – such as symbols 
associated with the Ahl al-Bayt, sacred memorabilia and objects of prayer – to specific 
forms of dress and style – such as the wearing of black and green, Iranian-style chadors, 
and garments associated with the mourning rituals of Muharram. While many of these 
symbols have historically been associated with the beliefs and practices of Shi’is, they 
have come to take on a new significance in the diasporic context of multicultural London 
where Shi’is of different ethnic and national backgrounds have increasingly come 
together under the mutually-constructed identity category of “Shi’aness”.  
 
The consumption and display of such Shi’a objects within the diasporic context 
contributes to shaping the discursive contours of the diasporic Shi’a subject while 
simultaneously signifying that subject as invested both in forms of religious piety and in 
concepts of minority representation. To be recognisably and intelligibly “Shi’a” in 
multicultural London requires the differentiation of Shi’a objects both from secular or 
non-religious objects and from “Muslim” objects more broadly. In this sense, the marking 
of “Shi’a identity” though objectification in the diasporic context necessarily involves the 
projection of a particularistic and religiously-inflected iteration of “Shi’aness” in order to 
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distinguish this particular identity category from other kinds of religious or community 
belonging. Moreover, as discussed earlier in the thesis, the social and political context of 
multicultural Britain has created a discursive field in which the assertion of difference is 
increasingly seen as an a claim towards minority identity and representation. For 
individual practicing Shi’is, the kinds of subjective identifications available within such a 
discursive hegemony are thus necessarily geared towards the assertion of a Shi’a-
specific minority identity predicated on difference and religiosity that works to produce 
the sectarianised Shi’a subject within the diasporic imaginary.  
 
One example of the use of ritual objects to proscribe and project a particular and 
religiously-inscribed articulation of Shi’a identity is an unofficial campaign I witnessed 
by a university ABSoc to have a collection of turbas151 permanently installed in the multi-
faith prayer room on campus. The idea was first floated at one of the society meetings in 
October 2014, with people citing the impracticality of having to carry their own turbas 
with them and arguing for the need to have Shi’ism “represented” on campus. However, 
there was also a considerable amount of scepticism and resistance, as people remarked 
on previous negative experiences of having similar religious items “desecrated”. As one 
young man affirmed: 
 
For someone who has had his [turbas] deliberately stepped on,152 not to mention 
had posters ripped up and left-handed handshakes, I for one suggest you don’t 
leave any turbas unaccompanied in the male prayer room, as I would rather it not 
be desecrated. (Author fieldnotes, 8 October 2014) 
                                                             
151 A turba (pl. turab – though here I am using the Anglicised plural turbas as this is reflective of 
the usage by the majority of my research participants) is a small piece of baked earth or clay 
(those made of the earth of Karbala being the most sacred) used by Shi’a Muslims during prayer. 
The turba represents something clean and natural, and can be substituted in most Shi’a schools 
by a piece of paper or other natural material. 
152 For a turba to be stepped on constitutes an act of desecration because it is considered a sacred 
object by some Shi’a (though this itself is disputed among different Shi’a schools). 
 260 
 
Eventually, it was decided that a small number of plain,153 non-Karbala turbas would be 
placed in the male prayer room and monitored. One person even shared a picture of the 
turbas on the society’s Whatsapp group to show that they had been successfully installed. 
However, at the following meeting, the topic surfaced again as it was revealed that of the 
original five turbas that had been placed in the prayer room, only three remained; the 
implication being that they had been intentionally taken as an act of sabotage by what 
one person called “Wahhabis” and “anti-Shi’a” members of the university Islamic society. 
The next day, an ABSoc member posted a picture on the society’s Whatsapp group 
showing the following note they had written and placed in the men’s prayer room: 
 
We kindly request that you stop stealing the Turbah [sic] from this place of 
worship. They are considered sacred154 by a sizeable Muslim minority and should 
be respected.  
 




                                                             
153 Some turbas are inscribed with the names of the Ahlulbayt. This itself is an object of contention, 
with one of my research participants remarking that: “We’re praying to Allah, why are the Imams’ 
names on any turba… It’s ridiculous” (Author fieldnotes, 10 October 2014). 
154 As mentioned above, not all Shi’is consider turbas to be sacred; rather, they simply represent 
something natural and “pure” on which to pray (and can be replaced by any other natural object). 
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Fig. 6 – “Allah sees all”  
Source: Author’s fieldnotes, 11 October 2014. 
 
This incident is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, it indicates that the turbas in 
this context do not simply signify ritual objects of prayer, they also represent the beliefs 
and, most importantly, presence of “a sizeable Muslim minority” within the context of a 
multi-faith prayer room in multicultural London. In this sense, the turbas have become a 
statement regarding the existence and rights of the Shi’a minority in the UK; not only are 
Shi’is understood to have the right to display their religious objects in a multi-faith 
location, this right is seen as a significant act of representation and self-determination 
(such language is itself reflective of the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” explored in the 
previous chapter). Secondly, the transformation of the turbas from ritual object to claim 
for minority representation points to the increasing objectification and commodification 
of Shi’ism as a minority religious identity. This is especially true in light of the fact that  
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the use of turbas is not required in Shi’a doctrine, and indeed may be substituted by any 
natural object during prayer. As one Iraqi Shi’i who grew up in Syria remarked: 
 
I remember in Syria, when we used to go and pray in the mosque, my father 
would tell us to look for the straw matting at the edge of the carpets, or a piece 
of paper, or even to just pray on top of our fingernails. Since Syria was majority 
Sunni, we didn’t want to draw attention to the fact that we were Shi’a.155  
 
In this sense, the insistence of the ABSoc members on installing turbas in the prayer room 
can be understood not just as a commitment to religious observance, but as a visible and 
public display of their minority (Shi’a) status through the use of objects. Here the object 
(turba) comes to stand in for the very practice of Shi’a observance it is intended to 
represent; the very act of placing the turbas in the prayer room thus becoming an act of 
Shi’a faith and identity over and above the turbas’ practical use as objects to facilitate 
prayer.  
 
Moreover, Shi’a objects such as turbas do not simply serve to represent the rights and 
status of Shi’i minorities within the UK context, they also serve to embed the 
representation of Shi’a identity within a global system of symbolic capital and ethno-
religious commodification. Turbas themselves are commodities that can be bought and 
sold on the market; indeed, the monetary and symbolic value of any individual turba 
stems not just from its status as a ritual object, but also from the circumstances 
surrounding its acquisition. For example, turbas bought in Karbala or other holy Shi’a 
sites and inscribed with the name of Imam Hussain or Ali are seen to be of greater “value” 
than those which are plain or have been bought in other non-sacred locations. Indeed, 
during a pilgrimage trip to Iran in June 2015, I was surprised to see Z, a 24-year-old 
                                                             
155 Author interview with Abu M, 2 April 2017. 
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Canadian-born Iraqi Shi’a, bring her own turba to pray in the Fatima Ma’asouma mosque 
in Qom (where there are hundreds, if not thousands, of turbas available throughout the 
shrine). When questioned, she told me that she had bought this particular turba in Imam 
Ali’s shrine in Najaf, and therefore she considered it to be more “holy” than the plain 
turbas on offer at the mosque.  
 
Such perceptions contribute to a “market” for turbas, in which those sold at locations 
considered to be more “sacred” (such as the holy shrines in Iraq and Iran) are sold for 
higher values than those elsewhere. In Mashhad, for example, I was specifically told not 
to buy any turbas from the stalls along the street leading to the Imam Reza shrine, since 
they would be more expensive than those sold in Tehran or elsewhere. This 
differentiated market for turbas thus works to render such ritual objects as “Shi’a 
commodities”; objects whose acquisition serves to mark the owner as visibly and 
identifiably “Shi’a” within a recognisable semiotic system of meaning and that, moreover, 
serves to differentiate different practicing Shi’is based on the associated “value” and 
status of the turbas that they buy and display. As Navaro-Yashin remarks in the context 
of secularist and Islamist markets in modern Turkey: “A politics of identity [has] become 
a politics over symbols in the context of consumerism” (Navaro-Yashin, 2001: 110). The 
turbas, as commodities, have themselves thus come to represent the very Shi’a identity 
that they are being made to stand in for. 
 
The acquisition and presentation of various kinds of tubas thus works not only to mark 
the individual using them as “Shi’a”, the differentiated value of those turbas seen as more 
“sacred” (and therefore more expensive) also functions as a way to represent status 
amongst Shi’is themselves – whether by signalling particular individuals as more “pious” 
than others (for example in carrying their own “sacred” turba with them), or as of a 
higher socio-economic status (in indicating that they have the funds to be able to afford 
 264 
their own personal turba rather than use the communal ones provided by the mosque). 
In this sense, the notion of “being Shi’a” has come to be represented through the 
commodification and consumption of religious objects. This is hardly something new in 
Shi’a religious tradition; indeed, the entire concept of “Shi’aness” (as of any other ethno-
religious identity) has been objectified and commodified throughout history through 
association with the iconography of the Ahl al-Bayt and the symbolic event of the Battle 
of Karbala (and later with the Iranian Revolution). As Pinto states: 
 
The process of mass production is a central element in the “cultural biography” 
of the Shi’i religious imagery, as it objectifies and homogenises it as a 
commodity that can be evaluated in the the transactions of the market… The 
objectification of the various meanings and values condensed in the dominant 
symbols of the Shi’i tradition and their codification in images or objects make 
these meanings and values more explicit and conscious to the faithful. (Pinto, 
2007: 118) 
 
Such Shi’a commodities are not limited to ritual objects such as turbas, 156  but also 
encompass other visible markers of Shi’a-specific identity such as displaying images and 
iconography associated with the Ahl al-Bayt, the wearing of religious garments such as 
certain styles of hijab or yashmagh, the green scarves worn by Sayyids (descendants of 
the Prophet Muhammad), and the sporting of Shi’a-specific fashion items. It is this last 
category that I wish to explore in the following section, especially when it comes to the 
way in which Shi’a fashion is being used and displayed in the contemporary diasporic 
context.  
                                                             
156  Other examples of such religious objects include sibha (prayer beads, often made out of 
precious gems or stones for added value), rings and jewellery inscribed with the names of the 
Ahlulbayt or in the shape of the saif Ali (the two-pronged sword carried by Imam Ali), posters 
depicting Imam Hussain or Imam Ali, etc.  
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Shi’a Fashion: “My Heart Beats Hussain” 
There are a number of visible signals, most notably through styles of dress and fashion, 
that can serve to mark an individual as recognisably “Shi’a” within a wider socio-
symbolic discursive field. Shi’a scholars, for example, traditionally wear long robes and 
either white or black turbans (depending on whether or not they are Sayyids), while non-
scholarly Sayyids (in particular merchants in Baghdad’s shorja souq) traditionally would 
have worn a red tarbush157 wrapped with a green cloth (this latter tradition was phased 
out under Saddam’s regime, as it served as a recognisable marker of Shi’a identity; 
although during the course of my research I came across a campaign by a young British-
born Iraqi Shi’i who was attempting to instigate a campaign to bring this particular 
garment back into fashion within the Shi’a community in London). Shi’a women also have 
the option of different styles of hijab (if they choose to wear it), with the wearing of 
Iranian-style chadors and veils covering the chin as a way of demonstrating both 
religious and political commitment to the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih. Hijabs can also be 
used to reflect the relative piety and socio-economic status of the wearer, with more 
conservative and older women tending to opt for muted colours and simple fabrics while 
many fashion-conscious younger women often choose to match the colour and style of 
their hijab to their outfit; similarly, synthetic or simple cotton hijabs can convey a 
different socio-economic status than more expensive fabrics such as silk or merino wool 
(Deeb, 2011; Navaro-Yashin, 2001, 2002). In this way, dress not only serves to mark 
individuals out as members of the Shi’a sect, but can also be used to differentiate both 
between different schools of Shi’a thought and between individuals of different 
academic, socio-economic, and religious status.  
 
                                                             
157 A type of hat, comparable to the North-African fez. 
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Other Shi’a-specific fashion items, beyond the wearing of black and green during 
Muharram, include the display of wearable symbols of religious iconography, such as 
jewellery inscribed with the names of the Ahl al-Bayt or in the shape of the saif Ali (the 
two-pronged sword carried by Imam Ali), and rings made from precious stones believed 
to have particular powers. These symbols tap into the rich history of Shi’a mythology and 
iconography (in particular the myths surrounding the Battle of Karbala), and serve as 
visible markers of “Shi’a identity”. For example, during a pilgrimage tour of Iran in June 
2015 I recall Z, the same Canadian-born Iraqi woman who brought her own turba to the 
Fatima Ma’asouma shrine, and who had recently relocated to Najaf showing me a small 
tattoo of the saif Ali she had on her wrist and remarking that: “I don’t do taqiyyah.158 My 
mum was so mad when I got it because if ISIS catch me I’m dead” (Author fieldnotes, 8 
June 2015). The fact that this young woman chose to physically and permanently inscribe 
a marker of her Shi’a identity onto her skin can be understood as a move towards 
minority self-determination and a positive affirmation of sectarian identity; albeit one 
couched in consumerist terms (after all, a tattoo is still a commodity that also serves as 
a marker of a particular social status and is associated with particular tropes 
surrounding alternative youth identity and rebellion against authority).  
 
Along with such religious iconography, there is also a growing market for Shi’a fashion 
items that draw on and reflect the changing lifestyles of contemporary Shi’is in the 
diaspora. For example, it is now possible to buy iPhone and iPad covers depicting images 
of Shi’a shrines, or inscribed with Shi’a religious messages, as well as hoodies and t-shirts 
that declare “My Heart Beats Hussain” (complete with ECG heartbeat), or Imam Hussain 
                                                             
158 Taqiyyah is the practice of dissimulation by which Shi’a Muslims do not publically declare their 
sectarian affiliation. Although there is a considerable amount of scholarly debate around the 
practice, it is generally thought to originate from the first days of Shi’ism’s inception and 
developed as a self-protection strategy for Shi’is throughout history who found themselves as a 
(sometimes persecuted) minority. 
 267 
wristbands and armbands inscribed with the words: “What Do I Stand For?” (akin to the 






















Fig. 7 – “What Do I Stand For?” smartphone cases for sale at the 2014 Imam Hussain 












Fig. 8 – “My Heart Beats Hussain” hoodie.  
Source: www.theislamicstore.org, accessed 14 August 2017. 
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Through the consumption and display of such items, practicing Shi’is in the diaspora can 
visibly mark their bodies as recognisably and definably Shi’a at the same time as they 
make certain statements about their lifestyle and fashion choices within the context of 
global consumer capitalism (such as owning an iPhone, or wearing a “cool” hoodie). In 
this sense, “Shi’aness” has become a consumable object in its own right, a product of the 
same market forces that differentiate and define the different lifestyles and identities to 
which individuals wish to ascribe through processes of commodification and 
consumption. Just as the symbolic and affective resonance of the turbas described above 
came to reside in their inscription in a recognisably “Shi’a” register of piety and religious 
minority self-determination within the context of multicultural London, so too do objects 
such as Shi’a iPhone cases and hoodies come to be consumed and coveted in their own 
right within the global diasporic context, rather than for any inherent element of 
religiosity or spirituality.  
 
Indeed, many more conservative and older practicing Shi’is told me that they 
disapproved of this move towards the commodification and conspicuous consumption 
of Shi’a fashion items (most often, though not exclusively, by the younger generation); 
one woman even remarked that: “The shabab [youth], they don’t understand what it 
means to be Shi’a, they’re just interested in fashion. They take religion by the arse.”159 On 
the other hand, many of those who engage in such conspicuous consumption of Shi’a 
objects arguably do so precisely because they believe that such items serve to enhance 
their religiosity or spirituality, thus signalling the hegemonic power of consumer 
capitalism in the contemporary world through the internalisation of market forces 
productive of the contemporary Shi’a subject. 
 
                                                             
159 Informal conversation with Um Zainab, November 2014. 
 269 
In this sense, the commodification and consumption of “Shi’a objects” has resulted in the 
fetishisation of Shi’ism itself (at least in the diaspora), in which “Shi’a identity” has 
become an object to be bought and sold on the market in the same manner as the 
commodities through which it comes to find expression. Moreover, this move towards 
the fetishisation of Shi’ism mirrors the way in which consumer capitalism works to 
produce and segment market identities that can be sold to consumers through the 
conspicuous consumption of goods (Appadurai, 1994; Billig, 1999; Navaro-Yashin et al., 
2002; Žižek, 2005; among others). In the context of contemporary consumer capitalism, 
which works to package and market identities to consumers through the objectification 
of identity, specific ways of being visibly and intelligibly “Shi’a” are thus rendered 
commodities to be bought and displayed in the same manner as other forms of 
conspicuous belonging. This is not to claim that such conspicuous consumption is the 
only way to be “Shi’a” in the contemporary world (indeed, many pious and conservative 
Shi’is would argue the opposite), but that the commodification of “Shi’aness” as a 
minority ethno-religious category is part of the wider global market for identities that is 
productive of the sectarianised and diasporic Shi’a subject under investigation here. As 
one of my research participants commented: “Religion is a way to control people. It’s a 
marketing tool, a brand.”160 
 
Buying Spirituality: The “Shi’a Industry” 
Along with such objective markers of commodified “Shi’a identity”, there is also an 
increasing number of activities, goods, and services specifically marked as “Shi’a” within 
the diasporic context that together form the basis of what Spellman-Poots calls the “Shi’a 
industry” (Spellman-Poots, forthcoming 2017.). For example, practicing Shi’is are able to 
fulfil their religious commitment to charitable action by donating to Shi’a-run charities 
such as the Al-Ayn Foundation, the Iraqi Children’s Aid and Repair Endeavour (ICARE), 
                                                             
160 Informal conversation with Abu D, 30 October 2015 (Author fieldnotes) 
 270 
the Imam Hussain Blood Donation Campaign (an offshoot of the Islamic Unity Society 
and affiliated to the NHS) and the “Who Is Hussain?” campaign, most of which have links 
to the Shi’a religious establishment. 161  Such charitable donations are undertaken in 
addition to the annual khums tax (literally “one fifth”), whereby practicing Shi’is donate 
one fifth of their disposable income to the marja’iyya to be distributed to the poor and 
needy.162 In the diasporic context, the khums is usually handled by the representatives of 
maraji’ such as the Al-Khoei Foundation (Ayatollah Sistani), Islamic Centre of England 
(Ayatollah Khamenei), and the Imam Ali Foundation (Ayatollah Sistani). Indeed, the 
global channelling of money and resources through the khums makes up a significant 
part of the annual income of the marja’iyya, and has attracted a considerable amount of 
controversy regarding accusations of corruption and embezzlement (Cockburn, 2008; 
Cole, 2002; Corboz, 2014; Mallat, 1988; Skocpol, 1982; Walbridge, 2001). A forum thread 
on the ShiaChat website entitled “Enquiry in Khums Accounts of Marjas”, for example, 
lists account figures from the Al-Khoei Foundation in London from 2008 in which the 
total income from khums was declared as £5,447, and draws the following conclusion: 
 
This is implausible. Where did the money go after being donated and then 
accounted for as just £5,447… We've been had boys, we've been made fools of… 
There is a massive gap between accounted khums and amount which is likely to 
have been actually donated, a staggering discrepancy in fact.163 
 
 
                                                             
161 The Al-Ayn Foundation, for example, has a statement on its website declaring that “since its 
establishment, Al-Ayn has enjoyed the support and blessings of the Supreme Religious Authority 
Grand Ayatollah Al-Sayyid Ali Al-Hussaini Al-Sistani”, the highest religious authority in Shi’a 
Islam; while the website of the Imam Hussain Blood Donation campaign includes quotes from 
various Shi’a scholars outlining the religious importance of giving blood. 
162 The khums is unique to Shi’ism, and is paid in addition to the charitable zakat tax required in 
Islam. 
163  Source: http://www.shiachat.com/forum/topic/234970661-enquiry-into-khums-accounts-
of-marjas/?page=4, accessed 9 April 2017 
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Indeed, a number of my research participants expressed similar scepticism regarding 
the khums, with at least one interviewee commenting that it was “an easy way for them 
[the marja’iyya] to get rich”.164 There have also been cases where scholars have been 
exposed to have been embezzling funds collected via the khums. Despite such 
controversies, however, the vast majority of practicing Shi’is in the diaspora continue to 
donate one fifth of their disposable annual income to their marja’ of choice. In this sense, 
the practice of khums serves not only to reinforce the clerical authority of the marja’iyya 
and the religious establishment, it inscribes individual Shi’is within a market for religious 
goods and services that replicates the logic of neoliberal capitalism. 
 
Pilgrimage (ziyara) represents yet another way for practicing Shi’is to demonstrate their 
commitment to their religious identity through the acquisition of services. Such demand 
has spawned a marketplace of Shi’a-run travel companies and organisations specialising 
in facilitating the logistical practicalities of travel to the shrine cities of Iraq, Iran, and 
Saudi Arabia. In London alone, for example, companies offer clients a variety of different 
services, from organising youth pilgrimage trips (such as the Al-Asr Foundation, Islamic 
Unity Society, AIM, and HB Travel), individual travel and visa assistance (Safir Travel, 
Spiritual Journeys), and package tours, often for specific events such as Ashura, Arbaeen, 
Umra, and Hajj (Misbah Ul Hoda Tours, Al-Amdaar, Ziyarats.co.uk, Al-Mehdi Tours, and 
Haj and Umra Travel Ltd, to name but a few).  
 
Such segmentation of the pilgrimage market reflects the varying requirements and 
preferences of Shi’is wishing to undertake such journeys, and replicates the logic of 
supply and demand inherent in neoliberal capitalism (cf. Pinto, 2007). Moreover, the 
practice of pilgrimage itself, which involves transfers of large numbers of people and 
resources across international borders, contributes to the ongoing commodification of 
                                                             
164 Informal conversation with Abu M. 
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Shi’a ethno-religious identity through its reliance on the expanding market for religious 
goods and objects. As Pinto notes: 
 
The experiential character of pilgrimage entices the demand for objects and 
images that can embody the memory of the emotions and sensations produced by 
the physical and symbolic activities connected to pilgrimage, such as travelling, 
performing rituals, and being in contact with sacred object and beings. The 
production of such objects and images leads to the commoditisation of the 
religious tradition, enhancing the circulation and diffusion of the symbols, 
practices, and even doctrines thus objectified. (Pinto, 2007: 110) 
 
For example, during a pilgrimage trip to Iran in 2015, the group I was with were charged 
USD 50 each to receive a meal directly from the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad (a service 
that used to be provided free of charge, presumably before the income opportunity was 
realised). When I questioned the steepness of the price tag, I was told that it was worth 
it, since eating the food would give me “baraka” (blessings). Indeed, several of the girls 
on the trip dried and saved pieces of the bread we were given to take back to their 
families in the UK in the same way that they bought religious items such as prayer beads 
and turbas as keepsakes. In the context of pilgrimage, then, even food can become a 
desirable commodity to be bought and sold as a symbolic pathway towards salvation. 
 
From the above, we can see how the global “Shi’a industry”, where Shi’a objects, goods, 
and services are bought, sold, and exchanged within the global marketplace, is 
undergirded by a moral economy of consumption that works to construct and objectify 
a diasporic “Shi’a identity” predicated on spirituality, piety, emancipation, and minority 
representation (akin to the discourse of “Shi’a Rights”). In this sense, the identity 
category “Shi’a” that is available to diasporans can be understood both as a discursive 
semiotic system and as a product of symbolic and material manufacture. To assert a 
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“Shi’a identity” within the diasporic context is thus to actively identify with the Shi’a 
subject both as an articulatory place-holder and as an ethno-religious subject within the 
global market for identities. Such an act of identification can only make sense within a 
pre-existing social and discursive system whereby the concept of “otherness” can serve 
both as a marker of difference and as a marketable product of diversity. It is precisely 
this dual process that is fulfilled by neoliberal capitalism. As Žižek argues: 
 
This ever-growing flowering of groups and sub-groups in their hybrid and fluid, 
shifting identities, each insisting on the right to assert a specific way of life and/or 
culture, this incessant diversification, is possible and thinkable only against the 
background of capitalist globalisation; it is the very way capitalist globalisation 
affects our sense of ethnic and other forms of community belonging: the only link 
connecting these multiple groups is the link of Capital itself, always ready to 
satisfy the specific demands of each group and subgroup… (Žižek, 2000: 209–
210) 
 
The diasporic Shi’a subject is thus (at least partially) a direct product of neoliberal 
capitalism and of the processes of globalisation it facilitates, as well as a discursive 
product of the contemporary diasporic imaginary. Indeed, the very concept of a 
contemporary “Shi’a diaspora”165 as a distinct and coherent entity that encompasses all 
Shi’i individuals – a community that is predominantly marked through ethno-religious, 
not national or cultural affiliation and thus to be differentiated from previous 
formulations of transnational Shi’ism or the “Shi’a international” predicated on the 
religious authority and knowledge of the marja’iyya (Corboz, 2014; Mallat, 1988) – can 
                                                             
165 This is not to say that Shi’a diasporas did not exist prior to the current moment (indeed, as 
outlined in Chapter 2, Shi’ism has often been characterised as a quintessentially transnational 
politico-religious community), but rather that there is something qualitatively different about the 
kind of transnational, trans-ethnic, and commodified Shi’a subject currently being articulated 
within the diasporic imaginary. 
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itself be seen as resulting from the logic of capitalist globalisation. It is only through the 
spread of Shi’a individuals, symbols, objects, goods, and services across international 
borders that any sense of unified and coherent “Shi’a identity” can come to be distilled 
and essentialised from the diverse experiences of the individuals who make up this faith 
community.  
 
Moreover, the way in which capitalism works to essentialise and objectify ethnic, 
religious, and cultural identity categories speaks against any notion of pre-existing or 
primordial identities, since this very primordialism is itself revealed to be a product of 
political and economic forces: 
 
[T]oday’s postmodern ethnic or religious ‘fundamentalism’ and xenophobia are 
not only not ‘regressive’ but, on the contrary, offer the supreme proof of the final 
emancipation of the economic logic of the market from the attachment of the 
ethnic Thing. (Žižek, 2000: 215) 
 
The inscription of the Shi’a subject into the global marketplace not only requires the 
notion of “Shi’a identity” to be reduced to essentialised categories, it also requires the 
creation of a non-Shi’a other against which this identity can come to be defined. It is for 
this reason that the capitalist Shi’a subject can also be understood as a sectarianised 
subject, since the assertion of a specific “Shi’a identity” involves an implicit and necessary 
differentiation from individuals and groups deemed to be “non-Shi’a”, whether that be 
non-Muslims, Sunnis, Wahhabis, or society as a whole. In the contemporary diasporic 
context, saturated by the global logic of supply and demand and undergirded by 
discourses of emancipation and minority rights, the commodified Shi’a subject is by 
definition a sectarian subject, since it involves the assertion of a narrowly-defined ethno-
religious identity over and above all others.  
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Shi’ism 2.0: Religion in the Digital Age 
While the above section focused on the material inscription of “Shi’a identity” within 
contemporary capitalist modes of production and consumption, here I wish to focus 
instead on the ways in which the virtual world (most notably the Internet and social 
media) functions similarly to construct a “Shi’a public sphere” (cf. Habermas, 1989)166 
productive of the sectarianised Shi’a subject. Such virtual channels, I maintain, form part 
of a wider socio-symbolic discursive field within which notions of “Shi’aness” are 
rendered intelligible through the politics of differentiation and recognition (Bourdieu, 
1979, 1985, 1991; Tilley, 2003). This virtual sphere can be roughly divided into the 
following categories: official religious websites and chatrooms; social media 
(encompassing websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, online video and 
news channels, and individual blogs); and virtual activism. I will explore each of these 
categories briefly in turn to demonstrate the ways in which the conspicuous 
consumption of and participation in virtual ways of “being Shi’a” contribute to the 





Creating Virtual Shi’a Spaces: Piety, Online 
                                                             
166 Although the notion of the “public sphere” is most closely associated with the work of Jürgen 
Habermas, his oeuvre has been criticised by a considerable number of scholars for presenting a 
model of the public sphere that is both partial (Gitlin 1998; Thompson 2003; Ismail 2006; Graham 
and Khosravi 2002) and elitist (Fraser 1991; Çinar 2005). As Keane puts it: “The conventional 
ideal of a unified public sphere…[is] obsolete” (1995:1). However, such debates fall outside of the 




In order to remain relevant and relatable in today’s connected world, most Shi’a scholars 
maintain active websites and chatrooms that facilitate communication between the 
marja’iyya and ordinary practicing Shi’is. For example, the office of Grand Ayatollah al-
Sistani in Najaf, Iraq, runs an official website that serves as a repository of information 
regarding the scholar’s teachings in English, Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, French, Turkish, and 
Azeri.167 As well as offering an archive of Islamic texts and information on various Shi’a 
seminaries around the world, the website also has an interactive Question and Answer 
section where practicing Shi’is can submit personal questions, with the resulting 
answers categorised alphabetically and ranging from topics such as abortion, autopsy, 
bullfighting, cologne, cat hair, divorce, masturbation, organ donation, and tattoos. Along 
with such practical advice, the website also hosts a repository of affiliated institutions 
and charitable organisations to which individuals can donate.  
 
Such official websites offer a way for practicing Shi’is to remain engaged and connected 
to their faith; as well as reinforcing the symbolic and spiritual dominance of the 
marja’iyya in defining and policing the boundaries of what constitutes “Shi’aness”.  
Similarly, chatrooms such as ShiaChat168 offer virtual spaces for practicing Shi’is from 
around the world to come together and engage with each other regarding matters of 
their faith. One of the most popular features of the website is the Guest Lounge, where 
unregistered members can pose questions regarding Shi’ism, Islam, and other topics to 
be answered by the ShiaChat community. As well as providing a way for Shi’is from 
diverse backgrounds to meet and engage with each other on matters of faith and 
religious practice, online communities such as ShiaChat allow Shi’is to reach out to 
people who share similar beliefs and lifestyles as themselves. Indeed, many of my 
younger research participants had made lasting friends via such chatrooms, especially 




in the early 2000s when these websites were most popular. As S, a 21-year-old British-
born Pakistani Shi’a told me: “Oh my God, I was obsessed with ShiaChat! And now it’s 
crazy because everyone knows each other. You can come on a [pilgrimage] trip to Iran 
or Iraq and meet people you were chatting with when you were 13.” (Author fieldnotes, 
8 June 2015).  
 
In this way, these online chatrooms and forums constitute a virtual network of 
likeminded practicing Shi’is who often frequent similar social and religious circles (such 
as the pilgrimage tours, many of which are specifically aimed at youth and run by 
organisations such as Al-Asr and the Islamic Unity Society). Indeed, one young woman 
even told me that she used such forums as a way to find eligible Shi’a men she might 
potentially want to marry – since there was less stigma involved than attempting online 
dating. Rather than simply acting as a virtual Shi’a public sphere, these forums also work 
to mark the individuals who use them as ascribing to a particular form of Shi’a identity; 
one that values piety and religious practice but that is also sees itself as relatively 
progressive and modern. Participation in such chatrooms isn’t merely a form of 
entertainment or passing the time, it is also a way to signal belonging to a virtual 
community of likeminded Shi’is in a way that is mutually intelligible to all involved.  
 
Such virtual Shi’a spaces are thus both reflective and constitutive of a particular way of 
“being Shi’a” within the online world – one that is simultaneously marked by discourses 
of piety and religious observance at the same time as it forms part of the objectification 
and commodification of “Shi’aness” through the segmentation of the global market for 
identities. These virtual communities work to structure the kinds of identification 
available to individuals by bracketing-off corners of the Internet to be defined and 
policed as “Shi’a”. Nevertheless, these remain relatively self-selective and self-referential 
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Shi’a spaces, and do not represent the full diversity of different forms of Shi’a 
identification and practice within the virtual sphere. 
 
Social Media: Performing “Shi’aness” 
If religious websites and chatrooms offer a place for likeminded pious Shi’is to converge 
and discuss issues without input or interference from non-Shi’is, social media more 
broadly – especially platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram – represent a 
virtual space within which a more publically-oriented sense of “Shi’aness” can be 
projected and displayed. With their focus on external audience, social media “frequently 
employ exhibitions, such as lists of status updates and sets of photos, alongside 
situational activities, such as chatting” (Hogan, 2010: 377) whereby individuals promote 
and define their identity through practices that constitute a performative “presentation 
of self” (ibid). Significantly, however, the kinds of identity performatively rendered 
through such practices are already prescribed and constrained by the socio-symbolic 
discursive field in which they are articulated. For example, performative iterations of 
“Shi’aness” function, through social media, to simultaneously police and define the 
contours of the Shi’a subject as discursively rendered in the virtual world. Social media 
thus represent a publically visible way for individuals to code their belonging to different 
in-groups through recognisable patterns of performative action that, in turn, come to be 
consumed and reproduced by others. In this way, social media can be understood as an 
extension of commodified identities, whereby individuals and groups “increasingly code 
their personal politics through personal lifestyle values… [that] echo across the porous 
boundaries of product and political advertising” (Bennet, 2012: 22).  
 
Of course, the types of identities enacted through social media are not limited to those 
defined by ethno-religious affiliation; but it is possible to trace the ways in which the 
contours of a Shi’a-specific identity are being performatively defined through the use of 
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such platforms. One way practicing Shi’is demonstrate their commitment to their 
religion, for example, is by posting images of themselves undertaking pilgrimage to the 
holy shrines in Iraq and Iran, often accompanied by descriptions outlining the 
individual’s spiritual journey and emotional attachment to the Ahl al-Bayt and Shi’ism 
more broadly. Individuals also frequently make use of the “About” section on sites such 
as Facebook to demonstrate their belonging to an (ethno-)religious community. For 
example, K, a 24-year-old British-born Iraqi Shi’i has listed her place of origin as “Najaf, 
Iraq” on her Facebook profile, despite the fact that she has never lived outside the UK. By 
defining herself not just as Iraqi, but specifically as coming from the holy shrine city of 
Najaf, K is discursively placing herself within the boundaries of a Shi’a-specific ethno-
religious identity that, in turn, works to performatively produce the Shi’a subject with 
which she is identifying.  
 
Social media thus present a way for Shi’is to both demonstrate their personal belonging 
and identification with “being Shi’a”, as well as to publically define and promote what 
being Shi’a means within the contemporary moment. Moreover, such networks are also 
used to police the boundaries of acceptable behaviour and define the division between 
in-group (Shi’a) and out-group (most frequently Sunni Muslims seen as “anti-Shi’a”). 
Take the following altercation between L, a young British Shi’a, and Z, a British Sunni 
Muslim, which resulted from a Facebook post by the latter linking to an article about the 
















Fig. 9 – “Shi’a Militias Are the Real Threat”. Source: Facebook (accessed 3 April 2017) 
 
This post resulted in L deciding to “unfriend” Z, but only after posting the following 
(public) message: 
 
AoA [Angle of Attack], I am deleting you from my Facebook as you are 
consistently posting anti-Shi’a lies and propaganda. I am also tired of the 
garbage that is shared on my timeline (generally by you) from Zakir Naik and 
Bilal Phillips.169 We all have our views and I think you have failed to respect 
that. Have a nice life. (Author fieldnotes, January 2016) 
 
Through this exchange, both young women are articulating mutually exclusive sectarian 
identities that serve to mark them as belonging to a particular in-group. Moreover, by 
publically denouncing Z and accusing her of spreading “anti-Shi’a lies and propaganda”, 
L is making a claim regarding the place and status of Shi’a minorities at the same time as 
this claim works to effectively police the boundaries of what this Shi’a identity 
constitutes. The discursive and sectarianised Shi’a subject constructed by this exchange 
                                                             
169 Both Naik and Phillips are Sunni preachers who have been banned from the UK for harbouring 
“extremist views” and “sympathising with terrorism”. 
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is one that prioritises representation and recognition, at the expense of coexistence and 
freedom of speech. Rather than simply accepting that people might hold opinions that 
differ considerably from her own, L refuses to further engage with Z or to acknowledge 
the potential nuances of the political situation in Iraq and instead chooses to exclude her 
from any further debate. In the act of attempting to defend what she perceives to be a 
threat to her understanding of “Shi’aness”, L has effectively constructed her Shi’a identity 
in opposition to Z’s Sunni one. In this way, “Shi’aness” comes to be defined as an 
oppositional and defensive identity.  
 
A similar sentiment regarding anti-Shi’a “discrimination” by certain Sunni factions was 
echoed by S, a young Shi’a student, who posted on the public Facebook page “Banned at 
[University]” with the following comment: 
 
Just have to rant. The amount of Shi’a hate is astounding at [University]. The 
Sunni groups view those who support the Ahlulbayt as some kind of monsters 
and refuse to acknowledge the hatred that is spewed from the mouths of groups 
like the MSA [Muslim Students’ Association] or the Palestinian society… I am 
constantly attacked just for pointing out that there is a real streak of 
discrimination in Palestine for the Shi’a. (Source: Facebook, accessed 12 
February 2016) 
 
Such statements serve to construct the terms of the debate, and work to performatively 
construct Shi’ism as a politically-salient identity category invested in the discourse of 
equality and minority rights. Again, a nuanced political context (in this case, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict) is selectively used to demonstrate the marginalisation and 




While social media sites thus offer practicing Shi’is a way to actively engage in and exhibit 
their commitment to a Shi’a-specific identity, other channels offer a more passive form 
of media consumption aimed at the Shi’a market. Examples of these kinds of media 
include online video channels such as Ahlulbayt TV and Safeer TV, which host videos on 
religious and lifestyle topics, as well as interviews with leading Shi’a religious and 
societal figures. As well as this, many hussainiyyat in the UK offer online video streaming 
services of religious events, particularly during Muharram. Such media represent a way 
for practicing Shi’is to consume information and advice regarding what it means to be 
Shi’a, and are thus involved in the production of the pious Shi’a subject with which 
individuals are able to identify. While most of these channels are run on a charitable 
basis, they demonstrate the breadth and diversity of the Shi’a-specific online market, 
suggesting that individuals are looking to consume forms of media that reflect and 
replicate the kinds of identities they wish to affirm for themselves. 
 
Finally, individual blogs function in a similar way to social media by offering practicing 
Shi’is a virtual platform via which to define and promote their self-ascribed identity. 
Examples of blog posts that are actively involved in constructing and portraying a 
specific kind of Shi’a subject (often through recourse to the “coming-out” discourse 
discussed in Chapter 4) include “Proud to be Shi’a”, 170  “My Proud Shi’a”, 171  “Shi’a 
Muslem” [sic]172 and “I am Shi’a”.173 While this list only represents a small sample of the 
kinds of blogs written and run by Shi’is around the world, it demonstrates the way in 
which the notion of “Shi’a identity” has become a recognisable discursive trope that can 
be performatively enacted by individuals via the replication of specific linguistic and 






visual paradigms (such as posting images of the shrine cities, promoting Shi’a religious 
events such as Muharram and Ashura, or quoting aphorisms attributed to the Ahl al-
Bayt) that serve to mark them as distinguishably and recognisably “Shi’a”.  
 
In this sense, blogs, just as other forms of online media, act as a virtual market for 
identities, in which particular patterns of behaviour and consumption come to 
performatively construct the category of “Shi’aness” in a way that reflects the 
fetishisation and commodification of the Shi’a subject through the accumulation and 
possession of Shi’a-specific objects and commodities (in this case, virtual and symbolic 
objects). Within the context of the postmodern contemporary era, the divisions between 
online and offline lives have become increasingly blurred to the extent to which identity 
performances come to be replicated across multiple platforms simultaneously (Bennett, 
2012) and individuals are able to mark their belonging to a particular identity category 
through recognisable patterns of consumption and display that transcend the 
boundaries between “real” and “virtual” worlds. It is through such patterns of 
performance and articulation that the contours of the Shi’a subject come to be defined 
and recognised, which, in turn, allows this “Shi’a identity” to be branded and fetishised 
as a commodity to be bought and sold within the global market 
 
Virtual Activism: Promoting Shi’ism 
As well as such personal displays of Shi’a performative identity, online media are also 
frequently used to engage in collaborative and public-facing campaigns and outreach. 
Indeed, there is an important extent to which Shi’a religious organisations and 
authorities are actively encouraging practicing Shi’is to make use of such channels to 
promote the visibility of Shi’a minorities worldwide and to make specific claims about 
the rights and representation of these minorities. For example, in a blog post entitled 
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“Islamic propagation in the age of new media” posted on the (UK-based) AIM website, 
the author argues that: 
 
Even if someone is a minority within a minority,174 a well planned and executed 
social media campaign can propel them to a position in which their reach can go 
beyond what was previously possible, or even available, with very little initial 
expenditure. Previously to reach a large audience, one way to go about it would 
be to host a channel on the UK’s biggest satellite channel provider. That would 
set one back half a million pounds annually before even spending a penny on the 
creation of content let alone marketing and other expenses. However, social media 
has the potential to reach millions all over the world at a fraction of the cost.175 
 
The power of social media to “spread the message” of Shi’a Islam was recently 
exemplified by Ayatollah Khamenei, the current religious leader of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, who in January 2015 posted a series of messages on Twitter which formed part 
of an open letter addressed to “the Youth in Europe and North America” and encouraging 
them not to “miss the opportunity to gain proper, correct and unbiased understanding 
of Islam”: 
 
I address you, the youth, not because I disregard your parents; rather, it is because 
I see the future of your peoples and nations to lie in your hands and the quest for 
truth to be more alive and conscious in your hearts.176 
 
                                                             
174 A reference to Shi’a minorities in the UK and West more broadly. 
175 Source: http://www.aimislam.com/islamic-propagation-in-the-age-of-new-media/, accessed 
22 July 2017. 
176  Source: http://www.aimislam.com/ayatollah-khamenei-writes-letter-to-the-youth-of-the-
west/, accessed 22 July 2017. 
 285 
While Khamenei’s letter specifically referred to “Islam” without delineating different 
sects, the use of social media by such a prominent (and controversial) Shi’a political and 
clerical figure is indicative of the way in which virtual media is increasingly being used 
as a way to promote specific political and religious visions of Islam (and Shi’a Islam in 
particular). Such cases form part of a wider network of social media and online activism 
via which both individual practicing Shi’is and Shi’a organisations and institutions can 
discursively produce and circulate specific understandings of what it means to be “(a 
good) Shi’a”. For example, in October 2014 I was sent a round-robin Whatsapp message 
from Mehdi, a young Iraqi Shi’a student encouraging all his contacts to spread the word 
regarding potential upcoming media coverage of the Camp Speicher massacre in Iraq: 
 
The editor of Channel 4 News, tomorrow morning, will look at the stories they’ve 
put out and determine what the most important to cover is. One of them is the 
story of a survivor from Camp Speicher. Let’s show Channel 4 how important the 
slaughter of Shi’a by ISIS is tonight by Watching and Sharing [sic] the Camp 
Speicher report all over your networks on Twitter, FB [Facebook], and Whatsapp 
before tomorrow morning. 
 
It’s not often the massacre of innocent Shi’as is shown on the news. Let’s show 
them that Shi’a blood is as precious as any other. Let’s get sharing, viewing, 
tweeting, and commenting. (Author’s fieldnotes, October 2014) 
 
This particular message exemplifies the ways in which the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” 
explored in the previous chapter is being articulated and circulated within the virtual 
public sphere in ways that promote particular ways of doing an envisaging “Shi’aness” 
that is similarly founded on a Shi’a-specific ethics of victimhood and emancipation.   
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While the above example represents grassroots community activism enacted through 
personal networks, there are also a significant number of organisations and campaigns 
that make use of similar channels that work together to discursively produce the 
contours of the Shi’a subject as articulated within the virtual world. In the previous 
chapter, I touched upon social media campaigns such as International Shi’a Day 
(exemplified by the hashtag #612ShiaDay) and #Anti-Shiism run by Shi’a Rights Watch, 
but there is another significant and influential campaign that I have yet to explore in 
detail: that of “Who is Hussain?” 
 
The “Who is Hussain?” campaign was started in 2012 by a group of young Shi’is in 
London from various ethno-national backgrounds and began as a way “to inspire people 
through the timeless example of Hussain and bring positive change in the world we live 
in.”177 Currently, the organisation is active in 27 countries worldwide, and uses a mixture 
of social media, online activism, and public awareness campaigns to promote the 
message of Imam Hussain in the name of a “common humanity” and “shared human 
understanding”. As one of the organisations’ founding members asserted in an online 
interview published on The Muslim Vibe: 
 
Hussain was a paragon of peace, justice, compassion, and morality… Hussain was 
a great leader and a tremendous visionary. Whilst he, his family members, and his 
companions were threatened and later slain, Hussain always had the end goal in 
mind: a more equitable society, one without an immoral and oppressive tyrant at 
the helm.178 
 
                                                             
177 Source: https://whoisHussain.org/the-organisation/about-us/, accessed 22 July 2017. 
178 Source: https://themuslimvibe.com/featured/behind-who-is-Hussain, accessed 22 July 2017. 
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The language and imagery here is evocative of the Karbala paradigm, and replicates the 
ethically-inflected discourse of “Shi’a Rights” to discursively produce a vision of Shi’a 
Islam that sees it as part of a wider global movement towards justice, equality, and 
morality. In this sense, the “Who is Hussain?” campaign can be seen as part of a wider 
socio-symbolic discursive field – both on- and off-line – that works to promote particular 
iterations of “Shi’aness” invested in the ethical imperative to “be (a) good (Shi’a)”. 
 
Such forms of virtual activism thus represent specific ways of being and doing “Shi’aness” 
that are reflective of the politics of difference and recognition with a wider socially-
constructed system of meaning. These specific iterations of “Shi’aness” are implicitly 
predicated on the construction of a non-Shi’a other and thus work to unconsciously 
sectarianise the Shi’a subject thus articulated. Moreover, this Shi’s subject functions, 
within the virtual “Shi’a public sphere” as a kind of ethno-commodity (cf. Comaroff and 
Comaroff, 2009) to be produced, displayed, and consumed within the online 
environment. In this sense, the virtual production of “Shi’aness” should be seen as an 
extension of, and not separate to, the workings of neoliberal consumer capitalism when 
it comes to to commodification and objectification of identity. 
 
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, I have exemplified the ways in which the notion of a specific 
“Shi’a identity” has been manufactured, commodified, consumed, and exchanged 
through the workings of consumer capitalism. Such processes have provided the 
discursive and material scaffolding for the emergence of a socio-symbolic Shi’a subject 
that combines tropes of Shi’a victimhood and ethics with a claim for Shi’a minority 
representation and visibility within the diasporic imaginary. The rise of globalised 
modes of commodification and identity fetishism, in which both individual and group 
identities are increasingly being constructed as objectified “goods” to be bought and sold 
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on the global market, has thus arguably contributed to the sectarianisation of the Shi’a 
subject through the cultivation of clear in- and out-group boundaries, and has led to an 
essentialisation and fetishisation of the identity category “Shi’a”. 
 
While the focus of the chapter has been on the patterns of production and consumption 
encountered within the diasporic Shi’a imaginary – whether through the cultivation and 
display of material Shi’a objects or the virtual performance of “Shi’a identity” through 
the Internet and social media – the argument here should not be understood as a claim 
towards the subjective understandings or orientation of individuals as much as the 
collective and social articulation of what it means to be “Shi’a” in the contemporary 
context. In other words, the subject of this chapter – and of the thesis as a whole – is not 
individual practicing Shi’is themselves, but the production, articulation, performance, 
and dissemination of the discursive Shi’a subject that is enacted through the ensemble 
of such individual behaviours. The Shi’a subject is primarily a product of socially-
embedded lived reality, and works to shape the kinds of subjective identifications and 
attachments available to individuals, but it remains both analytically and conceptually 
distinct from the individuals who express it and instead sheds light on the wider 
workings of discursive and hegemonic power within the contemporary world. 
 
In this way, the diasporic Shi’a subject whose emergence was traced in chapters 1-4 has 
come to be inscribed within contemporary modes of material and discursive power 
through the workings of the global market. The shift from national to ethno-religious 
forms of identification, and the discursive construction and policing of the Shi’a subject 
through mechanisms of production and consumption, should therefore be seen as a 
logical outcome of the contemporary world in which it is being articulated, and not as a 
throwback to a primordial or essentialised sectarian “essence”. The sectarianisation of 
the Shi’a subject is thus a necessary and inescapable by-product of the articulation of an 
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increasingly specific “Shi’a identity” predicated on the contemporary politics of 
difference and recognition; an insight that serves to unsettle the binary normative logic 
of the received wisdom that sees sectarianism as an unquestionably “bad thing” and to 
open up further questions about the potential repercussions of similar minority ethnic 









Throughout this thesis, I have traced the emergence of what I call the sectarianised Shi’a 
diasporic subject as a discursive construction cultivated and articulated across multiple 
contexts. In particular, I have been concerned with demonstrating how the 
sectarianisation of this subject takes place as an unconscious product of identity-
formation, and is tied in with the contemporary discursive ideological power structures 
of capitalism, (neo)liberalism, humanitarianism, and minority rights, as well as arising 
as a result of the specificities of the diasporic experience itself. Each of the five 
substantive chapters has focused on one particular element of Shi’a ethno-religious 
subject formation within the contemporary diasporic context – thus offering five fleeting 
snapshots of the sectarianised Shi’a subject that together build a more cohesive, albeit 
still partial, understanding of the various discursive forces and power structures 
working to produce this subject within the current moment.  
 
Here, I would like to draw together the various thematic and empirical threads of the 
preceding chapters in order to demonstrate that they not only form contiguous parts of 
a more substantive whole, but that they represent overlapping and mutually supportive 
elements with regards to the formation of the sectarianised diasporic Shi’a subject. In 
particular, I wish to tease out the concepts of discourse, identity, ideology, and 
unconscious running throughout the thesis in order to demonstrate how the various 
articulations and manifestations of the Shi’a subject as encountered through the 
empirical material presented in each chapter are representative of the differential (and 
unconscious) (re)production of sectarianism within the diasporic context. While the 
focus of this thesis has primarily been on the construction of an emerging and 
sectarianised Shi’a subject within the discursive diasporic imaginary – and the practices 
of identification that work to sustain this subject – it is also necessary to acknowledge 
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the various ways in which individuals may seek to challenge, reinterpret, reimagine, or 
alter this subject through (re)iterative practices of identification and dis-identification. 
Although space limitations have prevented me from thoroughly exploring such a line of 
inquiry throughout the thesis as a whole, it would be impossible to conclude such a 
theoretical and empirical project without at least touching on this aspect of identity 
formation. 
 
Finally, I set out possible avenues worthy of investigation if this research project were to 
be augmented further. One of the greatest challenges of researching and writing a 
doctoral thesis is the process of selection and refinement that necessarily requires the 
discarding, or at least sidelining, of large amounts of rich empirical data in order to 
produce a cohesive and structured argument. In the final part of this conclusion, I explore 
some of the alternative themes that emerged throughout my fieldwork regarding the role 
and function of the sectarianised diasporic Shi’a subject – including the implications this 
subject has regarding issues such as gender, minority Muslim identities in the West, and 
diasporic mobilisation. 
 
Discourse and Identity: Producing the Shi’a Subject 
While there are multiple ways to identify as “Shi’a” or to articulate and perform 
attachments to particular manifestations of “Shi’aness”, this thesis has been 
fundamentally preoccupied with documenting the emergence of one specific form of 
Shi’a identity construction as encountered throughout the research process – the 
identity construction I have called the sectarianised diasporic Shi’a subject. This subject 
should be understood as a fundamentally discursive construction, conceptually and 
analytically separate from the individuals who (may or may not) choose to identify with 
it. This analytical distinction between the Shi’a subject as the subject of discourse and 
individual Shi’is themselves draws on insights from Lacanian psychoanalysis and critical 
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discourse analysis and is ultimately crucial to the theoretical and empirical argument of 
the thesis as a whole. Specifically, adopting such a theoretical framework has allowed me 
to make claims about the content, structure, and political implications of the Shi’a 
diasporic subject without assuming that every single practicing Shi’i in the diaspora – or 
indeed every one of my research participants – approaches or articulates this subject in 
the same way. Rather, the collective ensemble of individual articulations and practices 
should be understood as a palimpsest of discursive architecture undergirding the socio-
symbolic construction of what it means to be “Shi’a” in the contemporary world. 
 
Neither do I claim that the sectarianised diasporic Shi’a subject whose discursive 
production I explore throughout the thesis is the only contemporary manifestation of 
Shi’a ethno-politico-religious identity within the diaspora – or even that it is the most 
relevant or important to my research subjects. Instead, the discussion of the thesis 
should be seen as arising from my personal and theoretical puzzlement with the kinds of 
identity articulations I encountered during the research process, and which spoke of an 
emergent sense of Shi’a-specific identity construction as yet to be adequately explored 
within the literature on Shi’ism or Muslim minorities more broadly. In particular, the 
discursive construction of “Shi’ism” and “Shi’aness” as categories in and of themselves 
went against many of my initial assumptions regarding the structure and content of Shi’a 
identity articulations by Iraqi Shi’is in the diaspora, where I expected notions of Shi’a 
religious belonging to be tempered by, and potentially secondary to, identifications with 
“Iraqi” national or ethno-cultural origin (or even to notions of a broader “British Muslim” 
identity). The argument of this thesis thus emerged as a result of my own attempts to 
make sense of the kinds of material encountered within the field, and in particular to 
understand the ways in which particularistic and sectarianised constructions of Shi’a-




In order to understand the political and social origins of the emergent Shi’a diasporic 
subject, the thesis began with an exploration of the historical and psychic architecture 
underpinning Iraqi Shi’a migration to the UK, and in particular on the enduring legacy of 
the traumatic and melancholic experience of exile and displacement experienced by 
these individuals under Saddam Hussain’s Ba’th regime. The combined effect of the 
discursive and physical marginalisation of Iraqi Shi’is under the structurally sectarian 
Ba’th regime, coupled with the nostalgia of exile and the discursive rupture produced by 
the US-led invasion of 2003 and ensuing sectarian violence, thus undergirded a shift 
away from nationalistic and towards ethno-sectarian forms of belonging (whether 
symbolically or in terms of mobilisation towards the homeland). In this sense, the 
discursive underpinnings of the emergent sectarianised diasporic Shi’a subject can be 
seen to (at least partially) originate from the domestic social and political context of Iraq 
itself, as well as in the very experience of exile and displacement productive of the Iraqi 
Shi’a diaspora in the first place. 
 
Although the historical context of the Ba’th regime and the sectarian violence of post-
2003 Iraq thus emerge as significant constitutive elements of the sectarianised diasporic 
(Iraqi-)Shi’a subject, the discursive production of this subject as a fundamentally ethno-
religious alignment not predicated on a specific national or cultural origin would equally 
not have been possible without the reliance on pre-existing understandings of Shi’a 
theology and political mythology. Unlike most other minority religious identities, Shi’ism 
has arguably been built upon a discursive foundation of victimhood and marginalisation 
(Dabashi, 2011) that has been cultivated and maintained through the transnational 
influence of the clerical establishment and the tradition of the marja’ al-taqlid with its 
emphasis on idealised piety and religious observance. Moreover, the politicisation of 
Shi’a religious mythology and practice throughout the latter half of the twentieth century 
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(most notably as a result of the Iranian Islamic revolution, although reinterpretations of 
Shi’a traditions along political lines predated the rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini), 
provided a rich politico-religious architecture onto which contemporary articulations of 
the Shi’a subject could be mapped.  
 
In this way, politicised articulations of Shi’a ethno-religious identity predated the 
emergence of the sectarianised Shi’a subject within the contemporary  diasporic context, 
and provided a pre-existing discursive template onto which contemporary grievances 
and political claims could be transposed. In particular, the affective and emotive 
resonance of the Karbala paradigm can be seen as underscoring the current emergence 
of the Shi’a subject within the diasporic imaginary – especially in relation to the militant 
Sunni Islamist group ISIS – within a sectarian narrative logic that constructs Shi’is as 
eternal victims and (radical) Sunnis as eternal oppressors. This discursive othering of 
certain interpretations of Sunni Islam presented as “radical” or “extremist” also feeds 
into contemporary Western discourses regarding the problematisation and 
securitisation of Islam (and especially Muslim minorities in Britain, Europe, and the US) 
that works to frame Shi’is as qualitatively different from their Sunni counterparts.  
 
The narrative production of Shi’a victimhood – beginning with the Battle of Karbala and 
extending through the marginalisation of Shi’is under Saddam Hussain all the way to the 
current persecution of Shi’a minorities across the Islamic world by militant Sunni groups 
such as ISIS – thus works to discursively produce a seemingly coherent notion of Shi’a 
ethno-religious identity. This “Shi’a identity”, on the one hand, draws together various 
historical, theological, mythological, and political strands within Shi’ism itself and, on the 
other, mirrors contemporary Western discourses regarding (certain forms of) Sunni 
Islam. While the former of these elements can be seen as a product of multiple and 
divergent political and discursive forces over time, the latter fusing of Western 
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discourses of Islamophobia and sectarianised iterations of the Sunni Other, I maintain, 
has emerged as a direct result of the diasporic encounter between Shi’ism as a 
historically-produced politico-religious discursive identity construction and the political 
and social realities of the contemporary British domestic context productive of the 
diasporic imaginary. 179  In particular, the British government’s implementation of 
multiculturalism policies founded on a logic of ethnonormativity, along with the 
securitisation of Islam through programmes such as Prevent, have facilitated the 
construction of a Shi’a ethno-religious identity formation defined in opposition to the 
(perceived) negative public conceptions of (Sunni) Islam. In other words, the 
sectarianisation of the Shi’a ethno-religious subject is a discursive product of the 
diasporic experience itself, and central to the production of Shi’a identity within the 
contemporary diasporic imaginary. 
 
As well as providing the discursive underpinnings for the cultivation of a Shi’a-specific 
ethno-religious identity construction, the material reality of the diaspora has also 
arguably formed a crucial role in shaping this subject as a transnational and trans-ethic 
articulation of Shi’a belonging. In particular, the encounter between Shi’is from divergent 
national and cultural backgrounds within the shared space of multicultural London has 
been significant in distilling a collective sense of “British Shi’a” identity. This is especially 
true in the second- and third-generation of British born diasporans who increasingly 
harbour little emotive or affective attachment to the “homeland” of their parents’ and 
grandparents’ generations and instead see their Shi’a ethno-religious identity to be 
compatible with, and not contrary to, their understandings of what it means to be British. 
                                                             
179 This thesis has focused primarily on the British domestic context as productive of the diasporic 
Shi’a subject. However, it would be interesting to investigate the extent to which the particular 
construction of this subject as explored here is translatable across different Western contexts. For 
example, might it be possible to speak of a European Shi’a diasporic subject, or a North American 
Shi’a subject? Although space limitations prevent me from undertaking such an investigation 
here, this might be a productive avenue for further research. 
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Moreover, the physical carving-up of different neighbourhoods within the urban fabric 
of London into “ethnic enclaves” (cf. Metcalf, 1996) has plausibly led to the 
sectarianisation of space whereby individuals hailing from different branches of Islam 
inhabit different loci within the city despite often living in close proximity to each other. 
In this sense, the domestic context of Britain – and London in particular – represent 
divergent aspects of the discursive production of the diasporic and sectarianised Shi’a 
subject as lived and experienced within the contemporary moment. 
 
In this way, chapters 1-3 traced the production of the diasporic Shi’a subject across time 
and contexts, and as the result of multiple and divergent discursive, political, social, 
material, and theological forces. Deepening the investigation, the final two chapters of 
the thesis explored the ways in which this subject has been inscribed into the various 
hegemonic political projects of the contemporary world firstly through the 
internalisation of modern liberal discourses of humanitarianism, minority 
representation, and human rights, and secondly via the commodification of Shi’a identity 
via entry to the global market. It is these final processes that point towards the 
emergence of the diasporic Shi’a subject as an ideological construction and, crucially, 
undergird this subject’s unconscious (re)production of sectarianism through the 
cultivation of particular identity attachments via the workings of ideological fantasy and 
ethical subject formation. This is the second thematic thread I wish to draw out as a way 
of concluding my discussion of the discursive production of the sectarianised diasporic 
Shi’a subject engaged throughout the thesis; and in particular the theoretical and 
analytical implications of such an approach when it comes to the conceptualisation and 
study of sectarianism as a political phenomenon. 
 
Ideology and Unconscious: Sectarianising the Shi’a Subject 
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In the Introduction, I argued that the discursive production of the diasporic Shi’a subject 
is fundamentally an ideological construction, one that is simultaneously invested in 
channelling individuals’ desire for collective belonging at the same time as it is reflective 
of the wider ideological forces of hegemonic neoliberalism and consumer capitalism. 
While the ideological functioning of the Shi’a subject has not always been explicitly 
stated at every juncture, it nevertheless represents an implicit and significant structuring 
theme running throughout the thesis that works to explain the ways in which individuals 
become attached to, internalise, and articulate the contours of this subject. In particular, 
the foregrounding of the role of ideological fantasy in producing and sustaining specific 
manifestations of the Shi’a subject within the diasporic imaginary has allowed me to 
articulate an alternative theorisation of sectarianism that eschews the essentialism of 
primordialist accounts and the anti-human reductionism of poststructural theory in 
order to conceptualise sectarianism as the unconscious by-product of identity formation. 
 
Moreover, it is as a result of the ideological contours underpinning the various 
manifestations of the diasporic Shi’a subject that transforms our understanding of this 
subject from a mere discursive formation to a thoroughly political phenomenon, invested 
and complicit in the hegemonic power structures of the contemporary world. While 
notions of ethno-religious “Shi’aness” have arguably existed at least since the Battle of 
Karbala in the ninth century, it is only within the contemporary moment – and as a result 
of the diasporic encounter between pre-existing politicised understandings of Shi’ism 
and Western liberal hegemonic norms such as “equality”, “justice”, and “minority rights” 
– that the Shi’a subject, articulated as an ethical imperative to “be (a) good (Shi’a)” has 
been able to emerge as a contingent and ideological attempt to construct a cohesive 
“Shi’a identity” in a fluid and mobile world. 
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The streamlining and policing of “Shi’a identity” inherent in ideological constructions of 
the Shi’a subject thus form part of a wider global movement towards the increasing 
specificity of ethnic, religious, cultural, and racial identity categories that are themselves 
ideological products of the current global political order predicated on consumer 
capitalism and the segmentation of the market (Alcoff et al., 2006; Reich et al., 1973; 
Wedel and Kamakura, 2012). Consumer capitalism works, at least in part, to channel the 
desires of individuals towards the acquisition of particular consumable commodities at 
the same time as it reifies and fetishises specific forms of ethnic, religious, and cultural 
identities as a result of their representation through such commodities. The logic of 
supply and demand that underlies the global market can only continue to operate if 
“suppliers deliberately fragment demand curves into smaller segments through 
contrived product differentiation” (Dickson and Ginter, 1987: 2). In this way, both 
consumers and products become increasingly differentiated in ways that (re)produce 
particular kinds of identity iterations predicated on the consumption of specific goods 
and services (for example, wearing a “My Heart Beats Hussain” hoodie to identify oneself 
as recognisably “Shi’a”). 
 
Moreover, the trend towards the increasing diversification of both social identities and 
the consumable products that represent them forms part of the ideological political logic 
of  the postmodern age. As Žižek makes clear: 
 
The postmodern identity politics of particular (ethnic, sexual, etc.) lifestyles 
perfectly fits with the depoliticised notion of society, in which every particular 
group is “accounted for”, has its specific status (of victim) acknowledged through 
affirmative action or other measures destined to guarantee social justice… This is 
politics proper: the moment in which a particular demand is not simply part of the 
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negotiation of interests but starts to function as the metaphoric condensation of 
the global restructuring of the entire social space. (Žižek, 2000: 208) 
 
In this sense, discursive formations of Shi’a-specific demands at recognition and 
minority rights (such as “Shi’a Rights”, “anti-Shi’ism”, “Shi’aphobia” and “Shi’a pride”) do 
not merely represent attempts to articulate the Shi’a subject itself, they are part of a 
wider move from the particular to the universal that is ideologically grounded in the 
liberal humanitarian discourses of consumer capitalism (Alonso, 1994; Comaroff and 
Comaroff, 2009; Laclau, 1994; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Žižek, 2000, 2005). This 
inscription of the Shi’a subject into contemporary ideologies of secularism, 
humanitarianism, minority representation, human rights, and capitalism thus not only 
binds individuals to specific iterations of what it means to be “Shi’a” through the 
workings of ideological fantasy and the manipulation of the desire to “belong”, it also 
works to paper over the discursive instability at the heart of the Shi’a subject and is 
productive of unconscious attachments to sectarianism through the foregrounding of 
Shi’a specificity, exceptionalism, and victimhood.  
 
Sectarianism, under this reading, thus emerges as an unconscious by-product of Shi’a 
specific identity formation as structured by the ideological workings of liberal hegemony 
and consumer capitalism within the contemporary context. It is worth reiterating at this 
juncture that my employment of the term “sectarianism” throughout this thesis is 
fundamentally descriptive, and not normative, and relates to the fact that the production 
of any minority ethno-religious identity is necessarily sectarian since it involves the 
discursive construction of an in-group and an out-group predicated on the denigration 
of the Other. Here, therefore, Shi’a sectarianism is not understood as stemming from any 
kind of eternal antagonism with Sunni Islam, or even as primarily resulting from 
contemporary socio-political grievances that are productive of a sectarianised social 
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reality or manipulated by sectarian entrepreneurs for personal gain. Rather, 
sectarianism arises unconsciously and inescapably (as a result of its complicity in 
ideological fantasy) from attempts to articulate a Shi’a-specific identity construction as 
one particular form of minority belonging within the context of the global “flowering of 
difference” (Bartholomeusz and De Silva, 1998: 157). 
 
Arguably, it is only as a result of the diasporic experience, whereby Shi’a minorities from 
diverse national and cultural backgrounds have come together under the communal 
category of “Shi’aness” constructed as a minority ethno-religious identity within the 
Western context (recall the formulation of Shi’is being “a minority within a minority”) 
that specific (sectarianised) articulations of the transnational and trans-ethnic diasporic 
Shi’a subject have gained social and political significance. In this way, the (unconscious) 
sectarianisation of the diasporic Shi’a subject is primarily a modern phenomenon, 
reflective of contemporary power structures and ideological formations.  
 
However, it would be reductive to assume that because contemporary manifestations of 
the (sectarianised) diasporic Shi’a subject are embedded in wider discursive and 
ideological power structures that this subject represents either a cohesive system of 
identity production for individuals seeking to express a collective notion of “Shi’aness”, 
or indeed a linear or one-directional process of identity formation in which individuals 
are required to identify with the sectarianised Shi’a subject in order to articulate their 
sense of “Shi’a identity”. Rather, it is important to acknowledge the dialectical, dynamic, 
(re)iterative and potentially transformative processes of identity formation as 
differentially produced through discourse and practice. On a theoretical level, the 
foregrounding of a Lacanian-inspired approach to identity throughout the thesis opens 
up space for the exercise of individual agency when it comes to the potential emergence 
of alternative iterations of the Shi’a subject across time and contexts. 
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Beyond Identity Formation: Challenging the Shi’a Subject 
Since the primary focus of this thesis has been on tracing the development of one 
particular articulation of the diasporic Shi’a subject within the contemporary discursive 
imaginary, and the implications this subject has regarding manifestations of Shi’a 
sectarianism, I have necessarily prioritised the kinds of discursive formations and 
subjective expressions that point to the production of this subject as a Shi’a-specific 
identity category. While this focus is reflective of the overarching trends that emerged 
from the empirical data garnered in the field, no single study can claim to represent a 
holistic picture of the social world – indeed, the process of research itself is by its very 
nature partial, fragmentary, subjective, iterative, and fundamentally contingent 
(Andrews et al., 9781; Bott, 2010; Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002; Kapiszewski et al., 2015; 
Lincoln and Denzin, 2003; Savage, 2013; Soss, 2006). For this reason, I feel it necessary 
to highlight the fact that the study presented here represents only one particular 
manifestation of the diasporic Shi’a subject, and that there may well be multiple 
alternative or contradictory articulations that are currently emerging within the 
diasporic imaginary. 
 
Due to the inherent lack at the heart of every identity construction – including that of the 
Shi’a subject – any attempt by the individual to identify with the discursive subject is 
necessarily incomplete, and precipitates an eternal process of identification and re-
identification in an attempt to paper over the lack at the heart of the subject (Glynos, 
2001; Howarth et al., 2000; Lacan, 2002; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Stavrakakis, 2002). 
This active practice of (re)identification not only foregrounds the role of individual 
agency in producing discursive identity constructions, it also harbours a transformative 
potential through the (re)iterative nature of such a process. Indeed, within the Derridean 
notion of iterability, “there can be no repetition without alteration, and vice versa” 
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(Thomassen, 2010: 47). In other words, the instability at the heart of the Shi’a subject 
precipitates an ongoing and constant need for individuals to (re)articulate and 
(re)identify with this subject, but the iterability of these very acts of identification can 
also result in subtly different articulations of the subject – thus resulting in a 
proliferation of multiple “Shi’a subjects” across time and space.  
 
Indeed, for many of my research participants, their attachment to the sectarianised 
diasporic Shi’a subject whose contours I have traced throughout this thesis changed and 
shifted over time and in relation to the socio-political environment in which they found 
themselves. Just as this subject itself has developed through engagement with the 
Ba’thist regime in Iraq, the experience of migration and exile, the transnational influence 
of the clerical establishment, the politicisation of Shi’a religious mythology, and 
contemporary global ideologies of liberal humanitarianism and consumer capitalism, so 
too have individuals’ understandings and articulations of this subject changed across 
contexts and in relation to the ideological and discursive power structures in which it is 
being articulated. What it meant to be “Shi’a” in Iraq during the 1980s, or in London 
during the 1990s, or indeed in the Middle East today, is qualitatively different from what 
it means to be “Shi’a” as a minority ethno-religious identity formation within the 
contemporary diasporic imaginary. It is for this reason that the sectarianised diasporic 
Shi’a subject explored here should be understood as a thoroughly modern subject, since 
it is both a product, and a (partial) reflection of the contemporary world. 
 
Neither has this thesis sought to address the ways in which non-practicing or secular 
Shi’is might differentially identify (or, significantly, dis-identify) with the sectarianised 
Shi’a subject under investigation here. As one of my (non-religious) research 
participants noted ruefully in relation to his family’s increasing investment in particular 
ways of being and doing “Shi’aness” that  he saw as antagonistic to alternative Muslim 
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identities: “This isn’t the way I was brought up. We used to have lots of Sunni friends and 
neighbours. Now, my family are becoming more and more sectarian.” 180  While this 
particular example involves an individual who explicitly refuses to identify with any kind 
of iteration of the Shi’a subject, it is my contention that every process of identification 
(and re-identification) necessarily harbours the potential for similar kinds of refusal or 
disavowal (albeit to various different extents). As Muñoz highlights: 
 
Identification is not about simple mimesis… Identifying with an object, 
person, lifestyle, history, political ideology, religious orientation, and so on, 
means also simultaneously and partially counteridentifying, as well as only 
partially identifying, with different aspects of the social and psychic world. 
(Muñoz, 1999: 8) 
 
It is for this reason that it is important to maintain a conceptual and analytical distance 
between individual practicing Shi’is (and the kinds of identifications and dis-
identifications they perform within different contexts and at different moments in time), 
and the discursively constructed, ideologically-invested Shi’a subject with which these 
individuals can choose to identify and which produces sectarianism as its unconscious 
by-product. Although articulations of the latter are only available through the 
performative practices of the former, neither should be seen as reducible to the other 
but rather as being engaged in a mutually reinforcing participatory identity politics 
reflective of the specific moment in time in which the Shi’a subject is articulated.  
 
This thesis thus represents an in-depth study of one particular iteration of the diasporic 
Shi’a subject (and of the unconscious forms of sectarianism it produces) at the particular 
historical and socio-political moment of writing. A similar study conducted at a different 
                                                             
180 Informal conversation with Abu M, February 2015. 
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point in time might well reveal very different ways of being and performing “Shi’aness” 
which would, themselves, be reflective of the particular discursive, political, and 
ideological forces at work within that specific historical moment. 
 
Possible Further Directions 
The five substantive chapters of this thesis have focused on five different aspects of 
subject formation productive of the sectarianised diasporic Shi’a subject: the symbolic 
significance of “Iraq” across time and contexts and the shift away from nationalistic 
towards ethno-sectarian forms of belonging (Chapter 1); the theological, mythological, 
and political underpinnings of what it means to be “Shi’a” in the contemporary world 
(Chapter 2); the material reality of diaspora and the significance of the British domestic 
political and social context (Chapter 3); the influence of global liberal humanitarian 
norms in shaping the contours of the Shi’a subject through the discourse of “Shi’a Rights” 
(Chapter 4); and the commodification of the Shi’a subject through its inscription within 
the global market for identities (Chapter 5). However, this is not to claim that these five 
aspects represent the only forms of subject formation productive of the sectarianised 
Shi’a subject within the contemporary diasporic imaginary; rather, they represent five 
significant themes that emerged out of the empirical data garnered in the field and which 
together are able to account for various historical, political, theological, affective, and 
ideological forces in which this subject is invested.  
 
Nevertheless, there remain a number of other themes and trends that also emerged 
throughout the research process and that represent potential avenues of further 
research. In particular, the issues of gender, minority Muslim identities in the West, and 
diasporic mobilisation all represent interesting (if less fundamental) aspects in the 
contemporary production, articulation, and performances of the diasporic Shi’a subject. 
For example, while gender was not something that emerged particularly strongly during 
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my fieldwork (or rather, was often superceded by other elements), it nevertheless 
represents a potential factor regarding the ways in which individuals cultivate, sustain, 
and engage with their understanding of what it means to be “Shi’a” in the contemporary 
diasporic imaginary. This is especially the case when it comes to the apparent paradox 
between the cultivation of female piety and submission through the promotion of 
religious practices such as hijab and gender segregation and the increasing visibility and 
significance of Shi’a women in public spaces. This is especially true of younger, British-
born Shi’a women. Conversely, while gender does indeed represent a significant aspect 
of identity formation (Butler, 2011a, 2011b; Deeb, 2011), it emerged less strongly in my 
fieldwork than I originally anticipated, and indeed many of my research participants 
seemed less invested in their understandings of themselves as “Shi’a men” or “Shi’a 
women” as in their attempts to articulate and represent a coherent sense of “Shi’a 
identity” or “British Shi’ism” regardless of the specific gender dynamics within these 
identity constructions.181 
 
While this thesis has focused primarily on the cultivation, and production of the 
sectarianised Shi’a subject within the context of diasporic Britain, there are possible 
questions that could be raised regarding the potential transference of this subject across 
time and space. In particular, the increasing emphasis on a transnational, trans-ethnic, 
and mobile category of “Shi’a identity” I have documented here has potential 
implications for the cultivation of a global Shi’a subject. However, while the possibility of 
a “global Shi’a subject” may represent an interesting future iteration of Shi’a ethno-
religious identity, at the time of writing there remain significant differences in the ways 
in which Shi’ism is lived and experienced in different parts of the world. As van den Bos 
notes, it is currently not possible to speak of “a European Shi’ism defined by significantly 
                                                             
181 Of course, this is not to claim that gender doesn’t hold any implications for the production and 
iteration of the diasporic Shi’a subject, but rather that it did not emerge as one of the primary 
factors I was able to identify from the empirical data garnered in this particular study. 
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transnational or transethnic organisation”, and it is rather “trans-European ties” that 
matter most when it comes to Shi’a activism within the European context (van den Bos, 
2012: 12). Moreover, Shi’a communities in the US are qualitatively different from those 
in the UK or Europe more broadly (Grewal, 2013; Sachedina, 1994; Scharbrodt and 
Shanneik, 2018), as well as facing very different political and social circumstances to 
Shi’a minorities (and majorities) within the Muslim world.  
 
It is for these reasons that I have prioritised one particular iteration of the diasporic Shi’a 
imaginary throughout this thesis – as understood through the prism of the British 
domestic context. Nevertheless, this prioritisation should be seen as a methodological 
and empirical, rather than analytical choice, and does not therefore preclude the 
potential for the cultivation of trans-ethnic and transnational ties that might speak to the 
future emergence of a global Shi’a subject.  
 
Moreover, against the background of rising sectarian violence in the Middle East and 
wider Islamic world – in particular the targeting of Shi’a religious communities in 
countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Senegal Syria, and 
Yemen – as well as the trend of Western-born Muslims travelling to fight in civil conflicts 
in Iraq and Syria, in future it might also be worth inquiring the extent to which 
contemporary articulations of the Shi’a subject are implicated in diasporic mobilisation 
along sectarian lines. Although it is difficult to establish the extent to which the diaspora 
has become materially and psychically invested in the sectarianisation of Iraqi and 
Middle East politics more broadly, it is plausible to argue that the sectarianisation of the 
Shi’a subject in the diasporic imaginary has impacted the kinds of activism Shi’is are 
likely to pursue. Indeed, this is something that has been explored elsewhere, especially 
among first-generation diasporans (Al-Ali, 2007; Al-Khalidi et al., 2007; Al-Khalifa Sharif, 
 307 
2003; Al-Rasheed, 1994; Alkhairo, 2011; Kadhum, 2016; Reidar, 2007), and as such has 
not been the primary focus of this thesis. 
  
Concluding Remarks 
Overall, the thesis has drawn on the case study of the Iraqi Shi’a diaspora in London in 
order to trace the emergence of a sectarianised Shi’a diasporic subject predicated on an 
underlying Shi’a discursive ethics, as well as by universalistic discourses of “equality” 
and “human rights” and hegemonies of global capital that have resulted in the reification 
of particularistic and pseudo-ethnic categories of “Shi’aness”. The production of this 
subject can thus be seen as an ideological formation, one that inscribes and reproduces 
pre-existing notions of neoliberal capitalism and commodified belonging, undergirded 
by an ethical imperative towards universal humanitarianism. Moreover, it is my 
contention that the recent rise of ISIS in the Middle East represents the Other to the 
signifier of “good Shi’a Muslim” that this discourse attempts to construct, and thus serves 
as the suturing point between Western media tropes of “evil Muslims/terrorists” and 
Shi’a historical and political orientations towards sectarianised identifications 
predicated on the negation of (certain forms of) Sunni Islam. In this sense, the merging 
of a Shi’a moral economy with a Western universal humanitarianism (the encounter 
between which takes place in the diasporic space) is undergirded by an ethical 
imperative to “be (a) good (Shi’a)” which nevertheless sustains a particularistic Shi’a 
subject that simultaneously harbours sectarian attachments as the unconscious by-
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